Jaentsch v. Puha et al

Filing 11

ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT IN PART AND SECOND REQUEST TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS re 8 , 10 - Signed by JUDGE HELEN GILLMOR on 6/1/2018. (1) Claims in Counts II and III of the FAC, as alleged under the Fourth Amendment against Defendants Raquel Taguchi and Yumi Suzuki in their individual capacities, state a plausible claim for relief and may be served. (2) Claims against Taguchi and Suzuki in their official capacities are DISMISSED with prejudice. (3 ) Claims against all Defendants under HRS §§ 708 810 to 708 814 are DISMISSED with prejudice. (4) Claims against Taguchi and Suzuki under the Fourteenth Amendment, and all claims alleged against Defendant Puha in Count I are DISMISS ED. (5) The Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs is DISMISSED as moot. (6) The Court will issue a separate service order with directions for serving the the FAC, Counts II and III, as limited by this Order, on Defendants Taguchi and Suzuki. (emt, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
KEONI RICHARD JAENTSCH,
#A1019833,

)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
PATTIE-ANN K. PUHA, RAQUEL )
TAGUCHI, YUMI SUZUKI,
)
)
Defendants,
)
__________________________ )

NO. 1:18- cv-00073 HG -KSC
ORDER DISMISSING FIRST
AMENDED COMPLAINT IN PART
AND SECOND REQUEST TO
PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT IN PART AND
SECOND REQUEST TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Keoni
Jaentsch’s first amended complaint (“FAC”) and second
request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”).
8, 10.

ECF Nos.

Jaentsch brings this action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Pattie- Ann K. Puha,
Raquel Taguchi, and Yumi Suzuki (“Defendants”).1
Jaentsch alleges that Defendants violated federal and
state laws when Puha and Taguchi allegedly entered his

1

Puha is a private party named in her individual capacity.
Taguchi and Suzuki are Hawaii Department of Human Services
(“DHS”), Child Welfare Services (“CWS”) employees, and are named
in their individual and official capacities.
1

home without his consent while he was incarcerated at
the Oahu Community Correctional Center (“OCCC”), and
Suzuki allegedly authorized Taguchi to do so.
For the following reasons, Jaentsch’s claims
against (1) Puha in Count I; (2) Puha and Taguchi under
Hawaii’s criminal statutes; (3) Taguchi and Suzuki in
Counts II and III as alleged under the Fourteenth
Amendment; and (4) Taguchi and Suzuki in their official
capacities are DISMISSED.
Jaentsch’s claims against Taguchi and Suzuki in
their individual capacities in Counts II and III as
alleged under the Fourth Amendment state a claim and
may be served.
Jaentsch’s second request to proceed IFP is
DISMISSED as moot.

Service of the FAC as limited below

will be directed by separate order.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

Procedural History
Jaentsch commenced this action on February 26,

2018, while he was incarcerated at OCCC.

See ECF Nos.

1 (original Complaint); and 2 (IFP application).
2

On February 28, 2018, the Court granted Jaentsch’s
first request to proceed IFP.

ECF No. 4.

On or about March 9, 2018, Jaentsch was released
from custody.
On March 23, 2018, the Court issued an Order
Dismissing Complaint in Part With Leave Granted to
Amend.

Order, ECF No. 5 (“March 23, 2018 Order”).

On April 5, 2018, the March 23, 2018 Order was
returned to the court by the U.S. Postal Service as
undelivered, with a notation on the envelope that
Jaentsch had been released from OCCC.

ECF No. 6.

On April 30, 2018, Jaentsch filed a Notice of
Change of Address.

ECF No. 7.

On May 7, 2018, Jaentsch submitted a second request
to proceed IFP.

ECF No. 8.

On May 17, 2018, Jaentsch filed the FAC and a
second Notice of Change of Address.
B.

ECF Nos. 9, 10.

Claims in the FAC
The FAC is nearly identical to the original

Complaint.

Jaentsch again alleges that Puha entered

his home without his permission several times between
3

April 16 and 20, 2017, while he was detained at OCCC.
FAC, ECF No. 10, PageID #89 (Count I).

He says that

Puha stole items from his property, and he now alleges
that she gave Taguchi permission to enter his home on
April 19, 2017.

Jaentsch claims that Puha’s actions

violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment and
Hawaii Revised Statutes (“HRS”) §§ 708 -810, 708- 812,
708- 813, and 708- 814.2
Jaentsch next alleges that CWS Social Worker
Taguchi entered his home without his permission on
April 19, 2017, albeit allegedly with Puha’s permission
and CWS Supervisor Suzuki’s authorization.

See FAC,

ECF No. 10, PageID #89 #90- 91 (Counts II and III).

He

claims that Taguchi’s entry and Suzuki’s authorization
for that entry into his home without his permission or
a warrant violated his rights under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments and HRS §§ 708- 811 & 708- 814.
Jaentsch seeks compensatory and punitive damages

2

Section 708-810 defines “Burglary in the first degree;”
§ 708-811 defines “Burglary in the second degree;” § 708-812
defines “Possession of burglar’s tools;” and §§ 708-813 & 708-814
respectively define “Criminal trespass” in the first and second
degrees.
4

and any injunctive relief to which he may be entitled.
II. SECOND REQUEST TO PROCEED IFP
On February 28, 2018, the court granted Jaentsch’s
Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis by a Prisoner.
See Order, ECF No. 4.

That IFP status has not been

revoked.
On May 7, 2018, Jaentsch submitted an Application
to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or
Costs, presumably because he thought that he was
required to submit a non-prisoner IFP application when
he was released from OCCC.

See ECF No. 8.

The

District of Hawaii, however, does not generally require
prisoners to resubmit an IFP application when they are
released from custody.

Because it is clear that

Jaentsch remains indigent and his IFP status has not
been revoked, his second IFP application, ECF No. 8, is
DISMISSED as moot.
III.

SCREENING STANDARDS

Because Jaentsch is proceeding IFP, the Court must
screen the FAC pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2002)
5

See

(per curiam) (holding that § 1915(e)(2)(B)’s screening
requirements apply to non- prisoners proceeding or
seeking to proceed IFP).

The Court must dismiss a

complaint or claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails
to state a claim for relief, or seeks damages from
defendants who are immune from suit.

See Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en
banc).
Screening under § 1915(e)(2) involves the same
standard of review as that used under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d

1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012).

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a

complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted);
Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121.

“Threadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
U.S. at 678.

Iqbal, 556

The “mere possibility of misconduct” or

an “unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me
6

accusation” falls short of meeting this plausibility
standard.

Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572

F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).
Pro se litigants’ pleadings must be liberally
construed and all doubts should be resolved in their
favor.

Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir.

2010) (citations omitted).

Leave to amend must be

granted if it appears the plaintiff can correct the
defects in the complaint.

Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130.

If

the complaint cannot be saved by amendment, dismissal
without leave to amend is appropriate.

Sylvia

Landfield Trust v. City of L.A., 729 F.3d 1189, 1196
(9th Cir. 2013).
IV.

DISCUSSION

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a
plaintiff must allege (1) that a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States was violated
and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a
person acting under the color of state law.

See West

v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Additionally, a plaintiff must allege that he
7

suffered a specific injury as a result of a particular
defendant’s conduct and an affirmative link between the
injury and the violation of his rights.

See Monell v.

Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976).
A.

Eleventh Amendment Immunity
“The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money

damages in federal court against a state, its agencies,
and state officials acting in their official
capacities.”

Aholelei v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 488

F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007).

Official capacity

defendants are subject to suit under § 1983 only “for
prospective declaratory and injunctive relief . . . to
enjoin an alleged ongoing violation of federal law.”
Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., 2013 WL 1767710, at *7 (D. Haw.
Apr. 23, 2013) (further citations omitted).
The FAC alleges no ongoing constitutional violation
or any colorable claim for prospective declaratory or
injunctive relief.

Official capacity claims against

Taguchi and Suzuki are again DISMISSED with prejudice.
B.

HRS §§ 708-810, -811, -812, -813 & -814
8

As explained in the March 23, 2018 Order, Jaentsch
lacks the authority to bring criminal charges under HRS
§§ 708-810, 811, -812, -813 & -814 against Defendants
Puha and Taguchi for their alleged illegal entry into
his home.

See Kapu v. Attorney Gen. Hawaii, 2017 WL

4479252, at *5 (D. Haw. Oct. 6, 2017) (private
individuals have no authority to issue a criminal
indictment for any criminal statute); Coryell v.
Oakley, 2018 WL 805663, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2018).
Jaentsch may not pursue criminal charges against Puha
and Taguchi by way of a federal civil rights action.
His claims in Counts I, II, and as alleged under HRS
§§ 708 -810 to 708-814 are DISMISSED with prejudice.
C.

Fourteenth Amendment: Equal Protection
Jaentsch alleges Taguchi and Suzuki violated his

rights to equal protection under the law.

The Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
that no state shall “deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of laws.”
Const. amend XIV, § 1.

U.S.

A plaintiff can state an equal

protection claim by alleging that “defendants acted
9

with an intent or purpose to discriminate against” him
based upon his membership in a protected class.

See

Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194-95 (9th Cir.
1998) (citation omitted).
If a plaintiff is not part of a protected class, he
can establish an equal protection “class of one” by
alleging that he “has been intentionally treated
differently from others similarly situated and that
there is no rational basis for the difference in
treatment.”

See Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528

U.S. 562, 564 (2000).
Jaentsch again fails to allege facts that show that
he is part of a protected class or that Taguchi and
Suzuki treated him differently than other similarly
situated individuals with no rational basis for their
actions.

Jaentsch’s Fourteenth Amendment equal

protection claims against Taguchi and Suzuki in Counts
II and III are again DISMISSED.3
D.

Fourth Amendment: Search and Seizure

3

The Court makes no determination whether these claims can
be cured by amendment.
10

Jaentsch claims that Defendants violated the Fourth
Amendment when they entered or authorized entry into
his home without a warrant or permission.

The Fourth

Amendment guarantees “the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures.”
Const. amend. IV.

U.S.

The unlawful “physical entry of the

home is the chief evil against which the wording of the
Fourth Amendment is directed.”

Payton v. New York, 445

U.S. 573, 585 (1980).
Under a Fourth Amendment analysis, a “search”
occurs when the government physically occupies private
property for the purpose of obtaining information.

See

United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012) (“It
is important to be clear about what occurred in this
case: The Government physically occupied private
property for the purpose of obtaining information.”).
A “seizure” of property occurs when “‘there is some
meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory
interest in that property.’”

Soldal v. Cook Cty.,

Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992) (quoting United States v.
11

Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)).

Accordingly,

warrantless searches of a home by government officials,
absent exigent circumstances or permission, are
presumptively unreasonable.

Matalon v. Hynnes, 806

F.3d 627, 633 (1st Cir. 2015).
1.

Defendants Taguchi and Suzuki

When government officials enter a home without a
warrant, court order, or consent, it is the State’s
burden to prove that some exception to the warrant
requirement applies.

See United States v. Hawkins, 249

F.3d 867, 872 (9th Cir. 2001).

This applies equally to

state child welfare officials as to law enforcement
officials.

See, e.g., Demaree v. Pederson, 887 F.3d

870, 878 (9th Cir. 2018) (denying qualified immunity to
social workers who removed children from a home without
a court order, warrant, or reasonable cause to believe
an emergency existed, based on clearly established
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment precedent); see, e.g.,
Kirkpatrick v. Cty. of Washoe, 843 F.3d 784, 788, 790
(9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“Under the Fourth Amendment,
government officials are ordinarily required to obtain
12

prior judicial authorization before removing a child
from the custody of her parent.”).
Jaentsch sets forth enough facts to state a
colorable claim that Taguchi and Suzuki violated his
rights under the Fourth Amendment when Taguchi entered
his home without his permission on Suzuki’s
authorization.

Jaentsch’s Fourth Amendment claims in

Counts II and III may be served on Taguchi and Suzuki
in their individual capacities.
2.

Puha

Because there are no allegations that Puha is a
State employee, to maintain a Fourth Amendment claim
against her under § 1983, Jaentsch must show that she
was otherwise acting under color of state law when she
allowed Taguchi to enter his property.

See Florer v.

Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, N.A., 639 F.3d 916, 922
(9th Cir. 2011) (stating that the plaintiff bears the
burden of establishing that a particular defendant is a
state actor).
Federal courts recognize four tests to identify
when a private party’s action can be considered state
13

action: (1) public function; (2) joint action; (3)
governmental compulsion or coercion; and (4)
governmental nexus.

See Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d

1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 2003).

Jaentsch suggests that

Puha acted jointly with Taguchi to violate his rights.
Under limited circumstances a private party may act
under color of state law when “[she] is a willful
participant in joint action with the State or its
agents.”

Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980);

Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 445 (9th Cir. 2002).

To

satisfy the joint action test, a plaintiff must plead
that a private party’s actions are “inextricably
intertwined” with those of the government.

Brunette v.

Humane Soc’y of Ventura Cty., 294 F.3d 1205, 1211 (9th
Cir. 2002) (holding that “substantial cooperation” must
be shown between the private party and the state; joint
action test may also be satisfied by a conspiracy
between the state and a private party).
The joint action test “focuses on whether the state
has ‘so far insinuated itself into a position of
interdependence with [the private actor] that it must
14

be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged
activity.’”
omitted).

Franklin, 312 F.3d at 445 (quotation
This requires “a substantial degree of

cooperation before imposing civil liability for actions
by private individuals that impinge on civil rights.”
Id.

“[M]erely complaining to the police does not

convert a private party into a state actor.”

Dietrich

v. John Ascuaga’s Nugget, 548 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir.
2008) (quotation omitted); see also Peng v. Mei Chin
Penghu, 335 F.3d 970, 980 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that
a single request for police assistance is insufficient
to show joint action).
Nothing within the FAC shows that Puha was acting
in concert or conspiracy with the State when she
entered his home.

Jaentsch does not allege that Puha

called DHS repeatedly requesting their assistance or
intervention or suggest that Puha and Taguchi conspired
to enter his property together without his permission.
He provides no facts showing that Taguchi or Suzuki
condoned, directed, or participated in Puha’s
“numerous” entries into his home or derived any benefit
15

from her alleged theft of his property.

That is, the

single alleged interaction between Puha and Taguchi on
April 19, 2017, is insufficient to show that “the state
. . . insinuated itself into a position of
interdependence with [Puha]” or knowingly accepted any
“benefits derived from [Puha’s] unconstitutional
behavior.”

Florer, 639 F.3d at 926.

The Court cannot infer that Puha acted jointly with
the State to deny Jaentsch his constitutional rights on
these facts.

He therefore fails to show that she was

acting under color of state law.

Jaentsch’s claims as

alleged against Puha under the Fourth Amendment in
Count I are DISMISSED.
V.
(1)

CONCLUSION

Claims in Counts II and III of the FAC,as

alleged under the Fourth Amendment against Defendants
Raquel Taguchi and Yumi Suzuki in their individual
capacities, state a plausible claim for relief and may
be served.
(2)

Claims against Taguchi and Suzuki in their

official capacities are DISMISSED with prejudice.
16

(3)

Claims against all Defendants under HRS

§§ 708 -810 to 708-814 are DISMISSED with prejudice.
(4) Claims against Taguchi and Suzuki under the
Fourteenth Amendment, and all claims alleged against
Defendant Puha in Count I are DISMISSED.
(5) The Application to Proceed in District Court
Without Prepaying Fees or Costs is DISMISSED as moot.
(6) The Court will issue a separate service order
with directions for serving the the FAC, Counts II and
III, as limited by this Order, on Defendants Taguchi
and Suzuki.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:

Honolulu, Hawaii, June 1, 2018.

Jaentsch v. Puha, No. 1:18-cv-00073 HG-KSC; ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
IN PART AND SECOND REQUEST TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS; Scrn ‘18 (dsm FAC prt srv
Taguchi Suzuki)

17