ME2 Productions, Inc. v. Does 1 through 20
ORDER Adopting In Part And Modifying In Part Findings And Recommendation That Default Judgment Be Awarded Against Defendant Ferdinand Pumaras re: 35 . "The court adopts in part and modifies in part the F&R. ME2 is awarded statutory damages ag ainst Pumaras in the amount of $750. ME2 is also awarded $250 from Pumaras in attorneys fees and taxes. Finally, Pumaras is ordered to delete or destroy all illegal copies of Mechanic: Ressurection in his possession or over which he has co ntrol and is enjoined from further infringingon ME2s copyright with respect to Mechanic: Ressurection." Signed by JUDGE SUSAN OKI MOLLWAY on 9/21/17. (cib, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to recei ve electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry. Copy of order mailed to pro se defendant.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
ME2 PRODUCTIONS, INC.,
FERDINAND PUMARAS, et al.,
CIVIL NO. 17-00078 SOM/RLP
ORDER ADOPTING IN PART AND
MODIFYING IN PART FINDINGS
AND RECOMMENDATION THAT
DEFAULT JUDGMENT BE AWARDED
AGAINST DEFENDANT FERDINAND
ORDER ADOPTING IN PART AND MODIFYING IN PART
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION THAT DEFAULT JUDGMENT
BE AWARDED AGAINST DEFENDANT FERDINAND PUMARAS
Plaintiff ME2 Productions, Inc., owns the copyright to
“Mechanic: Ressurection,” a movie starring Jason Statham, Jessica
Alba, and Tommy Lee Jones.
ME2 has sued 150 defendants in
numerous cases in this district for downloading and then sharing
“Mechanic: Ressurection” over BitTorrent, an online peer-to-peer
ME2 alleges that Defedant Ferdinand
Pumaras is one of the individuals who have pirated this movie by
downloading and sharing it over BitTorrent without paying for it.
Pumaras defaulted in this case.
This court must now
decide what Pumaras must pay for pirating ME2’s movie over
ME2 asks for $7,500 in statutory damages and
$2,187.36 in attorney’s fees and taxes for time spent by its
attorney, Kerry S. Culpepper.
On August 22, 2017, the Magistrate Judge issued
findings and a recommendation (“F&R”) that this court grant in
part and deny in part ME2’s motion for default judgment.
ME2 timely objected.
The court adopts the F&R to the extent ME2 did not
object to it.
After de novo review of the parts of the F&R that
ME2 did object to, this court adopts in part and modifies in part
the remainder of the F&R.
of ME2 and against Pumaras.
Default judgment is granted in favor
For Pumaras’s violation of ME2’s
copyright rights in connection with downloading “Mechanic:
Ressurection” over BitTorrent, the court declines to award ME2
the amount of damages and fees requested.
The Complaint in this
case is a cookie-cutter document nearly identical to several
other complaints filed in this district.
The Complaint names
numerous Defendants based on identical allegations.
Pumaras specifically, this court awards ME2: 1) statutory damages
of $750; 2) $250 in attorney’s fees, and 3) an injunction
requiring Pumaras to delete or destroy any and all illegal copies
of “Mechanic: Ressurection” in his possession or over which he
has control and to refrain from downloading “Mechanic:
Ressurection” again via BitTorrent or any other file-sharing
network or protocol in violation of ME2’s copyright.
On February 1, 2017, ME2 filed the Complaint in this
matter against 20 Doe Defendants, asserting claims of copyright
infringement (First Claim for Relief) and contributory copyright
infringement (Second Claim for Relief) in violation of 17 U.S.C.
§§ 106, 501, and 504.
ME2, the copyright holder for the movie
“Mechanic: Ressurection,” claims that each Doe Defendant violated
its copyright by downloading the movie via BitTorrent, an online
peer-to-peer file-sharing network.
Each Doe Defendant, having
allegedly downloaded a copy of the movie from BitTorrent to his
or her computer, then allegedly made the movie (or parts thereof)
available for others to download over BitTorrent.
example, Doe Defendant 4 allegedly downloaded “Mechanic:
Ressurection” from BitTorrent via IP address 188.8.131.52, then
made the movie (or parts of it) available for others to download
from his computer via BitTorrent.
See ECF No. 1.
On May 22, 2017, ME2 filed an Amended Complaint that
named Defendant Ferdinand Pumaras as Doe Defedant 4.
See ECF No.
Pumaras is not alleged to have been the first person to make
that movie available for others to download over BitTorrent.
The Complaint in this case is nearly identical to
complaints asserting the same claims on behalf of ME2 against 130
other Doe Defendants in Civil Nos. 17-00079 LEK/RLP, 17-00096
LEK/KSC, 17-00098 LEK/KSC, 17-00130 KJM, 17-00131 ACK/KJM, 1700155 JMS/KSC, and 17-00320 RLP.
A district judge reviews de novo those portions of a
magistrate judge’s findings and recommendation to which an
objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or
in part, the findings and recommendation made by the magistrate
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); Local Rule
Kealoha v. Totto, 2017 WL 1839280, *2 (D. Haw. May 8,
2017); Paco v. Meyers, 2013 WL 6843057, *1 (D. Haw. Dec. 26,
In other words, a district judge “review[s] the matter
anew, the same as if it had not been heard before, and as if no
decision previously had been rendered.”
Freeman v. DirectTV,
Inc., 457 F.3d 1001, 1005 (9th Cir. 2006).
The district judge may accept those portions of the
findings and recommendation that are not objected to if the
district judge is satisfied that there is no clear error on the
face of the record.
United States v. Bright, 2009 WL 5064355, *3
(D. Haw. Dec. 23, 2009); Stow v. Murashige, 288 F. Supp. 2d 1122,
1127 (D. Haw. 2003).
The district judge may receive further
evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The district judge may
also consider the record developed before the magistrate judge.
Local Rule 74.2.
While the district judge must arrive at
independent conclusions about those portions of the magistrate
judge’s report to which objections are made, a de novo hearing is
United States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617 (9th
Cir. 1989); Kealoha, 2017 WL 1839280, *2; Local Rule 74.2.
Before the court are objections to the very thorough
After de novo review, the court adopts the F&R in part and
modifies it in part.
The court adopts the F&R to the extent it determines
that Pumaras, having defaulted, should be subject to default
judgment in favor of ME2 with respect to the copyright
infringement claims asserted in the Amended Complaint.
no dispute that ME2 owns the copyright to “Mechanic:
Ressurection” or that Pumaras downloaded a copy of that movie via
BitTorrent and later made the movie available for others to copy
it via BitTorrent.
ME2 objects to the $750 in statutory damages
recommended by the Magistrate Judge, asking instead for statutory
damages of $7,500.
After de novo review, this court adopts the
F&R’s $750 recommendation.
Under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1), the court may award
statutory damages “in a sum of not less than $750 or more than
$30,000 as the court considers just” for each infringed work.
When the infringement is “willful,” statutory damages up to
$150,000 may be awarded.
17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2).
have “wide discretion in determining the amount of statutory
damages to be awarded, constrained only by the specified maxima
Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 1355
(9th Cir. 1984).
Statutory damages “serve both compensatory and punitive
purposes” so as “to sanction and vindicate the statutory policy
of discouraging infringement.”
Los Angeles News Serv. v. Reuters
Int'l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 996 (9th Cir. 1998) (quotation marks
and citation omitted).
The court is therefore guided by “what is
just in the particular case, considering the nature of the
copyright, the circumstances of the infringement and the like.”
Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
This court recognizes that district courts outside the
Ninth Circuit have awarded statutory damages greater that $750 in
this kind of case.
See, e.g., Plastic the Movie Ltd. v. Jenkins,
2015 WL 12856452, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 11, 2015) (awarding
statutory damages of $6,000); Malibu Media, LLC v. Flanagan, 2014
WL 2957701, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 1, 2014) (awarding $1,500 in
statutory damages per infringement); Disney Enters. v. Farmer,
427 F. Supp. 2d 807, 817 (E.D. Tenn. 2006) (findings and
recommendation that $1,200 per copyright infringement be awarded
in statutory damages for a total of $6,000).
demonstrated by the lengthy list of cases cited in the F&R,
district courts within the Ninth Circuit have tended to restrict
statutory damages to $750 in similar BitTorrent movie download
and sharing cases.
In Qotd Film Investment Ltd. v. Starr, 2016 WL 5817027,
at *2 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 5, 2016), for example, an analogous case
involving the use of BitTorrent to download and share a movie in
violation of the copyright holder’s rights, the court noted that
actual economic damages were likely minimal.
The court did
understand, of course, that Congress had authorized statutory
damages to compensate copyright holders for difficult-to-prove
downstream losses and to deter future infringement.
court nevertheless noted:
Copyright violations come in all shapes and
sizes, from the unauthorized copying of a
Halloween word puzzle for a child’s party to
the unauthorized manufacture and sale of
hundreds of thousands of bootleg copies of an
album. While Ms. Starr’s alleged copyright
violation is of concern given that it
represents a theft of intellectual property,
it is a relatively minor infraction causing
relatively minor injury. The Copyright Act
provides a range of statutory damages, and
the Court finds that a recovery of $750 for
participating in a BitTorrent swarm is
appropriate. This award is in line with the
awards made by other courts in the Ninth
Circuit and appears adequate to deter
Ms. Starr from infringing on plaintiff’s
copyright in the future. The Court is not
persuaded that a higher award is appropriate
simply because certain members of the
BitTorrent community are not impressed by a
$750 award against someone they do not know.
. . . This is a steep penalty for having
been too lazy to go to the local Redbox or
too cheap to pay a few dollars for an
authorized download. If the threat of such
an award is not having a deterrent effect (a
fact which plaintiff makes no effort to
prove), it is most likely because the chances
of prosecution are too low rather than that
the amount of the damage award is of no
consequence to the judgment debtor.
Other decisions from the same district court have noted
that $750 in statutory damages for similar BitTorrent copyright
violations is an “appropriate” amount that is “in line with the
awards given by other courts in the Ninth Circuit.”
Dallas Buyers Club, LLC v. Madsen, 2015 WL 6680260, *5 (W.D.
Wash. Nov. 2, 2015).
In Glacier Films (USA), Inc. v. Gallatin, 2016 WL
3148401 (D. Or. May 12, 2016), report and recommendation adopted,
2016 WL 3176583 (D. Or. June 2, 2016), the magistrate judge
recommended an award of $750 in statutory damages in a default
judgment case involving the downloading and sharing of a movie
In recommending that award, the magistrate
judge rejected a request for $7,500 in statutory damages,
common sense supports a conclusion that a
$750 financial penalty for illegal[ly]
downloading one movie is more than
sufficiently punitive to deter others from
illegally downloading free movies on the
BitTorrent network. With knowledge that it
will now cost $750 to watch a single movie on
the BitTorrent network, consumers should be
motivated instead to spend a few dollars to
rent the same movie legally.
Glacier Films, 2016 WL 3148401, at *3.
This is not the only
Oregon case awarding $750 in statutory damages under similar
See, e.g., Voltage Pictures, LLC v. Martinez,
2015 WL 4772856, *2 (D. Or. Aug. 11, 2015).
In Cobbler Nevada, LLC v. Inglesias, 2016 WL 8453643,
*4 to *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2016), the district court determined
that an award of $750 in statutory damages for a defendant’s
download and sharing of a movie over BitTorrent was appropriate.
Citing Glacier, the Cobbler Nevada court noted that $750 is more
than sufficient to deter the illegal downloading and sharing of
movies on BitTorrent.
This court agrees with the district courts of Western
Washington, Oregon, and Northern California that awarding the
minimum statutory damages of $750 adequately compensates
copyright holders of movies for a defendant’s improper
downloading and sharing of a movie over BitTorrent.
case, a high definition digital copy of “Mechanic: Ressurection”
can currently be purchased for $14.99.
(last visited September 18, 2017).
The award of $750 is 50 times
Even if the movie cost $25 to legally download, the
$750 award would be 30 times that cost.
Because of the minimal
cost of downloading “Mechanic: Ressurection” legally, because of
how difficult it is to establish whether others have downloaded
the film from Pumaras via BitTorrent, and because there is no
evidence that Pumaras was the person who originally made the
movie available for others to download via BitTorrent, the
minimum statutory amount of $750 represents an adequate
compensatory award in this case.
The court also agrees that the $750 award sufficiently
deters future downloading of movies in violation of copyright
As the court in Glacier stated, “With knowledge
that it will now cost $750 to watch a single movie on the
BitTorrent network, consumers should be motivated instead to
spend a few dollars to rent [or buy] the same movie legally.”
2016 WL 3148401, at *3.
ME2 next objects to the Magistrate Judge’s
recommendation that no attorney’s fees be awarded in this case.
ME2 asks that this court instead award $2100 in attorney’s fees
plus $87.36 in taxes on those fees.
After de novo review, this
court modifies the F&R and awards ME2 $250 in combined attorney’s
fees and taxes.
In relevant part, the Copyright Act provides that “the
court may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the
prevailing party as part of the costs.”
17 U.S.C. § 505
The Copyright Act’s use of “may” provides
district courts with discretion in granting or denying attorney’s
fees to prevailing parties in copyright cases.
See Fogerty v.
Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 (1994) (“The word ‘may’ clearly
connotes discretion,” and “attorney’s fees are to be awarded to
prevailing parties only as a matter of the court’s discretion”);
Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. v. Krypton Broad. of
Birmingham, Inc., 259 F.3d 1186, 1197 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming
district court’s exercise of discretion to deny attorney’s fees
under § 505).
In Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S. Ct.
1979, 1985 (2016), the Supreme Court recently noted that, in
exercising their “broad leeway” under § 505, courts are
encouraged to examine “several nonexclusive factors,” including
“frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness, and the
need in particular circumstances to advance considerations of
compensation and deterrence.”
and citation omitted).
Id. (alterations, quotation marks,
Kirtsang also recognized that courts, in
exercising discretion under § 505, may take into account
“overaggressive assertions of copyright claims.”
Id. at 1989.
The Supreme Court stated, “Although objective reasonableness
carries significant weight, courts must view all the
circumstances of a case on their own terms, in light of the
Copyright Act’s essential goals.”
Id. at 1989.
include “enriching the general public through access to creative
Id. at 1986; see also Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 518 (“the
Copyright Act’s primary objective is to encourage the production
of original literary, artistic, and musical expression for the
In Cobbler Nevada, LLC v. Anonymous Users of Popcorn
Time: Does 1–11, 2016 WL 4238639, at *3 (D. Or. Aug. 10, 2016),
the magistrate judge exercised her discretion and declined to
award attorney’s fees in a case involving a movie download and
sharing via BitTorrent.
The magistrate judge reasoned that,
while BitTorrent copyright infringement cases are not frivolous,
the degree of success in these cases is minimal.
She noted the
fees spent to achieve the award were high in proportion to the
$750 damage award.
Even if an injunction issued that prohibited
the infringing defendant from further violating a copyright, that
injunction would be de minimis in relation to the scope of the
piracy if a movie was downloaded many times.
Id. at *3.
also noted that the penalty of having to pay $750 in statutory
damages (as well as costs) was already sufficient without an
attorney’s fee award to deter future violations of the
The magistrate judge in Cobbler Nevada was unpersuaded
that awarding fees furthered the goals of the Copyright Act and
instead was being used in many BitTorrent cases in a manner that
was an overaggressive assertion of copyright claims.
Id. at *4.
She noted, “In these BitTorrent copyright cases, the threat of
fee-shifting has emboldened Plaintiff's counsel to demand
thousands of dollars to settle a claim, even where the infringing
defendant admits early in the case that they illegally downloaded
In a parenthetical, she quoted a case in which
a court had noted that
copyright litigation is increasingly being
overtaken by “copyright trolls,” roughly
defined as plaintiffs who are more focused on
the business of litigation than on selling a
product or service or licensing their
copyrights to third parties to sell a product
or service. The paradigmatic troll plays a
numbers game in which it targets hundreds or
thousands of defendants, seeking quick
settlements priced just low enough that it is
less expensive for the defendant to pay the
troll rather than defend the claim.
Id. (quoting Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe IP Address 184.108.40.206,
2015 WL 4092417, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2015) (alterations,
quotation marks, and citation omitted)).
The magistrate judge also stated in the Oregon case:
The Copyright Act, as it is being enforced in
these BitTorrent cases, has created results
inconsistent with the goals of the Act. When
an individual who has illegally downloaded a
movie is contacted by Plaintiff’s counsel,
and faces the threat of a statutory damage
award that could theoretically reach $150,000
(see 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2)), as well as the
threat of a substantial attorney fee award,
the resulting bargaining process is unequal,
and unfair. For this Court to award
Plaintiff its attorney fees in this case
would only contribute to the continued
overaggressive assertion and negotiation of
these Copyright Act claims.
She then concluded that “exercising the Court’s discretion
to require Defendant to pay thousands of dollars in attorney
fees, for illegally downloading a single movie, would render an
inequitable outcome that is inconsistent with the policies served
by the Copyright Act.”
Much of the magistrate judge’s reasoning in Cobbler
Nevada makes sense to this court, although this court is
certainly not equating ME2 or its counsel with a copyright troll.
Nevertheless, as noted above, ME2 has sued 150 individuals in
this district for downloading and sharing “Mechanic:
Ressurection” via BitTorrent.
The docket sheets in the various
cases indicate that most of the defendants have settled with ME2
on terms unknown to the court.
As reasoned in Cobbler Nevada,
imposing attorney’s fees on Pumaras would further the goals of
the Copyright Act in only a minimal way and would instead reward
the use of copyright claims to force individuals like Pumaras to
pay thousands of dollars for having downloaded and shared a
single movie via a peer-to-peer network.
This court would be
fully within the exercise of reasonable discretion if it declined
to award any attorney’s fees under these circumstances.
The court does, however, recognize that ME2 did incur
some, albeit limited, attorney’s fees in asserting its copyright
claims against Pumaras.
The court awards $250 in attorney’s fees
This is a reasonable amount equivalent to one-
third of the $750 statutory damage award.
It also represents an
amount that will compensate ME2 for the fees reasonably expended
in a cookie-cutter case in which much of its attorney’s work
could have been accomplished by a paralegal.
Even if the court awarded fees using the lodestar
method, a $250 award would be appropriate.
See Pinkham v. Camex,
Inc., 84 F.3d 292, 294 (8th Cir. 1996) (“We conclude that the
copyright statute provides for ‘reasonable’ fees based on a
lodestar figure represented by the reasonable hourly rate
multiplied by the hours expended in the litigation.”).
for ME2 submitted a declaration indicating that he spent six
hours in pursuing Pumaras and asks for $2,100 in fees based on a
billing rate of $350 per hour.
This fee request is not
Initially, the court notes that counsel submits that he
spent 1.5 hours preparing for a settlement meeting and responding
to police after Pumaras complained that he was being scammed by
See ECF No. 32-2, PageID # 147.
These tasks are
presented in a “block billing” format that makes it difficult for
the court to determine the reasonableness of the work done.
Entries are grouped together with only one time billed for
The court is unable to determine the
reasonableness of each entry, as the time spent on any specific
task is missing.
The court has the authority to reduce hours
that are block billed.
See Welch v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 480
F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 2007) (“We do not quarrel with the
district court’s authority to reduce hours that are billed in
The fee applicant bears the burden of documenting
the appropriate hours expended in the litigation and must submit
evidence in support of those hours worked.
It was reasonable for
the district court to conclude that Welch failed to carry her
burden, because block billing makes it more difficult to
determine how much time was spent on particular activities.”
This court declines to award any fees
relating to the police contact that is block-billed with
preparation for a meeting.
Counsel for ME2 says he spent 2 hours preparing and
filing the Amended Complaint and Summons.
PageID # 147.
See ECF No. 32.2,
The Amended Complaint in this case was filed on
May 22, 2017, and is substantially identical to the Amended
Complaint filed by the same counsel on March 27, 2017, in Cook v.
Gray, et al., Civ. No. 16-00637 KSC, ECF No. 24.
It is not at
all clear how 2 hours at $350 per hour could be reasonable under
Counsel for ME2 says he also spent 1 hour preparing and
filing the request for entry of default in this case.
No. 32-2, PageID # 147.
However, like the Amended Complaint, the
request for entry of default filed on July 6, 2017, ECF No. 30,
is substantially identical to the one filed by the same counsel
on May 26, 2017, in Cook v. Gray, et al., Civ. No. 16-00637 KSC,
ECF No. 43.
At most, counsel for ME2 added details about having
been contacted by Pumaras and his family members and having been
told that Pumaras downloaded the movie because he was too poor to
pay for it.
The request also complained that Pumaras had
contacted the police to assert that counsel was trying to scam
him out of money.
See ECF No. 30-1.
Finally, counsel for ME2 says that he spent 2 hours
preparing and submitting the motion for default judgment in this
See ECF No. 32-2, PageID # 147.
But the motion for
default judgment, ECF No. 32, was again substantially the same as
the motion filed in Cook v. Gray, et al., Civ. No. 16-00637 KSC,
ECF No. 48.
Given the nature of the claim against Pumaras and the
number of defendants sued in this district by ME2 in connection
with downloading and sharing “Mechanic: Ressurection” over
BitTorrent, the time claimed by ME2’s counsel for preparing and
filing the Amended Complaint, the motion for entry of default,
and the motion for default judgment is excessive.
documents were based on form documents already submitted to this
court in another case, meaning that, for the most part, counsel
for ME2 was simply changing a few facts when submitting documents
to the court.
An award of 1 hour would compensate ME2 for time
that its attorney reasonably spent working on this cookie-cutter
The court next turns to the hourly rate charged by
Counsel has 17 years of experience and seeks $350
per hour in attorney’s fees.
This rate exceeds the prevailing
market rate in this community, which this court is familiar with.
See Jordan v. Multnomah County, 815 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir.
1987) (“The prevailing market rate in the community is indicative
of a reasonable hourly rate.”).
The court caps ME2’s counsel’s
hourly rate at $250 (including taxes), which is closer to what
has been awarded to attorneys practicing in Hawaii with similar
See Blueearth Biofuels, LLC v. Hawaiian Elec. Co.,
2015 WL 881577, *13 (D. Haw. Feb. 27, 2015) (approving a rate of
$260 for an attorney with 20 years of experience and $225 for
attorneys with 12 years of experience).
The nature of the work
causes this court to treat $250 as including applicable taxes.
The court modifies the F&R and awards ME2 $250 in
attorney’s fees as the amount reasonable under the circumstances.
The F&R declined to enjoin Pumaras from knowingly and
willfully using BitTorrent or the Internet to copy or download
content in violation of federal copyright law.
It also declined
to order Pumaras to destroy all illegal copies of “Mechanic:
Ressurection” and BitTorrent.
See ECF No. 35, PageID # 226.
has objected to this part of the F&R.
This court agrees with the F&R that ME2 seeks an overly
However, after de novo review, the court
modifies the F&R and enters a limited injunction.
orders Pumaras to delete or destroy any and all illegal copies of
“Mechanic: Ressurection” that he has possession of or control
over and enjoins Pumaras from downloading “Mechanic:
Ressurection” in the future over BitTorrent or any other peer-topeer file-sharing network or protocol or in any other manner
infringing on ME2’s copyright with respect to that movie.
The Ninth Circuit has stated:
15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) vests the district court
with the “power to grant injunctions
according to principles of equity and upon
such terms as the court may deem reasonable,
to prevent the violation of any right” of the
trademark owner. The Supreme Court recently
reiterated that district courts should apply
“traditional equitable principles” in
deciding whether to grant permanent
Reno Air Racing Ass'n., Inc. v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126, 1137 (9th
This court’s injuction prevents Pumaras from
violating ME2’s copyright rights with respect to “Mechanic:
It also places the parties in the position they
would have been in had Pumaras not downloaded the movie via
BitTorrent in the first place.
The court declines to order a
broader injunction that requires Pumaras to cease using
BitTorrent or to delete other movies that Pumaras obtained from
BitTorrent has legal uses, and ME2 is not the
copyright holder with respect to every other movie.
The court adopts in part and modifies in part the F&R.
ME2 is awarded statutory damages against Pumaras in the amount of
ME2 is also awarded $250 from Pumaras in attorney’s fees
Finally, Pumaras is ordered to delete or destroy all
illegal copies of “Mechanic: Ressurection” in his possession or
over which he has control and is enjoined from further infringing
on ME2’s copyright with respect to “Mechanic: Ressurection.”
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, September 21, 2017.
/s/ Susan Oki Mollway
Susan Oki Mollway
United States District Judge
ME2 Productions, Inc. v. Pumaras, et al., Civil No. 17-00078 SOM/RLP; ORDER ADOPTING IN
PART AND MODIFYING IN PART FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION THAT DEFAULT JUDGMENT BE AWARDED
AGAINST DEFENDANT FERDINAND PUMARAS
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