Rigsbee v. Honolulu, City & County of

Filing 176

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND DEFENDANT'S AMENDED ANSWER (ECF NO. 129 ) re 151 - Signed by JUDGE HELEN GILLMOR on 2/28/2019. (emt, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
CLIFFORD MCARTHUR RIGSBEE, as
Personal Representative of the
Estate of Clifford Meredith
Rigsbee, deceased,

)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU,
)
)
Defendant.
)
)
_________________________________

Civ. No. 17-00532 HG-RT

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU’S MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO AMEND DEFENDANT’S AMENDED ANSWER (ECF No. 129)
This is a maritime action relating to the death of Clifford
Meredith Rigsbee following an accident on June 14, 2016.
The decedent was engaged in rescue watercraft training as
part of his duties as a firefighter with the Honolulu Fire
Department.

During the ocean training, the decedent suffered

blunt force injury to his head and neck.

He died two days later

as a result of his injuries.
On October 23, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Complaint.
On December 18, 2017, Defendant filed its Answer.
On May 17, 2018, Plaintiff filed the First Amended
Complaint.
On May 31, 2018, Defendant filed its Answer to First Amended

1

Complaint.
On June 4, 2018, Defendant filed its Amended Answer to the
First Amended Complaint.
More than eight months later and five weeks before trial, on
February 6, 2019, Defendant filed a Motion seeking to amend its
Amended Answer.
Defendant seeks to amend its answer to allow it to assert an
affirmative defense pursuant to the Exoneration and Limitation of
Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501-30512.

Defendant claims that

pursuant to this affirmative defense its limitation on liability
is capped at the value of the rescue watercraft at issue in this
case.
Defendant’s Motion for Leave to Amend Defendant’s Amended
Answer (ECF No. 129) is DENIED.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 23, 2017, Plaintiff Clifford McArthur Rigsbee, as
Personal Representative of the Estate of Clifford Meredith
Rigsbee, deceased, filed a Complaint.

(ECF No. 1).

On December 18, 2017, Defendant filed its Answer.

(ECF No.

21).
On December 21, 2017, the Magistrate Judge issued a Rule 16
Scheduling Order.

(ECF No. 23).

On January 29, 2018, Plaintiff filed PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO

2

STRIKE DEFENDANT’S SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (FOR ASSUMPTION OF
RISK) (ECF No. 27).
On February 8, 2018, the Parties signed a STIPULATION TO
DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE THE SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF
DEFENDANT CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU’S ANSWER TO COMPLAINT,
FILED ON DECEMBER 18, 2017.

(ECF No. 30).

On February 14, 2018, the Court signed the Stipulation and
Order agreed to by the Parties.

(Id.)

On May 17, 2018, Plaintiff filed the FIRST AMENDED
COMPLAINT.

(ECF No. 36).

On May 31, 2018, Defendant filed DEFENDANT CITY AND COUNTY
OF HONOLULU’S ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT.

(ECF No. 37).

On June 4, 2018, Defendant filed DEFENDANT CITY AND COUNTY
OF HONOLULU’S AMENDED ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT.

(ECF

No. 38).
On July 18, 2018, Plaintiff filed PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
DISPOSITIVE RULINGS UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 16 AND 56(a) REGARDING
AVAILABILITY OF HEDONIC DAMAGES and a Concise Statement of Facts
in Support.

(ECF Nos. 48 and 49).

On the same date, Plaintiff filed PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
DISPOSITIVE RULINGS UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 16 AND 56(a) REGARDING
THE ESTATE’S SURVIVAL-CLAIM FOR FUTURE LOST EARNINGS and a
Concise Statement of Facts in Support. (ECF Nos. 50 and 51).
On August 7, 2018, Defendant filed DEFENDANT CITY AND COUNTY

3

OF HONOLULU’S STATEMENT OF NO POSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
DISPOSITIVE RULINGS UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 16 AND 56(a) REGARDING
THE ESTATE’S SURVIVAL-CLAIM FOR FUTURE LOST EARNINGS.

(ECF No.

57) (emphasis added).
On the same date, Defendant filed DEFENDANT CITY AND COUNTY
OF HONOLULU’S STATEMENT OF NO POSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
DISPOSITIVE RULINGS UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 16 AND 56(a) REGARDING
THE AVAILABILITY OF HEDONIC DAMAGES.

(ECF No. 58) (emphasis

added).
On September 18, 2018, the Magistrate Judge issued a
STIPULATION EXTENDING EXPERT DISCLOSURES AND DISCOVERY DEADLINES.
(ECF No. 77).
On September 27, 2018, Defendant filed DEFENDANT CITY AND
COUNTY OF HONOLULU’S MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL AND PRETRIAL
DEADLINES.

(ECF No. 80).

On October 2, 2018, Plaintiff filed an Opposition to
Defendant’s Motion to Continue.

(ECF No. 89).

On October 15, 2018, the Court held a hearing.

The Court

GRANTED DEFENDANT CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU’S MOTION TO
CONTINUE TRIAL AND PRETRIAL DEADLINES.

(ECF No. 101).

On October 16, 2018, the Court issued an ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DISPOSITIVE RULINGS UNDER FED. R. CIV. P.
16 AND 56(a) REGARDING THE AVAILABILITY OF HEDONIC DAMAGES AND
GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DISPOSITIVE RULINGS UNDER FED. R.
4

CIV. P. AND 56(a) REGARDING THE ESTATE’S SURVIVAL-CLAIM FOR
FUTURE LOST EARNINGS.

(ECF No. 99).

On November 2, 2018, Defendant filed DEFENDANT CITY AND
COUNTY OF HONOLULU’S MOTION TO CONTINUE EXPERT DISCLOSURE
DEADLINE.

(ECF No. 102).

On November 26, 2018, the Court held a hearing and it denied
Defendant’s Motion to Continue Expert Disclosure Deadline.
No. 112).

(ECF

The Court extended the discovery deadline at

Defendant’s request for limited purposes.

(Id.)

On January 29, 2019, the Magistrate Judge held a Final
Pretrial Conference.

(ECF No. 124).

On February 6, 2019, Defendant filed DEFENDANT CITY AND
COUNTY OF HONOLULU’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND DEFENDANT’S
AMENDED ANSWER.

(ECF No. 129).

On February 14, 2019, Plaintiff filed PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION
TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND.

(ECF No. 134).

On February 19, 2019, Defendant filed DEFENDANT CITY AND
COUNTY OF HONOLULU’S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION
FOR LEAVE TO AMEND DEFENDANT’S AMENDED ANSWER.

(ECF No. 148).

On February 21, 2019, the Court held a hearing on
Defendant’s Motion for Leave to Amend.

5

STANDARD OF REVIEW
FED. R. CIV. P. 16
A party that seeks leave to amend his or her pleading after
the deadline for filing such a motion has passed must first
establish that there is good cause to amend the scheduling order
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4).

In re

Western States Wholesale, 715 F.3d 716, 737 (9th Cir. 2013);
Siliga v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., 637 Fed. Appx. 438, 440
(9th Cir. 2016).
Rule 16(b)(4) provides that a scheduling order may be
amended only “for good cause.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4).

Unlike

Rule 15(a)’s liberal amendment policy which focuses on the bad
faith of the party seeking to interpose an amendment, the Rule
16(b)(4) good cause standard primarily considers the diligence of
the party seeking the amendment.

Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations,

Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992) (emphasis added).

FED. R. CIV. P. 15
If a party establishes good cause to amend the scheduling
order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4), the party must also
meet the standard to allow for amendment of the pleading as set
forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
A party may amend its pleading before trial with the
6

opposing party’s consent or the court’s leave pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(a).

The rule states that the court should freely give

leave to amend when justice so requires.
15(a)(2).

Fed. R. Civ. P.

Courts consider bad faith, dilatory motive on the

movant’s part, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, and
futility in reviewing a party’s request to amend a pleading
pursuant to Rule 15(a).

In re Morris, 363 F.3d 891, 894 (9th

Cir. 2004).
ANALYSIS
This maritime action involves the June 14, 2016 accident
that resulted in the death of Clifford Meredith Rigsbee.
More than a year and a half after proceedings commenced and
five weeks before trial, Defendant seeks to raise an affirmative
defense pursuant to the federal Exoneration and Limitation of
Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501-30512 (“Limitation of Liability
Act”) for the first time.
Defendant’s Motion is untimely, would unduly delay trial,
and severely prejudice the Plaintiff.
I.

Defendant’s Motion for Leave to Amend Its Amended Answer Is
Untimely
As a preliminary matter, Defendant cites Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 15 as the rule governing its Motion For Leave to
Amend its Amended Answer.

(Def.’s Motion at p. 2, ECF No. 1297

1).

Defendant is incorrect.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16

governs Defendant’s Motion for Leave to Amend its Answer.
A party may seek to amend its pleadings pursuant to the
standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 only if it files a motion to amend
before the deadline set forth in the Rule 16 Scheduling Order.
The December 21, 2017 Rule 16 Scheduling Order set the
deadline for either party to file a Motion to Amend its
Pleadings.
2018.

The Scheduling Order set the deadline for May 18,

(Rule 16 Scheduling Order at p. 2, ECF No. 23).

Defendant filed its Motion for Leave to Amend its Amended
Answer on February 6, 2019, nearly nine months after the Rule 16
deadline.

(Def.’s Motion, ECF No. 129).

In such instances, the party must first establish good cause
to amend the scheduling order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
16(b)(4) before turning to the Rule 15 inquiry for amending the
pleading.

In re Western States Wholesale, 715 F.3d 716, 737 (9th

Cir. 2013).
Here, Defendant must first demonstrate good cause to amend
the scheduling order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b) before the
Court may evaluate if amendment is appropriate pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 15(a).
II.

Defendant Has Not Established Good Cause Pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 16(b)
The Rule 16(b) good cause inquiry focuses on the diligence
8

of the party seeking to modify the scheduling order.

Zivkovic v.

S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002).

The

pretrial schedule may be modified if the deadline could not have
been reasonably met despite the diligence of the party seeking
the extension.

Id. (citing Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc.,

975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992)) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
Defendant utterly failed to address Rule 16 and the good
cause inquiry in its February 6, 2019 Motion.

(Def.’s Motion and

Memorandum, ECF No. 129, 129-1).
On February 19, 2019, two days before the scheduled hearing
on the motion, Defendant filed a Reply without leave of Court.
(ECF No. 148).

In Defendant’s Reply, it states the following

regarding Rule 16 and the good cause inquiry:
First, in keeping with the purposes of the rule, good
cause exists to determine the issue of Defendant’s
Limitation of Liability Act defense on the merits in
the interests of judicial economy and to allow for the
comprehensive disposition of Plaintiff’s cause of
action and any defenses thereto. In the likely event
of appeal, a developed record addressing all questions
in this matter will further judicial economy.
(Def.’s Reply, at pp. 2-3, ECF No. 148).
Defendant misunderstands the good cause standard required to
amend a scheduling order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16.

Rule 16

is designed to prevent parties from benefitting from
carelessness, unreasonability, or gamesmanship.

In re Cathode

Ray Tube Antitrust Litigation, 2014 WL 4954634, *2 (N.D. Cal.
9

Oct. 1, 2014) (citing Orozco v. Midland Credit Mgmt. Inc., 2013
WL 3941318, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 30, 2013)).

Defendant cites no

authority for its position that a defendant should be able to
assert any defense on the eve of trial without notice to the
plaintiff as long as it is in the interest of judicial economy.
Diligence of the party seeking amendment is the critical
issue in the good cause determination.

The diligence required

for a showing of good cause has two parts:
(1)

diligence in discovering the basis for amendment; and,

(2)

diligence in seeking amendment once the basis for
amendment has been discovered.

Positive Techs., Inc. v. Sony Elecs., Inc., 2013 WL 322556,
at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2013).
Defendant has already been granted a continuance of trial
and multiple continuances of the discovery deadline and the
expert disclosure deadline.

(Stipulation Extending Expert

Disclosures and Discovery Deadlines, ECF No. 77; Minutes Granting
Defendant’s Motion to Continue, ECF No. 101; Stipulation and
Order Extending Date for Deposition, ECF No. 118).
The Court has previously ruled that Defendant has not been
diligent in this case.

(Minutes from November 26, 2018, denying

Defendant’s Motion to Continue Expert Disclosure Deadline due to
the Defendant’s lack of diligence, ECF No. 112).
Defendant has not addressed its own diligence for seeking
amendment to its Amended Answer to the First Amended Complaint.
10

The record demonstrates that Defendant has not been diligent.
Proceedings commenced on October 23, 2017, when Plaintiff
filed the Complaint.
Two months later, on December 18, 2017, Defendant City and
County of Honolulu filed its Answer.

Defendant did not assert an

affirmative defense pursuant to the Limitation of Liability Act
in its December 18, 2017 Answer.
On December 21, 2017, the Magistrate Judge held a Rule 16
Scheduling Conference.

(ECF No. 22).

The Magistrate Judge set a

deadline of May 18, 2018 for the filing of any motion to amend
the pleadings.

(ECF No. 23).

Five months later, on May 17, 2018, Plaintiff filed a First
Amended Complaint.

(ECF No. 36).

Defendant subsequently filed its Answer to the First Amended
Complaint two weeks later on May 31, 2018.

(ECF No. 37).

Defendant did not plead an affirmative defense pursuant to the
Limitation of Liability Act in its Answer to the First Amended
Complaint.
Defendant again amended its Answer to the First Amended
Complaint a few days later on June 4, 2018.

(ECF No. 38).

Once again, Defendant did not raise an affirmative defense
pursuant to the Limitation of Liability Act.
Five weeks before trial, on February 6, 2018, for the first
time, Defendant seeks to assert an affirmative defense pursuant

11

to the Limitation of Liability Act.

(Def.’s Motion for Leave to

Amend Answer, ECF No. 129).
As Plaintiff correctly asserts, Defendant “offers no
reason” why it failed to comply with the May 18, 2018 deadline
for seeking to amend its pleadings.

(Pla.’s Opp. at p. 3, ECF

No. 134).
The basis for Defendant’s defense would have been
discoverable from the initiation of these proceedings.

The

Limitations of Liability Act is commonly asserted in maritime
cases.
A shipowner can assert the right to limitation of liability
in two ways: (1) by filing a pre-emptive petition for limitation
of liability pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 30511 or (2) by pleading
limitation of liability as an affirmative defense in the answer
to an existing complaint.

Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Barge W-701,

654 F.2d 1164, 1173 (5th Cir. 1981); see Cape Flattery v. Titan
Maritime LLC, 2012 WL 3113168, *8-*9 (D. Haw. July 31, 2012).
Defendant did not timely comply with either mechanism for
invoking the Limitation of Liability Act defense.

There can be

no dispute that Defendant had notice of the potential
availability of the defense since proceedings commenced in
October 2017.

Defendant has not been diligent in pleading the

affirmative defense and not diligent in seeking amendment of the
scheduling order to plead the defense.

12

Defendant had multiple opportunities to include the defense.
Defendant filed three separate answers:
(1)

Defendant’s Answer to the Complaint on December 18,
2017 (ECF No. 21);

(2)

Defendant’s Answer to the First Amended Complaint on
May 31, 2018 (ECF No. 37); and,

(3)

Defendant’s Amended Answer to the First Amended
Complaint on June 4, 2018 (ECF No. 38).

Defendant has not provided any reasons, let alone good
cause, for its failure to include the affirmative defense that it
now seeks to plead.
The record establishes that Defendant was given notice,
early in the litigation, that there were issues concerning its
pleading of affirmative defenses.

On January 29, 2018, Plaintiff

filed a Motion to Strike Defendant’s Seventh Affirmative Defense.
(ECF No. 27).

Plaintiff sought to exclude Defendant’s defense

for assumption of risk.

(Id.)

On February 8, 2018, the Parties signed a STIPULATION TO
DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE THE SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF
DEFENDANT CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU’S ANSWER TO COMPLAINT.
(ECF No. 30).

On February 14, 2018, the Court signed the

Stipulation and Order.

(Id.)

Defendant also had the opportunity to file an Opposition to
Plaintiff’s two motions for summary judgment concerning the
damages available in this case.

Defendant did not respond to

Plaintiff’s Motions by raising a Limitation on Liability defense.
13

Rather, Defendant did not oppose Plaintiff’s Motions for Summary
Judgment.
Defendant waited until February 6, 2019, almost a year and a
half after proceedings commenced and mere weeks before trial, to
attempt to seek to plead such a defense.
Defendant has failed to establish good cause to amend the
scheduling order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16.
III. Defendant Has Not Established Amendment Is Appropriate
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 15(a)
Even if the Court found good cause to excuse Defendant’s
untimeliness under Rule 16, Defendant must demonstrate that leave
to amend its pleading is warranted pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 15(a).
Rule 15(a) policy favors amendment and is applied liberally
in the Ninth Circuit.

Johnson, 975 F.2d at 607.

The Rule

provides that permission to amend “should be granted unless
amendment would cause prejudice to the opposing party, is sought
in bad faith, is futile, or creates undue delay.”

Id.

Defendant claims that its amendment and assertion of a new
defense five weeks before trial would not prejudice Plaintiff and
would not create undue delay in the trial.
Defendant’s argument is not well taken.

Defendant seeks to

cap its own liability at the value of the water rescuecraft
involved in the accident on June 18, 2016.
14

Its assertion that

this liability limit would not prejudice Plaintiff or delay trial
misconstrues the Limitation of Liability Act.
A.

Limitation Of Liability Act of 1851

The Limitation of Liability Act was designed to limit the
financial liability of a shipowner to the value of the vessel and
its freight.

In re UFO Chuting of Hawaii, Inc., 233 F.Supp.2d

1254, 1256-57 (D. Haw. 2001).

The United States Supreme Court

explained that the object of the law was to encourage
shipbuilding and to induce investment in this branch of industry.
Norwich & N.Y. Trans. Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. 104, 121 (1871).
The statute was enacted in 1851.

Many cases have criticized

the Act as “hopelessly anachronistic.”

Hawaiian Watersports,

LLC, Civ. No. 07-617 ACK-BMK, 2008 WL 3065381, *2 (D. Haw. Feb.
29, 2008) (citing Keys Jet Ski, Inc. v. Kays, 893 F.2d 1225, 1228
(11th Cir. 1990) and collecting cases).
The Limitation of Liability Act limits the shipowner’s
liability.

The Act provides limitations either because of the

unseaworthiness of the shipowner’s vessel or due to the
negligence of the vessel’s crew.

In re BOWFIN M/V, 339 F.3d

1137, 1137 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).

The Limitation of

Liability Act does not apply if the condition of unseaworthiness
or the act of negligence was within the shipowner’s privity or
knowledge.

Id.

15

B.

Allowing The Late Affirmative Defense Would Prejudice
Plaintiff And Delay Trial

A key issue for determining the applicability of the
Limitation of Liability Act is the existence of privity or
knowledge of the vessel owner pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 30506(a).
A shipowner has privity if he personally participated in the
negligent conduct or brought about the unseaworthy condition.
Knowledge, when the shipowner is a corporation, is judged not
only by what the corporation’s managing officers actually knew,
but also by what they should have known with respect to
conditions or actions likely to cause the loss or injury.
Pennzoil Producing Co. v. Offshore Exp., Inc., 943 F.2d 1465,
1473-74 (5th Cir. 1991).
Extensive discovery may be required to address not only the
issue of privity and knowledge of the managing officers of a
corporation but also questions regarding the vessel itself.

In

re Kaufman, 2015 WL 1529850, *995 (E.D. N.Y. Mar. 31, 2015)
(explaining that “privity and knowledge are issues involving some
degree of culpability that cannot be determined as a matter of
law without discovery”); Kahue v. Pac. Environmental Corp., 834
F.Supp.2d 1039, 1059 (D. Haw. 2011) (denying summary judgment due
to questions of fact presented in evidence as to the
corporation’s supervisors and vice presidents as to their
knowledge and privity for purposes of the Limitation Of Liability

16

Act); see In re RQM, LLC., 2011 WL 98472, *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12,
2011) (ordering discovery on the issue of “privity or knowledge”
for purposes of 46 U.S.C. § 30505).
The use of the defense is further complicated in this case
as the owner of the rescue watercraft was the City and County of
Honolulu and not a corporation or one individual.
Discovery in this case closed on December 20, 2018, more
than two months ago, after it was extended at the Defendant’s
request.

(Minutes from November 26, 2018, ECF No. 112).

Motions

in Limine have already been filed and deposition designations
have been provided to the Court in preparation for trial.
Allowing Defendant to assert this untimely defense would not only
require delay of trial but it would require the Court to reopen
discovery.

Doing so would not only increase litigation costs for

Plaintiff but would also create delay in potential recovery from
Defendant.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that a need
to reopen discovery and therefore delay the proceedings results
in prejudice supporting the denial of a delayed motion to amend
pleadings.

Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194

F.3d 980, 986 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Solomon v. N. Am. Life And
Cas. Ins. Co., 151 F.3d 1132, 1139 (9th Cir. 1998).
Here, there are questions of whether the Limitations of
Liability Act would even apply to the case.

17

The Parties have not

briefed the issues nor have they conducted any discovery
contemplating the complex issues and requirements set forth in
the statute.

If Defendant was able to assert the defense, it

would require a substantial delay in proceedings and the need to
reopen discovery.

The addition of such an untimely defense would

result in prejudice to Plaintiff.

The amendment is not

appropriate even under Defendant’s wish to rely on Fed. R. Civ.
P. 15.

Zivikovic, 302 F.3d at 1087.

CONCLUSION
Defendant City and County of Honolulu’s Motion for Leave to
Amend Defendant’s Amended Answer (ECF No. 129) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 28, 2019, Honolulu, Hawaii.

Clifford McArthur Rigsbee as Personal Representative of the
Estate of Clifford Meredith Rigsbee, deceased v. City and County
of Honolulu; Civ. No. 17-00532 HG-RT; ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT
CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
DEFENDANT’S AMENDED ANSWER (ECF No. 129)
18