Horowitz et al v. Stewart Title Guaranty Company et al

Filing 39

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART: (1) DEFENDANT FIRST AMERICAN TITLE CO.'S MOTION TO DISMISS "MOTION TO AMEND AS A MATTER OF COURSE [FRCP RULE 15(A)(1)(A)]; AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS" [ECF NO 10 ] FILED ON JANUARY 4, 2017; AND (2) DEFENDANT STEWART TITLE GUARANTY CO.'S MOTION TO DISMISS MOTION TO AMEND AS A MATTER OF COURSE [FRCP RULE 15(A)(1)(A)]; AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES, FILED JANUARY 4, 2017 [DKT. 10 ] re 36 Signed by JUDGE LESLIE E. KOBAYASHI on 06/30/2017. Defendant First American Title Co.'s Motion to Dismiss "Motion to Amend as a Matter of Course [FRCP Rule 15(a)(1)(A)]; Amended Complaint for Damages Against all Defendants" [ECF No 10 ] Filed on January 4, 2017, filed January 17, 2017, is HEREBY GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. It is GRANTED insofar as all of the claims against First American are HEREBY DISMISSED. It is DENIED insofar as the dismis sal is WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Similarly, Defendant Stewart Title Guaranty Co.'s Motion to Dismiss Motion to Amend as a Matter of Course [FRCP Rule 15(a)(1)(A)]; Amended Complaint for Damages, Filed January 4, 2017 [Dkt. 10 ], filed January 20, 2017 , is HEREBY GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. It is GRANTED insofar as all of the claims against Stewart Title are HEREBY DISMISSED. It is DENIED insofar as the dismissal is WITHOUT PREJUDICE. If Plaintiffs choose to file a second amended complaint , they must do so by July 31, 2017, and the second amended complaint must comply with the terms of this Order. (eps, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
LEONARD G. HOROWITZ, an
individual; SHERRI KANE, an
individual; ROYAL BLOODLINE
OF DAVID, a dissolved
corporation sole,

)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
vs.
)
)
STEWART TITLE GUARANTY
)
COMPANY; FIRST AMERICAN TITLE )
CO., and DOES 1 through 50,
)
Inclusive,
)
)
Defendants.
)
_____________________________ )

CIVIL 16-00666 LEK-KJM

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART: (1) DEFENDANT
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE CO.’S MOTION TO DISMISS “MOTION TO
AMEND AS A MATTER OF COURSE [FRCP RULE 15(A)(1)(A)]; AMENDED
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS” [ECF NO 10]
FILED ON JANUARY 4, 2017; AND (2) DEFENDANT STEWART TITLE
GUARANTY CO.’S MOTION TO DISMISS MOTION TO AMEND AS A
MATTER OF COURSE [FRCP RULE 15(A)(1)(A)]; AMENDED
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES, FILED JANUARY 4, 2017 [DKT. 10]
On January 17, 2017, Defendant First American Title Co.
(“First American”) filed a Motion to Dismiss “Motion to Amend as
a Matter of Course [FRCP Rule 15(a)(1)(A)]; Amended Complaint for
Damages Against all Defendants” [ECF No 10] Filed on January 4,
2017 (“First American Motion”).

[Dkt. no. 19.]

On January 20,

2017, Defendant Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (“Stewart Title”)
filed a Motion to Dismiss Motion to Amend as a Matter of Course
[FRCP Rule 15(a)(1)(A)]; Amended Complaint for Damages, Filed

January 4, 2017 [Dkt. 10] (“Stewart Title Motion”).
23.]

[Dkt. no.

On February 27, 2017, pro se Plaintiffs Leonard G. Horowitz

(“Horowitz”), Sherri Kane (“Kane” and collectively “Plaintiffs”),
and the Royal Bloodline of David (“Royal”) filed a memorandum in
opposition to both motions.

[Dkt. no. 29.]

On March 6, 2017,

Stewart Title and First American each filed a reply.
30, 31.]

[Dkt. nos.

The Court finds these matters suitable for disposition

without a hearing pursuant to Rule LR7.2(d) of the Local Rules of
Practice of the United States District Court for the District of
Hawai`i (“Local Rules”).

In an Entering Order filed on April 26,

2017 (“4/26/17 EO”), the Court granted the First American Motion
and the Stewart Title Motion, [dkt. no. 36,] and the instant
Order supersedes the 4/26/17 EO.

The First American Motion and

the Stewart Title Motion are granted in part and denied in part
for the reasons set forth below.
BACKGROUND
On December 21, 2016, Plaintiffs and Royal filed their
Verified Complaint for Damages (“Complaint”).

[Dkt. no. 1.]

On

January 4, 2017, Plaintiffs and Royal filed their Motion to Amend
as a Matter of Course [FRCP Rule 15(a)(1)(A)] (“Motion to
Amend”), and attached their Amended Complaint for Damages
(“Amended Complaint”).

[Dkt. no. 10.]

Because Plaintiffs and

Royal filed the Motion to Amend and Amended Complaint within the
time period provided by Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(A), the
2

magistrate judge concluded that the Motion to Amend was not
necessary and construed the filing as only an Amended Complaint.
[Dkt. no. 11.]
The Amended Complaint is over seventy pages long, not
including exhibits, and includes a long series of purported facts
and other allegations, many of which are not relevant to the
instant motions.

However, because Plaintiffs and Royal are

proceeding pro se, the Court must construe the Amended Complaint,
and any other pleadings, liberally.

See Bernhardt v. Los Angeles

Cty., 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Courts have a duty to
construe pro se pleadings liberally, including pro se motions as
well as complaints.” (some citations omitted) (citing Zichko v.
Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001))).

The Amended

Complaint and the briefs all make repeated reference to a number
of documents.

This Court has explained:

As a general rule, this Court’s scope of review in
considering a motion to dismiss is limited to the
allegations in the complaint. See Daniels-Hall v.
Nat’l Educ. Ass’n., 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir.
2010). “[A] court may consider evidence on which
the complaint necessarily relies if: (1) the
complaint refers to the document; (2) the document
is central to the plaintiff’s claim; and (3) no
party questions the authenticity of the copy
attached to the [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 12(b)(6)
motion.” Id. (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). In addition, the court may
consider documents attached to the complaint and
matters that are subject to judicial notice.
Consideration of any other types of material
requires the court to convert the motion to a
motion for summary judgment. Hawaii Reg’l Council
3

of Carpenters v. Yoshimura, Civ. No. 16-00198 ACKKSC, 2016 WL 4745169, at *2 (D. Hawai`i Sept. 12,
2016) (quoting United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d
903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003)).
Hays v. VDF Futureceuticals, Inc., CIVIL 15-00535 LEK-RLP, 2016
WL 5660395, at *4 (D. Hawai`i Sept. 28, 2016).
The relevant facts in the instant matter are:

Royal is

a ministry that “was formed in 2001 to advance its global
humanitarian mission.”1

[Amended Complaint at pg. 1.]

On

January 15, 2004, Royal acquired a property in Pahoa, Hawai`i
(“the Property”) via Warranty Deed from C. Loran Lee (“Lee”) and
recorded the Warranty Deed with the State of Hawai`i Bureau of
Conveyances (“BOC”).

[Amended Complaint, Aff. of Leonard G.

Horowitz (“Horowitz Aff.”), Exh. 4 at 22-26 (Warranty Deed).2].
Royal financed part of the purchase of the Property with a loan
from Lee, and Royal signed a Promissory Note for $350,000 on
January 15, 2004 (“Note”), and recorded a Mortgage in the BOC the
same day.

[Id. at 27-28 (Promissory Note), 29-44 (Mortgage).]

First American was the escrow agent for Royal’s purchase of the

1

Plaintiffs and Royal also allege that, with regard to the
incidents and property sales at issue in the Amended Complaint,
they worked with Island Title Company (“Island Title”), which was
subsequently bought by First American. [Amended Complaint at pg.
2.] The Court will therefore construe any allegations or
documents to which Island Title is or was a party as referencing
First American.
2

The exhibits attached to the Amended Complaint are
consecutively paginated as a whole, and not by exhibit.
4

Property.

[Amended Complaint at pg. 2.]

Stewart Title provided

title insurance on the Property, and issued the title insurance
policy to Royal for $550,000 on January 23, 2004 (“the Policy”).
[Horowitz Aff., Exh. 1.]
Because of a judgment entered in a separate case, Royal
was instructed to make payments under the Note and Mortgage to
someone aside from Lee starting in 2004.

[Stewart Title Motion,

Decl. of Jenny J.N.A. Nakamoto (“Nakamoto Decl.”), Exh. 5
(Garnishment Order, dated 12/27/2004).]

On May 15, 2009, Lee

assigned the Mortgage to himself as the “Overseer of the Office
of the Overseer, a Corporate Sole and His Successor Over/For the
Popular Assembly of Revitalize, a Gospel of Believers” (“Gospel
of Believers” and “Assignment”).

[Horowitz Aff., Exh. 30.]

Lee

died on June 29, 2009, and Jason Hester (“Hester”), as his
successor, became the Overseer of the Gospel of Believers
(“Overseer”).

See First American Motion, Decl. of Summer H.

Kaiawe (“Kaiawe Decl.”), Exh. C (Quitclaim Deed, dated May 3,
2010 (“5/3/10 Quitclaim Deed”)) at 2; see also Amended Complaint
at pg. 16.

On April 2, 2010, Hester, as Overseer, initiated non-

judicial foreclosure proceedings by filing the Mortagee’s
Affidavit of Foreclosure under Power of Sale with the BOC.
[Kaiawe Decl., Exh. B.]

On April 20, 2010, the Overseer held a

sale by public auction, and the Overseer purchased the Property
for $175,000 and conveyed the Property via a Quitclaim Deed.
5

See 5/3/10 Quitclaim Deed; see also Amended Complaint at pg. 17.
On June 9, 2011, the Overseer conveyed the Property to Hester via
Quitclaim Deed (“6/9/11 Quitclaim Deed”).

[Kaiawe Decl., Exh. D

(6/9/11 Quitclaim Deed); Amended Complaint at pg. 17.]

Finally,

on June 28, 2012, Royal conveyed the Property to Plaintiffs via
Quitclaim Deed (“6/28/12 Quitclaim Deed”).

[Horowitz Aff., Exh.

6.]
Plaintiffs and Royal allege that First American and
Stewart Title “have withdrawn unreasonably, and neglected their
duties,” and “seek compensation for damages of more than $6
million stemming from protracted litigation and the Property’s
wrongful conversion by Lee’s virtual representative, attorney
Sulla, aided-and-abetted by the Defendants alleged negligence and
willful blindness.”

[Amended Complaint at pg. 4.]

Plaintiffs and Royal bring claims for:

To that end,

negligence (“Count I”);

[id. at pg. 20-26;] gross negligence (“Count II”); [id. at
pg. 27-28;] bad faith (“Count III”); [id. at pg. 29-36;] fraud
(“Count IV”); [id. at pg. 37-49;] unfair and deceptive trade
practices, in violation of Haw. Rev. Stat. § 480-2 and Haw. Rev.
Stat. § 481-3(a)(7) (“Count V”); [id. at pg. 50-52;] negligent
infliction of emotional distress (“Count VI”); [id. at pg. 5253;] violation of the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1972(1) (“Count VII”); [id. at pg. 53-55;] tortious
interference with prospective business advantage (“Count VIII”);
6

[id. at pg. 55-59;] breach of fiduciary duty (“Count IX”); [id.
at pg. 59-60;] civil conspiracy (“Count X”); [id. at 61-62;] and
violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (“Count XI”) [id. at pg. 63-72].
DISCUSSION
I.

Horowitz and Kane’s Representation of Royal
Horowitz and Kane bring the instant action pro se, and

purport to also represent Royal.
83.11 states:

[Id. at pg. 1.]

Local Rule

“Business entities, including but not limited to

corporations, partnerships, limited liability partnerships,
limited liability corporations, and community associations,
cannot appear before this court pro se and must be represented by
an attorney.”

This district court has noted that “[t]his Rule

implements established law.”

Quality Prof’l Indus., Inc. v. Sun

Power, CIV. NO. 15-00080 JMS-BMK, 2015 WL 12838142, at *1 (D.
Hawai`i Mar. 19, 2015) (citing Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, 506
U.S. 194, 201-02 (1993) (“It has been the law for the better part
of two centuries . . . that a corporation may appear in the
federal courts only through licensed counsel.”); Taylor v. Knapp,
871 F.2d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The general rule, widely
recognized in federal and state courts, is that a corporation can
appear only through an attorney.”)).

7

Plaintiffs argue that Local Rule 83.11 does not apply
to them because “[a]n ecclesiastical sole corporation is a nonprofit religious group; it is not a business, and not regulated
by LR 83.11.”

[Mem. in Opp. at 33 (emphasis in original).]

Plaintiffs’ argument is simply not true.

The Ninth Circuit has

held that the prohibition on businesses being represented by nonattorneys applies to non-profits and many other types of
entities:
Unincorporated associations, like corporations,
must appear through an attorney; except in
extraordinary circumstances, they cannot be
represented by laypersons. In re Highley, 459
F.2d 554, 555 (9th Cir. 1972) (corporations);
Strong Delivery Ministry Association v. Board of
Appeals of Cook County, 543 F.2d 32, 33-34 (7th
Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (not-for-profit
corporation); Move Organization v. United States
Department of Justice, 555 F. Supp. 684, 693 (E.D.
Pa. 1983) (unincorporated association), and cases
cited therein; The First Amended Foundation v.
Village of Brookfield, 575 F. Supp. 1207, 1207-08
(N.D. Ill. 1983) (unincorporated association).
Church of the New Testament v. United States, 783 F.2d 771, 77374 (9th Cir. 1986).

Plaintiffs fail to cite any authority

allowing them to represent Royal in a pro se capacity.

See Mem.

in Opp. at 30-32 (citing, inter alia, Washington and Hawai`i law
regarding the structure and rights of corporate entities).

Any

claims brought by Royal must therefore be dismissed without
prejudice because it is possible that Royal may find an attorney
to represent it and file a separate action to pursue its claims.
8

II.

Horowitz and Kane’s Individual Claims
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) requires that
[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must
contain:
(1) a short and plain statement of the
grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, unless
the court already has jurisdiction and the
claim needs no new jurisdictional support;
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief; and
(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may
include relief in the alternative or
different types of relief.

Moreover, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007)).

“[T]he

tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations
contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.
Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”

Id.

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955).
The gravamen of the Amended Complaint against First
American and Stewart Title is that First American and/or Stewart
Title harmed Plaintiffs by failing to properly investigate the
title and refusing to defend the Property title.
9

See, e.g.,

Amended Complaint at pgs. 14 (discussing the improper
investigation of the Property’s title history), 16-19 (explaining
the results of the failure to defend the title of the Property).
The Amended Complaint is over seventy pages and consists of
eleven claims.

Plaintiffs, however, do not state to which party

each claim applies.

Instead, they refer to First American and

Stewart Title as if they are one entity.

See, e.g., Amended

Complaint at pgs. 20, 35, 53, 63 (referring to “Stewart/ITC”);
id. at 16, 18, 17, 50 (referring to “Defendants”).

Plaintiffs’

conflation of the entities in this matter is particularly
concerning because Plaintiffs had a different relationship with
each entity.
funds.”

An escrow agent is “a mere conduit to transmit the

Matter of Bishop, Baldwin, Rewald, Dillingham & Wong,

Inc. v. Bank of Hawaii, 69 Haw. 523, 529, 751 P.2d 77, 81 (1988)
(alteration, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted).

In

contrast, “an insurer’s duty to defend its insured is contractual
in nature, [and] we must look to the language of the policy
involved to determine the scope of that duty.”

Sentinel Ins. Co.

v. First Ins. Co. of Haw., 76 Hawai`i 277, 287, 875 P.2d 894, 904
(1994) (citation omitted).
With regard to First American, Plaintiffs do not
dispute that the Commitment for Title Insurance (“the
Commitment”) names Royal as the “Proposed Insured.”
Aff., Exh. 34 (the Commitment).

See Horowitz

Plaintiffs do not explain how
10

they have acquired Royal’s rights under the Commitment.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in the previous section,
Plaintiffs may not bring any claims against First American in
their individual capacities.
With regard to Stewart Title, the Policy names Royal as
the “insured.”

[The Policy at 4.] The Policy defines “insured”

as:
the insured named in Schedule A, and, subject to
any rights or defenses the Company would have had
against the named insured, those who succeed to
the interest of the named insured by operation of
law as distinguished from purchase including, but
not limited to, heirs, distributees, devisees,
survivors, personal representatives, next of kin,
or corporate or fiduciary successors.
[The Policy at ¶ 1(a).]

The Policy also states:

The coverage of this policy shall continue in
force as of Date of Policy in favor of an insured
only so long as the insured retains an estate or
interest in the land, or holds an indebtedness
secured by a purchase money mortgage given by a
purchaser from the insured, or only so long as the
insured shall have liability by reason of
covenants of warranty made by the insured in any
transfer or conveyance of the estate or interest.
This policy shall not continue in force in favor
of any purchaser from the insured of either (i) an
estate or interest in the land, or (ii) an
indebtedness secured by a purchase money mortgage
given to the insured.
[Id. at ¶ 2.]

Royal conveyed the Property to Horowitz and Kane

via the 6/28/12 Quitclaim Deed.
Policy no longer exists.
at 11-12.]

Stewart Title argues that the

[Mem. in Supp. of Stewart Title Motion

Plaintiffs submit that they are still covered by the
11

Policy because “[Horowitz] is the ‘body corporate’ and Kane is
the Scribe.

Both continue to steward or wind up the sole

corporation’s interests as best they can under duress as the
Insureds and victims of Defendants’ torts and crimes.”
Opp. at 30.]

[Mem. in

To the extent that Plaintiffs argue that they have

rights under the Policy because they are “winding up” Royal’s
business, it is clear from the Amended Complaint that Plaintiffs
brought their claims in their individual capacities.

See, e.g.,

Amended Complaint at pg. 0 (stating that the claims are brought
on behalf of Royal, as well as “Plaintiffs’ individual
interests”).

Royal’s claims have been dismissed.

Further,

“winding up” is done on behalf of the corporate entity:
In general, directors may continue in office
during the winding up period for the limited
purpose of liquidating corporate assets and
distributing proceeds to creditors and
shareholders. Some states confer “trustee” status
on directors or others who operate the
corporation, and requires that these trustees act
on behalf of corporate creditors and shareholders.
Where there is some question regarding the ability
of directors to act competently or fairly, a court
may appoint a receiver to take charge of the
corporate assets.
16A Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Corps. § 8157 (2016)
(footnotes omitted).

While Plaintiffs cite to Hawai`i and

Washington statutes to support their position that they have
rights under the Policy, these statutes do not allow Plaintiffs
to act on behalf of a nonprofit religious institution in their

12

individual capacities.

[Mem. in Opp. at 30 (some citations

omitted) (citing Haw. Rev. Stat. § 419-8(4) (“The church, to
administer the affairs, property, and temporalities of which the
corporation was organized, shall stand in the place and stead of
the stockholders, and may be represented in court by an
authorized officers thereof or trustee acting in its behalf[.]”);
Wash. Rev. Code § 24.12.010).]

Any argument that Plaintiffs’

claims as individuals can go forward because they are winding up
the corporation is unavailing.3
Finally, the Overseer foreclosed on the Property and
conveyed it to Hester via the 6/9/11 Quitclaim Deed.

As such,

there is a serious question as to whether or not Plaintiffs had
any interest in the Property at the time they executed the
6/28/12 Quitclaim Deed.

Insofar as Plaintiffs bring the claims

in their individual capacities, they are dismissed.
III. Summary and Application
The Court has dismissed all of the claims in the
Amended Complaint and Plaintiffs may not file claims on behalf of

3

Plaintiffs argue that they were required to assign Royal’s
interest to Horowitz. See Mem. in Opp. at 26; Horowitz Aff.,
Exh. 33 (assignment dated 1/14/04 (“1/14/04 Assignment”)). The
1/14/04 Assignment is unsigned, and Plaintiffs’ claims cannot be
saved by conclusory statements. In addition, Plaintiffs submit
that the 1/14/04 Assignment is evinced by the Mortgage, which is
signed by Horowitz. [Mem. in Opp. at 26.] The Mortgage,
however, is signed by Horowitz in his capacity as the Overseer of
Royal. See Mortgage at 41.
13

Royal without the assistance of licensed legal counsel.

While it

is arguably possible that Plaintiffs could amend their Amended
Complaint to state claims against First American and Stewart
Title, Plaintiffs must first explain how they are covered by the
respective policies, and set forth a cognizable claim for relief.
Plaintiffs are reminded that pro se parties are not excused from
following rules of procedure.

See Local Rule LR83.13 (“Pro se

litigants shall abide by all local, federal, and other applicable
rules and/or statutes”).
If Plaintiffs do wish to amend these claims, they must
file a second amended complaint by July 31, 2017.

Plaintiffs’

second amended complaint must include all claims that they wish
to pursue, as well as all allegations that their claims are based
upon, even if they previously presented these allegations in the
Amended Complaint.

Plaintiffs may not incorporate any part of

the Amended Complaint into the second amended complaint by mere
reference to the Amended Complaint.

In crafting any second

amended complaint, the Court calls Plaintiffs’ attention to Rule
8.

See supra Section II.
Plaintiffs are cautioned that:

if they fail to file

their second amended complaint by July 31, 2017, Plaintiffs’ case
will be dismissed with prejudice; or, if a claim in the second
amended complaint fails to cure the defects identified in this

14

Order, that claim will be dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiffs have not been granted leave to make other
changes, such as adding new parties, claims, or theories of
liability.

If Plaintiffs wish to do so, they must file a motion

for leave to amend pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
CONCLUSION
Defendant First American Title Co.’s Motion to Dismiss
“Motion to Amend as a Matter of Course [FRCP Rule 15(a)(1)(A)];
Amended Complaint for Damages Against all Defendants” [ECF No 10]
Filed on January 4, 2017, filed January 17, 2017, is HEREBY
GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

It is GRANTED insofar as all

of the claims against First American are HEREBY DISMISSED.
DENIED insofar as the dismissal is WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

It is

Similarly,

Defendant Stewart Title Guaranty Co.’s Motion to Dismiss Motion
to Amend as a Matter of Course [FRCP Rule 15(a)(1)(A)]; Amended
Complaint for Damages, Filed January 4, 2017 [Dkt. 10], filed
January 20, 2017, is HEREBY GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
It is GRANTED insofar as all of the claims against Stewart Title
are HEREBY DISMISSED.
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

It is DENIED insofar as the dismissal is

If Plaintiffs choose to file a second amended

complaint, they must do so by July 31, 2017, and the second
amended complaint must comply with the terms of this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

15

DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAII, June 30, 2017.

/s/ Leslie E. Kobayashi
Leslie E. Kobayashi
United States District Judge

LEONARD HOROWITZ, ET AL. VS. STEWART TITLE GUARANTY COMPANY, ET
AL; CIVIL 16-00666 LEK-KJM; ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN
PART: (1) DEFENDANT FIRST AMERICAN TITLE CO.’S MOTION TO DISMISS
“MOTION TO AMEND AS A MATTER OF COURSE [FRCP RULE 15(A)(1)(A)];
AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS” [ECF NO 10]
FILED ON JANUARY 4, 2017; AND (2) DEFENDANT STEWART TITLE
GUARANTY CO.’S MOTION TO DISMISS MOTION TO AMEND AS A MATTER OF
COURSE [FRCP RULE 15(A)(1)(A)]; AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES,
FILED JANUARY 4, 2017 [DKT. 10]

16