Woods v. Hatakeyama

Filing 6

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND re 1 - Signed by JUDGE DERRICK K. WATSON on 4/3/2018. "(1) The Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend as a result of Woods' failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(1) and 1915A(a). (2) Woods may file an amended complaint on or before May 4, 2018 that cures the deficiencies discussed above. Failure to do so will result in dismissal of this action for failure t o state a claim and may result in a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). (3) The Clerk is DIRECTED to send Woods a blank prisoner civil rights form so that he can comply with the directions of this Order." (emt, )COURT'S CERTIFICATE of Service - William D.M. Woods shall be served by First Class Mail to the address of record on April 4, 2018. A copy of the Court's Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint form and its instructions shall be included in the mailing to Mr. Woods.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
WILLIAM D.M. WOODS,
#A0264228,

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Plaintiff,
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vs.
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DEANE HATAKEYAMA, M.D.,
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Defendant.
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_______________________________ )

CIV. NO. 1:18-cv-00095 DKW-KSC
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT
WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

Before the court is pro se Plaintiff William Woods’ prisoner civil rights
Complaint. ECF No. 1. Woods is incarcerated at the Halawa Correctional Facility
(“HCF”) and is proceeding in forma pauperis. ECF No. 5. Woods claims that
Defendant Deane Hatakeyama, M.D., violated the Eighth Amendment when he
allegedly denied Woods adequate health care. For the following reasons, Woods’
Complaint is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A(a) for
failure to state a claim, albeit with leave to amend.
I. BACKGROUND
Woods was diagnosed with Ideopathic Pulmonary Atrial HypertensionVasoreactive, Functional Class II, in August 2013. Woods says that he had been
prescribed a specific dosage of medication for pulmonary hypertension since that
time. Woods has been a patient of The Queen’s Medical Center (“QMC”)

Pulmonary Hypertension Program under the care of pulmonary hypertension
specialist Dr. Chris Flack since at least January 10, 2014. Woods says this
information should have been available in his prison institutional records.
Dr. Hatakeyama met with Woods on or about November 28, 2016, during
Woods’ medical intake assessment at HCF. Woods authorized QMC to release his
medical records that day, which were faxed to HCF on or about December 7, 2016.
Woods complains that Dr. Hatakeyama lowered the dosage of his medication and
refused to increase it until the HCF Medical Director reviewed his complaint.
Woods alleges this change in medication damaged his heart and increased his
hypertension. He seeks lifetime medical treatment and punitive damages.
II. SCREENING
Federal courts must conduct a pre-answer screening in all cases in which
prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity, officer, or employee, or seek to
proceed without prepayment of the civil filing fees. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)
and 1915A(b). The court must identify cognizable claims and dismiss those claims
that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or
seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at
§§ 1915(b)(2) and 1915A(b). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the
targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’”
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Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v.
Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual
allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007)). A plaintiff must “set forth specific facts as to each individual
defendant’s” deprivation of his rights. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir.
1988); see also Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). That is, a
plaintiff must demonstrate each defendant’s personal participation in the
deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Simmons v. Navajo Cty., 609
F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010).
Pro se prisoners’ pleadings must be liberally construed and given the benefit
of any doubt. Blaisdell v. Frappiea, 729 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2013); Hebbe v.
Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). However, “the liberal pleading standard
. . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not
supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l
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Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of
Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). A plaintiff must identify specific
facts supporting the existence of substantively plausible claims for relief. Johnson
v. City of Shelby, 135 S. Ct. 346, 347 (2014) (per curiam) (citation omitted). Leave
to amend should be granted if it appears possible that the plaintiff can correct the
complaint’s defects. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).
III. DISCUSSION
“To sustain an action under section 1983, a plaintiff must show ‘(1) that the
conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law;
and (2) that the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or
statutory right.’” Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation
omitted), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 556 U.S. 1256 (2009); see also
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
A.

Eleventh Amendment
Woods names Dr. Hatakeyama in his individual and official capacities.

“The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages in federal court against a
state, its agencies, and state officials acting in their official capacities.” Aholelei v.
Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007). Defendants named in
their official capacities are subject to suit under § 1983 only “for prospective
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declaratory and injunctive relief . . . to enjoin an alleged ongoing violation of
federal law.” Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., 2013 WL 1767710, at *7 (D. Haw. Apr. 23,
2013) (quoting Wilbur v. Locke, 423 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2005), abrogated
on other grounds by Levin v. Commerce Energy Inc., 560 U.S. 413 (2010)); see
also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989) (“[A] suit
against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official
but rather is a suit against the official’s office.”); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908).
Because Woods does not allege an ongoing violation of federal law, there is
no basis for his seeking prospective injunctive relief. Claims against Dr.
Hatakeyama in his official capacity are DISMISSED.
B.

Eighth Amendment
“[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical

treatment, an inmate must show ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’”
Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). This requires a prisoner to show (1) “a ‘serious medical
need’ by demonstrating that ‘failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in
further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’” and
(2) that “the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Id.
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(quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation and
internal quotations marks omitted), overruled on other grounds by WMX
Technologies Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc)).
Deliberate indifference is established only when the defendant subjectively
“knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.” Toguchi
v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). Deliberate indifference can be established “by
showing (a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible
medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096
(citation omitted).
“A difference of opinion between a physician and the prisoner – or between
medical professionals – concerning what medical care is appropriate does not
amount to deliberate indifference.” Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir.
2012), overruled in part on other grounds by Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076,
1082-83 (9th Cir. 2014) 987 (citing Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir.
1989) ); Wilhelm v. Rothman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122-23 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing
Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1986) ). Rather, a plaintiff “must
show that the course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable
under the circumstances and that the defendants chose this course in conscious
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disregard of an excessive risk to [his] health.” Snow, 681 F.3d at 988 (citing
Jackson, 90 F.3d at 332) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard. A showing of medical
malpractice or negligence is insufficient to establish a constitutional deprivation
under the Eighth Amendment.” Hamby v. Hammond, 821 F.3d 1085, 1092 (9th
Cir. 2016) (quoting Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1060); see Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106.
Negligence, or even gross negligence, does not amount to deliberate indifference
and cannot satisfy the subjective prong of an Eighth Amendment claim. See
Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122-23 (finding doctor was not deliberately indifferent when
he declined to operate, but had merely made a “negligent misdiagnosis” that
plaintiff was not suffering from a hernia).
Accepting that Woods’ pulmonary hypertension represents a serious medical
need, Woods nonetheless fails to assert sufficient facts to show that Dr.
Hatakeyama acted with deliberate indifference to this serious medical condition.
While Woods, and possibly the HCF Medical Director, may have disagreed with
Dr. Hatakeyama’s decision to lower Woods’ medication, this disagreement does
not show that Dr. Hatakeyama acted purposefully to deny Woods medical care or
failed to respond to Woods’ serious medical needs. Dr. Hatakeyama changed
Woods’ medication dosage only after he had examined Woods on intake at HCF
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and reviewed Woods’ QMC medical records. Woods also suggests that Dr.
Hatakeyama had access to his 2014 prison medical records. Woods does not allege
that Dr. Hatakeyama disregarded this information, or denied him any medication.
Rather, he says that Dr. Hatakeyama lowered his dosage only until the HCF
Medical Director reviewed the information and his recommendation and
determined that the original dosage should be maintained. The decision to lower
Woods’ medication dosage appears to be “a classic example of a matter for
medical judgment” that “does not represent cruel and unusual punishment.”
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107. While that decision may have been incorrect, even
negligent, it does not support a claim for deliberate indifference.
Moreover, Woods’ Complaint lacks the “further factual enhancement” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted), necessary to demonstrate that Dr. Hatakeyama’s
“purposeful act or failure to respond to [Woods’] pain or possible medical need”
caused Woods harm by deliberate indifference. Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122
(citation omitted). Woods offers only “labels and conclusions” and “formulaic
recitation[s] of the elements of a[n] [Eighth Amendment] cause of action,” which is
insufficient. Iqbal, 662 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Woods’ fails to allege any facts that show that Dr. Hatakeyama’s decision to
lower his dosage was medically unacceptable or was the actual cause of Woods’
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worsening hypertension. Woods does not state when Dr. Hatakeyama lowered the
medication, how long he remained at a lower dose, or when the Medical Director
determined that it should be raised back to its previous level. Woods simply sets
forth the bare minimum of facts regarding his claim and concludes that Dr.
Hatakeyama’s treatment worsened his condition and was made with deliberate
indifference to his medical needs. These unsupported “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action” are insufficient to state a constitutional violation
Iqbal, 556 at 678. Woods’ claim against Dr. Hatakeyama is DISMISSED.
IV. LEAVE TO AMEND
Woods’ Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend as limited above.
Woods may file an amended complaint on or before May 4, 2018 that cures the
deficiencies noted above. If Woods elects to amend his pleading, he must comply
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of the United States
District Court for the District of Hawaii. Local Rule LR10.3 requires that an
amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading.
Any amended complaint must be short and plain, comply with Rule 8 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, submitted on the court’s prisoner civil rights
form, and will supersede the preceding complaint. See Ramirez v. Cty. of San
Bernadino, 806 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015); LR99.7.10. Defendants not
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renamed and claims not realleged in an amended complaint may be deemed
voluntarily dismissed. See Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir.
2012).
V. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)
The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) restricts prisoners’
ability to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) when filing certain federal lawsuits.
Title 28, United States Code § 1915(g) provides a “three-strikes” rule that bars
prisoners from proceeding IFP if they have accrued “three strikes” under the
statute:
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment
in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on
3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any
facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that
was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is
under imminent danger of serious physical injury.
Woods is notified that if he fails to cure the deficiencies in his Complaint, he
will likely incur a strike.
VI. CONCLUSION
(1) The Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend as a result of
Woods’ failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(1) and 1915A(a).

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(2) Woods may file an amended complaint on or before May 4, 2018 that
cures the deficiencies discussed above. Failure to do so will result in dismissal of
this action for failure to state a claim and may result in a strike pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(g).
(3) The Clerk is DIRECTED to send Woods a blank prisoner civil rights
form so that he can comply with the directions of this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: April 3, 2018 at Honolulu, Hawaii.

/s/ Derrick K. Watson
Derrick K. Watson
United States District Judge

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Woods. v. Hatakeyama, No. 1:18-cv-00095 DKW-KSC; Order Dismissing
Complaint With Leave Granted to Amend; Scrng ‘18/Woods 18-95 (dsm R8 8amd lv amd)

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