Venice PI, LLC et al v. Doe 1; et al.

Filing 99

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' RENEWED APPLICATION FOR ENTRY OF TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION re: 87 - Signed by JUDGE LESLIE E. KOBAYASHI on 12/31/2019. (jo)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF HAWAII

VENICE PI, LLC, HEADHUNTER,
LLC, MON LLC, COOK
PRODUCTIONS, LLC, COLOSSAL
MOVIE PRODUCTIONS, LLC, CLEAR
SKIES NEVADA, LLC, BODYGUARD
PRODUCTIONS, INC., I.T.
PRODUCTIONS, LLC, COBBLER
NEVADA, LLC, JUSTICE EVERYWHERE
PRODUCTIONS, INC., GLACIER
FILMS 1, LLC, MILLENNIUM
FUNDING, INC., TBV PRODUCTIONS,
LLC,

CIV. NO. 18-00192 LEK-RT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
GALBATROSS TECHNOLOGIES, LLP,
HIMANSHU SAXENA, GAURAV JAGGI,
Defendants.

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ RENEWED APPLICATION FOR
ENTRY OF TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
On August 16, 2019, Plaintiffs Venice PI, LLC;
Headhunter LLC; MON LLC; Millennium Funding, Inc.; TBV
Productions, LLC; Cook Productions, LLC; Glacier Films 1, LLC;
Colossal Movie Productions, LLC; Clear Skies Nevada, LLC;
Bodyguard Productions, Inc.; I.T. Productions, LLC; Cobbler
Nevada, LLC; and Justice Everywhere Productions, Inc.
(“Plaintiffs”) filed, ex parte, their Renewed Application for
Entry of Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction

(“Motion”).1

[Dkt. no. 87.]

On September 5, 2019, Plaintiffs

filed a supplemental memorandum in support of the Motion.
no. 90.]

[Dkt.

The Court finds this matter suitable for disposition

without a hearing pursuant to Rule LR7.1(c) of the Local Rules
of Practice for the United States District Court for the
District of Hawaii (“Local Rules”).

The Motion’s request for a

TRO is hereby denied for the reasons set forth below.
BACKGROUND
Some of the current Plaintiffs, along with other
entities, initiated this action on May 23, 2018.2
(dkt. no. 1).]

[Complaint

The operative pleading is Plaintiffs’ Second

Amended Complaint, filed on December 5, 2018.

[Dkt. no. 54.]

Plaintiffs each own one or more copyrights to various motion
pictures listed in the Second Amended Complaint (collectively
“the Works”).

[Id. at ¶ 8.]

“Each of the Works are motion

pictures currently offered for sale in commerce.”
¶ 90.]

[Id. at

Plaintiffs allege Defendants Galbatross Technologies,

LLP (“Galbatross”); Himanshu Saxena (“Saxena”); Gaurav Jaggi
(“Jaggi”); DOE 5, doing business as

1

In light of the denial of the Motion’s request for a
temporary restraining order (“TRO”), the Court will reserve
ruling on the portion of the Motion seeking a preliminary
injunction until the completion of service.
2

A First Amended Complaint was filed on August 13, 2018.
[Dkt. no. 26.]
2

show-box.en.uptodown.com/android (“Doe 5”); Rajat Kulshrestha
(“Kulshrestha”); Ipathy Srinivas Rao (“Rao”), and Monitu Bansal
(“Bansal” and collectively “Defendants”) utilize the Show Box
software application (“Show Box app”) to engage in “massive
piracy of” the Works.

[Id. at pg. 1.]

According to Plaintiffs,

“Defendants misleadingly promote the Show Box app as a
legitimate means for viewing content to the public, who eagerly
install the Show Box app to watch copyright protected content,
thereby leading to profit for the Defendants.”

[Id. at ¶ 1.]

Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to the United States
Copyright Act of 1976, as amended (“Copyright Act”), 17 U.S.C.
§ 101, et seq.

[Id. at ¶ 2.]

Plaintiffs allege the following

claims: contributory copyright infringement, based on the
inducement of third parties to stream the Works (“Count I”);
contributory copyright infringement, based on the inducement of
third parties to torrent the Works (“Count II”); contributory
copyright infringement, based on Defendants’ material
contribution to the infringement upon Plaintiffs’ rights under
the Copyright Act (“Count III”); and direct copyright
infringement (“Count IV”).
Plaintiffs and Rao stipulated to a consent judgment,
[filed 12/28/18 (dkt. no. 63),] and Plaintiffs also did so with
Doe 5 – who was identified as Lahoucine Ikous, [filed 2/1/19
(dkt. no. 66),] Bansal, [filed 2/1/19 (dkt. no. 67),] and
3

Kulshrestha, [filed 5/23/19 (dkt. no. 78)].

Thus, the only

defendants remaining in this action are Galbatross, Saxena, and
Jaggi (“Remaining Defendants”).

Plaintiffs have made multiple

attempts to effectuate service upon the Remaining Defendants,
but have been unsuccessful.

See, e.g., Submission of Report of

Service per Hague Convention of Def. Pebblebridge Technologies,
LLP,3 filed 12/12/19 (dkt. no. 98) (documents showing that
attempted service on Galbatross at a Business Park address in
India was unsuccessful); Decl. of Stephanie Kessner, filed
7/17/19 (dkt. no. 85) (with documents showing that attempted
service on Jaggi at a Green Park address in India, in accordance
with the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and
Extrajudicial Documents (“Hague Convention”), was unsuccessful);
summons returned unexecuted, filed 5/7/19 (dkt. no. 75) (similar
Hague Convention documents as to attempted service upon Saxena
at a Green Park address in India).4

A new summons was issued for

service upon Jaggi at a residential address in Gurgaon, India,
[Summons in a Civil Case, filed 9/17/19 (dkt. no. 93),] but no
return has been filed.

3

The title of the document erroneously refers to another
entity, but the text of the document refers to Galbatross.
4

The Saxena service documents do not have an declaration of
counsel like the one filed with the Jaggi service documents.
4

Plaintiffs previously filed two ex parte motions for
authorization to utilize alternate service of process for the
Remaining Defendants, but both motions were denied.

[Ex parte

motion, filed 5/23/19 (dkt. no. 79) (“5/23/19 Motion”); ex parte
motion, filed 7/10/19 (dkt. no. 84) (“7/10/19 Motion”); order
denying 5/23/19 Motion, filed 6/28/19 (dkt. no. 83) (“6/28/19
Order”); order denying 7/10/19 Motion, filed 8/30/19 (dkt.
no. 89) (“8/30/19 Order”).]
In the instant Motion, Plaintiffs seek a TRO
requiring:
the registrar NameCheap, Inc. to immediately lock
the following domains associated with [the
Remaining Defendants] to prevent [them] from
transferring said domains to a registrar outside
of the United States:
galbatross.com; show-box.one;
showboxmediagroup.org; showboxme.com;
showboxforpcguide.com; showboxcomputer.com;
showboxapp.me; showboxapkdownloads.com;
showboxandroid.com; showbox360.com;
downloadshowboxapps.com; downloadshowboxapp.co;
app-showbox.com; showoxforpc.me;
showboxforpc.xyz; showboxforpc.me;
showboxforpc.io; showboxforpc.download;
forpcdownload.com; downloadshowbox.co;
downloadshowbox.app; cinemaboxhdi.com; cinemaboxhd.com; terrariumtv.org; terrariumtv.net;
terrarium-tv.com[.]
[Motion at 1-2.]
DISCUSSION
The requirements to obtain a TRO or a preliminary
injunction are well-established.

See Winter v. Nat’l Res. Def.
5

Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (“A plaintiff seeking a
preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to
succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable
harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of
equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the
public interest.” (citations omitted)); Washington v. Trump, 847
F.3d 1151, 1159 n.3 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“the legal
standards applicable to TROs and preliminary injunctions are
substantially identical” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).

Further, under very limited circumstances, a

district court may grant a plaintiff’s request for a TRO without
notice to the defendant.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1); Reno Air

Racing Ass’n v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2006).
However, some threshold issues must be addressed before the
requirements for a TRO can be examined.
I.

Service
Plaintiffs assert they have completed service upon the

Remaining Defendants by email, in accordance India’s law
regarding service - Order V, Rule 20(1) of the Code of Civil
Procedure 1908 - and this satisfies Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(2)(A).
[Suppl. Mem. at 27 (citing Motion, Decl. of Sanjay Aggarwal

6

(“Aggarwal Decl.”) at ¶¶ 7-11; Motion, Decl. of Counsel at
¶ 2).5]

Rule 4(f) states:
Serving an Individual in a Foreign Country.
Unless federal law provides otherwise, an
individual – other than a minor, an incompetent
person, or a person whose waiver has been filed may be served at a place not within any judicial
district of the United States:
(1) by any internationally agreed means of
service that is reasonably calculated to
give notice, such as those authorized by the
Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of
Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents;
(2) if there is no internationally agreed
means, or if an international agreement
allows but does not specify other means, by
a method that is reasonably calculated to
give notice:
(A) as prescribed by the foreign
country’s law for service in that
country in an action in its courts of
general jurisdiction;
(B) as the foreign authority directs
in response to a letter rogatory or
letter of request; or
(C) unless prohibited by the foreign
country’s law, by:
(i) delivering a copy of the
summons and of the complaint to
the individual personally; or
(ii) using any form of mail that
the clerk addresses and sends to
the individual and that requires a
signed receipt; or

5

Sanjay Aggarwal is a licensed attorney in India.
[Aggarwal Decl. at ¶ 2.]
7

(3) by other means not prohibited by
international agreement, as the court
orders.
Thus, service can be effected pursuant to Rule 4(f)(2) only
where there is no international agreement regarding service or
where an international agreement exists, but it “does not
specify other means.”
India became a signatory to the Hague Convention,
effective August 1, 2007. In so doing, India
prohibited service through channels including
mail and private process servers and instead
required foreign plaintiffs to effect service
through the Central Authority of India. See
Tuckerbrook Alt. Invs., LP v. Banerjee, 754 F.
Supp. 2d 177, 181–82 (D. Mass. 2010).
Merial Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd., 681 F.3d 1283, 1295–96 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
law.

Galbatross is believed to be a partnership under India

[Second Amended Complaint at ¶ 10.]

Saxena and Jaggi are

believed to be residents of India who are Galbatross’s partners.
[Id. at ¶ 12.]

Plaintiffs are therefore required to effectuate

service on the Remaining Defendants through the Central
Authority of India.

Plaintiffs have attempted to do so, but

those efforts have been unsuccessful.
85, 98 (cited supra).

See, e.g., dkt. nos. 75,

A district court has discretion to

authorize alternate service methods upon parties in a foreign
country, even if the country is a signatory to the Hague
Convention, and service by email of a defendant in India has
been permitted.

See, e.g., Sadis & Goldberg, LLP v. Banerjee,
8

No. 14-CV-913-LTS, 2017 WL 1194476, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30,
2017), vacated on other grounds, 715 F. App’x 99 (2d Cir. 2018).
However, Plaintiffs’ requests for authorization to utilize
alternative service methods have been denied.

See supra

discussing the 6/28/19 Order and the 8/30/19 Order.
Plaintiffs’ assertion that they have completed service
upon the Remaining Defendants pursuant to Rule 4(f)(2)(A) is
therefore rejected.
II.

Personal Jurisdiction
A TRO can only be issued if personal jurisdiction over

the Remaining Defendants exists.

See Price v. City of Stockton,

390 F.3d 1105, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004) (“A federal court may issue
an injunction if it has personal jurisdiction over the parties
and subject matter jurisdiction over the claim; it may not
attempt to determine the rights of persons not before the
court.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)).
A.

Federal Long-Arm Statute
Plaintiffs first argue this Court has jurisdiction

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k), also known as the federal
long-arm statute.

[Mem. in Supp. of Motion at 28.]

Rule 4(k)

states:
Territorial Limits of Effective Service.
(1) In General. Serving a summons or
filing a waiver of service establishes
personal jurisdiction over a defendant:
9

(A) who is subject to the jurisdiction
of a court of general jurisdiction in
the state where the district court is
located;
(B) who is a party joined under
Rule 14 or 19 and is served within a
judicial district of the United States
and not more than 100 miles from where
the summons was issued; or
(C) when authorized by a federal
statute.
(2) Federal Claim Outside State-Court
Jurisdiction. For a claim that arises under
federal law, serving a summons or filing a
waiver of service establishes personal
jurisdiction over a defendant if:
(A) the defendant is not subject to
jurisdiction in any state’s courts of
general jurisdiction; and
(B) exercising jurisdiction is
consistent with the United States
Constitution and laws.
Neither Rule 4(k)(1) nor Rule 4(k)(2) applies because Plaintiffs
have not served a summons on, nor obtained a waiver of service
from, any of the Remaining Defendants.

Personal jurisdiction

pursuant to Rule 4(k) is therefore unavailable at this time.
B.

Hawai`i Long-Arm Statute and Due Process Analysis
Plaintiffs also argue personal jurisdiction exists

pursuant to the Hawai`i long-arm statute, Haw. Rev. Stat. § 63435.

[Mem. in Supp. of Motion at 25-26.]

The § 634-35 analysis

is the same as the Fifth Amendment due process analysis.

10

The district court considers two factors
before exercising personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant in a diversity of
citizenship case: “(1) whether an applicable
state rule or statute potentially confers
jurisdiction over the defendant; and (2) whether
assertion of such jurisdiction accords with
constitutional principles of due process.” Flynt
Distrib. Co. v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389, 1392 (9th
Cir. 1984). “The jurisdictional inquiries under
state law and federal due process merge into one
analysis” when, as here, the state’s long-arm
statute is “co-extensive with federal due process
requirements.” Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d
617, 620 (9th Cir. 1991).[6] See Cowan v. First
Ins. Co. of Hawaii, 61 Haw. 644, 649, 608 P.2d
6

Subject matter jurisdiction in the instant case is not
based on diversity jurisdiction, but federal question
jurisdiction and patent, copyright, and trademark jurisdiction.
[Second Amended Complaint at ¶ 3.] The personal jurisdiction
analysis is the same, except that Fifth Amendment due process
rights are implicated.
In a “federal question case [in which] a
federally created right is at issue, we examine
due process in light of the fifth amendment
rather than the fourteenth amendment.” Dakota
Indus., Inc. v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc., 946 F.2d
1384, 1389 n.2 (8th Cir. 1991). Although this is
a federal question case, the Fourteenth Amendment
is also involved in that determining whether
personal jurisdiction is present requires
examining the forum state’s long-arm statute.
Genetic Implant [Sys., Inc. v. Core-Vent Corp.],
123 F.3d [1455,] 1458 [(Fed. Cir. 1997)].
Hawaii’s long-arm statute permits personal
jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the
Fourteenth Amendment. The due process inquiry in
this case therefore concerns the protections
provided by the Due Process Clauses of both the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, collapsing into
a single inquiry.
Kowalski v. Anova Food, LLC, Civ. No. 11-00795 HG-RLP, 2012 WL
3308884, at *5 n.1 (D. Hawai`i Aug. 10, 2012) (some alterations
in Kowalski).
11

394, 399 (1980) (Hawaii’s long-arm statute, Haw.
Rev. Stat. § 634–35, was adopted to expand the
jurisdiction of Hawaii’s courts to the extent
permitted by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment). Accordingly, personal
jurisdiction over [the defendant] depends on
federal due process requirements.
The Due Process Clause protects a person’s
“liberty interest in not being subject to the
binding judgments of a forum with which he has
established no meaningful ‘contacts, ties, or
relations.’” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462, 471–72, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d
528 (1985) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 319, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95
(1945)). The Due Process Clause requires that
defendants have “certain minimum contacts with
[Hawaii] such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S.
at 316, 66 S. Ct. 154; Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems
Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1287 (9th
Cir. 1977). The minimum contacts required mean
that the defendant must have purposefully availed
itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the foreign jurisdiction, thereby invoking
the benefits and protections of the foreign
jurisdiction’s laws. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co.
v. Sup. Court of Cal., Solano County, 480 U.S.
102, 109, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 94 L. Ed. 2d 92
(1987). In applying Due Process Clause
requirements, courts have created two
jurisdictional concepts — general and specific
jurisdiction.
A court may exercise general jurisdiction
over the defendant when the defendant is a
resident or domiciliary of the forum state, or
the defendant’s contacts with the forum state are
continuous, systematic, and substantial.
Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v.
Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414–16, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 80
L. Ed. 2d 404 (1984); Data Disc, 557 F.2d at
1287 . . . .

12

Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand,
may be found when the cause of action arises out
of the defendant’s contact or activities in the
forum state. See Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942
F.2d 617, 620 (9th Cir. 1991); Data Disc, 557
F.2d at 1287. . . .
Barranco v. 3D Sys. Corp., 6 F. Supp. 3d 1068, 1077-78 (D.
Hawai`i 2014) (some alterations in Barranco) (some citations
omitted).
1.

General Jurisdiction

First, nothing in the Second Amended Complaint
indicates that any of the Remaining Defendants either: 1) is a
resident or domiciliary of the State of Hawai`i, or 2) has
contacts with Hawai`i that are so “continuous, systematic, and
substantial” that general jurisdiction is warranted.
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416.

See

Therefore, general jurisdiction

over the Remaining Defendants is lacking.
2.

Specific Jurisdiction

[The Ninth Circuit] employ[s] a three-part test
to determine if a defendant has sufficient
minimum contacts to be subject to specific
personal jurisdiction:
(1) The non-resident defendant must
purposefully direct his activities or
consummate some transaction with the forum
or resident thereof; or perform some act by
which he purposefully avails himself of the
privilege of conducting activities in the
forum, thereby invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws;

13

(2) the claim must be one which arises out
of or relates to the defendant’s forumrelated activities; and
(3) the exercise of jurisdiction must
comport with fair play and substantial
justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.
Brayton Purcell [LLP v. Recordon & Recordon], 606
F.3d [1124,] 1128 [(9th Cir. 2010)] (internal
quotation marks omitted). As [the plaintiff]
bears the burden of establishing the district
court’s jurisdiction over [the defendant], it
must satisfy the first two prongs. If it does
so, then [the defendant] must come forward with a
“‘compelling case’ that the exercise of
jurisdiction would not be reasonable.”
CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d
1066, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477, 105 S. Ct.
2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985)).
Washington Shoe Co. v. A-Z Sporting Goods, Inc., 704 F.3d 668,
672 (9th Cir. 2012) (footnote and some citations omitted).7

7

In light of Walden, Brayton Purcell and Washington Shoe
have been abrogated as to the “individualized targeting” theory.
Axiom Foods, Inc. v. Acerchem Int’l, Inc., 874 F.3d 1064, 1070
(9th Cir. 2017) (“Following Walden, we now hold that while a
theory of individualized targeting may remain relevant to the
minimum contacts inquiry, it will not, on its own, support the
exercise of specific jurisdiction, absent compliance with what
Walden requires.”). “A theory of individualized targeting
alleges that a defendant ‘engaged in wrongful conduct targeted
at a plaintiff whom the defendant knows to be a resident of the
forum state.’” Id. at 1069 (quoting Washington Shoe, 704 F.3d
at 675). The “individualized targeting” theory does not apply
in this case because the Second Amended Complaint does not
allege any Plaintiff is a Hawai`i resident.
14

a.

Purposeful Direction
“Purposeful direction requires a defendant to have

(1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the
forum state, and (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is
likely to be suffered in the forum state.”

Lazar v. Kroncke,

862 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2017) (brackets, citations, and internal
quotation marks omitted).

In analyzing whether a defendant

purposefully directed his activities at the forum state, the
district court must focus upon “the relationship between the
defendant, the forum, and the litigation.”

Brennan v. Hawaii,

CIV. NO. 17-00163 HG-RLP, 2017 WL 3187215, at *4 (D. Hawai`i
July 26, 2017) (citing Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1126
(2014)).

Under the Walden analysis, “the relationship must

arise out of contacts that the defendant himself creates with
the forum State,” and the court must “look[] to the defendant’s
contacts with the forum State itself, not the defendant’s
contacts with persons who reside there.”

571 U.S. 277, 284-85,

134 S. Ct. at 1122 (emphasis in Walden) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiffs generally allege the Remaining Defendants
“have placed hundreds of individuals in Hawaii if not thousands
of individuals in the United States in legal peril for copyright
infringement.”

[Second Amended Complaint at ¶ 1.]

Plaintiffs

specifically allege James Sosa, Kazzandra Pokini, Chenie A.
15

Horcajo, Keith Norton, and Margaret Burrows, each of whom is a
Hawai`i resident, utilized the Show Box app, while he or she was
in Hawai`i, to access one or more of the Works.
12, 115-17.]

[Id. at ¶¶ 110-

In addition, two internet protocol (“IP”)

addresses in Hawai`i were allegedly utilized by an unnamed
individual (or by unnamed individuals) to use the Show Box app,
while in Hawai`i, to access one of the Works.
14.]

[Id. at ¶¶ 113-

These are merely contacts with persons who reside within

Hawai`i; they do not constitute contacts with Hawai`i itself.
Under the Walden analysis, such contacts are insufficient to
establish purposeful direction.
Plaintiffs submitted an email to their counsel from
Saxena, dated November 2, 2018, in which Saxena admits that
showboxappdownload.co previously belonged to him, Jaggi, and
Galbatross, but they sold and transferred it.
Complaint, Exh. 5.]

[Second Amended

Plaintiffs therefore argue the Remaining

Defendants “have admitted to operating the interactive website
for distributing and promoting the interactive software program
Show Box app.”

[Mem. in Supp. of Motion at 26.]

Plaintiffs

assert that “‘operation of an interactive, commercial website is
often sufficient’ to establish personal jurisdiction.”

[Id.

(quoting Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419
(9th Cir. 1997)).]
Cybersell.

First, Plaintiffs overstate the holding of

The Ninth Circuit stated: “Courts that have
16

addressed interactive sites have looked to the ‘level of
interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of
information that occurs on the Web site’ to determine if
sufficient contacts exist to warrant the exercise of
jurisdiction.”

Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 418 (some citations

omitted) (quoting Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F.
Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (finding purposeful availment
based on Dot Com’s interactive web site and contracts with 3000
individuals and seven Internet access providers in Pennsylvania
allowing them to download the electronic messages that form the
basis of the suit)).

The Ninth Circuit also noted

“advertisement or solicitation for sale of goods and services on
the Internet” was insufficient, and “‘something more’ [is
required] to indicate that the defendant purposefully (albeit
electronically) directed his activity in a substantial way to
the forum state.”

Id.

Plaintiffs have not established the

“something more” showing that the Remaining Defendants
purposefully directed their activity in a substantial way to
Hawai`i.

Nor have Plaintiffs shown the type of extensive

website contacts with Hawai`i that existed in Zippo
Manufacturing.

Thus, even apart from the Walden analysis,

Plaintiffs have not identified the type of contacts with Hawai`i
that would be sufficient to establish purposeful direction under
Cybersell.
17

Plaintiffs have not established that the Remaining
Defendants either purposefully directed their activities to
Hawai`i or that they purposefully availed themselves of the
privileges of conducting business in Hawai`i.
b.

Other Washington Shoe Prongs

The second Washington Shoe prong requires that the
plaintiff’s claim arise out of the defendant’s forum-related
activities.

704 F.3d at 672.

This factor is not met because

the Remaining Defendants do not have forum-related activities.
Based on the available record, the Remaining Defendants merely
had contacts with persons within forum.
The third Washington Shoe prong requires that the
exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant be reasonable.

Id.

Exercising jurisdiction over any of the Remaining Defendants
would be unreasonable because Plaintiffs have not established
the first two prongs of the analysis.
This Court therefore concludes that it does not have
specific jurisdiction over any of the Remaining Defendants under
the minimum contacts analysis, i.e. under either the Hawai`i
long-arm statute or the due process analysis.
C.

Summary
There is no basis for personal jurisdiction over the

Remaining Defendants.

Even if Plaintiffs established all of the

requirements, a TRO could not be issued at this time.
18

Thus, it

is not necessary to determine whether Plaintiffs have
established the TRO requirements.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ Renewed
Application for Entry of Temporary Restraining Order, filed
August 16, 2019, is HEREBY DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAI`I, December 31, 2019.

VENICE PI, LLC, ET AL. VS. GALBATROSS TECHNOLOGIES, LLP, ET AL;
CV 18-00192 LEK-RT; ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' RENEWED
APPLICATION FOR ENTRY OF TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

19