Jaentsch v. Puha et al

Filing 5

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT IN PART WITH LEAVE GRANTED TO AMEND re 1 - Signed by JUDGE HELEN GILLMOR on 3/23/2018. "(1) Claims in Counts II and III as alleged under the Fourth Amendment state a plausible claim for relie f against Defendants Raquel Taguchi and Yumi Suzuki in their individual capacities and may proceed. (2) Claims against Taguchi and Suzuki in their official capacities are DISMISSED with prejudice. (3) All other claims are DISMISSED witho ut prejudice. Jaentsch may file an amended pleading that cures the deficiencies in claims dismissed without prejudice on or before May 4, 2018. (4) IN THE ALTERNATIVE, Jaentsch may choose to notify the Court in writing on or b efore May 4, 2018, that he elects to proceed with his claims against Defendants Raquel Taguchi and Yumi Suzuki under the Fourth Amendment as limited in this Order and those claims shall be served. (6) The Clerk is DIRECTED to send Jaentsch a pr isoner civil rights complaint form so that he may comply with this Order if he elects to file an amended pleading." " (emt, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electr onic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Keoni R. Jaentsch shall be served by first class mail to the address of record on March 27, 2018. A copy of the Court's Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint form shall be included in the mailing to Mr. Jaentsch.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
KEONI R. JAENTSCH,
#A1019833,

)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
PATTIE -ANN K. PUHA, RAQUEL )
TAGUCHI, YUMI SUZUKI,
)
)
Defendants,
)
__________________________ )

NO. 1:18-cv -00073 HG -KSC
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT
IN PART WITH LEAVE GRANTED
TO AMEND

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT IN PART
WITH LEAVE GRANTED TO AMEND
Pro se Plaintiff Keoni R. Jaentsch is incarcerated
at the Oahu Community Correctional Center (“OCCC”); he
brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Compl., ECF. No. 1.

Jaentsch alleges Defendants

Pattie-Ann K. Puha, Raquel Taguchi, and Yumi Suzuki
(“Defendants”) violated his constitutional rights and
state criminal statutes when they allegedly entered his
home without his consent while he was detained at OCCC.
For the following reasons, Jaentsch’s Complaint is
DISMISSED in part with leave granted to amend.

1

I.

STATUTORY SCREENING

Because Jaentsch is a prisoner proceeding in forma
pauperis the Court is required to screen his Complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a).

The

Court must dismiss a complaint or claim that is
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim for
relief, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune
from suit.

See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 -27

(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (screening under
§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004
(9th Cir. 2010) (screening under § 1915A(b)).
Screening under §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b) involves
the same standard of review as that used under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Watison v. Carter,

668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (screening under
§ 1915(e)(2)); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d
1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (screening pursuant to
§ 1915A).

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must

“contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
2

(internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d
at 1121.

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

The “mere possibility of misconduct” or an “unadorned,
the defendant- unlawfully -harmed me accusation” falls
short of meeting this plausibility standard.

Id.; see

also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th
Cir. 2009).
Pro se litigants’ pleadings must be liberally
construed and all doubts should be resolved in their
favor.

Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir.

2010) (citations omitted).

Leave to amend must be

granted if it appears the plaintiff can correct the
defects in the complaint.

Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130.

the complaint cannot be saved by amendment, dismissal
without leave to amend is appropriate.

Sylvia

Landfield Trust v. City of L.A., 729 F.3d 1189, 1196
(9th Cir. 2013).

3

If

II.

ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT

In Count I, Jaentsch states that Puha, who is named
in her individual capacity, entered Jaentsch’s home
between April 16 and 20, 2017, and “stole items without
my permission or concent [sic]” while he was detained
at OCCC.

Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID #5.

Jaentsch

alleges this constitutes an illegal search and seizure
under the Fourth Amendment and violated Hawaii Revised
Statutes §§ 708 -810, 708-812, 708 -813,and 708 -814.1
Jaentsch filed a police report and homeowners insurance
claim regarding this incident.
In Counts II and III, Jaentsch alleges that
Taguchi, a Department of Human Services (“DHS”), Child
Welfare Services division social worker, entered his
home without his consent on April 19, 2017, while he
was incarcerated at OCCC, with her supervisor, Suzuki’s
authorization.

Jaentsch says that he has video

surveillance of Taguchi’s entry into and exit from his

1

Hawaii Revised Statutes § 708-810 defines “Burglary in the
first degree;” § 708-812 defines “Possession of burglar’s tools;”
and §§ 708-813 & 708-814 define “Criminal trespass” in the first
and second degrees, respectively.
4

home.

He alleges Taguchi’s and Suzuki’s actions

constitute an illegal search and seizure under the
Fourth Amendment, violate the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and violate Haw. Rev.
Stat. §§ 708 -811 & 708 -814.2

Jaentsch names Taguchi and

Suzuki in their individual and official capacities.
III.

DISCUSSION

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a
plaintiff must allege (1) that a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States was violated,
and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a
person acting under the color of state law.

See West

v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Additionally, a plaintiff must allege that he
suffered a specific injury as a result of a particular
defendant’s conduct and an affirmative link between the
injury and the violation of his rights.

See Monell v.

Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976).
2

Hawaii Revised Statutes § 708-811 defines “Burglary in the
second degree” and § 708-814 defines “Criminal trespass” in the
second degree.
5

A.

Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Jaentsch names Taguchi and Suzuki in their official

capacities.

“The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for

money damages in federal court against a state, its
agencies, and state officials acting in their official
capacities.”

Aholelei v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 488

F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007).

Defendants named in

their official capacities are subject to suit under
§ 1983 only “for prospective declaratory and injunctive
relief . . . to enjoin an alleged ongoing violation of
federal law.”

Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., 2013 WL 1767710,

at *7 (D. Haw. Apr. 23, 2013) (quoting Wilbur v. Locke,
423 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2005), abrogated on other
grounds by Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 560 U.S. 413
(2010)); see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,
491 U.S. 58, 70 -71 (1989).
Jaentsch does not allege an ongoing constitutional
violation or raise any colorable claim for prospective
declaratory or injunctive relief.

Claims against

Taguchi and Suzuki as named in their official
capacities are DISMISSED with prejudice.
6

B.

Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment guarantees “the right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.”

U.S. Const. amend. IV.

The unlawful

“physical entry of the home is the chief evil against
which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.”
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980).
The Supreme Court has consistently emphasized that
“except in certain carefully defined classes of cases,
a search of private property without proper consent is
‘unreasonable’ unless it has been authorized by a valid
search warrant.”

Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439

(1973) (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523, 528-29 (1967).

See also Katz v. United States,

389 U.S. 347, 356 -57 (1967) (“Over and over again this
Court has emphasized that the mandate of the [Fourth]
Amendment requires [that] . . . searches conducted
outside the judicial process . . . are per se
unreasonable . . . subject only to a few specifically
established and well-defined exceptions.”) (citation
7

omitted).

Accordingly, warrantless searches of a home

are presumptively unreasonable.

Matalon v. Hynnes,

806 F.3d 627, 633 (1st Cir. 2015).
1.

Defendants Taguchi and Suzuki

When government officials enter and search a home
without a warrant (or consent), it is the State’s
burden to prove that some exception to the warrant
requirement applies.

See United States v. Hawkins, 249

F.3d 867, 872 (9th Cir. 2001).

Although Jaentsch’s

facts are sparse, he states enough for the Court to
plausibly infer that Taguchi, a state employee, entered
his home without his permission or a warrant and that
Suzuki authorized her to do so in her capacity as a DHS
supervisor.

Counts II and III state claims under the

Fourth Amendment against Taguchi and Suzuki in their
individual capacities and may proceed.
2.

Puha

Puha appears to be a private individual unconnected
with Taguchi and Suzuki.3

Courts “start with the

3

On Oct. 30, 2016, Jaentsch was charged with
“intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly physically abus[ing]
8

presumption that private conduct does not constitute
governmental action.”

Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph

Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 835 (9th Cir. 1999).

A

private party may, under limited circumstances, act
under color of state law when “[she] is a willful
participant in joint action with the State or its
agents.”

Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980);

Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 445 (9th Cir. 2002).
Courts use the following factors to identify
private action that qualifies as state action: “(1)
public function; (2) joint action; (3) governmental
compulsion or coercion; and (4) governmental nexus.”
Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 2003)
(quotation omitted).

Regardless of which test applies,

the fundamental consideration is whether the private
conduct is fairly attributable to the state.

Id. at

Pattie-Ann Jaentsch, a family or household member,” in State v.
Jaentsch, 1FC161000066 (1st Cir. Haw. 2016). See United States
ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971
F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating courts “may take notice of
proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal
judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to
matters at issue”); see also Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Jaentsch was
convicted of Abuse of Family or Household Members in the Presence
of a Household Member Less than 14 years of Age, in violation of
Haw. Rev. Stats. § 706-906(1) and (9), on Nov. 15, 2017.
9

1096.

Ultimately, a plaintiff bears the burden of

establishing that a particular defendant is a state
actor under any applicable test.

Florer v.

Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, N.A., 639 F.3d 916, 922
(9th Cir. 2011).
Jaentsch alleges no facts suggesting that Puha
acted under color of state law when she allegedly
entered the property here without Jaentsch’s permission
and stole items.

He may be attempting to show that

Puha acted jointly with Taguchi, although his
statements are vague.

To establish joint action, a

plaintiff must show willful, joint participation
between the state and a private actor in which “the
state has so far insinuated itself into a position of
interdependence with the private [actor] that it must
be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged
activity.

This occurs when the state knowingly accepts

the benefits derived from unconstitutional behavior.”
Florer, 639 F.3d at 926.
Jaentsch, however, does not allege that Taguchi or
Suzuki condoned, directed, or participated in Puha’s
10

alleged theft.

Nor does he allege that Puha gave

Taguchi permission to enter the house or that Taguchi
was present when Puha entered the house.

He also

alleges no facts showing that the State derived any
benefit from Puha’s conduct.

Finally, Jaentsch fails

to allege facts showing that Puha’s conduct violated
his constitutional rights, as opposed to having
allegedly violated Hawaii’s criminal statutes.
The Court is unable to infer that Puha acted in
concert with the State here.

Claims alleged against

Puha under the Fourth Amendment in Count I are
DISMISSED without prejudice.
C.

Equal Protection Claims are Dismissed
Jaentsch alleges that Taguchi’s and Suzuki’s

actions violated his rights under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

See Compl., ECF

No. 1, PageID #6 -7.
The Equal Protection Clause provides that no state
shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of laws.”

U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1.

A plaintiff can state an equal protection claim in one
11

of two ways.

First, a plaintiff can allege that

“defendants acted with an intent or purpose to
discriminate against the plaintiff based upon
membership in a protected class.”

See Barren v.

Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 -95 (9th Cir. 1998)
(citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239- 40
(1976)).
Second, if there is no allegation of a suspect
classification a plaintiff can establish an equal
protection “class of one” by alleging that he or she
“has been intentionally treated differently from others
similarly situated and that there is no rational basis
for the difference in treatment.”

See Vill. of

Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); Squaw
Valley Dev. Co. v. Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936, 944 (9th
Cir. 2004).
Even when liberally read, the Complaint fails to
state an equal protection violation.

Jaentsch does not

allege that he is part of a protected class or that
Taguchi and Suzuki treated him

differently than other

similarly situated individuals, and that there was no
12

rational basis for their actions.

Jaentsch’s

conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a
claim for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)
(“Although . . . [the court] must take all the factual
allegations in the complaint as true, [it is] not bound
to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a
factual allegation.”) (citations omitted)).
To the extent that Counts II and III allege that
Taguchi and Suzuki violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, they are DISMISSED without
prejudice.
D.

Claims Raised Under Hawaii’s Criminal Statutes Are
Dismissed
As a private individual, Jaentsch does not have the

authority to bring criminal charges under Hawaii’s
criminal statutes against Puha, Taguchi, and Suzuki.
See Kapu v. Attorney Gen. Hawaii, 2017 WL 4479252, at
*5 (D. Haw. Oct. 6, 2017) (private individuals have no
authority to issue a criminal indictment for any
criminal statute); Coryell v. Oakley, 2018 WL 805663,

13

at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2018); Retanan v. Cal. Dep’t
of Corr. & Rehab., 2012 WL 1833888, at *5 (E.D. Cal.
May 18, 2012) (stating, “it is well- established that a
private individual has no constitutional right and
standing to bring a criminal complaint against another
individual”).
Whether to prosecute and what charges to file are
decisions that generally rest in the prosecutor’s sole
discretion.

United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114,

124 (1979).

That is, only the government has the

authority to decide if criminal charges should be filed
against an individual.

Bailey v. Robinson, 2009 WL

1034890, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 15, 2009).

Jaentsch

has filed a police report regarding his claims and it
is up to the state prosecutor to initiate charges on
that report.

Jaentsch may not pursue criminal charges

against Defendants by way of a federal civil rights
action.
To the extent Jaentsch alleges claims under Hawaii
Revised Statutes §§ 708-810 to 708-814, those claims
are DISMISSED with prejudice.
14

IV.

LEAVE TO AMEND

The Complaint is DISMISSED in part.

Jaentsch may

file an amended complaint on or before May 4, 2018,
that cures the deficiencies in claims dismissed without
prejudice.

If he elects to file an amended pleading,

Jaentsch must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Local Rules of the United States
District Court for the District of Hawaii.

Local Rule

LR10.3 requires that an amended complaint be complete
in itself without reference to any prior pleading.

Any

amended complaint must be short and plain, comply with
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
submitted on the court’s prisoner civil rights form,
and will supersede the preceding complaint.

See

Ramirez v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 806 F.3d 1002, 1008
(9th Cir. 2015); LR99.7.10.

Defendants not renamed and

claims not realleged in an amended complaint may be
deemed voluntarily dismissed.

See Lacey v. Maricopa

Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012).

15

IN THE ALTERNATIVE:
In writing on or before May 4, 2018, Jaentsch may
choose to stand on his claims against Defendants
Taguchi and Suzuki in Counts II and III as alleged
under the Fourth Amendment and limited by this Order.
On receipt of written notification, or if Jaentsch
fails to timely submit an amended complaint, the Court
will order the present Complaint as limited herein
served on Defendants Raquel Taguchi and Yumi Suzuki
without further notice.
V.
(1)

CONCLUSION

Claims in Counts II and III as alleged under

the Fourth Amendment state a plausible claim for relief
against Defendants Raquel Taguchi and Yumi Suzuki in
their individual capacities and may proceed.
(2)

Claims against Taguchi and Suzuki in their

official capacities are DISMISSED with prejudice.
(3)

All other claims are DISMISSED without

prejudice.

Jaentsch may file an amended pleading that

cures the deficiencies in claims dismissed without
prejudice on or before May 4, 2018.
16

(4)

IN THE ALTERNATIVE, Jaentsch may choose to

notify the Court in writing on or before May 4, 2018,
that he elects to proceed with his claims against
Defendants Raquel Taguchi and Yumi Suzuki under the
Fourth Amendment as limited in this Order and those
claims shall be served.
(6) The Clerk is DIRECTED to send Jaentsch a
prisoner civil rights complaint form so that he may
comply with this Order if he elects to file an amended
pleading.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:

Honolulu, Hawaii, March 23, 2018.

Keoni R. Jaentsch, #A1019833 v. Pattie-Ann K. Puha,
Raquel Taguchi, Yumi Suzuki, No. 1:18 -cv -00073 HG -KSC;
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT IN PART WITH LEAVE GRANTED
TO AMEND

17