Kahapea v. Hawaii State Federal Credit Union et al

Filing 32

ORDER DISMISSING, FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION, PETITIONER'S MOTION TO CONFIRM ARBITRATION AWARD re 1 - Signed by JUDGE LESLIE E. KOBAYASHI on 9/20/2021. For the foregoing reasons, Kahapea's Moti on to Confirm Arbitration Award, filed June 10, 2020, is HEREBY DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Clerk's Office is DIRECTED to enter judgment and close this case immediately, pursuant to the instant Order and the Order Adopting Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendation, filed June 2, 2021. (emt, )

Case 1:20-cv-00281-LEK-KJM Document 32 Filed 09/20/21 Page 1 of 16

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF HAWAII
RONNIE KAHAPEA,

CIV. NO. 20-00281 LEK-KJM
Petitioner,

vs.
HAWAII STATE FEDERAL CREDIT
UNION, ET AL.,
Respondents.
ORDER DISMISSING, FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION,
PETITIONER’S MOTION TO CONFIRM ARBITRATION AWARD
On June 10, 2020, pro se Petitioner Ronnie Kahapea
(“Kahapea”) filed a Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award (“Motion
to Confirm”), seeking an order confirming a Final Arbitration
Award issued in his favor by Sitcomm Arbitration Association
(“Sitcomm”) on July 18, 2019 (“Award”).

[Dkt. no. 1.1]

The

Court finds this matter suitable for disposition without a
hearing pursuant to Rule LR7.1(c) of the Local Rules of Practice
for the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii.

Kahapea originally requested that the Motion to Confirm be
filed in a miscellaneous case. [Kahapea v. Haw. State Fed.
Credit Union, et al., MC 20-00214 LEK-KJM, Notice to Clerk:
Filing Procedure, filed 6/10/20 (dkt. no. 2).] This Court
subsequently issued an entering order that: directed the Clerk’s
Office to re-file the Motion to Confirm in a new civil case; and
accepted Kahapea’s miscellaneous filing fee as the filing fee
for the new civil case. [Id., Minute Order - EO: Court Order to
Convert Miscellaneous Case to a Civil Case, filed 6/19/20 (dkt.
no. 4).]
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Kahapea’s Motion to Confirm is hereby dismissed because this
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

Further, even if it

had subject matter jurisdiction, this Court would conclude that
Kahapea is not entitled to confirmation of the Award because he
failed to establish the existence of a valid and binding
arbitration agreement.
BACKGROUND
The arbitration proceedings between Kahapea and
Respondents Hawaii State Federal Credit Union (“HSFCU”), Bank of
America (“BANA”),2 and Dave Smith Motors (“DSM” and,
collectively, “Respondents”) were purportedly presided over in
Laurel, Mississippi by Sandra Goulette as the “Arbitrator” and
Alden Bennett as the “Committee Member.”
dkt. no. 1-2 (Award) at PageID #: 23-24.]

[Motion to Confirm,
The arbitration

proceedings were initiated with a dispute resolution complaint
submitted on June 14, 2019.

[Id. at PageID #: 25, ¶ 2.]

The Award noted that “[t]he Respondent(s) in a related
action have made a claim against [Kahapea] of this instant
matter related to [Kahapea]’s interests and/or properties.”
[Id. at PageID #: 25, ¶ 4.]

According to State of Hawai`i

Respondent Bank of America, N.A., for itself and as
successor in interest to BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, states
Kahapea erroneously sued it as Bank of America. [Opposition of
Respondent Bank of America, N.A., to Plaintiff’s Motion to
Confirm Arbitration Award [ECF No. 1] (“BANA Opposition”), filed
7/7/20 (dkt. no. 7), at 1.]
2

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Judiciary records, HSFCU filed the following against Kahapea in
the State of Hawai`i, District Court of the Third Circuit Court,
Puna Division (“state court”):
-a complaint seeking to recover $26,148.04, representing the
unpaid principal on a line of credit loan, with interest
and late charges; see Haw. State Fed. Credit Union v.
Kahapea, 3DCR-19-0000219 (“Line of Credit Action”), filed
10/30/19 (dkt. no. 1); and
-a complaint seeking to recover $24,020.36, representing the
unpaid principal on an auto loan and security agreement,
with interest and late charges, see Haw. State Fed. Credit
Union v. Kahapea, 3DCR-19-0000289 (“Auto Loan Action”),
filed 11/13/19 (dkt. no. 1).
The state court granted summary judgment in favor of HSFCU in
both actions.

See Line of Credit Action, Order Granting

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment Against Defendant Filed
January 13, 2020, filed 4/22/20 (dkt. no. 66); Auto Loan Action,
Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment Against
Defendant Filed January 13, 2020, filed 4/22/20 (dkt. no. 61).
Prior to the submission of Kahapea’s dispute
resolution complaint to Sitcomm, Kahapea sent HSFCU a document,
dated March 31, 2019, and titled “Conditional Acceptance for
Value and Counter Offer/Claim for Proof of Claim and Tender of
Payment Offering” (“Conditional Acceptance”).

[Motion to

Confirm, dkt. no. 1-1 (Conditional Acceptance) at PageID #: 7.]
Kahapea stated he had an agreement with BANA, “the original
lender[,]” and he was conditionally accepting an unspecified
offer of new terms by HSFCU, but he demanded that HSFCU provide
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a proof of claim.

[Id.]

PageID #: 229

Included within Kahapea’s Conditional

Acceptance was an “Equitable Remittance Coupon” that purported
to constitute payment of $100,000 to HSFCU.
#: 8.]

[Id. at PageID

Kahapea asserted the coupon could be presented for

redemption “to the United States Treasury Department or at any
Federal Reserve bank to include any Federal Reserve member
banks” and he asserted that he was “tender[ing] payment for the
referenced obligation of debt[.]”

[Id.]

The collateral

identification number associated with the coupon was the same as
the vehicle identification number of the vehicle at issue in the
Auto Loan Action.

Compare id. with Auto Loan Action, Complaint

at Continuation Sheet to Complaint.
Kahapea asserted the Conditional Acceptance
supersedes and predates as well as replaces any
and all prior agreements between the parties, and
is binding on all parties and irrevocable, and
the parties agreed to the terms and conditions of
this agreement upon default of the defaulting
party as of the date of the default, that the
value of this agreement is $100,000.00 (ONE
HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS), the amount demanded is
$44,000.00 (FORTY FOUR THOUSAND DOLLARS).
[Motion to Confirm, dkt. no. 1-1 (Conditional Acceptance) at
PageID #: 9 (emphases in original).]

He also stated:

Should the Respondent(s) fail or otherwise
refuse to provide the requested and necessary
Proof of Claims raised herein above within the
expressed period of time established and set
herein above, Respondent(s) agree that they will
have failed to State any claim upon which relief
can be granted. Further, Respondent(s) will have
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agreed and consented through “tacit acquiescence”
to ALL the facts in relation to the above
referenced alleged Commercial/Civil/Cause, as
raised herein above as Proof of Claims herein;
and ALL facts necessarily and of consequence
arising there from, are true as they operate in
favor of the Undersigned, and that said facts
shall stand as prima facie and ultimate (unrefutable) between the parties to this
Conditional Acceptance binding contractual
agreement coupled with interests for Value and
counter offer/claim for Proof of Claim, the
corporate Government juridical construct(s)
Respondent(s) represents/serves, and ALL
officers, agents, employees, assigns, and the
like in service to Respondent(s), as being
undisputed. . . .
[Id. at PageID #: 10 (emphasis in original).]

The Conditional

Acceptance also stated it
constitutes an agreement of all interested
parties in the event of a default and acceptance
through silence/failure to respond when a request
for summary disposition of any claims or
particular issue may be requested and decided by
the arbitrator, and the parties agree that the
policies and procedures of SAA (THE SITCOMM
ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION) whereas a designated
arbitrator shall be chosen at random, who is duly
authorized, and in the event of any physical or
mental incapacity to act as arbitrator, the
Undersigned shall retain the authority to select
any neutral(s)/arbitrator(s) that qualify
pursuant to the common law right to arbitration,
as the arbitration process is a private remedy
decided upon between the parties, and with
respects this agreement, the defaulting party
waives any and all rights, services, notices, and
consents to the undersigned and or the
undersigned’s representative selection of the
arbitrator thereby constituting agreement, and
any controversy or claim arising out of or
relating in any way to this Agreement or with
regard to its formation, interpretation or
breach, and any issues of substantive or
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procedural arbitrability shall be settled by
arbitration, and the arbitrator may hear and
decide the controversy upon evidence produced,
and not based on personal opinion, legalese,
legal terminology, legal technicalities,
statutes, codes, ordinances, regulations, but
within the scope of this herein agreement
according to its terms and conditions, and must
do so even if and or although a party who was
duly notified of the arbitration proceeding did
not appear; that the Undersigned deems necessary
to enforce the “good faith” of ALL parties hereto
within without respect to venue, jurisdiction,
law, and forum the Undersigned deems appropriate.
[Id. at PageID #: 11-12 (emphasis in original).]
The Arbitrator referred to the Conditional Acceptance
as “a written, self-executing, binding, irrevocable, contractual
agreement coupled with interests, for the complete resolution of
their misconvictions and other conflicts respecting their
previous relationship.”

[Motion to Confirm, dkt. no. 1-2

(Award) at PageID #: 27, ¶ 18.]

The Arbitrator found that

Respondents’ failure to respond to the Conditional Acceptance
constituted a default and an affirmation of “the truth and
validity of said facts set” forth in the Conditional Acceptance.
[Id. at PageID #: 28, ¶ 22.]

The Arbitrator found that, in

addition to the agreement in the Conditional Acceptance, Kahapea
and “the parties had a pre-established relationship which placed
an obligation on each to communicate with the other[,]” and
Respondents “made changes to the original agreement which
permitted and allowed [Kahapea] to present a counter offer

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and/or conditional acceptance of the offer to change the
agreement to the Respondent(s).”
c.]

[Id. at PageID #: 36, ¶¶ 45,a-

The Arbitrator awarded a total of $132,000.00 to Kahapea,

with Respondents each being responsible for $44,000.00, based on
their respective breaches of a contractual agreement with
Kahapea.

[Id. at ¶¶ 45.c-f.]

The Arbitrator also ordered

Respondents “to restore and release” to Kahapea his “corpus and
ALL property currently under a ‘storage contract[.]’”
PageID #: 31, ¶ 29.]

[Id. at

Although the Award does not contain an

award of punitive damages, the Arbitrator stated that the issue
of a punitive damages award could be revisited if Respondents
failed to comply with the Award.

[Id. at PageID #: 38, ¶ 51.]

Kahapea seeks to confirm the Award, pursuant to the
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 9.

The Motion to

Confirm asserts confirmation is warranted because the Award is
proper in all respects, and Respondents have not sought to
vacate, modify, or correct the Award, pursuant to 9 U.S.C. §§ 10
and 11.

BANA has appeared in this action and urges this Court

to deny the Motion to Confirm and to strike the Award.
Opposition at 2.]

[BANA

Kahapea has never established that he

completed service of the Motion to Confirm on HSFCU and DSM, and
neither HSFCU nor DSM has appeared in this case.

This Court

therefore adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation to
dismiss the Motion to Confirm as to HSFCU and DSM.
7

[Findings

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and Recommendation to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute
Plaintiff’s Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award as to Defendants
Hawaii State Federal Credit Union and Dave Smith Motors, filed
5/7/21 (dkt. no. 26); Order Adopting Magistrate Judge’s Findings
and Recommendation, filed 6/2/21 (dkt. no. 27).]

Thus, the only

portion of the Motion to Confirm remaining before this Court is
Kahapea’s request to confirm the Award as to BANA.
DISCUSSION
I.

Jurisdiction
The BANA Opposition does not challenge this Court’s

jurisdiction over this action.3

However, this Court must address

whether jurisdiction exists because “[a] court’s ‘[s]ubjectmatter jurisdiction can never be waived or forfeited,’
‘objections [to the court’s jurisdiction] may be resurrected at
any point in the litigation,’ and courts are obligated to
consider sua sponte requirements that ‘go[] to subject-matter
jurisdiction.’”

Wong v. Beebe, 732 F.3d 1030, 1035–36 (9th Cir.

2013) (en banc) (some alterations in Wong) (some citations
omitted) (quoting Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 648

In another filing, BANA argued this Court lacks
jurisdiction over this action because there is no binding
arbitration agreement between the parties, and because this
district court was not the proper place to bring an action to
confirm the Award. [Respondent Bank of America, N.A.’s
Scheduling Conference Statement, filed 7/29/20 (dkt. no. 10), at
2-3.]
3

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(2012)), aff’d and remanded sub nom. United States v. Wong, 575
U.S. 402 (2015).
The FAA “creates federal substantive law requiring the
parties to honor arbitration agreements, [but] it does not
create any independent federal-question jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (1976) or otherwise.”

Southland Corp. v. Keating,

465 U.S. 1, 15 n.9 (1984) (citation omitted).
diversity jurisdiction exists in this case.
at 1-2.]

Kahapea asserts

[Motion to Confirm

As the party asserting the existence of diversity

jurisdiction, Kahapea has the burden of establishing the
required elements.
(2010).

See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 96

28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) provides that diversity

jurisdiction exits in civil actions between citizens of
different states, if the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000,
excluding interest and costs.

The amount in controversy

requirement is satisfied because the Conditional Acceptance
sought a minimum of $144,000.00, and the Arbitrator awarded
$132,000.00.

See Motion to Confirm, dkt. no. 1-1 (Conditional

Acceptance) at PageID #: 9; id., dkt. no. 1-2 (Award) at PageID
#: 36, ¶ 45.c.4

This district court has noted that the circuit courts
reviewing the issue of whether the amount in controversy
requirement is satisfied in an action to confirm an award
utilize either the award approach or the demand approach.
Peraton Gov’t Commc’ns, Inc. v. Haw. Pac. Teleport L.P., Civ.
(. . . continued)
4

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Diversity jurisdiction “requires ‘complete diversity’
of citizenship, meaning that ‘the citizenship of each plaintiff
is diverse from the citizenship of each defendant.’”

Demarest

v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 920 F.3d 1223, 1226 (9th Cir.) (quoting
Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68, 117 S. Ct. 467, 136
L. Ed. 2d 437 (1996)), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 386 (2019).
Kahapea asserts he and Respondents are all citizens of Hawai`i
for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.
1-2.]

[Motion to Confirm at

There is nothing in the record which calls into question

his assertion of his own citizenship.

Although BANA has not

asserted its citizenship in this case, it has affirmatively
represented in other cases that it is a citizen of North
Carolina.

See, e.g., Daligcon v. Bank of Am., N.A., CIVIL

NO. 21-00020 JAO-RT, 2021 WL 1329450, at *2 (D. Hawai`i Apr. 9,
2021); Inokuma v. Bank of Am., N.A., CIVIL NO. 20-00178 LEK-RT,
2020 WL 4455102, at *2 (D. Hawai`i Aug. 3, 2020),
reconsideration denied, 2020 WL 5807332 (Sept. 29, 2020);
Apilado v. Bank of Am., N.A., CIVIL NO. 19-00285 JAO-KJM, 2019
WL 4039616, at *1 (D. Hawai`i Aug. 27, 2019).

Although the

No. 20-00287 JMS-WRP, 2021 WL 767854, at *5 n.4 (D. Hawai`i
Feb. 26, 2021) (citing Pershing, LLC v. Kiebach, 819 F.3d 179,
182 (5th Cir. 2016)). It noted that, “[a]lthough somewhat
unclear, the Ninth Circuit appears to follow a ‘demand
approach.’” Id. (citations omitted). Because the amount in
controversy requirement is satisfied under either approach in
this case, this Court need not determine which approach applies
in the Ninth Circuit.
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current parties in this case appear to be diverse, the question
of whether diversity jurisdiction exists is determined based on
facts at the time the action was filed.

See Grupo Dataflux v.

Atlas Glob. Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 570–71, (2004).

Thus, the

citizenship of HSFCU and DSM must also be considered.
As previously noted, Kahapea asserts HSFCU and DSM are
Hawai`i citizens.

Kahapea attempted service on HSFCU at a

Honolulu, Hawai`i address, and he attempted service on DSM at a
Kellogg, Idaho address.

[Notice of Proof of Service, filed

8/20/20 (dkt. no. 14), Exh. 1 (copies of certified mail receipts
and return receipts).]

Kahapea purportedly sent the Conditional

Acceptance to HSFCU at a Honolulu, Hawai`i address, and the
Award was purportedly served on HSFCU at the address reflected
in the Conditional Acceptance.

See Motion to Confirm, dkt.

no. 1-1 (Conditional Acceptance) at PageID #: 7; id., dkt.
no. 1-2 (Award) at PageID #: 42.

Because there is no evidence

in the record calling Kahapea’s representation of HSFCU’s
citizenship into question, and because the available evidence
supports his representation, this Court finds that HSFCU’s
principal place of business is in Hawai`i, and therefore HSFCU
is a Hawai`i citizen for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.
Cf. Lloyd v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, Case No. 17-cv-1280-BASRBB, 2019 WL 2269958, at *5 (S.D. Cal. May 28, 2019) (noting
that, for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1), the defendant
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credit union “qualifie[d] as a ‘corporation’ in view of the
statues under which credit unions are created” (citing 12 U.S.C.
§ 1754)); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (“a corporation shall be deemed
to be a citizen of every State and foreign state by which it has
been incorporated and of the State or foreign state where it has
its principal place of business”).

Because Kahapea and HSFCU

are both citizens of Hawai`i, complete diversity is lacking,5 and
Kahapea has failed to carry his burden to establish that
jurisdiction exists in this case.

The Motion to Confirm must be

dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

However, for

the sake of completeness, this Court will also address whether
it would confirm the Award, if jurisdiction existed.
II.

Whether the Award Would Be Confirmed
This district court has stated:
Under the FAA, “if a party seeks a judicial
order confirming an arbitration award, ‘the court
must grant such an order unless the award is
vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in
section 10 and 11 of this title.’” Kyocera Corp.
[v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc.], 341
F.3d [987,] 997 [(9th Cir. 2003)] (quoting 9
U.S.C. § 9) (emphasis omitted). “‘[C]onfirmation
is required even in the face of erroneous
findings of fact or misinterpretations of law.’”
Id. (quoting French v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 784 F.2d 902, 906 (9th Cir.
1986)).
Rather, § 10 [of the FAA] permits vacatur
only:

In light of this finding, it is not necessary to determine
the citizenship of DSM.
5

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(1) where the award was procured by
corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or
corruption in the arbitrators, or either of
them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of
misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in
refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy; or of any other
misbehavior by which the rights of any party
have been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their
powers, or so imperfectly executed them that
a mutual, final, and definite award upon the
subject matter submitted was not made.
Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)) (emphasis
omitted). “[A]rbitrators ‘exceed their powers’
in this regard not when they merely interpret or
apply the governing law incorrectly, but when the
award is ‘completely irrational,’ or exhibits a
‘manifest disregard of law.’” Id. (citations
omitted).
Peraton, 2021 WL 767854, at *5 (some alterations in Peraton).
While Kahapea contends this Court must confirm the
Award because it has never been vacated, modified, or corrected,
he has not established the threshold requirement of an agreement
between Kahapea and BANA to arbitrate.

See 9 U.S.C. § 9 (“If

the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of
the court shall be entered upon the award made pursuant to the
arbitration, and shall specify the court, then at any time
within one year after the award is made any party to the

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arbitration may apply to the court so specified for an order
confirming the award . . . .” (emphases added)).
asserts he had a loan agreement with BANA.

Kahapea

See Motion to

Confirm, dkt. no. 1-1 (Conditional Acceptance) at PageID #: 7.
However, he has not presented that agreement to this Court.
The Conditional Acceptance is addressed to HSFCU.
[Id.]

Kahapea’s position appears to be that he sent a

comparable document to BANA, and, by failing to respond to that
document, BANA entered into an agreement with Kahapea to submit
his dispute to arbitration before Sitcomm.

Even assuming that

BANA received a version of the Conditional Acceptance, BANA’s
failure to respond to the document did not create a valid and
enforceable arbitration agreement under Hawai`i law.6

In a

similar situation, this district court stated
The documents Plaintiff sent to Equifax do not
constitute binding contracts because there is no
indication that Equifax agreed to Plaintiff’s
terms. See Carson v. Saito, 53 Haw. 178, 182,
489 P.2d 636, 638 (1971) (recognizing that as a
“fundamental principle of law[,] there must be
mutual assent or a meeting of the minds on all
essential elements or terms in order to form a
binding contract”) (quoting Honolulu Rapid
Transit Co. v. Paschoal, 51 Haw. 19, 26, 449 P.2d
123, 127 (1968)); see also In re Estate of
In actions brought pursuant to the FAA, “[s]tate law
governs the validity, revocability, and enforceability of a
contract. Federal substantive law governs the scope of an
arbitration agreement.” Shivkov v. Artex Risk Sols., Inc., 974
F.3d 1051, 1058–59 (9th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted), cert.
denied, No. 20-1313, 2021 WL 2637867 (U.S. June 28, 2021).
6

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Tahilan v. Friendly Care Home Health Servs.,
Inc., 731 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1006 (D. Haw. 2010)
(explaining that mutual assent must include “an
offer, an acceptance, and consideration”) (citing
Douglass v. Pflueger Haw., Inc., 110 Haw. 520,
525, 135 P.3d 129, 134 (2006)); Orman v. C. Loan
Administration & Reporting, 2019 WL 6841741, at
*4-5 (D. Ariz. Dec. 16, 2019) (“It is a
fundamental principle of contract law that
silence does not constitute acceptance of a
contract.”) (citing Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 69 and cases).
Patao v. Equifax, Inc., CIV. NO. 19-00677 JMS-WRP, 2020 WL
5033561, at *6 (D. Hawai`i Aug. 25, 2020) (alteration in Patao).7
This Court therefore concludes that, as a matter of law, BANA’s
failure to respond to a document similar to the Conditional
Acceptance attached to the Motion to Confirm did not result in
valid and binding agreement between Kahapea and BANA to submit a
dispute to arbitration before Sitcomm.
Because Kahapea has not established the existence of a
valid and enforceable arbitration agreement between him and
BANA, he is not entitled to confirmation of the Award under the
FAA.

Thus, even if this Court could exercise diversity

jurisdiction over this case, this Court would deny the Motion to

The plaintiff mailed Equifax, Inc. (“Equifax”) a letter
informing Equifax that he was injured because of an Equifax data
breach and demanding that Equifax provide “Proofs of Claim”
about the incident. Patao, 2020 WL 5033561, at *1. The letter
stated that, if Equifax did not respond within ten days, Equifax
would be deemed to have acquiesced in the terms set forth in an
affidavit that the plaintiff subsequently sent Equifax after it
did not respond to his letter. Id. at *1-2.
7

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Confirm.

PageID #:

Although BANA appears to request that the Award be

vacated, see BANA Opposition at 2 (arguing the Award should be
stricken), this Court declines to address that request because
of the lack of jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Kahapea’s Motion to Confirm
Arbitration Award, filed June 10, 2020, is HEREBY DISMISSED for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The Clerk’s Office is

DIRECTED to enter judgment and close this case immediately,
pursuant to the instant Order and the Order Adopting Magistrate
Judge’s Findings and Recommendation, filed June 2, 2021.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAII, September 20, 2021.

RONNIE KAHAPEA VS. HAWAII STATE FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, ET AL.;
CV 20-00281 LEK-KJM; ORDER DISMISSING, FOR LACK OF SUBJECT
MATTER JURISDICTION,PETITIONER’S MOTION TO CONFIRM ARBITRATION
AWARD

16