Lau v. Kekuaokalani et al

Filing 27

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL re: 26 . Signed by MAGISTRATE JUDGE KEVIN S.C. CHANG on 11/20/2017. (afc)CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive ele ctronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
SHAWN THOMAS LAU
#AO20582,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MICHAEL KEKUAOKALANI; DENISE
JOHNSON; RICHARD BANNER,
M.D.,
Defendants.
____________________________

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CIVIL NO. 17-00258 JMS-KSC
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF
COUNSEL

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
On November 13, 2017, Plaintiff Shawn Thomas Lau
(“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed a Motion for the
Appointment of Counsel (“Motion”).

In proceedings that do not

threaten a litigant with loss of physical liberty, there is no
presumptive right to appointed counsel.

Lassiter v. Dep’t of

Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1981); Palmer v. Valdez, 560
F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Generally, a person has no right
to counsel in civil actions.”).

“However, a court may under

‘exceptional circumstances’ appoint counsel for indigent civil
litigants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1).”

Palmer, 560 F.3d

at 970 (citation omitted).
In exercising its discretion, “[a] district court must
determine whether a) there is a likelihood of success on the
merits; and b) the prisoner is unable to articulate his claims in
light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.”

Cano v.

Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted) .
These factors must be considered cumulatively; none are
dispositive.

Id. (citation omitted).

Although Plaintiff is incarcerated, indigent, and
lacks legal expertise, these conditions do not constitute
extraordinary circumstances requiring the appointment of counsel.
Many pro se litigants are confronted with the same difficulties,
but are able to adequately litigate their actions.
Plaintiff can read, write, understand, and present his
claims sufficiently to proceed pro se.

And, contrary to his

assertion, Plaintiff’s claims are not particularly complex.
Accordingly, neither the interests of justice nor exceptional
circumstances warrant appointment of counsel at this time.
LaMere v. Risley, 827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987); Terrell v.
Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991).

Plaintiff’s Motion

for the Appointment of Counsel is therefore DENIED without
prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

Honolulu, Hawaii, November 20, 2017.

_____________________________
Kevin S.C. Chang
United States Magistrate Judge

CV 17-00258 JMS-KSC; LAU V. KEKUAOKALANI, ET AL.; ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

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