Schuyler v. Berryhill
Filing
29
ORDER Denying Defendant's Motion To Amend and Alter The Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 59(e) re 23 . Signed by JUDGE LESLIE E. KOBAYASHI on 7/31/2019. (cib)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
SEAN PHILIP SCHUYLER,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
)
Commissioner of Social
)
Security,
)
)
Defendant.
)
_____________________________ )
CIVIL 17-00277 LEK-KSC
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO AMEND AND ALTER
THE JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. PRO. 59(E)
On September 21, 2018, this Court issued the Order
Granting Plaintiff’s Appeal and Reversing the Administrative Law
Judge’s October 15, 2015 Decision (“9/21/18 Order”).
no. 21.1]
[Dkt.
On October 19, 2018, Defendant Nancy A. Berryhill,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”),
filed her Motion to Amend and Alter the Judgment Pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. Pro. 59(e) (“Motion for Reconsideration”).
no. 23.]
[Dkt.
Plaintiff Sean Philip Schuyler (“Plaintiff”) filed his
memorandum in opposition on November 22, 2018, and the
Commissioner filed her reply on December 4, 2018.
28.]
[Dkt. nos. 27,
The Court has considered the Motion for Reconsideration as
a non-hearing matter pursuant to Rule LR7.2(e) of the Local Rules
of Practice of the United States District Court for the District
1
The 9/21/18 Order is also available at 2018 WL 4558466.
of Hawaii (“Local Rules”).
The Commissioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration is hereby denied for the reasons set forth below.
BACKGROUND
The relevant factual and procedural background of this
case is set forth in the 9/21/18 Order, which ruled on
Plaintiff’s appeal from Administrative Law Judge Jeffrey
Hatfield’s (“ALJ”) October 15, 2015 Decision (“Decision” and
“Appeal”).
The ALJ ultimately ruled that Plaintiff was not
disabled, for purposes of the Social Security Act, since
February 26, 2013.
(Decision).]
[Administrative Record (“AR”) at 12-36
This Court granted the Appeal and reversed the
Decision, ruling that the ALJ committed legal error by rejecting
Plaintiff’s testimony regarding the severity of his symptoms and
by rejecting the lay witness testimony regarding Plaintiff’s need
for one day off per week to manage his symptoms.
These errors
were not harmless and, in light of these errors, the ALJ’s
ultimate ruling that Plaintiff was not disabled was not supported
by substantial evidence.
9/21/18 Order, 2018 WL 4558466, at *13.
This Court remanded the case to the ALJ to make a determination
that Plaintiff was disabled during the period in question and to
make an award of benefits.
Id. at *14.
entered on September 21, 2018.
Final judgment was
[Dkt. no. 22.]
In the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commissioner
argues this Court should amend the judgment and affirm the ALJ’s
2
Decision because the 9/21/18 Order is based on the following
manifest errors: 1) misstatements of the findings that
William Marks, Ph.D., made regarding Plaintiff’s limitations; 2)
failure to give the deference that the substantial evidence
standard of review requires be given to an ALJ’s rulings; and
3) failure to follow the ordinary remand rule.
STANDARD
The Commissioner filed the Motion for Reconsideration
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), and it was timely filed within
twenty-eight days after the entry of judgment.
Amending a judgment after entry is “an
extraordinary remedy which should be used
sparingly.” McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253,
1255 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (per curiam).
A Rule 59(e) motion may be granted if:
(1) such motion is necessary to correct
manifest errors of law or fact upon which the
judgment rests; (2) such motion is necessary
to present newly discovered or previously
unavailable evidence;
(3) such motion is necessary to prevent
manifest injustice; or (4) the amendment is
justified by an intervening change in
controlling law.
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herron, 634 F.3d 1101, 1111
(9th Cir. 2011). In unusual circumstances, a
court may also consider other grounds for amending
or altering a judgment under Rule 59(e). Id.
(allowing amendment for clerical errors). . . .
Grandinetti v. Sells, CIV. NO. 16-00517 DKW/RLP, 2016 WL 6634868,
at *1 (D. Hawai`i Nov. 8, 2016).
Rule 59(e) motions “may not be
3
used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present
evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of
judgment.”
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 486 n.5
(2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
DISCUSSION
I.
Dr. Marks’s Opinion
The Commissioner argues this Court made a manifest
error of fact because this Court stated Dr. Marks found that
Plaintiff “would have difficulty maintaining consistent job
attendance and performance.”
See 9/21/18 Order, 2018 WL 4558466,
at *11; see also id. at *12 (making a similar statement).
The
Commissioner contends these were manifest errors because
Dr. Marks merely stated that Plaintiff “may have some difficulty
maintaining regular employment attendance on a consistent basis
as evident from past work performance,” and that Plaintiff’s
“mental health condition may negatively impact consistent work
performance.”
See Administrative Record (“AR”) at 368 (page 8 of
Dr. Marks’s Psychological Evaluation of Plaintiff, signed 7/19/13
(“Marks Report”)) (emphases added).
This Court’s first statement that Plaintiff “would have
difficulty maintaining consistent job attendance and
performance,” follows a lengthy block quote from the Marks
Report, and the block quote includes the language that the
4
Commissioner relies upon in the Motion for Reconsideration.
9/21/18 Order, 2018 WL 4558466, at *10-11.
See
Thus, this Court was
clearly aware of the specific language of the Marks Report.
This
Court’s statement that Dr. Marks opined Plaintiff “would have
difficulty maintaining consistent job attendance and performance”
was a summary of Dr. Marks’s overall opinion.
(emphasis added).
Id. at *11
That summary was based on all of the factors
addressed in the block quote from the Marks Report, including
Plaintiff’s: “‘poor interpersonal skills to work well with others
on a consistent basis’”; suspicions that others are “‘exploiting
or deceiving him’” or “‘trying to influence him’”; and
“‘difficulty listening to authority.’”
368-69).
Id. at *10 (quoting AR at
The block quote and the Marks Report as a whole support
this Court’s statement of Dr. Marks’s overall opinion.
at *11.
See id.
The second “would have difficulty” statement in the
9/21/18 Order that the Commissioner alleges was a manifest error
of fact is based upon the previous summary of Dr. Marks’s overall
opinion.
See id. at *12.
Therefore, the Commissioner’s argument
that this Court’s two “would have difficulty” statements
constitute manifest errors of fact is rejected.
The Motion for
Reconsideration is denied as to the alleged misreading of the
Marks Report.
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II.
Required Deference to the ALJ
The Commissioner next argues this Court committed a
manifest error of law by not giving the deference to the ALJ’s
rulings that the substantial evidence standard requires.
In
considering Plaintiff’s Appeal, this Court was clearly aware of
the substantial evidence standard and the deference that the
standard requires, when warranted by the administrative record.
See 9/21/18 Order, 2018 WL 4558466, at *7 (describing standards
applicable to judicial review of social security decisions).
This Court noted that a district court must “not substitute its
judgment for the ALJ’s” if “the inferences reasonably drawn from
the record would support either affirmance or reversal.”
Id.
(emphasis added) (citing Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110-11
(9th Cir. 2012)).
In this case, the record does not support
either affirmance or reversal.
In the 9/21/18 Order, this Court
concluded that:
the ALJ committed legal error because: 1) the
ALJ’s rejection of Plaintiff’s testimony regarding
the severity of his symptoms was not supported by
specific, clear and convincing reasons; and 2) the
ALJ’s rejection of the lay evidence submitted
regarding Plaintiff’s need for one day off per
week to manage his symptoms was not supported by
germane reasons.
Id. at *13.
Thus, this Court concluded that “the ALJ’s ultimate
ruling that Plaintiff was not disabled was not supported by
substantial evidence.”
Id.
The Motion for Reconsideration’s
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substantial evidence argument essentially expresses the
Commissioner’s disagreement with this Court’s ultimate conclusion
on the issue of whether Plaintiff was disabled.
A party’s mere
disagreement with a court’s prior order is not a valid basis to
grant relief pursuant to Rule 59(e).
See, e.g., United States ex
rel. Atlas Copco Compressors LLC v. RWT LLC, Civ. No. 16-00215
ACK-KJM, 2017 WL 2986586, at *2 (D. Hawai`i July 13, 2017)
(citing Leong v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 689 F. Supp. 1572, 1573 (D.
Haw. 1988) (Kay, J.)).
Further, all of the specific arguments the Commissioner
raised within the context of her argument that this Court
incorrectly applied the substantial evidence standard are
rejected.
This includes, inter alia, the Commissioner’s
arguments regarding Plaintiff’s “32-hour workweeks” and
Plaintiff’s previous full-time work.
at 10.]
[Motion for Reconsideration
All of those arguments are improper attempts to
relitigate issues that were before this Court when it originally
considered Plaintiff’s Appeal.
See Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at
486 n.5.
The Commissioner has failed to establish that this
Court committed legal error in its application of the substantial
evidence standard.
The Motion for Reconsideration is therefore
denied as to the Commissioner’s substantial evidence argument.
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III. Remand for Payment of Benefits
Finally, the Commissioner argues this Court committed
manifest error because it remanded the case for the determination
and payment of benefits, which the Commissioner contends shows
that this Court failed to follow the ordinary remand rule.
This
Court acknowledged that: 1) the ordinary remand rule applies in
social security cases; and 2) a remand for the award of benefits
is only appropriate “‘in rare circumstances, where no useful
purpose would be served by further administrative proceedings and
the record has been thoroughly developed.’”
9/21/18 Order, 2018
WL 4558466, at *13 (quoting Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1100 (9th Cir. 2014)).
This Court found
that the instant case presented such rare circumstances, and this
Court, after considering its rulings in light of the record as a
whole, exercised its discretion to remand the case for the
determination and award of benefits.
See id. at *14.
The
Commissioner merely disagrees with this Court’s analysis, and
that disagreement is not a valid ground for reconsideration.
Because the Commissioner has failed to establish that this Court
committed legal error in its analysis of the type of remand
appropriate in this case, the Motion for Reconsideration is
denied as to the Commissioner’s remand argument.
The Commissioner has therefore failed to present any
ground that warrants reconsideration of the 9/21/18 Order.
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CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, the Commissioner’s
Motion to Amend and Alter the Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
Pro. 59(e), filed October 19, 2018, is HEREBY DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAII, January 31, 2019,
/s/ Leslie E. Kobayashi
Leslie E. Kobayashi
United States District Judge
SEAN PHILIP SCHUYLER VS. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, ETC.; CV 17-00277
LEK-KSC; ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO AMEND AND ALTER THE
JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. PRO. 59(E)
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