Dolin v. Facebook, Inc.
Filing
40
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), ECF NO. 9 . "The Clerk of Court is directed to transfer this action to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Cali fornia."IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed by CHIEF JUDGE J. MICHAEL SEABRIGHT on 2/6/2018. (afc) WRITTEN ORDER follows hearing held January 29, 2018. Minutes of hearing: ECF no. 38 . CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE< /center>Participants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
MARK D. DOLIN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Civ. No. 17-00515 JMS-RLP
ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
TRANSFER VENUE PURSUANT
TO 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), ECF NO. 9
FACEBOOK, INC.,
Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE
PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), ECF NO. 9
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the court is Defendant Facebook, Inc.’s (“Facebook” or
“Defendant”) “Motion to Transfer Venue Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) and/or
Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).” ECF No. 9. For the reasons
discussed below, the Motion is GRANTED, and the Clerk of Court is directed to
transfer this action to the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California.
II. BACKGROUND
A.
Factual Background
The Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”), alleges the following. Pro
se Plaintiff Mark D. Dolin (“Plaintiff”) registered the domain name
“www.shopfacebook.com” on April 12, 2015, and then created thousands of
unique “Pages” on Facebook that he incorporated into his development of a larger
shopping platform. TAC ¶¶ 1, 9, 16, 18, ECF No. 1-2. Beginning on August 7,
2015, Defendant “encouraged Plaintiff’s work” through phone conversations and
email communications and confirmed that Plaintiff’s shopping platform complied
with Facebook policies. Id. ¶¶ 9-10, 17, 21. Since May 29, 2015, Defendant has
received profits of $2,097.04 from Plaintiff’s shopping platform. Id. ¶ 11.
On October 3, 2016, Defendant released its own shopping platform
titled “Marketplace.” Id. ¶ 12. And on November 2, 2016, Defendant released
“Instagram Shopping.” Id. ¶ 13. Prior to Defendant’s release of these products,
Defendant never objected to Plaintiff’s use of the “www.shopfacebook.com”
domain name. Id. ¶¶ 12-13, 21.
In November and December 2016, Plaintiff received letters from
Defendant threatening a lawsuit if Plaintiff did not “cease and decist” (sic) from
using the “www.shopfacebook.com” domain. Id. ¶¶ 2, 4. Plaintiff attempted to
contact Defendant repeatedly in order to resolve this issue, but Defendant failed to
respond. Id. ¶¶ 3, 5-7. As of November 3, 2016, Defendant withdrew “tech
support” for all of Plaintiff’s “Pages” and began “altering the layout design by
removing all pictures,” thereby “making Plaintiff’s shopping platform less
desirable, less appealing and harder to navigate.” Id. ¶¶ 15-16.
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Plaintiff’s plan for his shopping platform and specific information
about how it would work were “detailed in his application for patent” and in emails
Plaintiff sent to Facebook officials prior to the release of Facebook’s Marketplace
and Instagram Shopping platforms. Id. ¶ 32. Plaintiff’s ideas were allegedly
incorporated in both of Facebook’s shopping platforms. Id. Thus, the TAC alleges
that Facebook “used . . . Plaintiff as beta testing to benefit [its] own product
releases.” Id. ¶ 29; accord id. ¶ 34. The TAC asserts claims for “negligent
interference,” fraud, and “tortious interference,” and seeks damages of $10 billion.
Id. at 13-14.
Defendant now moves to transfer this action to the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California based on a forum-selection
clause. As set forth in Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of its Motion, from
April 2015 to the present, users creating a “Page” on Facebook’s website or mobile
application were presented with a message stating “By clicking Get Started, you
agree to the Facebook Pages Terms.” Def.’s Mem. at 5-6, ECF No. 9-1; Decl. of
Michael Duffey ¶¶ 3-5, ECF No. 9-2; Def.’s Exs. A, B, ECF Nos. 9-3, 9-4. In
order to create a “Page,” a user was required to click the “Get Started” button.
Duffey Decl. ¶ 5. “On both platforms, the phrase ‘Facebook Pages Terms’ was
highlighted and hyperlinked to a webpage that posted the Pages Terms in their
entirety.” Id. ¶ 6.
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The Facebook Pages Terms in effect from April 2015 through the
present incorporate Facebook’s general terms of use, known as the “Statement of
Rights and Responsibilities” (“SRR”). Def.’s Mem. at 7; Duffey Decl. ¶ 7, Def.’s
Exs. C-F, ECF Nos. 9-4 to 9-8. The term “Statement of Rights and
Responsibilities” in the first paragraph of the Facebook Pages Terms is highlighted
and hyperlinked to a webpage that contains a copy of the SRR. Duffey Decl. ¶ 7;
Def.’s Exs. C-F. The SRR provides in part:
This Statement of Rights and Responsibilities . . . is our
terms of service that governs our relationship with users
and others who interact with Facebook, as well as
Facebook brands, products, and services, which we call
the “Facebook Services” or “Services”. By using or
accessing the Facebook Services, you agree to this
Statement . . . .
Def.’s Ex. G at 1, ECF No. 9-9. And under the section titled “Disputes,” the SRR
includes the following forum-selection clause:
You will resolve any claim, cause of action or dispute
(claim) you have with us arising out of or relating to this
Statement or Facebook exclusively in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California or a state
court located in San Mateo County, and you agree to
submit to the personal jurisdiction of such courts for the
purpose of litigating all such claims. The laws of the
State of California will govern this Statement, as well as
any claim that might arise between you and us, without
regard to conflict of law provisions.
Id. at 4.
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B.
Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed a Complaint and Amended Complaint against
Defendant in the State of Hawaii Circuit Court of the Second Circuit on September
18 and 20, 2017, respectively. ECF Nos. 1-4, 1-5. The Amended Complaint was
served on September 25, 2017. See Decl. of Michael P. Duffey ¶ 3, ECF No. 1-1.
Thereafter, Plaintiff filed both a Second Amended Complaint and the TAC. ECF
Nos. 1-2 to 1-3. On October 25, 2017, Defendant filed a timely Notice of Removal
to this court. ECF No. 1.
Defendant filed the instant Motion to Transfer Venue and/or Dismiss
on November 13, 2017. ECF No. 9. Plaintiff filed an Opposition on December 21,
2017, and numerous exhibits on December 29, 2017. ECF Nos. 24, 28. Defendant
filed a Reply on January 12, 2018. ECF No. 34. A hearing was held on January
29, 2018.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal law governs the validity, interpretation, and enforceability of
a forum-selection clause. Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 552 F.3d 1077, 1081, 1083 (9th Cir.
2009) (per curiam) (citing Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci Am., Inc., 858 F.2d 509,
513 (9th Cir. 1988)); Argueta v. Banco Mexicano, S.A., 87 F.3d 320, 324-25 (9th
Cir. 1996). Enforcement, however, is limited to mandatory forum-selection
clauses that “clearly designate[] a forum as . . . exclusive.” N. Cal. Dist. Council of
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Laborers v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 69 F.3d 1034, 1037 (9th Cir. 1995)
(declining to enforce permissive clause that did not mandate an exclusive forum);
accord Hunt Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Supreme Oil Co., 817 F.2d 75, 78 (9th Cir.
1987). The proper procedure to enforce a mandatory forum-selection clause that
specifies a different federal district is a motion to transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a). Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for W. Dist. of Tex., 134 S. Ct.
568, 579 (2013).1 Section § 1404(a) provides:
For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil
action to any other district or division where it might
have been brought or to any district or division to which
all parties have consented.
Generally, when considering a § 1404(a) motion to transfer venue, the
court “must evaluate both the convenience of the parties and various public-interest
considerations.” Atl. Marine Constr. Co., 134 S. Ct. at 581; see In re Rolls Royce
Corp., 775 F.3d 671, 677 (5th Cir. 2014) (characterizing § 1404(a) factors as “the
interest of the litigants, and the interests of the public and judicial system writ
large”). “The calculus changes, however, when the parties’ contract contains a
valid forum-selection clause, which ‘represents the parties’ agreement as to the
1
“Section 1404(a) is merely a codification of the doctrine of forum non conveniens for
the subset of cases in which the transferee forum is within the federal court system; in such
cases, Congress has replaced the traditional remedy of outright dismissal with transfer.”
Atl. Marine Constr. Co., 134 S. Ct. at 580 (clarifying that courts may still dismiss a case under
the doctrine of forum non conveniens when the forum-selection clause points to a state or foreign
jurisdiction).
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most proper forum.’” Atl. Marine Constr. Co., 134 S. Ct. at 581 (quoting Stewart
Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 31 (1988)). “A proper application of
§ 1404(a) requires that a forum-selection clause be given controlling weight in all
but the most exceptional cases.” Id. at 579 (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted). And the non-moving party bears the burden of showing that exceptional
circumstances make transfer inappropriate. Id. at 581.
Where faced with a valid forum-selection clause, Atlantic Marine
instructs courts to alter the usual § 1404(a) analysis by disregarding: (1) the
plaintiff’s choice of forum; (2) the parties’ private interests; and (3) the original
venue’s choice-of-law rules. Id. at 581-82. Rather, because the parties’ private
interests are deemed to “weigh entirely in favor of the preselected forum,” the
court “may consider arguments about public-interest factors only.” 2 Id. at 582.
And “because [public-interest] factors will rarely defeat a transfer motion, the
practical result is that forum-selection clauses should control except in unusual
cases.” Id.
This analysis, however, “presupposes a contractually valid forumselection clause.” Id. at 581 n.5. Thus, in order to defeat transfer, Plaintiff must
2
Public-interest factors include, but are not limited to, “the administrative difficulties
flowing from court congestion; the local interest in having localized controversies decided at
home; [and] the interest in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the
law.” Atl. Marine Constr. Co., 134 S. Ct. at 581 n.6 (quoting Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454
U.S. 235, 241 n.6 (1981) (alteration in Atlantic Marine).
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show that the forum-selection clause is not valid and enforceable or does not apply
to his claims, or that § 1404(a) “public-interest factors overwhelmingly disfavor a
transfer.” Id. at 579, 583.
IV. DISCUSSION
A.
The Forum-Selection Clause is Valid and Enforceable
1.
Legal Standards Regarding Validity
In the Ninth Circuit, “a forum selection clause is presumptively
valid.” Doe 1, 552 F.3d at 1083; accord Murphy v. Schneider Nat’l Inc., 362 F.3d
1133, 1140 (9th Cir. 2004). To overcome this presumption, “[t]he party
challenging the clause bears a ‘heavy burden of proof’ and must ‘clearly show that
enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause [is] invalid for
such reasons as fraud or over-reaching.’” Murphy, 362 F.3d at 1140 (quoting M/S
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972); accord, e.g., ManettiFarrow, Inc., 858 F.2d at 514 (“Forum selection clauses are prima facie valid, and
are enforceable absent a strong showing by the party opposing the clause[.]”).
“Enforcement is unreasonable and unjust if the clause results from
fraud or overreaching; if enforcing the clause would effectively deprive [Plaintiff]
8
of [his] day in court;3 or if enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of
[the forum in which the suit was filed].” Adema Tech., Inc. v. Wacker Chem.
Corp., 657 F. App’x 661, 663 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing M/S Bremen, 407 U.S. at 1213, 15, 18) (quotation marks and additional citation omitted); accord Petersen v.
Boeing Co., 715 F.3d 276, 280 (9th Cir. 2013). The Supreme Court has also stated
that a forum-selection clause may be unreasonable if the moving party failed to
give notice of the clause to the party it now seeks to bind. Carnival Cruise Lines,
Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991). These exceptions to enforceability of a
valid forum-selection clause must be construed narrowly. Argueta, 87 F.3d at 325.
2.
Application of Legal Standards to Forum-selection Clause
a.
Fraud or overreaching
To establish the invalidity of a forum-selection clause based on fraud
or overreaching, Plaintiff must “show that the inclusion of that clause in the
contract was the product of fraud or coercion.” Peterson, 715 F.3d at 282 (quoting
Richards v. Lloyd’s of London, 135 F.3d 1289, 1297 (9th Cir. 1998) (additional
citation omitted). Overreaching includes conduct “short of fraud,” Murphy, 362
F.3d at 1141, involving “undue influence” or “overweening bargaining power,”
Bremen 407 U.S. at 12.
3
Post Atlantic Marine, this consideration must be viewed as a matter of public interest,
and cannot be based on Plaintiff’s private interests. See 134 S. Ct. at 582.
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Plaintiff does not allege fraud, duress, or undue influence, but he does
suggest overreaching by contending that Defendant is a “mega corporation,” and
he is “unsophisticated” in the law. Opp’n, ECF No. 24-5 at PageID #521. But
neither “unequal bargaining power between the parties” nor the lack of opportunity
to negotiate, without more, will invalidate a forum-selection clause. Murphy, 361
F.3d at 1141 (citing Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 499 U.S. at 595). And although
Plaintiff acknowledges the existence of the forum-selection clause, to the extent he
could be asserting lack of notice at the time he created his “Pages,” such argument
fails. Courts regularly uphold forum-selection clauses in online user agreements
“when the user is given notice of the agreement by clicking a box stating ‘I agree
to the terms of the User Agreement,’ followed by a hyperlink.” Tresona
Multimedia LLC v. Legg, 2015 WL 470228, at *12 (D. Ariz. Feb. 4, 2015); see,
e.g., Segal v. Amazon.com, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1369 (S.D. Fla. 2011);
Meier v. Midwest Recreational Clearinghouse, LLC, 2010 WL 2738921, at *3
(E.D. Cal. July 12, 2010); Beard v. PayPal, Inc., 2010 WL 654390, at *3 (D. Or.
Feb. 19, 2010); cf. McKee v. Audible, Inc., 2017 WL 4685039, at *6 (C.D. Cal.
July 17, 2017) (applying same standard to arbitration clause in online terms of
service); Starke v. Gilt Groupe, Inc., 2014 WL 1652225, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24,
2014) (enforcing arbitration clause where plaintiff “was directed exactly where to
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click in order to review those terms, and his decision to click the ‘Shop Now’
button represents his assent to them”).
Here, on both the website and mobile application through which
Plaintiff created his “Pages,” a disclosure statement was located immediately
above or below (depending on the platform) the “Get Started” button. See Def.’s
Exs. A, B, ECF Nos. 9-3, 9-4. The disclosure statement read “[b]y clicking Get
Started, you agree to the Facebook Pages Terms.” Id. And the words “Facebook
Pages Terms” were highlighted and served as a hyperlink by which Plaintiff could
easily access the complete Pages Terms. Id. Further, the first paragraph of the
Pages Terms included a statement that incorporated the SRR, which was also
highlighted and available in its entirety (including the forum-selection clause) by
hyperlink. See Def.’s Exs. C-G, ECF Nos. 9-5 to 9-9. Neither the disclosure
statement nor the specific terms, including the forum-selection clause, was hidden
or otherwise withheld from Plaintiff’s consideration.
Under similar circumstances, numerous courts have found Facebook’s
SRR, and forum-selection clause to be valid. See, e.g., Franklin v. Facebook, Inc.,
2015 WL 7755670, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 24, 2015) (“The Court cannot identify a
single instance where any federal court has struck down [Facebook’s] SRR as an
impermissible contract of adhesion induced by fraud or overreaching[.]”); Fteja v.
Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 835 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (enforcing forum11
selection clause based on disclosure below “Sign Up” button); E.K.D. ex rel.
Dawes v. Facebook, Inc., 885 F. Supp. 2d 894, 900-03 (S.D. Ill. 2012) (imputing
“constructive knowledge” of the terms of the SRR to the plaintiffs and finding
Facebook’s forum-selection clause to be mandatory, reasonable, not in
contravention of public policy, and enforceable); Miller v. Facebook, Inc., 2010
WL 9525523, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 15, 2010) (same). This court agrees and finds
that Plaintiff has not shown that the forum-selection clause is invalid based on
fraud or overreaching.
b.
Plaintiff’s day in court
When considering the second Bremen factor, Atlantic Marine instructs
that courts are not to consider private interests such as cost or inconvenience. 134
S. Ct. at 582 (“When parties agree to a forum-selection clause, they waive the right
to challenge the preselected forum as inconvenient or less convenient for . . . their
pursuit of the litigation.”); see Adema Tech, Inc., 657 F. App’x at 663 (recognizing
that after Atlantic Marine, courts are precluded from considering private interests
such as financial hardship); see also Kebb Mgmt.,Inc. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.,
59 F. Supp. 3d 283, 288 (D. Mass. 2014) (“[T]he Atlantic Marine decision
unequivocally removed any consideration of private interests in the § 1404(a)
context when a forum-selection clause is present.”); Monasteiro v. appMobi, Inc.,
2014 WL 1991564, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2014) (explaining that Atlantic
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Marine precludes consideration of financial cost and inconvenience when
evaluating the second Bremen factor).
Here, Plaintiff does not contend that he would effectively be deprived
of his day in court if the forum-selection clause is enforced. Thus, the second
Bremen factor is not met.
c.
Hawaii public policy
The final Bremen factor is whether enforcement of the forumselection clause would contravene a strong Hawaii public policy. Plaintiff does not
address this factor at all. He does not allege that transfer of this action would be
contrary to any specific Hawaii law or policy. Nor does he allege that forcing him
to litigate in California, rather than in Hawaii, would deprive him of a remedy for
his claims. Thus, Plaintiff fails to establish this factor.
Based on the foregoing, the court finds that the forum-selection clause
is contractually valid.
3.
The Forum-Selection Clause Applies to Plaintiff’s Claims
When interpreting a forum-selection clause, phrases such as “arising
under,” “arising hereunder,” and “arising out of” should be construed to encompass
“only those disputes concerning ‘the interpretation and performance of the contract
itself.’” Henry v. Cent. Freight Lines, Inc., 2017 WL 4517836, at *2 (E.D. Ca.
Oct. 10, 2017) (quoting Cape Flattery Ltd. v. Titan Mar., LLC, 647 F.3d 914, 922
13
(9th Cir. 2011)). But the phrase “relating to” should be construed “more broadly.”
Id. (citing Cape Flattery Ltd., 647 F.3d at 922); cf. Manetti-Farrow, 858 F.2d at
514 (“[F]orum selection clauses can be equally applicable to contractual and tort
causes of action.”).
Here, the forum-selection clause states that Plaintiff “will resolve any
claim, cause of action or dispute (claim) . . . with [Facebook] arising out of or
relating to this [SRR] or Facebook exclusively in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California[.]” Def.’s Ex. G ¶ 15, ECF No. 9-9.
Plaintiff does not dispute that his tort claims “relate to” Facebook and
are covered by the forum-selection clause. Further, the Complaint’s allegations are
based on events related to Plaintiff’s use of Facebook to create “Pages,”
Facebook’s alleged removal of technical support and content from those “Pages,”
and Plaintiff’s use of a domain name and business name that Facebook asserts is in
violation of its Terms and/or SRR. Plaintiff’s claims both “arise out of” and
“relate to” Facebook and are therefore covered by the forum-selection clause. See
Cape Flattery Ltd., 647 F.3d at 922, see also Manetti-Farrow, 858 F.2d at 514.
Based on the foregoing, the court finds that the forum-selection clause
in Facebook’s SRR is valid, applicable to Plaintiff’s claims, and enforceable.
///
///
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B.
Transfer Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) is Warranted
Plaintiff contends that transfer is not warranted as a matter of public
policy — specifically, that people should have a chance to resolve disputes
informally without being forced involuntarily into litigation. See Opp’n at PageID
#535 (arguing that by failing to respond to Plaintiff’s attempts to resolve his claims
informally, Defendant has forced Plaintiff “unwillingly into litigation”). He
contends that because Defendant could have resolved this matter informally, it
should not be rewarded for imposing hardship on Plaintiff. Further, Plaintiff
argues that “[t]he forum selection clause . . . wasn’t . . . created for the purpose of
forcing it upon people when other remedies exist. Other remedies are simple email
communications, a conference call, any such effort where two parties can adjoin
and discuss the issue/s and possibly proceed forward acting fair and civil,
potentially reaching an agreement to resolve.” Id. And finally, Plaintiff contends
that striking (or not enforcing) the forum-selection clause “will not wreak havoc on
the entire social networking industry[,] . . . will [not] hinder the way history has
used such a clause[,] . . . will keep these giants alert and diligent in preventing such
claims from arising unnecessarily,” and would protect “Facebook and internet
users.” Id. at PageID #536.
Plaintiff’s initial contentions — that Defendant should not benefit
from its failure to resolve Plaintiff’s claims informally, and that Defendant is
15
intentionally imposing a hardship on Plaintiff — relate to the private interests of
the parties and are not permissible factors for consideration. See Atl. Marine
Constr. Co., 134 S. Ct. at 582 (stating that “a district court may consider arguments
about public interest factors only” when ruling on a transfer motion to enforce a
forum-selection clause). Nor does Plaintiff provide any authority to suggest that as
a matter of public policy, transfer is “overwhelmingly disfavor[ed]” based on a
party’s failure to engage in informal dispute resolution.
Plaintiff’s remaining contentions are purely speculative and lack any
legal authority. Plaintiff does not explain how denying enforcement of the forumselection clause “will keep these giants alert and diligent in preventing such claims
from arising unnecessarily.” Opp’n at PageID # 536. Nor does he provide context
for his statement that ignoring the forum-selection clause “will [not] hinder the
way history has used such a clause.” Id. And Plaintiff’s remaining comments
appear to be a naked attempt to refute the reasoning set forth by Miller v.
Facebook, Inc., which upheld a similar forum-selection clause:
Even if the court were to assume without deciding that
[Facebook’s Terms of Use (“TOU”)] was a contract of
adhesion, striking the forum-selection clause could wreak
havoc on the entire social-networking internet industry.
If this court were to determine that the forum-selection
clause contained in Facebook’s TOU was unenforceable,
the company could face litigation in every state in this
country and in nations around the globe which would
have potential adverse consequences for the users of
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Facebook’s social-networking site and for other internet
companies.
Id. at 1. Plaintiff does not provide any authority to support his contrary,
conclusory contention.
V. CONCLUSION
In sum, while the court is sympathetic to Plaintiff’s desire to resolve
his claims informally, he has failed to show that “public-interest factors
overwhelmingly disfavor a transfer.” Atl. Marine Constr. Co., 134 S. Ct. at 583.
The forum-selection clause is valid and enforceable, and transfer is warranted.
Accordingly, the court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Transfer Venue. The
Clerk of Court is directed to transfer this action to the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, February 6, 2018.
/s/ J. Michael Seabright
J. Michael Seabright
Chief United States District Judge
Dolin v. Facebook, Inc., Civ. No. 17-00515 JMS-RLP, Order Granting Defendant’s Motion
to Transfer Venue Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), ECF No. 9
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