Springer v. Hunt et al

Filing 196

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS HUNT, WAKITA, TINGLE, TAVARES, AND ISHII'S MOTION FOR TERMINATING SANCTIONS, ECF NO. 182 Based on the foregoing, Defendants' Motion for Terminating Sanctions is DENIED. Th e parties are ORDERED to confer in good faith by June 21, 2019, to attempt to work out a schedule for Plaintiff to pay the $787.50 sanction. Any agreed upon payment schedule must be reduced to writing, signed by Plaintiff and Defendants' co unsel, and filed (by Defendants' counsel) with the court by June 28, 2019. If an agreement as to a payment schedule is not reached and Plaintiff claims that she is unable to pay all or any portion of the sanction, she must file documentation wit h the court in support of her claimed inability to pay by June 28, 2019. The parties shall attend a Status Conference on July 12, 2019, at 9:00 a.m., before Magistrate Judge Rom Trader to provide an update concerning this matter. Both parties may ap pear by telephone. Plaintiff is again warned that the court may dismiss her action sua sponte should she fail to comply with this Order and/or the federal and local rules. See Hells Canyon Preservation Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 2005). IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed by CHIEF JUDGE J. MICHAEL SEABRIGHT on 5/28/2019 (jo)COURTS CERTIFICATE of Service - Non-Registered CM/ECF Participants have been served by First Class Mail to the addresses of record listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII

RUTH-ANN SPRINGER,

Civ. No. 17-00269 JMS-RT

Plaintiff,
vs.
OFFICER BRIAN HUNT, ET AL.,

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS
HUNT, WAKITA, TINGLE,
TAVARES, AND ISHII’S MOTION
FOR TERMINATING
SANCTIONS, ECF NO. 182

Defendants.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS HUNT, WAKITA, TINGLE,
TAVARES, AND ISHII’S MOTION FOR TERMINATING SANCTIONS,
ECF NO. 182
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the court is Defendants Officer Brian Hunt, Sergeant Wakita,
Sergeant Tingle, Officer Shaine Tavares, and Officer Kenneth Ishii’s (collectively,
“Defendants”) Motion for terminating sanctions (“Motion”) for Plaintiff’s failure
to comply with an August 28, 2018 discovery order, ECF No. 124, (the “August 28
Order”). ECF No. 182. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is DENIED.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

Factual Background
This case arises from State of Hawaii foreclosure and eviction, and

subsequent criminal, proceedings against Plaintiff. Plaintiff asserts claims against

Defendants for unlawful seizure and excessive force in violation of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution and state-law claims for assault and
battery and intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress. ECF
No. 1.
The instant Motion arises from a discovery dispute and a July 10,
2018 Order compelling Plaintiff to respond to an interrogatory, produce certain
documents, and authorize the disclosure of medical information. See ECF
No. 104. The July 10, 2018 Order warned Plaintiff that failure to comply by July
24, 2018, may result in the imposition of sanctions. Id. Thereafter, Plaintiff wrote
a letter to the court and filed documents opposing disclosure of private medical
information, discussing her health condition, and/or seeking extensions of time to
meet various deadlines. See ECF Nos. 106, 110, 115, 121, 122. The court issued
orders recognizing that Plaintiff “regularly flouts rules and deadlines,” reminding
Plaintiff that she must comply with all deadlines and the Local Rules, warning that
failure to comply with the rules may result in sanctions, and advising Plaintiff that
if she wishes to obtain an extension of a particular deadline, she must submit a
formal request in advance. See ECF Nos. 107, 112, 123.
On July 31, 2018, Defendants filed a Motion for Sanctions based on
Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the July 10, 2018 Order, ECF No. 113, which
was granted in part and denied in part on August 28, 2018. ECF No. 124. The
2

August 28, 2018 Order directed Plaintiff to comply, by September 4, 2018, with
the discovery previously ordered, imposed a sanction against Plaintiff of
Defendants’ fees and costs in an amount to be determined, and directed
Defendants’ counsel to submit a declaration of the fees and costs reasonably
incurred in connection with the Motion for Sanctions. Id. at 6. The August 28,
2018 Order again warned Plaintiff that “her failure to timely comply with this
order will result in the imposition of additional sanctions, which may include
dismissal of this action,” and “encourage[d] the parties to confer regarding the
entry of a stipulated protective order” with respect to Plaintiff’s medical records.
Id. at 7. On September 14, 2018, the parties filed a Stipulated Protective Order.
ECF No. 141.
Meanwhile, on August 29, 2018, Defendants’ counsel filed his
Declaration of fees and costs, ECF No. 126, and on September 20, 2018, the court
ordered Plaintiff to pay by October 9, 2018, Defendants’ reasonably incurred fees
and costs of $787.50. ECF No. 146.
On October 11, 2018, the court stayed all proceedings until January
31, 2019, based on Plaintiff’s documented “active treatment” for a serious health
condition. ECF No. 157. On January 28, 2019, the court sua sponte extended the
stay through February 28, 2019. ECF No. 166.

3

B.

Procedural Background
On March 30, 2019, Defendants filed the instant Motion for Plaintiff’s

failure to comply with the August 28, 2018 Order. ECF No. 182. A hearing was
held on May 6, 2019, and Plaintiff appeared by telephone. ECF No. 193.
Although Plaintiff had failed to file an opposition memorandum, during the
hearing, Plaintiff stated that she did not get the Motion until that day and that she
lacks the financial ability to pay the sanction. The court granted Plaintiff leave to
file an opposition by May 20, 2019. Id. As of May 22, 2019, no opposition was
filed.
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants contend that terminating sanctions are warranted based on
Plaintiff’s “willful and repeated refusal to comply with Court directions and
deadlines,” specifically, Plaintiff’s failure to pay the sanction of $787.50 and her
repeated assertions to Defendants’ counsel that she will not pay the sanction. Mot.
at 2, ECF No. 182; Declaration of D. Kaena Horowitz ¶¶ 15-16, ECF No. 182-1.
Defendants’ counsel contends that the stay of proceedings from October 11, 2019
through February 28, 2019, “did not alter the deadline for payment,” and states that
Plaintiff has made “no attempts to contact [counsel] to settle such amounts.”
Horowitz Decl. ¶¶ 13-14. Counsel argues that “this Motion is not about the
money; it is about the principle of the matter.” Id. ¶ 18.
4

Defendants do not specify any legal authority for their Motion. 1
“Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), [however], the district court
may dismiss an action for failure to comply with any order of the court.” Ferdik v.
Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992). In determining whether dismissal
is appropriate, the court must consider five factors: “(1) the public’s interest in
expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket;
(3) the risk of prejudice to the other party; (4) the public policy favoring
disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic
sanctions.” Dreith v. Nu Image, Inc., 648 F.3d 779, 788 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Adriana Int’l Corp. v. Thoeren, 913 F.2d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir. 1990). The court
addresses these factors in turn.
A.

Public Interest in Expeditious Resolution
Generally, the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of cases

favors dismissal. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing
Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999). Here, however,
Defendants do not allege that Plaintiff’s failure to pay a court-ordered sanction has
caused any delay in resolving this action, nor does the case docket reflect delay

1

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 does not appear to apply because the Motion does
not allege that any discovery ordered by the August 28 Order remains due.
5

beyond that caused by the court-imposed stay. Thus, this factor weighs against
dismissal.
B.

The Court’s Need to Manage its Docket
This second factor—the court’s need to manage its docket—also

generally weighs in favor of dismissal. See Yourish, 191 F.3d at 990 (finding the
second factor favored dismissal where the plaintiffs’ conduct allowed them, and
not the court, to control the pace of the docket); see also Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at
642 (“It is incumbent upon the Court to manage its docket without being subject to
routine noncompliance of litigants[.]”) (citing Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1261).
Plaintiff’s failure to pay the court-ordered sanction has caused additional litigation
unrelated to the merits of this case. Thus, this factor favors dismissal.
C.

The Risk of Prejudice to Defendants
To prove the third factor, Defendants must establish that Plaintiff’s

failure to pay the court-ordered sanction has impaired their ability to proceed to
trial or has threatened to interfere with the rightful decision of this case. See
Malone v. United States Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 131 (9th Cir. 1987).
Defendants do not contend that any discovery remains outstanding. Nor do they
contend that Plaintiff’s failure to pay the sanction has impaired their ability to
proceed to trial or will interfere with the rightful decision of this case. Thus, this
favor weighs against dismissal.
6

D.

Public Policy Favoring Disposition of Cases on Their Merits
The public policy “favoring resolution of cases on their merits ‘is

particularly important in civil rights cases.’” Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138
F.3d 393, 399 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th
Cir. 1987)). Plaintiff asserts civil rights claims and therefore, this factor weighs
strongly against dismissal.
E.

Availability of Less Drastic Alternatives
During the hearing, Plaintiff indicated a willingness to comply with

court orders, but stated that she lacks the financial resources to pay the sanction.
Although the court afforded her an opportunity to oppose the motion and provide
some evidence of her inability to pay, Plaintiff failed to file such opposition.
Given Plaintiff’s representation during the hearing, however, the court finds that
ordering additional monetary sanctions may well be futile. And despite her intent
to comply with court deadlines and rules, she routinely disregards or fails to
comply. Thus, the court questions the availability of less drastic alternatives.
Nevertheless, because the parties were able to work out a stipulated protective
order regarding a prior topic in dispute, the court finds that there is a less drastic
alternative—ordering the parties to confer in an attempt to work out a payment
schedule, and if not successful, returning for a court-imposed schedule. Thus, this
factor weighs slightly against dismissal.
7

Balancing these five factors, the court finds that dismissal for
Plaintiff’s failure to pay a court-imposed monetary sanction is not warranted at this
time. Although the court is sympathetic to Defendants’ frustration with Plaintiff’s
repeated failure to comply with rules and deadlines, non-payment of a monetary
fine does not outweigh the strong public policy favoring resolution of civil rights
actions, such as this, on the merits. And Defendants do not suggest that Plaintiff’s
failure to pay the sanction impedes their ability to proceed toward a resolution on
the merits. Should Plaintiff fail to comply with future court orders in a way that
significantly alters the balance of the five factors discussed above, however,
terminating sanctions could be imposed.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ Motion for Terminating
Sanctions is DENIED. The parties are ORDERED to confer in good faith by June
21, 2019, to attempt to work out a schedule for Plaintiff to pay the $787.50
sanction. Any agreed upon payment schedule must be reduced to writing, signed
by Plaintiff and Defendants’ counsel, and filed (by Defendants’ counsel) with the
court by June 28, 2019. If an agreement as to a payment schedule is not reached
and Plaintiff claims that she is unable to pay all or any portion of the sanction, she
must file documentation with the court in support of her claimed inability to pay by
June 28, 2019. The parties shall attend a Status Conference on July 12, 2019, at
8

9:00 a.m., before Magistrate Judge Rom Trader to provide an update concerning
this matter. Both parties may appear by telephone.
Plaintiff is again warned that the court may dismiss her action sua
sponte should she fail to comply with this Order and/or the federal and local rules.
See Hells Canyon Preservation Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 683, 689
(9th Cir. 2005).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, May 28, 2019.

/s/ J. Michael Seabright
J. Michael Seabright
Chief United States District Judge

Springer v. Hunt, et al., Civ. No. 17-00269 JMS-RT, Order Denying Defendants Hunt, Wakita,
Tingle, Tavares, and Ishii’s Motion for Terminating Sanctions, ECF No. 182

9