Springer v. Hunt et al

Filing 16

ORDER: (1) DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 14 ; AND (2) DIRECTING SERVICE OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT 1 . Signed by CHIEF JUDGE J. MICHAEL SEABRIGHT on 8/4/2017. (afc) Excerpt of conclusion:"[T]he FAC [First Amended Complaint] is DISMISSED without leave to amend for failure to state a claim.""Plaintiff is notified that, until service of the original Complaint has been effected, Plaintiff should not file motions or other documen ts with the court. Plaintiff is further notified that she must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules for the District of Hawaii."CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to re ceive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications will be served by first class mail on August 7, 2017.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII

RUTH-ANN SPRINGER,

CIV. NO. 17-00269 JMS-KSC
ORDER: (1) DISMISSING FIRST
AMENDED COMPLAINT; AND
(2) DIRECTING SERVICE OF THE
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,
vs.
OFFICER BRIAN HUNT, ET AL.,
Defendants.

ORDER: (1) DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT; AND
(2) DIRECTING SERVICE OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the court is pro se Plaintiff Ruth-Ann Springer’s (“Plaintiff”)
“Complaint: Writ of Error is of the District of the Hawaii Federal: Title 42,” which
the court construes as a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). ECF No. 14. The
FAC names the undersigned, among many others, as new Defendants. FAC at 1;
Ex. B at 4, ECF No. 14-2. For the reasons set forth below, the court declines to
recuse itself from this case, DISMISSES the FAC without leave to amend, and
DIRECTS service of the original Complaint, ECF No. 1.
///
///
///

II. BACKGROUND
A.

The Original Complaint
On June 8, 2017, Plaintiff filed her original Complaint against Hawaii

County Police (“HCP”) Officer Brian Hunt (“Hunt”); HCP Sargent Wakita
(“Wakita”); HCP Sargent Tingle (“Tingle”); HCP Officer Shane Travis (“Travis”);
HCP Officer Kenneth Ishii (“Ishii”); realtor Lori Henbest (“Henbest”)
(collectively, the “Eviction Defendants”); and State of Hawaii Judge Harry P.
Freitas (“Judge Freitas”), ECF No. 1, along with an Application to proceed in
forma pauperis (“IFP Application”), ECF No. 4. On June 23, 2017, Plaintiff filed a
Motion for Temporary Injunction. ECF No. 9.
The original Complaint asserts (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against
Judge Freitas, and the Eviction Defendants in their individual capacities only, for
violation of, and conspiracy to violate, Plaintiff’s statutory and/or constitutional
rights, particularly those protected by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments; and
(2) state-law claims. Compl. at 4-7, 11.1 These claims appear to arise from State

1

More specifically, the original Complaint asserts claims for violation of the following
statutory or constitutional rights: (1) “the enumeration in the constitution of certain rights shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people”; (2) “offense against public
administration: tampering with physical evidence”; (3) “conspiracy against rights”;
(4) “deprivation of rights”; (5) “conspiracy to interfere: . . . for the purpose of depriving . . . any
person’s rights”; (6) “neglect to prevent: . . . the wrongs conspired to be done”; (7) “failure to
correct the wrongs: . . . [The underlying] case was a civil matter. The officer made a personal
political determination . . . [to] make this a criminal matter”; (8) “state court must prove on the
record: All jurisdictional facts . . . I had questioned [the state court’s] jurisdiction . . . over the
(continued . . . )
2

of Hawaii foreclosure and eviction, and subsequent criminal, proceedings. In
addition to allegations connected to these claims, the original Complaint contains
numerous nonsensical opinions, assumptions, conclusory allegations, and
pronouncements. 2
On July 11, 2017, this court granted the IFP Application, dismissed
the original Complaint in part for failure to state a claim, denied a temporary
injunction, and granted Plaintiff leave to amend (the “July 11 Order”). ECF No.
11. More specifically, the July 11 Order dismissed the conspiracy claim with leave
to amend, dismissed claims against Judge Freitas without leave to amend, and
found that the original Complaint stated “plausible § 1983 claims for unlawful
seizure and excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and state-law

(. . . continued)
15-month period protecting my rights at all times with UCC 1-308”; (9) “right to a speedy trial:
Statutes which would deprive a citizen of rights . . . or property without a regular trial . . . would
not be the law of the land”; (10) “no immunity”; and (11) “duty of courts: . . . to be watchful for
. . . stealthy encroachments” on “Constitutional rights.” Compl. at 4-6.
2

For example, the original Complaint alleges: (1) “[t]he common law is the real law . . . ;
the codes, rules, regulations, policy and statu[t]es are not the law,” id. at 8; (2) “bank[s] never
actually ‘loan[]’ anything of equitable value and contribute[] nothing but a minor accounting
service when they set up a mortgage,” and therefore “have no valid security interest,” id.;
(3) “we can’t really own anything unless paid in gold” or “silver,” and therefore “we are mere
tenant’s [(sic)] with rights of use, in regards to our property we presume,” id. at 9; (4) “I have
reserved all my rights with [Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”)] 1-308 and all my rights [are]
protected by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of December 1948,” id. at 12; and
(5) “your corporation agencies have agreed to pay me per your violations of my unalienable
rights, protected by 1978 Hawai’i Constitution and the Constitution for the United States of
America,” id.

3

claims for assault and battery and [intentional and negligent infliction of emotional
distress (“IIED/NIED”)].” Id. at 15-16. The conspiracy claim was dismissed
based on Plaintiff’s failure “to allege specific facts showing any ‘meeting of the
minds,’ to deprive Plaintiff of her constitutional rights.” Id. (citing Franklin v.
Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that to state a § 1983
conspiracy claim, a plaintiff “must show an agreement or ‘meeting of the minds’ to
violate constitutional rights”)).
The July 11 Order granted Plaintiff leave to amend “to attempt to cure
the deficiency in her conspiracy claim, and to replead all claims that are not
dismissed by this Order, but not to add new or different claims.” Id. at 16
(emphasis added). Finally, the July 11 Order warned Plaintiff that if she failed to
file an amended complaint as set forth in that order by August 4, 2017, “the
[original] Complaint will remain the operative pleading and the court will issue an
order directing service.” Id. at 18-19.
B.

The FAC
On August 1, 2017, Plaintiff filed the instant FAC, which includes

(1) seventeen pages that largely list statutes and assert incomprehensible
pronouncements;3 (2) Exhibit A, ECF No. 14-1, which appears to be an invoice for

3

For example, the first two pages of the FAC list statutes, excerpts of which follow:
(continued . . . )
4

(. . . continued)
TITLE: 4: CHAPTER: SECTION: 1&2, AND -3
TITLE: 36: CHAPTER: 10: SECTION: 176(g)
FOREIGN-SOVEREIGN-IMMUNITY-ACT, OCTOBER 21,
1976
AMRY [(SIC)] REGULATIONS: 840-10 SECTION: 1&2 AND
2-3, 2-5, AND 2-6
TITLE: 28: U.S.A. CODES: 636(1)(c) ADMERTY [(SIC)]MARITIME JURISDICTION
....
TITLE: 28: SECTION: 3: IN THE JURISDICTION OF THE
PLAINTIFF “In Propria Persona” AND NO DISCLAIMER OF
RESPONCIBILITY [(sic)] CONTRACT FOR THE
FOREIGN/FICTION-FRINGE-FLAG
....
TITLE: 28:U.S.A. CODES: SECTION: 1359(3) TWO OR MORE
CONSPIRE GO ON THE PREMISES OF ANOTHER TO
DEPRIVE ANY PERSON EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE
LAWS
TITLE: 18: U.S.A. CODES: SECTION: 1202 RANSOM FOR
SECURITY . . . .
FAC at 1. The FAC also contains numerous paragraphs, asserted as facts, such as:
ON THE JUNE 8, 2017 . . . WITH THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE
LAW BY THE TITLE: 42: U.S.A. CODES: SECTION: 1983:
AND BY THE NEGLECT OF THE DUE-PROCESS OF THE
LAW UNDER THE [CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITEDSTATES UNDER THE AMERICA FLAG (“C.U.S.A.F.”)] FOR
THE AMENDMENT OF THE FIVE (5) FOR THE Plaintiff “In
Propria Persona” IS-INJURED, . . . BY THE RESPONDENTS
TITLED-HEREIN . . . F.R.C.P. RULE: 12(b)(2) LACK OF THE
JURISDICTION OVER THE PARTY BEFORE THE COURT
BY THE LACK OF THE DECLAIMER [(sic)] FOR THE
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE COURT OVER THE Plaintiff “In
Propria Persona” UNDER THE U.C.C. 1-308 EXPLICIT
RESERVATION OF RIGHTS, . . . HUNT, ET AL. NOTE: BY
THE WANT OF THE CARE UNDER THE CONSPIRACY,
WILL LOSE ALL IMMUNITY AND NOW CAN BE
PROSECUTED FOR THE VIOLATIONS AND BREACH OF
THE C.U.S.A.F.-CONTRACT BY THE OATH AND/OR
AFERMATIONS [(sic)], OF THE OATH OF THE OFFICE OF
RESPONDENTS HUNT ET. AL.
Id. ¶ 6.
5

Plaintiff’s appearances in state court; (3) Exhibit B, ECF No. 14-2, which lists the
original Defendants and sixteen new Defendants;4 (4) Exhibit C, ECF No. 14-3,
which appears to be an invoice for damages from property losses and the alleged
assault against Plaintiff; (5) Exhibit D, ECF No. 14-4, Plaintiff’s Declaration
summarizing the events on the day Plaintiff was evicted and arrested; and
(6) Exhibit E, ECF No. 14-5, state court public records of underlying state criminal
actions against Plaintiff.
III. DISCUSSION
A.

Recusal
Because the FAC names the undersigned as a Defendant, the court

initially addresses whether recusal is necessary or appropriate. The FAC names
the undersigned in the caption and in Exhibit B, but does not include factual
allegations clearly linking the undersigned to any specific claim. Construed
liberally, however, the FAC may be alleging that by describing Plaintiff’s Motion
for Temporary Injunction as “incomprehensible gibberish that fails to comply with
applicable legal standards for granting injunctive relief,” July 11 Order at 18, the

4

Newly-named Defendants include: J. Michael Seabright (the undersigned); Jared
Ahuna; Ocwen Loan Servicing; Mike Sarehkhani; Indy Mac/Onewest; Fanny Mae; MERS; U.S.
Bank National; RICO Hawaii; Loretta Lynch; Consumer Financial Protection Bureau; Controller
of the Currency; Elijah Jenkins; Postal Inspector; Attorney General, Doug Chin; and State of
Hawaii, Taxation, Zielinski. FAC, Ex. B, ECF No. 14-2.
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undersigned committed a tort against, and violated and conspired to violate
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights:
(27.) NOTE: FOR THE Plaintiff “In Propria Persona” ISINJURED THROUGH CONSPIRACY, COLLUSION,
TORT, FORCEFUL C.U.S.A.F.-CONTRACT, FOR
PERJURY OF THE OATH, OR SURRENDER OF THE
C.U.S.A.F. INTO THE FOREIGN/FICTION-STATELANGUAGE, FOR THE CONSTRUCTIVE-TREASON
BY THE COURT. UNDER THE TITLE: 28: U.S.A.
CODES: SECTION: 454 AND 455, FOR THE
RESPONDENTS AND INCORPORATED INTO THE
CASE FOR THE CONSPIRACY. . . . BY THE
WRITTEN-LANGUAGE-WORD OF THE
RESPONDENTS HUNT ET AL. REMARKS (I.E.
GIBERISH) [(sic)] FOR THE DISPLAYING OF THE
NEGLECT OF THE OATH OF THE COURT-OFFICER
AND DEPRIVATION OF THE C.U.S.A.F. RIGHTS
UNDER THE . . . TITLE: 28: C.U.S.A.F. CHAPTER:
21: SECTION: 454 AND . . . SECTION:
455,(b)(1)(4)(5)(ii)(iii), (d)(2) AS THE Plaintiff “In
Propria Persona” IS-INJURED BY THE PRACTICE OF
THE LAW BY THE JUDGES ON THE BENCH . . . .
FAC ¶ 27 (emphases added).
The recusal statute provides that a judge “shall disqualify himself in
any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28
U.S.C. § 455(a). It further provides that a judge “shall also disqualify himself . . .
[if he is] a party to the proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5)(i). But, well-settled
law also provides that “a judge is not disqualified merely because a litigant sues or
threatens to sue him.” Ronwin v. State Bar of Ariz., 686 F.2d 692, 701 (9th Cir.
1982), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984)
7

(quotation marks omitted); see also Gabor v. Seligmann, 222 F. App’x 577, 578
(9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Ronwin); In re Bush, 232 F. App’x 852, 854 (11th Cir.
2007); In re Hipp, Inc., 5 F.3d 109, 116 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Grismore,
564 F.2d 929, 933 (10th Cir. 1977). “Such an easy method for obtaining
disqualification should not be encouraged or allowed.” Ronwin, 686 F.2d at 701.
This is because “a federal judge has a duty to sit where not disqualified which is
equally as strong as the duty to not sit where disqualified.” Laird v. Tatum, 409
U.S. 824, 837 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., mem.). Thus, the Ninth Circuit has upheld a
district judge’s decision not to recuse himself after pro se plaintiffs named him as a
defendant in their amended complaint. See Gabor, 222 F. App’x at 578.
And with regard to § 455(a), allegations of a judge’s impartiality
“must result from an extrajudicial source; a judge’s prior adverse ruling is not
sufficient cause for recusal.” United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir.
1986) (citation omitted); see also White v. Stephens, 2014 WL 4925867, at *4
(W.D. Tenn. Sept. 30, 2014) (“The basis for recusal under § 455(a) . . . cannot be a
judge’s prior ruling.”). Here, because the only allegation in the FAC connected to
the undersigned references this court’s July 11 Order, and the undersigned was
only added as a Defendant in the FAC, neither § 455(a) nor § 455(b)(5)(i) mandate
recusal.

8

Further, the Code of Conduct for United States Judges (“Code of
Conduct”) includes provisions regarding recusal that are similar to § 455’s
provisions. See Code of Conduct, Canon 3C. The Committee on Codes of
Conduct issues advisory opinions regarding application of the Code of Conduct to
various circumstances. Advisory Opinion 103 identifies competing interests where
claims are asserted against judges:
Important reasons exist for a judge not to disqualify
routinely, as this would permit and might even encourage
litigants to manipulate and abuse the judicial process,
which could undermine public confidence in the integrity
of the judiciary. Automatic disqualification of a judge
cannot be obtained by the simple act of suing the judge,
particularly where the suit is primarily based on the
judge’s prior judicial rulings. On the other hand, a
universal refusal to recuse could also lead to disrespect
for and a loss of public confidence in the integrity of the
judicial process.
Guide to Judiciary Policy, Vol. 2B, Ch. 2, which can be accessed at
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/vol02b-cg02.pdf (last visited August 3,
2017). Advisory Opinion 103 also identifies the following factors to consider
when determining whether recusal is warranted: “the nature of the complaint, the
applicable law, the possibility of factual issues involving the credibility of the
named judge or judges, and any other circumstances that might provide a
reasonable ground for questioning the impartiality of the assigned judge.” Id. And
it states that “[a] complaint filed against a judge that is subject to prompt dismissal
9

on judicial immunity grounds will not ordinarily give rise to a reasonable basis to
question the judge’s impartiality . . . and thus will not require the judge to recuse.”
Id.
Here, given the nature of Plaintiff’s claims and because the FAC’s
allegations concern only a prior ruling in this case, and claims asserted against the
undersigned based on such ruling would be subject to judicial immunity, recusal is
not warranted under Code of Conduct Canon 3C. To recuse, given the facts of this
case, would permit and encourage abuse and manipulation of the judicial system
by simply naming -- with no support -- a judge in an amended complaint after
dismissal (or, as in this case, partial dismissal) of the original complaint.
Based on the foregoing, the court finds that recusal from this case is
neither required nor appropriate.
B.

Screening the FAC
1.

Standards of Review
The court must subject each civil action commenced pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a)5 to mandatory screening, and order the dismissal of any claims it
finds “frivolous, malicious, failing to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeking monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.”

5

Section 1915(a) governs IFP proceedings.

10

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see, e.g., Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir.
2001) (per curiam) (holding that “the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are
not limited to prisoners”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000)
(en banc) (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not only permits but requires” the
court to sua sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a
claim).
To state a claim, a pleading must contain a “short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
A complaint that lacks a cognizable legal theory or alleges insufficient facts under
a cognizable legal theory fails to state a claim. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v.
Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1014 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing
Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)). A plaintiff
must allege “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Weber v. Dep’t of
Veterans Affairs, 521 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2008). This tenet -- that the court
must accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint -- “is
inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Plaintiff is appearing pro se; consequently, the court liberally
construes the FAC. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Eldridge v.
11

Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam). The court also
recognizes that “[u]nless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the
defect . . . a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint’s deficiencies and
an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of the action.” Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr.,
66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967,
977-78 (9th Cir. 2013). A court may, however, deny leave to amend where further
amendment would be futile. See, e.g., Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Pub., 512
F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008) (reiterating that a district court may deny leave to
amend for, among other reasons, “repeated failure to cure deficiencies by
amendments previously allowed . . . [and] futility of amendment”).
2.

Application of Standards to the FAC
As set forth in the July 11 Order, the court granted Plaintiff leave to

amend to attempt to cure the deficiencies of her conspiracy claim, in particular, the
original Complaint’s failure to allege any specific facts showing a “meeting of the
minds” to deprive her of her constitutional rights. July 11 Order at 12, 16. The
court further granted Plaintiff leave to replead her § 1983 claims for unlawful
seizure and excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and state-law
claims for assault and battery and IIED and/or NIED. Id. at 15, 16. Plaintiff was
not granted leave to add new or different claims. Id. at 16. Finally, the July 11
Order instructed Plaintiff to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
12

the court’s Local Rules, and designate an amended complaint as a “First Amended
Complaint.” Id.
Nowhere does the FAC allege facts showing an agreement or
“meeting of the minds” by Defendants to deprive Plaintiff of her constitutional
rights. Thus, the court finds that FAC fails to state a conspiracy claim. See
Franklin, 312 F.3d at 441 (explaining that to state a § 1983 conspiracy claim, a
plaintiff “must show an agreement or ‘meeting of the minds’ to violation
constitutional rights”).
And despite the court’s admonition that an amended complaint may
not contain new or different claims, the FAC attempts to do just that. First, the
FAC contains an exhaustive list of civil and criminal statutes and court rules, many
of which were not included in the original Complaint. In addition, the FAC’s
nearly incomprehensible numbered paragraphs that purport to be causes of action,
facts, conclusion, or prayer are riddled with these newly-added statutes and rules.
Nowhere does the FAC contain any specific factual allegations to support a
conspiracy claim, such as a “meeting of the minds” by any Defendants. And the
FAC fails to allege any facts that connect any of the newly-named Defendants to
the non-dismissed claims. In short, the FAC neither attempts to cure the
conspiracy claim nor appears to replead those claims that were not dismissed by

13

the July 11 Order. 6 Thus, the FAC in its entirety is DISMISSED for failure to state
a claim. See UMG Recordings, Inc., 718 F.3d at 1014 (stating that a complaint that
lacks a cognizable legal theory or alleges insufficient facts under a cognizable legal
theory fails to state a claim).
Because the original Complaint stated plausible federal and state
claims, and the FAC not only failed to allege any plausible claim for relief, but was
largely filled with confusing, nonsensical gibberish, the court finds that granting
further leave to amend would be futile. See Leadsinger, Inc., 512 F.3d at 532.
Accordingly, the FAC is DISMISSED without leave to amend.
Given Plaintiff’s pro se status, the court, after dismissing the FAC,
will treat the original Complaint as the operative pleading. Because the original
Complaint states some plausible claims for relief against the Eviction Defendants,
it shall be served.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the FAC is DISMISSED without leave to
amend for failure to state a claim. The U.S. Marshal is DIRECTED to serve the
6

And to the extent the FAC may be asserting a stand-alone claim against the undersigned
based on the July 11 Order, such claim is barred by judicial immunity. See Schucker v.
Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 1988 (per curiam) (“Judges are absolutely immune
from damages action for judicial acts taken within the jurisdiction of their courts.”); see also
Ashman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (“Judges . . . are absolutely
immune from damage liability for acts performed in their official capacities.”).

14

original Complaint and summons on Defendants Hunt, Wakita, Tingle, Travis,
Ishii, and Henbest at Plaintiff’s direction. Plaintiff is DIRECTED to mail a copy
of the original Complaint and the fully completed service documents to the U.S.
Marshal, as set forth below. If Defendants accept waiver of service of the
summons, they shall return the completed waiver of service documents to the U.S.
Marshal, who will file the waivers with the court. Defendants are thereafter
directed to file an Answer or other response to the original Complaint within the
time allowed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

The Clerk of Court is directed to send Plaintiff two (2) summonses,
two (2) USM-285 forms, two (2) Notice of Lawsuit and Request for
Waiver of Service of Summons forms (AO 398), two (2) Waiver of
Service of Summons forms (AO 399), and a copy of the endorsed
original Complaint. Plaintiff shall then complete the forms as
directed, and submit the following documents to the United States
Marshals Service in Honolulu, Hawaii, for service on each Defendant:
a completed USM-285 form, a copy of the endorsed original
Complaint, and a summons as to each Defendant. A set of forms is
needed for each Defendant.

15

2.

Upon receipt of these documents and a copy of this Order, the United
States Marshal shall serve on each Defendant a copy of the original
Complaint, completed Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of
Service form (AO 398) and completed Waiver of Service of Summons
form (AO 399), as directed by Plaintiff pursuant to Rule 4 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure without payment of costs.

3.

The United States Marshal is directed to retain the sealed summons
and a copy of the original Complaint for future use. The United States
Marshal shall file a returned Waiver of Service of Summons form as
well as any request for waiver that is returned as undeliverable, as
soon as it is received.

4.

If a Waiver of Service of Summons form is not returned by any
Defendant within sixty days from the date the United States Marshal
mailed the request for waiver, the United States Marshal shall:
a.

Personally serve such Defendant with the above-described
documents pursuant to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 566(c).

b.

Within ten days after personal service is effected, the United
States Marshal shall file the return of service for such
Defendant, along with evidence of any attempts to secure a
16

waiver of service of summons and of the costs subsequently
incurred in effecting service on Defendant. The costs shall be
enumerated on the USM-285 forms and shall include the costs
incurred by the Marshal’s office for photocopying additional
copies of the summons and original Complaint and for
preparing new USM-285 forms, if required. Costs of service
will be taxed against the personally served Defendant in
accordance with the provisions in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(d)(2).
5.

Plaintiff shall serve a copy of all further pleadings or documents
submitted to the court upon Defendants or their attorneys. Plaintiff
shall include, with any original paper to be filed with the Clerk of
Court, a certificate stating the date that an exact copy of the document
was mailed to Defendants or their counsel. Any paper received by a
District Court Judge or Magistrate Judge that has not been filed with
the Clerk of Court or which does not include a certificate of service
will be disregarded.

///
///
///
17

6.

Plaintiff is notified that, until service of the original Complaint has
been effected, Plaintiff should not file motions or other documents
with the court. Plaintiff is further notified that she must comply with
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules for the
District of Hawaii.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, August 4, 2017.

/s/ J. Michael Seabright
J. Michael Seabright
Chief United States District Judge

Springer v. Hunt, et al., Civ. No. 17-00269 JMS-KSC, Order: (1) Dismissing First Amended
Complaint; and (2) Directing Service of the Original Complaint

18