Annan-Yartey v. State of Hawaii Department of Transportation Airport et al

Filing 42

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT, FILED JULY 16, 2018 (ECF NO. 31 ) - Signed by JUDGE HELEN GILLMOR on 9/13/2018. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 31) is GRANTED< /B>. Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims pursuant to the First Amendment of the United States Constitution are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the United Sta tes Constitution are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Court declines to assert supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. The Clerk of Court is ordered to CLOSE THE CASE. (emt, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
NAPOLEON T. ANNAN-YARTEY,
SR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
SECURITAS SECURITY SERVICE
USA, INC.; SANJ SAPPAL;
JUSTIN CASTRO; E. RODRIGUEZ;
W. AGAPAY; R. RODERICK,
Defendants.

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CIVIL NO. 18-00107 HG-KJM

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS THIRD AMENDED
COMPLAINT, FILED JULY 16, 2018 (ECF No. 31)
On July 16, 2018, Plaintiff filed his Third Amended
Complaint, naming as Defendants Securitas Security Service USA
Inc. (hereafter “Securitas”), Sanj Sappal, Justin Castro, E.
Rodriguez, W. Agapay, and Rojas Roderick.

(ECF No. 29).

The

named individual defendants are all employees of Securitas.

On

July 31, 2018, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the Third
Amended Complaint.

(ECF No. 31).

Plaintiff filed seven different documents that he labeled as
Complaints throughout the course of proceedings in this case.
Both the Magistrate Judge and the District Judge issued multiple
orders with detailed instructions and guidance to inform
Plaintiff how to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and the Local Rules for the District of Hawaii.

Despite the

Court’s multiple efforts, Plaintiff continually failed to comply
1

with the Rules.1

Plaintiff has not properly pled a federal law

cause of action to confer the Court with subject-matter
jurisdiction.
Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint does not contain a
plausible federal law cause of action.
jurisdiction in this case.

There is no diversity

The Court declines to take

supplemental jurisdiction on Plaintiff’s state law causes of
action.
Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint (ECF No. 29) is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 19, 2018, Plaintiff filed a pleading entitled
COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS and an Application to
Proceed In Forma Pauperis.

(ECF Nos. 1, 2).

On April 6, 2018, the Magistrate Judge issued FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATION TO: (1) DISMISS COMPLAINT WITH LIMITED LEAVE TO
AMEND; (2) DENY PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN DISTRICT
COURT WITHOUT PREPAYING FEES OR COSTS.

1

(ECF No. 5).

Plaintiff has filed more than half a dozen lawsuits in the
United States District Court for the District of Hawaii and has
been repeatedly instructed that he is required to comply with
both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules for
the District of Hawaii. See Annan-Yartey v. Equifax Credit Inc.,
95-cv-00725 DAE-FIY; Annan-Yartey v. State of Hawaii, 97-cv-01383
ACK-FIY; Annan-Yartey v. Harris, 01-cv-00426 SOM-KSC; Annan
Yartey v. Star Protection, 03-cv-00267 DAE-BMK; Annan-Yartey v.
Honolulu Police Department, 06-cv-00166 DAE-BMK; Annan-Yartey v.
DTRIC Insurance Co., 13-cv-00391 DKW-BMK; Annan-Yartey v.
Muranaka, 16-cv-00590 JMS-KJM.
2

On May 11, 2018, the Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s
Findings and Recommendation.

(ECF No. 8).

Also on May 11, 2018, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint
and a second Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis.

(ECF Nos.

9, 10).
On June 4, 2018, Plaintiff filed another pleading entitled
PLAINTIFF NAPOLEON T. ANNAN-YARTEY’S AMENDED CIVIL RIGHTS
COMPLAINT.

(ECF No. 19).

The Court construed the pleading as a

Second Amended Complaint.
On June 18, 2018, the Magistrate Judge struck the Second
Amended Complaint as Plaintiff exceeded the leave to amend
granted in the Court’s May 11, 2018 Order.

(ECF No. 22).

Also on June 18, 2018, Plaintiff paid the filing fee.

(ECF

No. 24).
On June 19, 2018,

the Magistrate Judge issued FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATION TO: (1) DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH
LIMITED LEAVE TO AMEND; AND (2) DENY PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION TO
PROCEED IN DISTRICT COURT WITHOUT PREPAYING FEES OR COSTS.

(ECF

No. 23).
On June 29, 2018, Plaintiff filed a pleading entitled SECOND
AMENDED COMPLAINT.

(ECF No. 25).

On July 2, 2018, Plaintiff filed another pleading entitled
AMENDED COPY SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT.

(ECF No. 26).

On July 12, 2018, the Court issued an Order Adopting the
Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.

(ECF No. 28).

The Court also struck Plaintiff’s filings entitled SECOND AMENDED
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COMPLAINT (ECF No. 25) and AMENDED COPY SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
(ECF No. 26).
On July 16, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Third Amended Complaint.
(ECF No. 29).
On July 31, 2018, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss.
(ECF No. 31).
On August 6, 2018, Plaintiff filed another pleading also
entitled Third Amended Complaint.

(ECF No. 34).

On August 9, 2018, the Court struck Plaintiff’s August 6,
2018 pleading.

(ECF No. 35).

On August 16, 2018, Plaintiff filed an Opposition.

(ECF No.

37).
On August 31, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Reply.

(ECF No. 40).

Pursuant to Local Rule 7.2(d), the Court elected to decide
the matter without a hearing.

(ECF No. 33).

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff has filed his fourth attempt to plead a cause of
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Securitas
and the individually named Defendants.

Plaintiff alleges that he

is a Black male, Permanent Resident of the United States of
America, who is domiciled in the State of Hawaii.

(Third Amended

Complaint at ¶ 4, ECF No. 29)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Securitas Security Service,
Inc. (hereinafter “Securitas”) “is a corporation duly existing by
reason of and pursuant to the laws of the State of Hawaii.”
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(Id.

at ¶ 5).

Defendants Castro, Rodriguez, and Agapay are employed

as security guards by Securitas.

(Id. at ¶¶ 6-8).

Defendant

Roderick is employed as a Security Guard Supervisor by Securitas.
(Id. at ¶ 9).

Defendant Sappal is a Vice President of Securitas.

(Id. at ¶ 10).
Plaintiff alleges that on July 4, 2017, at 2:30 AM, he was
falsely arrested and beaten by Defendants Agapay, Rodriguez and
Castro while waiting for his flight at Honolulu International
Airport.

(Id. at ¶¶ 29-30).

Plaintiff states that he was

stopped by Defendants Agapay and Rodriguez as he was walking from
his friend’s vehicle toward the Delta Airline check-in counter.
(Id. at ¶¶ 39-41).

Defendant Rodriguez allegedly told Plaintiff,

“I am detaining you.”

(Id. at ¶ 41).

Plaintiff claims that

Defendants Rodriguez and Agapay refused to answer Plaintiff’s
questions about why he was being detained.

(Id. at ¶¶ 42-43).

According to the Third Amended Complaint, Defendants
Rodriguez and Agapay asked Plaintiff if the baggage he was
carrying belonged to him and asked Plaintiff to provide the keys
to the bags for inspection.

(Id. at ¶¶ 43-45).

Plaintiff

refused to provide the keys, stating that only the Transportation
Security Administration agency was authorized to search passenger
bags.

(Id. at ¶ 46).

Defendants Rodriguez and Agapay called for

backup and Defendant Castro arrived.

(Id. at ¶¶ 47-48).

After

inspecting Plaintiff’s ticket, Defendant Castro again demanded
the keys to Plaintiff’s baggage.

(Id. at ¶¶ 48-49).

Plaintiff

again objected, and Defendants Rodriguez, Agapay, and Castro
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allegedly slammed Plaintiff to the ground by his neck, causing
Plaintiff to sustain injuries.

(Id. at ¶ 52).

Defendant Castro

then allegedly instructed Defendants Agapay and Rodriguez to
remove the keys from Plaintiff’s pocket.

(Id. at ¶ 56).

The exact sequence of the allegations is difficult to
decipher from the Third Amended Complaint.

Plaintiff claims he

was beaten in intervals between roughly 2:45 AM and 3:45 AM,
until he was unconscious.

(Id. at ¶¶ 54-55, 57-58, 63-69).

He

states that at some point during this period, he was handcuffed.
(Id. at ¶¶ 53, 57).

Plaintiff alleges that Securitas issued him

a criminal citation and initiated criminal proceedings against
him.

(Id. at ¶ 68).
According to Plaintiff, someone allegedly called paramedics

at 3:50 AM.

(Id. at ¶ 59).

At an unspecified time later,

paramedics arrived and took Plaintiff to Kuakini Medical Center.
(Id. at ¶¶ 60, 70).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss a complaint as a matter of law
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) where it
fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”

Rule

(8)(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief.”

When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion

to dismiss, the Court must presume all allegations of material
fact to be true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
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the non-moving party.
Cir. 1998).

Pareto v. F.D.I.C., 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th

Conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted

inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.
at 699.

Id.

The Court need not accept as true allegations that

contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or
allegations contradicting the exhibits attached to the complaint.
Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th
Cir. 2001).
In Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, the United States Supreme
Court addressed the pleading standards under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in the anti-trust context.

550 U.S. 544 (2007).

The Supreme Court stated that Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” and
that “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level.”

Id. at 555.

Most recently, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court
clarified that the principles announced in Twombly are applicable
in all civil cases.

129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009).

The Court stated

that “the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require
‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me-accusation.”
at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

Id.

To survive a motion

to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.

Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
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A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

Id. (citing

The plausibility standard is not akin

to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

Id. (quoting

Where a complaint pleads facts that

are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops
short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
‘entitlement to relief.’”

Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 557).
The complaint “must contain sufficient allegations of
underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing
party to defend itself effectively” and “must plausibly suggest
an entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require
the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery
and continued litigation.”

AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cty. of

Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotations
omitted).
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff appears pro se.
Plaintiff's filings.

The Court liberally construes

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007);

Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The
Supreme Court has instructed the federal courts to liberally
construe the ‘inartful pleading’ of pro se litigants.”)(citing
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Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam)).
Allegations in a complaint may not simply recite the
elements of a cause of action.
1216 (9th Cir. 2011).

Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202,

The complaint must contain

sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice
and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.
Id.

Factual allegations taken as true must plausibly suggest an

entitlement to relief.

Id.

To date, Plaintiff has filed seven documents that he has
labeled as complaints.

(ECF Nos. 1, 9, 19, 25, 26, 29, and 34).

The Magistrate Judge and District Judge have each issued multiple
orders with guidance as to the timing and content necessary for
Plaintiff to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
the Local Rules for the District of Hawaii in amending a
complaint.
Plaintiff has already received several opportunities to
amend his complaint.

In Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint, he

attempts to assert thirteen causes of action.

Construed

liberally, Plaintiff lists both federal and state law claims in
the Third Amended Complaint.
Plaintiff has listed nine separate causes of action as being
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The nine causes of action

each seek relief for various violations of three separate
amendments to the United States Constitution:
(1)

the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution, U.S. Const. Amend. I.;

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(2)

the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, U.S. Const. Amend. IV.; and,

(3)

the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, U.S. Const. Amend. XIV.

Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint also brings a variety of
Hawaii state law claims for (1) negligence, (2) excessive force,
(3) false arrest, (4) false imprisonment, (5) assault, (6)
battery, (7) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (8)
failure to properly screen and hire, (9) failure to properly
train, (10) failure to supervise or discipline, and (11) punitive
damages.
Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint is difficult to decipher
and combines state law claims and Section 1983 claims in the same
causes of action.

Each of the causes of action he styles as

Section 1983 violations allege that the First, Fourth, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution were
violated.
The Court examines the allegations with respect to the three
separate Amendments to the United States Constitution to
determine if Plaintiff has stated a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983.
The Court finds that Plaintiff has not stated a plausible
Section 1983 claim or any other federal law claim that would
provide the Court with federal law subject-matter jurisdiction.

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I.

PLAINTIFF’S SECTION 1983 CLAIMS FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Plaintiff cites to the First Amendment of the United States

Constitution in the Third Amended Complaint.

The Third Amended

Complaint does not contain a single allegation that would support
a claim pursuant to the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution.
There are no facts pled that would allow Plaintiff to
proceed on such a claim.
Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims for violations of the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.

II.

PLAINTIFF’S SECTION 1983 CLAIMS FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Plaintiff previously attempted to plead a claim pursuant to

the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution for
“due process” violations.

The claim was already dismissed with

prejudice by the Findings and Recommendation as adopted by the
Court.

(Findings and Recommendation, hereinafter “F&R”, at pp.

20-22, ECF No. 23).
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects
the liberty of pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners.
Alexander v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 545 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1132
(D. Haw. 2008)(citing Redman v. Cty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435,
1440 (9th Cir. 1991), abrogated on other grounds by Farmer v.
11

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994)).
As in his previous Complaints, the entirety of the conduct
described in the Third Amended Complaint occurred before any
possible arraignment.

The Court has explained at length to the

Plaintiff that he cannot state a claim for relief based on the
facts alleged, because he was not a pretrial detainee or
convicted prisoner.

Plaintiff has not established any other

basis for a Section 1983 claim pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims for violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

III. PLAINTIFF’S SECTION 1983 CLAIMS FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
A.

FOURTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS AGAINST SECURITAS

In the Court’s previous Order, Plaintiff was instructed as
to what he must do to state a claim against Securitas for
violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.

(F&R at pp. 10-17, ECF No. 23).

failed to do so.

Plaintiff has

Plaintiff has not cured the deficiencies set

forth in the Findings and Recommendation.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2)
that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under
12

the color of state law.

See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48

(1988).
In Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, the
Supreme Court of the United States held that municipalities and
other local government units may be subject to suit under Section
1983.

436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).

Under Monell, a municipality

can not be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor.
Id. at 691.

To hold a municipality liable for the actions of its

employees, the constitutional violation must be caused by either
a “policy, practice, or custom of the entity,” or “be the result
of an order by a policy-making officer.”

Tsao v. Desert Palace,

Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Dougherty v.
City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011).

In Tsao, the

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Monell applied to suits
brought under Section 1983 against private entities acting on
behalf of municipalities.

Id. at 1139.

Plaintiff was informed that in order to plead a Monell
claim, he must allege and identify a specific policy statement,
ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and
promulgated by Securitas that led to the alleged incident
involving the Defendants Sappal, Castro, Rodriguez, Agapay, and
Roderick (hereinafter “Individual Defendants”).
17, ECF No. 23).

(F&R at pp. 15-

Plaintiff was also informed that in order to

allege facts showing a policy of inaction, Plaintiff must do more
than use key terms and conclusory allegations.

(Id.)

Plaintiff has not cured the defects identified in the
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previous Complaint.
Plaintiff does not identify a specific policy, practice, or
custom of Securitas which led to the alleged incident between
Plaintiff and the Individual Defendants.

Jackson v. Barnes, 749

F.3d 755, 763 (9th Cir. 2014); Tsao, 698 F.3d at 1144.

Plaintiff

does not identify an order by a policy-making officer that led to
the conduct alleged.

Instead, Plaintiff relies entirely on

conclusory statements that such a policy, practice, custom, or
order existed.

(Third Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 12, 85, 90, 116,

132, 133, 147, 148, 155, 177, 182, 188, ECF No. 29).

It is not

enough to repeatedly state that a policy, practice, custom, or
order existed and caused his injuries.

Plaintiff must identify

with specificity what the policy, practice, custom, or order he
is referring to.
Further, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts that illustrate
Securitas had actual or constructive notice such that it could
have prevented the alleged incident by implementing a particular
policy.

Gibson v. Cty. of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1194 (9th Cir.

2002).
The Third Amended Complaint fails to state a plausible
Section 1983 claim under Monell against Securitas.

Plaintiff

must allege facts, not recite legal terms.
Plaintiff has already been given numerous opportunities to
amend his Complaints to state a claim against Securitas and
failed to do so.
Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims for violations of the Fourth
14

Amendment of the United States Constitution against Securitas are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

B.

FOURTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS AGAINST INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS

In most circumstances, a private individual does not act
under color of state law, an essential element of a Section 1983
action.

See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).

private conduct is not covered by Section 1983.

Purely

See Ouzts v.

Maryland Nat'l Ins. Co., 505 F.2d 547, 550 (9th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975).

There is no right to be free from

the infliction of constitutional deprivations by private
individuals.

See Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831,

835 (9th Cir. 1996).
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, private parties may only be
held liable if a plaintiff can show the private party’s conduct
amounted to state action.
922, 937 (1982).

Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S.

There are four tests to determine if a private

party’s conduct amounts to state action:
(1) the public function test;
(2) the joint action test;
(3) the state compulsion test; and
(4) the governmental nexus test.
Tsao, 698 F.3d at 1140.

The plaintiff has the burden to

plead and prove state action by a private defendant.

Id. (citing

Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937).
Plaintiff's allegations in the Third Amended Complaint do
15

not demonstrate that the Individual Defendants acted under color
of state law.

Plaintiff has failed to allege facts that meet any

of the above tests for state action by the Individual Defendants.
The conduct alleged in the Third Amended Complaint appears to be
limited to state law assault and battery claims.
subject to Hawaii state law, not federal law.

Such claims are

(Third Amended

Complaint at pp. 5-7, ECF No. 29).
Plaintiff has already been given numerous opportunities to
amend his Compliant against the Individual Defendants (formerly
Doe Defendants) and failed to do so.

Further amendment would be

futile.
Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims for violations of the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution against the
Individual Defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IV.

PLAINTIFF’S STATE LAW CLAIMS
There are no remaining federal claims and no other basis for

federal subject-matter jurisdiction.

The Court declines to

assert supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law
claims.
CONCLUSION
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 31) is GRANTED.
Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims pursuant to the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution are DISMISSED WITH

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PREJUDICE.
Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims pursuant to the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
The Court declines to assert supplemental jurisdiction over
the remaining state law claims.
The Clerk of Court is ordered to CLOSE THE CASE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: HONOLULU, HAWAII, September 13, 2018.

Napoleon Annan-Yartey, Sr. v. Securitas Security Service USA,
Inc.; Sanj Sappal; Justin Castro; E. Rodriguez; W. Agapay; R.
Roderick, CIVIL NO. 18-00107 HG-KJM; ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO DISMISS THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT, FILED JULY 16, 2018
(ECF No. 31)
17