Chavez v. Hagel et al

Filing 9

ORDER DISMISSING AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE GRANTED TO AMEND re 6 - Signed by JUDGE HELEN GILLMOR on 3/9/2017. " (1) The Complaint is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b)(1). Specifically, Chavez's (a) Bivens claims are DISMISSED with prejudice; (b) claims seeking back pay and retirement benefits are DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; and (c) claims seeking corre ction of military records are DISMISSED for failure to state a claim with leave granted to amend as discussed above. (2) Chavez may file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies of his claims for correction of mil itary records as noted above on or before April 10, 2017. (3) Failure to timely amend and cure the pleading deficiencies noted herein will result in dismissal of this action with prejudice for failure to state a claim, and Chavez may incur a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). (4) The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to mail Chavez a prisoner civil rights complaint form to assist him in complying with the directions in t his Order." (emt, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Leonardo R. Chavez shall be served by first class mail at the address of record on March 10, 2017. A copy of the Court's Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint form shall be included in the mailing to Mr. Chavez.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
CHUCK HAGEL, WILLIAM H.
McRAVEN, P. GARDNER HOWE, )
)
III, NORMAN BROSNICK,
STEVEN GRZESZCZAK, MICHAEL )
)
RIVERA, JOHN O’CONNOR,
)
CIELO ALMANZA,
)
)
Defendants,
)
LEONARDO R. CHAVEZ,
#A6068476,

CIV. NO. 16-00685 HG/KJM
ORDER DISMISSING AMENDED
COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE
GRANTED TO AMEND

ORDER DISMISSING AMENDED COMPLAINT
WITH LEAVE GRANTED TO AMEND
Before the court is pro se Plaintiff Leonardo R.
Chavez’s amended civil rights complaint brought pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Am. Compl., ECF. No. 6.

Chavez

names former United States Secretary of Defense Chuck
Hagel, Admiral William H. McRaven, Rear Admiral P.
Garner Howe III, Major General Norman Brosnik, Captain
Steven Grzeszczak, Lieutenant Michael Rivera, Lieutenant
Colonel John O’Connor, and Commander Cielo Almanza as

Defendants in their individual and official capacities
(collectively, “Defendants”).

Chavez alleges Defendants

violated the Fourteenth Amendment and United States
Special Operation Command Policy (“USSCOM”) No. 12-11,
during his separation proceedings from the United States
Army.
For the following reasons, Chavez’s Amended
Complaint is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim with
leave granted to amend as discussed and limited below.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

Procedural History
On December 30, 2016, Chavez filed a Complaint

alleging that Defendants had violated his rights to due
process under the Eighteenth Amendment1 during
separation and discharge proceedings from the Armed
Forces.

Compl., ECF No. 1.

On January 23, 2017, the court granted Chavez’s in
forma pauperis (“IFP”) application.

1

Order, ECF No. 5.

The Eighteenth Amendment enacted Prohibition and was
repealed by the Twenty-First Amendment in 1933.
2

On February 17, 2017, before the Court screened the
Complaint, Chavez submitted a new pleading labeled as an
“Original Complaint,” a new IFP application, and a
letter.

See ECF Nos. 6, 7. Chavez mistakenly believed

the Court had terminated this action when it granted his
IFP application and he sought to commence a new action
alleging the same claims.

ECF No. 7.

Chavez explained

that the new pleading corrected his assertion of claims
under the Eighteenth Amendment to allege claims under
the Fourteenth Amendment.

Id.; ECF No. 6, PageID #33

(“I listed wrong amendment.”).
Because the new pleading alleges the same claims
against the same Defendants, clarifies Defendants’
official titles, explicitly asserts a claim for damages,
and better explains the constitutional and factual bases
for his claims, the Court construes it as an Amended
Complaint rather than opening a new action (which would
require additional filing fees).
No. 6.

3

See Am. Compl., ECF

B.

Facts2
Chavez is incarcerated at the Oahu Community

Correctional Center (“OCCC”) awaiting trial in the
Circuit Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii
(“circuit court”), for Murder in the Second Degree and
Carrying or Use of a Firearm in the Commission of a
Separate Felony.3

See Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID #8

(“facing murder in the 2nd”); State v. Chavez,
1PC141000360 (Haw. 1st Cir. 2014) (last visit Feb. 22,
2017), https://jimspss1.courts.state.hi.us/JEFS.4
Chavez alleges that Defendants:
Denied me access to my Administrative
Separation Board, and equal protection of the
laws (UCMJ). Deprived me of liberty (rest
between Deployments) and property (falsified my

2

These facts are taken from the Complaint, Amended
Complaint, and public records, and are accepted as true for
the purposes of this Order only.
3

In violation of Haw. Rev. Stats. §§ 707-701.5; 706-656 &
134-0021.
4

A court “may take notice of proceedings in other courts,
both within and without the federal judicial system, if those
proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.”
United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v.
Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992).
4

military service and strip[p]ed me of my
retirement). [Count I]
Deployed in excess twice as much of SECDEF own
policy without his written approval.
! Deliberate falsification of U.S.SOCOM Policy
12-11[.]
! No deployment waivers on file for my
Operational Tempo[.] [Count II]
!

Am. Compl., ECF No. 6, PageID 35-36 (Counts I-II).
Chavez claims Defendants left him “to rot at OCCC,”
pushed him to commit suicide, caused his PTSD (posttraumatic stress disorder), deprived him of his family,
and denied him retirement benefits.

Id.

He seeks 100

million dollars and the correction of his military
records.

Id., PageID #38.
II.

STATUTORY SCREENING

Because Chavez is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP,
the Court screens his Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b).

The Court must dismiss a

complaint or any portion of it that is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from
defendants who are immune.

See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d

1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 28
5

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002,
1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).
Screening under §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b) involves
the same standard of review as that used under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Watison v. Carter,

668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v.
Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing
screening pursuant to § 1915A).

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a

complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted);
Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121.

“Determining whether a

complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . .
a context-specific task that requires the reviewing
court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
6

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

The “mere

possibility of misconduct” or an “unadorned, the
defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation” falls short
of meeting this plausibility standard.

Id.; see also

Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir.
2009).
Pro se litigants’ pleadings must be liberally
construed and all doubts should be resolved in their
favor.

Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir.

2010) (citations omitted).

Leave to amend should be

granted if it appears the plaintiff can correct the
defects in the complaint.

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d

1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

If it is clear

the complaint cannot be saved by amendment, dismissal
without leave to amend is appropriate.

Sylvia Landfield

Trust v. City of L.A., 729 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir.
2013).
7

III.

DISCUSSION

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff
must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States
was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was
committed by a person acting under the color of state
law.
A.

See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Bivens Jurisdiction
Chavez mistakenly asserts that jurisdiction for his

claims arises under § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment.
Chavez’s constitutional tort claims against these
federal Defendants arise, at least superficially, under
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), which “recognized for
the first time an implied private action for damages
against federal officers alleged to have violated a
citizen’s constitutional rights” under the Fourth
Amendment.

Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61,

66 (2001); see Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395-97.
8

The Supreme

Court has since expanded Bivens’ application only twice,
to claims brought under the Fifth Amendment, Davis v.
Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 234 (1979), and under the Eighth
Amendment, Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 17–18 (1980).
Because he alleges claims against federal government
agents and employees, the Court construes Chavez’s equal
protection and due process claims as arising under the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth, rather that the
Fourteenth, Amendment.

See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S.

228, 229 (1979) (discussing equal protection claims
under the Fifth Amendment); Consejo de Desarrollo
Economico De Mexicali, A.C. v. United States, 482 F.3d
1157, 1170 n.4 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding Fifth Amendment
“subjects the federal government to constitutional
limitations that are the equivalent of those imposed on
the states by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”) (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497 (1954)); see also Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420
U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975); (“This Court’s approach to
Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has . . . been
9

precisely the same as to equal protection claims under
the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Lamb v. Millennium
Challenge Corp., --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2017 WL 74690, at
*12 (D.D.C. Jan. 6, 2017).
Bivens actions are identical to actions brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “save for the replacement
of a state actor under § 1983 by a federal actor under
Bivens.”

Van Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406, 409 (9th Cir.

1991) (borrowing state personal-injury statute of
limitation for Bivens action).

To state a cognizable

Bivens claim, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) a right
secured under the United States Constitution was
violated, and (2) the violation was committed by a
federal actor.

Id.; see also Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S.

250, 254 n.2 (2006).

Additionally, a plaintiff must

allege that he suffered a specific injury as a result of
the conduct of a particular defendant, and he must
allege an affirmative link between the injury and the
conduct of that defendant.

Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S.

10

362, 371-72, 377 (1976) (addressing claims under § 1983).

B.

Chavez Cannot Maintain A Bivens Action Against
Defendants
The Supreme Court has consistently declined “to

extend Bivens liability to any new context or new
category of defendants.”

Malesko, 534 U.S. at 68;

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 68; see also Wilkie v. Robbins, 551
U.S. 537, 550 (2007) (stating that “in most instances we
have found a Bivens remedy unjustified”); Terry v.
Newell, --- F. App’x ---, 2016 WL 3450293, at *1 (9th
Cir. 2016).

Bivens actions are permitted only where

there are “no special factors counseling hesitation in
the absence of affirmative action by Congress.”

Bivens,

403 U.S. at 396.
The Supreme Court has consistently declined to
extend Bivens to suits by service members like Chavez’s,
explicitly holding that “enlisted military personnel may
not maintain a suit to recover damages from a superior
officer for alleged constitutional violations.”

11

Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 305 (1983).

Bivens

may not be extended to service members suits against
their superior officers because the Constitution confers
on Congress the power “[t]o make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,”
U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 14, and “contemplated that
the Legislative Branch [would] have plenary control over
rights, duties, and responsibilities in the framework of
the Military Establishment.”

Id. at 301.

The “need for

special regulations in relation to military discipline,
and the consequent need and justification for a special
and exclusive system of military justice,” underlies
this rule and counsels strongly against judicial review
of most military decisions.

Id. at 300; see also Klay

v. Panetta, 758 F.3d 369, 377 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (finding
service members’ claims that alleged plaintiffs were
raped, sexual assaulted, and retaliated against by
military officials while on active duty were noncognizable under Bivens); Cioca v. Rumsfeld, 720 F.3d
505 (4th Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal for failure to
12

state Bivens claim, because “special factors clearly
counsel hesitation in implying a cause of action for
injuries arising out of military service”).
Service members’ Bivens claims against civilian
government employees, such as the Secretary of Defense,
for “injuries arising out of or incident to their
military service” are equally foreclosed.

See United

States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 684 (1987) (citing
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950)
(holding Government not liable under Federal Tort Claims
Act “for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise
out of or are in the course of activity incident to
service”)); see also Oliver v. Wong, 158 F. Supp. 3d
1036, 1044-46 (D. Haw. 2016) (holding, inter alia, Feres
doctrine barred judicial review of service member’s
termination from his employment with the Hawaii Air
National Guard).
Because Chavez’s military separation and discharge
proceedings clearly arise “out of or . . in the course
of activity incident to service,” indeed, such
13

proceedings are at the heart of military activity
incident to service, Chavez fails to state a cognizable
claim for damages under Bivens.
684.

Stanley, 483 U.S. at

Chavez’s Bivens claims are DISMISSED with

prejudice because granting leave to amend is futile.
C.

Correction of Military Records: Retirement Benefits
Liberally construing the Amended Complaint, it

appears Chavez seeks military retirement benefits and
back pay based on Defendants’ actions during his
separation procedures.

See Am. Compl., ECF No. 6,

PageID #35 (“[Defendants] strip[p]ed me of my retirement
. . . and forfeiture of my retirement wages.”).
The Court of Federal Claims has “explicit statutory
authority” under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2),
to provide relief for service members’ complaints
requesting “back pay, reinstatement, and correction of
records.”

Mitchell v. United States, 930 F.2d 893, 895-

96 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see also Remmie v. United States,
98 Fed. Cl. 383, 388 (Fed. Cl. 2011) (“[T]he Court of
Federal Claims has jurisdiction over military pay cases
14

where the plaintiff seeks back pay for alleged unlawful
discharge from military service.

In addition to back

pay and other allowances, the court may grant relief
incidental and collateral to judgment granted for
monetary relief, such as changes in military or
retirement status and corrections of military records.”)
(quotation omitted)); Knight v. Dep’t of the Army, 2014
WL 241945, at *4 (D. Or. Jan. 22, 2014) (dismissing
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
While the Court of Federal Claims and federal
“district courts have concurrent jurisdiction under the
Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2), over non-tort
monetary claims against the United States that do not
exceed $10,000,” Chavez seeks significantly more than
$10,000 in damages, whether those damages are limited to
his likely actual loss of retirement benefits or
represent his claim for 100 million dollars.
2014 WL 241945, at *4.

Knight,

The Court of Federal Claims has

exclusive jurisdiction over Chavez’s claims to the
extent he seeks military retirement benefits and back
15

pay.

These claims are DISMISSED for lack of

jurisediction without prejudice to Chavez raising them
in the appropriate court.

D.

Other Forms of Correction of Records
A district court may have jurisdiction of an action

to correct a service member’s military records following
an unfavorable decision by a military board in certain
circumstances.

See Smith v. Marsh, 787 F.2d 510, 512

(10th Cir. 1986) (district court had jurisdiction to
review Army Board for Correction of Military Records
(“ABCMR”) decision not to upgrade plaintiff’s military
discharge); Muhammad v. Sec’y of Army, 770 F.2d 1494,
1495 (9th Cir. 1985) (“Military discharge decisions are
subject to judicial review.”); cf. Narula v. Yakubisin,
650 F. App’x 337, 338 (9th Cir. 2016) (discussing
exhaustion of military remedies for service members
challenging a court-martial conviction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241).

16

Challenges to a separation or discharge decision, or
to the procedures concerning a discharge certificate
under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”),
however, must first be filed as an administrative claim
before the Board for the Correction of military records.
See 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a) (empowering Board to correct
military record that is in error or to remove an
injustice); Chappell, 462 U.S. at 303.
Title 10 § 1558(f)(1) states:
(f) Judicial review.-(1) A person seeking to challenge an action or
recommendation of a selection board, or an
action taken by the Secretary of the military
department concerned on the report of a
selection board, is not entitled to relief in
any judicial proceeding unless the action or
recommendation has first been considered by a
special board under this section or the
Secretary concerned has denied the convening of
such a board for such consideration.
(2)(A) A court of the United States may review
a determination by the Secretary of a military
department not to convene a special board in
the case of any person. In any such case, the
court may set aside the Secretary’s
determination only if the court finds the
determination to be--(i) arbitrary or
capricious;(ii) not based on substantial
17

evidence;(iii) a result of material error of
fact or material administrative error; or(iv)
otherwise contrary to law.
A court therefore may review allegedly unlawful military
decisions only if the plaintiff alleges (a) violation of
a constitutional right, federal statute, or military
regulations, and (b) exhaustion of administrative
remedies, unless exhaustion is excused.

Wenger v.

Monroe, 282 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2002); Stein v.
Dowling, 867 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1096 (S.D. Cal. 2012);
see also, Oliver, 158 F. Supp. at 1046-49 (detailing
service member’s failure to exhaust military
administrative remedies, precluding judicial review).
A failure to exhaust military administrative
remedies pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 1558 relates to this
Court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

Santana v. United

States, 127 Fed. Cl. 51, 61 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (stating
“§ 1558 is a jurisdictional bar that cannot be waived,”
and dismissing action) (citing Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,
546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (finding that “subject-matter

18

jurisdiction, because it involves a court’s power to
hear a case, can never be forfeited or waived”).
Chavez fails to allege any facts showing that he
exhausted available administrative remedies under the
Administrative Procedures Act, The Army Board for
Correction of Military Records, the United States Code
of Military Justice, or the Federal Tort Claims Act.

He

also fails to allege facts showing that Defendants’
discharge decision was arbitrary, capricious, in error,
not based on substantial evidence, or otherwise contrary
to the law.

Chavez fails to state a claim for

correction of his records beyond seeking reinstatement
of his retirement benefits and such claims are DISMISSED
with leave to amend.
E.

Constitutional Claims
Even assuming this Court has jurisdiction to

consider Chavez’s claims to correct his records and such
claims are exhausted or exhaustion is excused, Chavez
fails to allege facts showing that Defendants violated

19

his constitutional rights to equal protection or due
process.
An equal protection claim may be established by
showing that the defendant intentionally discriminated
against the plaintiff based on the plaintiff’s
membership in a protected class, Serrano v. Francis, 345
F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003), or that similarly
situated individuals were intentionally treated
differently without a rational relationship to a
legitimate state purpose, Village of Willowbrook v.
Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); see also Lazy Y Ranch
Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 592 (9th Cir. 2008);
North Pacifica LLC v. City of Pacifica, 526 F.3d 478,
486 (9th Cir. 2008).

Chavez does not allege that he is

part of a protected class or set forth facts showing
that he was treated differently than similarly situated
service members who were separated or discharged from
the military.
While Chavez’s allegations that Defendants
“falsified” his service records and “U.S.SOCOM Policy
20

12-11,” and denied him access to the “Administrative
Separation Board” suggests a due process claim, he fails
to allege additional facts to nudge this claim from
merely possible to plausible.
PageID ##35-36.

Am. Compl., ECF No. 6,

Chavez provides no context to these

bare allegations.

That is, he fails to detail when or

where this military separation proceeding took place,
who presided over it, what evidence was relied on, and
what were its results.

Chavez does not explain how his

military service and Policy 12-11 were falsified (or
what this policy says).

Most importantly, Chavez fails

to allege any facts showing that each individual
Defendant personally violated his constitutional rights.
See Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002)
(discussing jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Rizzo,
423 U.S. at 371-72.
As written, the Court is unable to discern a basis
for either a due process or an equal protection claim.
Chavez’s claims are simply a “[t]hreadbare recital[] of
the elements of a cause,” unsupported by concrete facts
21

and unconnected to any Defendant’s conduct.
U.S. at 678.

Iqbal, 556

The Court cannot plausibly infer that

Defendants violated Chavez’s constitutional rights based
on his statement of facts, or that he has exhausted his
military remedies prior to raising his claims in this
court.
The Amended Complaint is DISMISSED pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(c)(1).
IV.

LEAVE TO AMEND

Chavez may file an amended complaint as limited by
this Order on or before April 10, 2017 that cures the
above-noted deficiencies.

He must comply with the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules for
the District of Hawaii if he amends his pleading.
An amended complaint generally supersedes the
original complaint.

See Ramirez v. Cty. of San

Bernadino, 806 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015).

The

Court will not refer to the original pleading to make an
amended complaint complete, although it will not ignore
22

contradictory statements of fact between an original and
amended complaint.

Local Rule 10.3 further requires

that an amended complaint be complete in itself without
reference to any prior pleading.

Defendants not named

in the caption and claims dismissed without prejudice
that are not realleged in an amended complaint may be
deemed voluntarily dismissed.

See Lacey v. Maricopa

Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[C]laims
dismissed with prejudice [need not] be repled in a[n]
amended complaint to preserve them for appeal. . . .
[but] claims [that are] voluntarily dismissed
[are] . . . waived if not repled.”).

In an amended

complaint, each claim and the involvement of each
Defendant must be sufficiently alleged.
V.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)

If Chavez fails to timely file an amended complaint,
or is unable to amend his claims to cure their
deficiencies, this dismissal may count as a “strike”
under the “3-strikes” provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
Under the 3-strikes provision, a prisoner may not bring
23

a civil action or appeal a civil judgment in forma
pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior
occasions, while incarcerated or detained in
any facility, brought an action or appeal in a
court of the United States that was dismissed
on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious,
or fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, unless the prisoner is under
imminent danger of serious physical injury.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
VI.
(1)

CONCLUSION

The Complaint is DISMISSED for failure to state

a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and
1915A(b)(1).

Specifically, Chavez’s (a) Bivens claims

are DISMISSED with prejudice; (b) claims seeking back
pay and retirement benefits are DISMISSED for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction; and (c) claims seeking
correction of military records are DISMISSED for failure
to state a claim with leave granted to amend as
discussed above.

24

(2) Chavez may file an amended complaint curing the
deficiencies of his claims for correction of military
records as noted above on or before April 10, 2017.
(3) Failure to timely amend and cure the pleading
deficiencies noted herein will result in dismissal of
this action with prejudice for failure to state a claim,
and Chavez may incur a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g).
(4)

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to mail Chavez a

prisoner civil rights complaint form to assist him in
complying with the directions in this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:

Honolulu, Hawaii, March 9, 2017.

_________________________________
__
Helen Gillmor
United States District Judge

Chavez v. Hagel,1:16-cv-00685-HG-KJM; scrn 2017 Chavez 16-685 HG (Chappell doctrine
ftsc)

25