Tia v. Honolulu Police Department (HPD) et al

Filing 13

ORDER (1) GRANTING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 7 , (2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, AND (3) DENYING MOTIONS FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 8 , 9 . Excerpt of order:" ;Plaintiff is granted until February 9, 2018 to file an amended complaint....Failure to file an amended complaint by February 9, 2018 will result in automatic dismissal of this action without prejudice." Signed by CHIEF JUDGE J. MICHAEL SEAB RIGHT on 1/4/2018. (afc) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). A copy of the instant order will be served with a copy of "Pro Se 15" form, the Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights, Non-Prisoner Complaint and served on January 5, 2018 by First Class Mail addressed to Mr. Peter R. Tia at his address of record.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
PETER R. TIA,

Civ. No. 17-00523 JMS-RLP
Plaintiff,

vs.
HONOLULU POLICE DEPARTMENT
(HPD); OFFICER DE CAIRES;
WALMART; TENNESSEE
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
(TDOC); FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION (FBI); FBI AGENT
RACHEL BIRD; CHRISTINA G. FUTI;
BUD BOWLES OF UNITED SELFHELP; HALAWA CORRECTIONAL
FACILITY (HCF); CAPTAIN CAL
MOCK OF HCF,

ORDER (1) GRANTING MOTION
TO PROCEED IN FORMA
PAUPERIS, (2) DISMISSING
COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO
AMEND, AND (3) DENYING
MOTIONS FOR APPOINTMENT
OF COUNSEL

Defendants.

ORDER (1) GRANTING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS,
(2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, AND
(3) DENYING MOTIONS FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
I. INTRODUCTION
On October 13, 2017, pro se Plaintiff Peter R. Tia (“Plaintiff”) filed a
Complaint against the Honolulu Police Department (“HPD” or the “City”), 1 HPD

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The court considers claims against HPD to be against the City and County of Honolulu.
See, e.g., Dowkin v. Honolulu Police Dep’t., 2010 WL 4961135, at *3 (D. Haw. Nov. 30, 2010)
(concluding that because “HPD is not an independent legal entity . . . [t]he court will treat
Plaintiff’s claims against the HPD as claims against the City”) (citations omitted).

Officer DeCaires, Walmart, Tennessee Department of Corrections (“TDOC”),
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), FBI Agent Rachel Bird, Christina F. Futi,
Bud Bowles of United Self-Help, Halawa Correctional Facility (“HCF”), and HCF
Captain Cal Mock. 2 ECF No. 1. On November 16, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Motion
to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”). ECF No. 7. And on November 30 and
December 4, 2017, Plaintiff filed virtually identical Motions for Appointment of
Counsel. ECF Nos. 8, 9. Based on the following, the court GRANTS the IFP
Motion,3 DISMISSES the Complaint with leave to amend, and DENIES the
Motions for Appointment of Counsel.
II. DISCUSSION
A.

Plaintiff’s IFP Motion Is Granted
Plaintiff’s IFP Motion indicates that beginning November 3, 2017, he

receives monthly Social Security Disability (“SSD”) payments of $664, and on
October 20, 2017, he received a one-time SSD payment of $3,951.80. IFP Motion
¶ 3; ECF No. 7-3. The IFP Motion also indicates that after paying Plaintiff’s

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The Complaint names all Defendants in their individual and official capacities. Compl.

at 1.
3

Plaintiff is a former prisoner who has accrued three strikes under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
See, e.g., Tia v. Head of the United States Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit, 2017 WL
2951423, at *1 (D. Haw. July 10, 2017). Because he is no longer incarcerated, however,
§ 1915(g)’s exception — allowing a new civil action to proceed IFP only when a prisoner is in
imminent danger of serious physical injury — does not apply.
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monthly expenses of $1,020 ($255 per week) for a room at the YMCA, $73.08 for
storage, and unspecified clothing, food, and other living expenses, he had only
$1,129 remaining in a bank account and no other assets. IFP Motion ¶¶ 1, 3, 6;
ECF Nos. 7-4, 7-6. Because Plaintiff has made the required showing under 28
U.S.C. § 1915 to proceed in forma pauperis (i.e., without prepayment of fees), the
court GRANTS Plaintiff’s IFP Motion.
B.

Plaintiff’s Complaint Is Dismissed With Leave to Amend
1.

The Complaint
As alleged in the Complaint, on September 23 and 24, 2017, Plaintiff

purchased from Walmart a smart phone and a 30-day phone card with unlimited
talk, text, and data. Compl. at 1. Plaintiff did not receive his unlimited data. Id. at
2. The rest of the Complaint is a confused, somewhat incoherent, rambling
narrative. Plaintiff alleges that “Rachel Bird of the TDOC FBI” cut off his data
because she is connected to “Plaintiff’s ex-girlfriend Christina G. Futi who does
not wish . . . to be contacted by Plaintiff.” Id. Plaintiff further alleges that on
October 9, 2017, Officer DeCaires refused to correct Walmart’s alleged breach of
contract and instead, “threatened to harm and arrest Plaintiff for complaining”
about Walmart’s alleged “illegality.” Id. at 1, 2. The Complaint alleges that
DeCaires and two unnamed HPD officers are “homosexual tomboy females” who
are part of a “homosexual mafia tied to . . . Mock.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff sued Mock
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in a separate lawsuit in 2010 for allegedly harming his “brother John Tia with
homosexual mafia injuries” that are somehow “tied [to] Plaintiff’s ex-girlfriend
Futi also a lesbian!” Id. The Complaint further alleges that Bird is a homosexual
who “abuses her law enforcement ties in behalf of all citied homosexual
defendants to break the laws and intentionally pervert the law and Plaintiff’s
safety!” Id. And Plaintiff alleges that all defendants “wish to kill [him] for
exposing . . . Mock’s perverse misconduct at HCF . . . in [a separate] lawsuit!” Id.
Finally, the Complaint alleges that Bowles “failed to provide Plaintiff gate monies
[of] $200 upon release from HCF after Plaintiff served a 10 year prison term . . .
due to [Futi] falsely arresting Plaintiff for corrupt HPD.” Id. at 2.
Plaintiff asserts claims for “breach of duty,” breach of contract, and
“government corruption.” Id. at 1-3. Plaintiff seeks a “court investigation,” an
injunction to protect him “from all Defendants and their illegalities,” compensatory
damages of $4 million, and $1.5 million in punitive damages. Id. at 4.
2.

Standards of Review
The court may dismiss sua sponte a complaint for lack of subject-

matter jurisdiction. Fiedler v. Clark, 714 F.2d 77, 78-79 (9th Cir. 1983); Belleville
Catering Co. v. Champaign Mkt. Place, L.L.C., 350 F.3d 691, 693 (7th Cir. 2003)
(“[I]nquiring whether the court has jurisdiction is a federal judge’s first duty in
every case.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). “Federal courts are courts of limited
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jurisdiction,” possessing “only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.”
United States v. Marks, 530 F.3d 799, 810 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Kokkonen v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)). Plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing subject-matter jurisdiction. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377. At the
pleading stage, Plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to show a proper basis for the
court to assert subject-matter jurisdiction over the action. McNutt v. Gen. Motors
Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); Johnson v. Columbia Props.
Anchorage, L.P., 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1).
Plaintiff is appearing pro se; consequently, the court liberally
construes the Complaint. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); see also
Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The Supreme Court has
instructed the federal courts to liberally construe the ‘inartful pleading’ of pro se
litigants.”) (citing Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam)).
The court also recognizes that “[u]nless it is absolutely clear that no amendment
can cure the defect . . . a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint’s
deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of the action.” Lucas
v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Crowley v. Bannister,
734 F.3d 967, 977-78 (9th Cir. 2013).
In addition, the court must subject each civil action commenced
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) to mandatory screening, and order the dismissal of
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any claims it finds “frivolous, malicious, failing to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, or seeking monetary relief from a defendant immune from such
relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th
Cir. 2000) (en banc) (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not only permits but
requires” the court to dismiss sua sponte an in forma pauperis complaint that fails
to state a claim); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam)
(holding that “the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to
prisoners”).
A complaint “is ‘frivolous’ where it lacks an arguable basis either in
law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (“[The] term
‘frivolous,’ . . . embraces not only the inarguable legal conclusion, but also the
fanciful factual allegation.”). When determining whether to dismiss a complaint as
“frivolous,” the court need not “accept without question the truth of the plaintiff’s
allegations.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992) (“[A] finding of
factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the
irrational or the wholly incredible.”).
And to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Weber v. Dep’t of
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Veterans Affairs, 521 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2008). This tenet — that the court
must accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint — “is
inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Accordingly,
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Rather, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Factual
allegations that permit the court to infer only “the mere possibility of misconduct”
do not show that the pleader is entitled to relief as required by Rule 8. Id. at 679.
A complaint must also meet Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8’s
requirements that a complaint include a “short and plain statement of the claim,”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and that “each allegation must be simple, concise, and
direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). A district court may dismiss a complaint for
failure to comply with Rule 8 where it fails to provide the defendant fair notice of
the wrongs allegedly committed. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1178-80
(9th Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal of complaint where “one cannot determine
from the complaint who is being sued, for what relief, and on what theory, with
enough detail to guide discovery”); cf. Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr.,
521 F.3d 1097, 1105 n.4 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding dismissal under Rule 8 was in
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error where “the complaint provide[d] fair notice of the wrongs allegedly
committed by defendants and [did] not qualify as overly verbose, confusing, or
rambling”). Rule 8 requires more than “the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation[s]” and “[a] pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(citations and quotations omitted). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders
naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (quotation signals
omitted). “The propriety of dismissal for failure to comply with Rule 8 does not
depend on whether the complaint is wholly without merit.” McHenry, 84 F.3d at
1179.
3.

Application of Standards
a.

Subject-matter jurisdiction

In general, Plaintiff may establish the court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction in one of two ways. First, Plaintiff may invoke the court’s “diversity
jurisdiction,” which applies “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of
different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). To premise jurisdiction on diversity, the
Complaint must allege both diversity of citizenship and the proper amount in
controversy. See Rilling v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 909 F.2d 399, 400-01 (9th Cir.
1990). Alternatively, Plaintiff may assert that Defendants violated the
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Constitution, a federal law, or treaty of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”).
Plaintiff failed to assert, and apparently cannot assert, the existence of
diversity jurisdiction because it appears that both Plaintiff and some Defendants
are citizens of Hawaii. The envelope in which the Complaint was mailed lists a
Honolulu address for Plaintiff, and claims against HPD and HCF (and their
employees sued in their official capacities) are considered to be against the City
and State of Hawaii, respectively. See Dowkin, 2010 WL 4961135, at *3;
Thompson v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 2017 WL 217647, at *3 (D. Haw. Jan. 18,
2017) (recognizing that a claim against HCF is against the State of Hawaii).
Plaintiff also failed to specifically identify any federal laws or rights
that were violated. Rather, the Complaint alleges only state-law claims. Thus, the
Complaint is DISMISSED for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
b.

The Complaint is frivolous

But even if the Complaint could be construed to assert a claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a general violation of some constitutional right, thereby
establishing subject-matter jurisdiction, the Complaint is frivolous. Any potential
constitutional claim is based on the fantastic, irrational, and delusional theory that
the FBI, HPD, HCF, TDOC, or their agents and officers are somehow connected to
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a “homosexual mafia” that seeks to harm Plaintiff through: (1) Bird cutting off
Plaintiff’s unlimited data plan; (2) DeCaires threatening to harm and arrest Plaintiff
rather than enforce Plaintiff’s contractual rights against Walmart; and (3) all
Defendants seeking to kill Plaintiff. Courts have routinely dismissed similarly
implausible and unsubstantiated claims as frivolous. See, e.g., Ellerbe v. U.S. Fed.
Gov’t Officials, Officers, Agents, and Emps., 2017 WL 1324898, at *2 (E.D. Pa.
Apr. 6, 2017) (dismissing without leave to amend frivolous complaint alleging vast
government conspiracy against plaintiff); Buzzell v. Skowhegan Sav. Bank, 2017
WL 149958, at *2 (D. Me. Jan. 13, 2017) (dismissing frivolous complaint where
“allegations are disjointed and largely conclusory” and fail “to give rise to any
[cognizable] cause of action”); Vidmar v. Honolulu Police Dep’t, 2016 WL
4523586, at *6 (D. Haw. Aug. 29, 2016) (dismissing as frivolous complaint
alleging that city and state agencies and officials conspired to harm Plaintiff by
failing to stop the spraying of deadly poison in her residence); Mendes v. United
States, 88 Fed. Cl. 759 (Fed. Cl.), app. dism’d, 375 F. App’x 4 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(upholding dismissal of frivolous complaint alleging that “zealot, fanatical
women” employed by the FBI and CIA used “laser beam technology” against
plaintiff); Cain v. City of Ventura, 2011 WL 4403290, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 7,
2011) (collecting cases).

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c.

The Complaint fails to state a claim

Further, the Complaint fails to state a federal civil rights claim. “To
sustain an action under § 1983, a plaintiff must show ‘(1) that the conduct
complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and
(2) that the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory
right.’” Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 556 U.S. 1256 (2009); see also West v.
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Here, the Complaint neither identifies any federal constitutional or
statutory right that was allegedly violated, nor alleges facts to support such a claim.
Accordingly, the Complaint is DISMISSED as frivolous and for
failure to state a claim.
d.

Improperly joined claims and parties

Lastly, even if the Complaint could be construed to assert subjectmatter jurisdiction and a federal civil rights claim, it would still be deficient for
failure to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The alleged incidents
forming the bases of the Complaint — Walmart’s failure to provide unlimited data,
Bird’s actions cutting off Plaintiff’s unlimited data, DeCaires’ threat to harm
and/or arrest Plaintiff for complaining about Walmart’s failure to provide
unlimited data, Bowles’ failure to provide “gate monies” upon Plaintiff’s release
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from prison, an alleged “homosexual mafia,” Mock’s harm to Plaintiff’s brother,
Bird’s alleged abuse of her law enforcement ties, and all Defendants’ “wish to kill
. . . Plaintiff for exposing Mock’s perverse misconduct at HCF” in a separate
lawsuit — are not all related in terms of time and location, and involve individuals
who are not mutually responsible for all incidents. Thus, the Complaint appears to
violate Rules 18 and 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Under Rule 18(a), governing joinder of claims, a plaintiff may bring
multiple claims, related or not, in a lawsuit against a single defendant. To name
different defendants in the same lawsuit, however, a plaintiff must satisfy Rule 20,
governing joinder of parties. Under Rule 20(a)(2), permissive joinder of multiple
defendants in a single lawsuit is allowed only if: (1) a right to relief is asserted
against each defendant that relates to or arises out of the same transaction or
occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences; and (2) any question of law or
fact common to all defendants will arise in the action. Unrelated claims involving
different defendants belong in different suits. See Woods v. City of L.A., 2017 WL
5634105, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2017) (citing George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605,
607 (7th Cir. 2007)); Pitts v. Tuitama, 2017 WL 1731681, at *4 (D. Haw. May 2,
2017) (citing cases).
Plaintiff’s Complaint involves incidents that do not arise from the
same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences, and they
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clearly involve separate acts done by different individuals. Plaintiff’s attempt to tie
the alleged facts together through allegations of a “homosexual mafia” flies in the
face of common sense and this court’s judicial experience. That is, Plaintiff’s
interpretation does not meet Iqbal’s standard of plausibility. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
679-80.
Because Plaintiff’s unrelated allegations against numerous Defendants
cannot be joined in the same action, the Complaint is DISMISSED.
4.

Leave to Amend
This dismissal is without prejudice, and Plaintiff is granted leave to

amend. If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, he should write short,
plain statements telling the court: (1) the treaty, constitutional right, or statutory
right Plaintiff believes was violated; (2) the specific basis of this court’s
jurisdiction; (3) the name of the defendant who violated that right; (4) exactly what
that defendant did or failed to do; (5) how the action or inaction of that defendant
is connected to the violation of Plaintiff’s rights; and (6) what specific injury
Plaintiff suffered because of that defendant’s conduct. Plaintiff should repeat this
process for each person or entity that he names as a defendant. If Plaintiff fails to
affirmatively link the conduct of each named defendant with the specific injury he
suffered, the allegation against that defendant will be dismissed for failure to state

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a claim. Further, any amended complaint must comply with Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 8, 18 and 20.
5.

Supplemental Jurisdiction over State-Law Claims
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), “district courts may decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over [state-law claims] if . . . the district court has
dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction[.]” Because the
Complaint fails to allege any basis for diversity jurisdiction and fails to state a
federal claim, the court does not address Plaintiff’s state-law claims.
If Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint, the court will decline
jurisdiction over the state-law claims pursuant to § 1367(c) and dismiss them
without prejudice. See City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156,
173 (1997) (“[W]hen deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, ‘a
federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the
litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.’”
(quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988))). “[I]n the
usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance
of factors will point towards declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining
state-law claims.” Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 1997)
(en banc).

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If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint that states a
cognizable federal claim against a Defendant, however, the court will retain
jurisdiction over related state-law claims included in the amended complaint and
address them at that time.
C.

Motions for Appointment of Counsel
Plaintiff seeks appointed counsel to assist him with this action as well

as numerous other issues he has with matters not connected to this case. For
example, he refers to HPD incident reports in which he reported a stolen bike and
documented a patent attorney’s failure to help Plaintiff with an invention. ECF
Nos. 8-2, 9-2. Plaintiff states that he dropped out of high school and lacks funds
and a stable place to live. ECF Nos. 8 at 1, 9 at 1.
Generally, a civil litigant has no right to counsel. See Palmer v.
Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Storseth v. Spellman, 654 F.2d
1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981)). However, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), the
court “may under ‘exceptional circumstances’ appoint counsel for indigent civil
litigants.” Id.; see also Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th
Cir. 2004) (“The decision to appoint such counsel is . . . granted only in
exceptional circumstances.”). In determining whether “exceptional circumstances”
exist, the court must consider a litigant’s “‘likelihood of success on the merits as
well as the [litigant’s] ability . . . to articulate his claims pro se in light of the
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complexity of the legal issues involved.’” Palmer, 560 F.3d at 970 (quoting
Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983)). Difficulties that any litigant
proceeding pro se would face “‘do not indicate exceptional factors.’” Johnson v.
Young, 2016 WL 923094, at *2 (D. Nev. Mar. 10, 2016) (quoting Wood v.
Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990)).
Here, Plaintiff has not demonstrated “exceptional circumstances.”
Although Plaintiff may be ill-equipped to articulate his claims pro se, he is highly
unlikely to succeed on the merits of his claims. Plaintiff’s claims are based largely
on the irrational theory that federal, state, and city agents and officers are
connected to a “homosexual mafia” that is threatening, and has threatened, to harm
and/or kill Plaintiff. Such claims are fanciful. Thus, the Motion for Appointment
of Counsel is DENIED.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the court (1) GRANTS the IFP Motion;
(2) DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint as frivolous, for failure to state a claim, and
for failure to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and (3) DENIES
the Motions for Appointment of Counsel. Plaintiff is granted until February 9,
2018 to file an amended complaint.
An amended complaint will supersede the Complaint and must be
complete in itself without reference to prior superseded pleadings. E.g., King v.
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Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987), overruled in part by Lacey v. Maricopa
Cty., 693 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc)). An amended complaint must state
that it is the “Amended Complaint,” and must be retyped or rewritten in its entirety
— it may not incorporate any part of the original Complaint merely by reference.
Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1992). Failure to file an amended
complaint by February 9, 2018 will result in automatic dismissal of this action
without prejudice.
To assist Plaintiff to comply with this order, the Clerk of Court is
DIRECTED to send Plaintiff a copy of the court’s non-prisoner pro se civil rights
complaint form.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, January 4, 2018.

/s/ J. Michael Seabright
J. Michael Seabright
Chief United States District Judge

Tia v. Honolulu Police Dept., et al., Civ. No. 17-00523 JMS-RLP, Order (1) Granting Motion to
Proceed In Forma Pauperis, (2) Dismissing Complaint With Leave to Amend, and (3) Denying
Motions for Appointment of Counsel

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