Henry, M.D. v. The Queen's Medical Center, et al.

Filing 48

ORDER Granting Plaintiff's Motion For Voluntary Dismissal of Federal Claims and For Remand re: 36 . "The court grants Henry's motion to voluntarily dismiss his federal claims and to remand the case to state court. As a result o f the remand, this court will not address Defendants' motion for summary judgment and their motion to dismiss Henry's demand for punitive damages. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate those motions in this action, to close this case, and to send a certified copy of this order to the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, noting the state case number of Civil No. 17-1-0569-04 in the transmittal. The court's termination of Defendants' motions should not be construed as an impediment to Defendants' refiling of the motions in state court." Signed by JUDGE SUSAN OKI MOLLWAY on 6/28/2018. (cib, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
DAVID HENRY, M.D.,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
THE QUEEN’S MEDICAL CENTER;
)
KATHLEEN MAH, M.D.; LESLIE
)
CHUN, M.D.; ROBERT HONG,
)
M.D.; ROBERT OHTANI, M.D.;
)
MIHAE YU, M.D.; JOHN DOES 1)
50; JANE DOES 1-50; DOE
)
PARTNERSHIPS 1-50; DOE
)
CORPORATIONS 1-50; DOE
)
ENTITIES 1-50; and DOE
)
GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES 1-50,
)
)
Defendants.
_____________________________ )

Civ. No. 17-00397 SOM-RLP
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR VOLUNTARY
DISMISSAL OF FEDERAL CLAIMS
AND FOR REMAND

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF
FEDERAL CLAIMS AND FOR REMAND
I.

INTRODUCTION.
Plaintiff David Henry, M.D., filed a Complaint in

state court against Defendants The Queen’s Medical Center
(“QMC”); Kathleen Mah, M.D.; Leslie Chun, M.D.; Robert Hong,
M.D.; Robb Otani, M.D.; 1 Mihae Yu, M.D.; and several Doe parties,
asserting federal and state-law claims relating to the
suspension of Henry’s medical privileges at QMC.
9.

Defendants removed the case to federal court based on

federal question jurisdiction.

1

See ECF No. 7-

See ECF No. 1.

According to Defendants, the Complaint incorrectly named Robb
Ohtani, M.D., as “Robert Ohtani, M.D.” See ECF No. 46, PageID
# 634.

Henry now seeks to voluntarily dismiss his federal due
process claims pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.

Provided that the federal claims are

dismissed, Henry also seeks remand of this case to state court.
See ECF No. 36.

Defendants do not oppose dismissal of the

federal claims, but argue that they will suffer prejudice if the
case is remanded to state court.

See ECF No. 43, PageID #s 605-

06.
Opting to decide this motion without a hearing
pursuant to Local Rule 7.2(d), this court dismisses the federal
claims asserted in the Complaint given the absence of any
indication that Defendants will thereby suffer legal prejudice.
The court further declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over the remaining state-law claims.

Accordingly, the court

grants Henry’s motion for voluntary dismissal and motion for
remand.
II.

BACKGROUND.
Henry alleges that he had privileges to practice at

QMC from September 2015 until April 2016, when Mah informed
Henry that his surgical privileges were suspended.
7-9, PageID #s 228, 231.

See ECF No.

The suspension is now in effect.

ECF No. 36-1, PageID # 455.

See

Henry alleges that Defendants’ true

reason for the suspension is to drive him out of practice in
Hawaii.

See ECF No. 7-9, PageID # 232.
2

Henry also alleges

that, in suspending him, Defendants have violated QMC’s medical
staff bylaws, contravened Mah’s representations to him, and
violated section 480-2 of Hawaii Revised Statutes, as well as
his rights to fairness and due process.

See id. at 231-33.

Henry filed an initial complaint in state court in
April 2017 and an amended complaint (“Complaint”) in July 2017.
See ECF Nos. 7-3, 7-9.

The Complaint asserted the following

counts: “Breach of Contract/Promissory Estoppel” (Count I),
“Denial of Common Law Fair Procedure Rights” (Count II),
“Violations of Procedural and Substantive Due Process” (Count
III), “Intentional Interference” (Count IV), “H.R.S. Chapter
480, Unfair Competition and Methods of Com[p]etition” (Count V),
“Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress” (Count VI),
“Injunctive Relief” (Count VII), and “Declaratory Relief” (Count
VIII).

ECF No. 7-9, PageID #s 251-58.
In August 2017, Defendants removed the case to federal

court, arguing that there was federal question jurisdiction over
Henry’s due process claims and the alleged violations of the
Healthcare Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (“HCQIA”) referenced
in Counts II and III.
§ 11101 (1986). 2

See ECF No. 1, PageID #s 3-4; 42 U.S.C.

Shortly thereafter, Defendants filed their

answer to the Complaint.

2

ECF No. 6.

Over the next year, the

Specifically, the Complaint alleges violations of §§ 11111(a),
11112, and 11151(9) of the HCQIA. See ECF 7-9, PageID # 239.
3

parties participated in several settlement conferences.

See ECF

Nos. 20, 22, 33, and 35.
On May 18, 2018, both parties filed dispositive
motions.

ECF Nos. 36, 37.

Henry filed a motion for voluntary

dismissal of the federal due process claims pursuant to Rule
41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and for remand
under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

ECF No. 36.

motion for summary judgment.

ECF No. 37.

Defendants filed a
On June 20, 2018,

Defendants also filed a motion to dismiss Henry’s demand for
punitive damages.
III.

ECF No. 46.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW.
A.

Rule 41(a)(2) Voluntary Dismissal.

Rule 41(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
permits a plaintiff to dismiss an action without a court order
by filing a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves
either an answer or a motion for summary judgment.

When, as in

the present case, an opposing party has served an answer, a
plaintiff may voluntarily dismiss an action only by court order
pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2).

Rule 41(a)(2) states, “Except as

provided in Rule 41(a)(1), an action may be dismissed at the
plaintiff’s request only by court order, on terms that the court
considers proper.”
“A motion for voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2)
is addressed to the district court’s sound discretion.”
4

Stevedoring Servs. of Am. v. Armilla Int’l B.V., 889 F.2d 919,
921 (9th Cir. 1989).

“The purpose of the rule is to permit a

plaintiff to dismiss an action without prejudice so long as the
defendant will not be prejudiced, or unfairly affected by
dismissal.”

Id. (citation omitted).

Therefore, “[a] district

court should grant a motion for voluntary dismissal under
Rule 41(a)(2) unless a defendant can show that it will suffer
some plain legal prejudice as a result.”

Smith v. Lenches, 263

F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 2001) (footnote omitted).
“Legal prejudice” is “prejudice to some legal
interest, some legal claim, [or] some legal argument.”
Westlands Water Dist. v. United States, 100 F.3d 94, 97 (9th
Cir. 1996)).

Legal prejudice does not result from

“[u]ncertainty because a dispute remains unresolved” or because
“the threat of future litigation . . . causes uncertainty.”

Id.

at 96–97. “Also, plain legal prejudice does not result merely
because the defendant will be inconvenienced by having to defend
in another forum or where a plaintiff would gain a tactical
advantage by that dismissal.”

Smith, 263 F.3d at 976.

Expenses

incurred in defending a lawsuit do not amount to legal
prejudice.

Westlands Water Dist., 100 F.3d at 97.
B.

28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) Remand.

Section 1447(c) provides, in part: “If at any time
before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks
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subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”
U.S.C. § 1447(c).

28

When the federal claim that served as the

basis for removal is eliminated, either through dismissal by the
court or by a plaintiff amending his or her complaint, federal
courts have discretion to remand the remaining state claims.
Harrell v. 20th Century Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 203, 205 (9th Cir.
1991).

In addressing such a motion to remand, district courts

should consider judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and
comity.

See Carnegie–Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357

(1988).

In the usual case, “it is generally preferable for a

district court to remand remaining pendant claims to state
court.”

Harrell, 934 F.2d at 205.

IV.

ANALYSIS.
Because Defendants do not indicate that they will

suffer any legal prejudice from dismissal of the federal claims,
this court grants Henry’s Rule 41(a)(2) motion for voluntary
dismissal.

This court declines to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over Henry’s remaining state-law claims and grants
Henry’s motion for remand.
A.

Henry’s Federal Claims Are Dismissed.

Henry asks this court to dismiss his federal due
process claims, specifically “the claims in the [Complaint]
arising under the United States Constitution (portions of Counts
II, III).”

ECF No. 36-1, PageID # 461.
6

Defendants’ notice of

removal was based on Henry’s due process claims in Counts II and
III, but also on the alleged violations of HCQIA referenced in
Count III.
253.

See ECF No. 1, PageID #s 3-4; ECF No. 7-9, PageID #

In his motion, Henry clarifies that he asserts no claims

under HCQIA.

See ECF No. 36-1, PageID #s 461-62.

Rather, he

states that the Complaint’s references to HCQIA relate to
Defendants’ potential defenses.

See id.

To the extent there is

any confusion with respect to the federal claims asserted in the
Complaint, Henry makes clear that “[b]y this Motion, Plaintiff
intends to dismiss any claim that purportedly arises under
federal law.”

ECF 36-1, PageID # 456.

Defendants do not argue that they will suffer any
legal prejudice from dismissal of Henry’s federal claims.

In

fact, Defendants insist that they will suffer prejudice if the
federal claims are not dismissed.

See ECF 43, PageID #606

(“Defendants cannot argue that they will suffer ‘legal
prejudice’ unless the Court takes the extreme step of denying
Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss his baseless federal due process
claims.”).
Accordingly, the court dismisses all federal claims
asserted in Henry’s Complaint.

See Smith, 263 F.3d at 975 (“A

district court should grant a motion for voluntary dismissal
under Rule 41(a)(2) unless a defendant can show that it will

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suffer some plain legal prejudice as a result.”

Smith, 263 F.3d

at 975 (footnote omitted).
B.

The Court Declines to Exercise Supplemental
Jurisdiction Over the Remaining State–Law Claims.

Henry further seeks remand to state court, see ECF No.
36-1, PageID #s 470-71, requiring this court to consider whether
it should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining
state-law claims.
Supplemental jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion,
not of right.

See City of Chicago v. Int’l College of

Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 172 (1997); United Mine Workers of Am.
v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).

Supplemental jurisdiction

over state-law claims exists when a federal claim is
sufficiently substantial to confer federal jurisdiction, and
there is “a common nucleus of operative fact between the state
and federal claims.”

Brady v. Brown, 51 F.3d 810, 816 (9th Cir.

1995) (quoting Gilder v. PGA Tour, Inc., 936 F.2d 417, 421 (9th
Cir. 1991)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

A court may decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim if:
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of state law; (2)
the state-law claim substantially predominates over the claim or
claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction;
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it
has original jurisdiction; or (4) in exceptional circumstances,

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there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
When, as here, “the federal claims are dismissed
before trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional
sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well.”
383 U.S. at 726.

Such a dismissal is not “a mandatory rule to

be applied inflexibly in all cases.”
U.S. at 350 n.7.

Gibbs,

Carnegie–Mellon Univ., 484

“[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law

claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be
considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine--judicial
economy, convenience, fairness, and comity--will point toward
declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law
claims.”

Id.
Defendants argue that they will be prejudiced by

remand of the state-law claims and that the balance of factors
weigh in favor of the court’s exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction.

See ECF No. 43, PageID # 605-10.

They argue that

“this Court has already expended significant resources in the
multiple lengthy settlement conferences, and the Defendants have
incurred the additional expense of preparing their expert
disclosure and Motion for Summary Judgment.”
# 608.

ECF No. 43, PageID

Defendants further argue that they will be

inconvenienced by litigating in state court because they have
already filed a motion for summary judgment in this court, and
9

that Henry’s motion for remand is part of his strategy to delay
and “obstruct the peer review process” at QMC.

See id. at 609-

10.
The court disagrees that the exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction is appropriate here.

Legal prejudice does not

result from expenses incurred in defending a lawsuit, see
Westlands Water Dist., 100 F.3d at 97, or “because the defendant
will be inconvenienced by having to defend in another forum or
where a plaintiff would gain a tactical advantage,” Smith, 263
F.3d at 976.

Moreover, the case is still at a relatively early

stage; Defendants concede that they have not conducted
discovery, and trial is not scheduled to begin for several
months.

See ECF 43, PageID #s 602-03.

The fact that Defendants

have filed a motion for summary judgment is of little persuasive
value.

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and Henry’s

motions for voluntary dismissal and remand were filed on the
same day--the deadline for dispositive motions set by the court.
See ECF Nos. 31, 36, and 37.

Nothing prevents Defendants from

refiling their motion for summary judgment in state court, after
modifying the motion to reflect the dismissed federal claims.
Having dismissed the claims conferring federal
question jurisdiction, and after considering the Carnegie-Mellon
factors, this court declines to exercise supplemental

10

jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims and remands
this case to state court.
V.

CONCLUSION.
The court grants Henry’s motion to voluntarily dismiss

his federal claims and to remand the case to state court.
As a result of the remand, this court will not address
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and their motion to
dismiss Henry’s demand for punitive damages.

The Clerk of Court

is directed to terminate those motions in this action, to close
this case, and to send a certified copy of this order to the
Circuit Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, noting the
state case number of Civil No. 17-1-0569-04 in the transmittal.
The court’s termination of Defendants’ motions should not be
construed as an impediment to Defendants’ refiling of the
motions in state court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, June 28, 2018.

/s/ Susan Oki Mollway
Susan Oki Mollway
United States District Judge

David Henry, M.D. v. The Queen’s Medical Center, et al., Civ.
No. 17-00397 SOM-RLP; ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF FEDERAL CLAIMS AND FOR REMAND.

11