Firsov v. City and County of Honolulu

Filing 32

ORDER: GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT; DENYING PLAINTIFF'S "MOTION ON THE APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 28 U.S. CODE § 1441 (C)(2)"; DENYING PLAINTIFF'S "MOT ION ON THE APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF FED R. CIV. P. 11(C)" re 4 , 7 , 18 - Signed by JUDGE LESLIE E. KOBAYASHI on 2/5/2024. On the basis of the foregoing, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Complaint, filed October 30, 2023, is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED insofar as: the claims against DCS, Mayor Blangiardi, and Hashiro are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and the claims alleging violations of the 19 51 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and Plaintiff's claims alleging discrimination in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Hawai'i Constitution are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Complaint is DENIED insofar as Plaintiff's other claims alleging the unlawful denial of his REAL ID renewal application pursuant to the REAL ID Act of 2005 and Hawai'i Administrative Rule Section 19-149-2; and the due process violations in contravention of the Hawai'i Constitution - to the extent Plaintiff brings such claims - remain. Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to file an amended complaint to cure the defects in his claims that are identified in this Order. If he chooses to do so, he must file his amended complaint by April 5, 2024, and it must comply with the rulings in this Order. Plaintiff's "Motion on the application of the provisions of Article 28 U.S. Code § 1441(c)(2),&q uot; filed November 2, 2023, and Plaintiffs "Motion on the application of the provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)," filed November 13, 2023 are DENIED. (eta)COURT'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE - Evgeny Firsov has been served by First Class Mail to the address of record listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) on February 5, 2024. Registered Participants of CM/ECF received the document electronically to the email addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF HAWAII
EVGENY FIRSOV,

CIV. NO. 23-00429 LEK-KJM
Plaintiff,

vs.
CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU;
RICK BLANGIARDI, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS MAYOR OF CITY AND
COUNTY OF HONOLULU; DEPARTMENT
OF CUSTOMER SERVICES, CITY AND
COUNTY OF HONOLULU; KIMBERLY
HASHIRO, IN HER OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF
DEPARTMENT OF CUSTOMER SERVICES,
CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU,
Defendants.
ORDER: GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT; DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
“MOTION ON THE APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE
28 U.S. CODE § 1441(C)(2)”; DENYING PLAINTIFF’S “MOTION
ON THE APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF FED R. CIV. P. 11(C)”
On October 30, 2023, Defendants City and County of
Honolulu (“the City”), Rick Blangiardi, Mayor of City and County
of Honolulu in his official capacity (“Mayor Blangiardi”),
Department of Customer Services, City and County of Honolulu
(“DCS”), and Kimberly Hashiro, DCS Director, in her official
capacity (“Hashiro” and collectively “Defendants”) filed their
Motion to Dismiss Complaint (“Motion to Dismiss”). [Dkt. no. 4.]
Also before the Court are: pro se Plaintiff Evgeny Firsov’s

(“Plaintiff”) “Motion on the application of the provisions of
Article 28 U.S. Code § 1441(c)(2),” filed on November 2, 2023
(“Motion for Partial Remand”); and Plaintiff’s “Motion on the
application of the provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c),” filed
on November 13, 2023 (“Motion for Sanctions”). [Dkt. nos. 7,
18.] On November 3, 2023, Plaintiff filed his opposition to the
Motion to Dismiss, [dkt. nos. 11, 12,1] and on November 17, 2023,
Defendants filed their reply, [dkt. no. 21]. On November 22,
2023, Plaintiff filed a surreply regarding the Motion to Dismiss
without leave of court in violation Rule LR7.2 of the Local
Rules of Practice for the United States District Court for the
District of Hawaii (“Local Rules”), which states “[n]o further
or supplemental briefing shall be submitted without leave of
court.” Therefore, Plaintiff’s surreply to the Motion to Dismiss
is stricken.
On November 7, 2023, Defendants filed their opposition
to the Motion for Partial Remand, [dkt. no. 16,] and on
November 17, 2023 Plaintiff filed his reply [dkt. no. 22]. The
Court finds these matters suitable for disposition without a
hearing pursuant to Rule LR7.1(c) of the Local Rules. For the

Docket number 11 is Plaintiff’s “Motion to Deny the
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,” docket number 12 is Plaintiff’s
memorandum in support. Citations in this order to “Motion to
Dismiss, Memorandum in Opposition” refer to dkt. no. 12.
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reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is
granted in part and denied in part, Plaintiff’s Motion for
Partial Remand is denied, and Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions
is denied.
BACKGROUND
This action was removed from the State of Hawai`i,
First Circuit Court (“state court”) to this district court on
October 23, 2023. [Notice of Removal, filed 10/23/23 (dkt.
no. 1).] The operative pleading is Plaintiff’s Complaint, which
was filed on September 22, 2023 in state court. [Id., Decl. of
Counsel by Daniel M. Gluck (“Gluck Removal Decl.”), Exh. 1 (all
filings in the state court) at PageID.9-12 (Complaint).2]
Plaintiff alleges the following: he has lawfully lived
in Honolulu since December 2021; and has possessed a Hawai`i
Driver’s License – REAL ID (“REAL ID”) since March 2022.
Plaintiff is an asylee. Plaintiff’s REAL ID was set to expire at
the end of October 2023. On July 20, 2023, Plaintiff went to two
different Department of Motor Vehicle (“DMV”) locations (Waianae
and Kapalama) to renew his REAL ID, and both locations declined
to renew. [Complaint at pgs. 2-3.] That same day, Plaintiff
emailed a complaint to DCS and the City and County of Honolulu.
[Id.] The DCS Director responded on July 28, 2023, and wrote

Exhibit 1 to the Gluck Removal Declaration is docket
numbers 1-2, 1-3, and 1-4.
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that Plaintiff’s “legal presence in Hawaii is limited” and
“beyond the time you are authorized to be in Hawaii.” [Id.] On
August 4, 2023 Plaintiff submitted a pre-trial claim to the
Mayor of the City and County of Honolulu, but did not receive a
response. [Id. at pg. 3.]
Plaintiff contends the refusal to renew his REAL ID
constitutes unlawful discrimination based on immigration status
or nationality. Plaintiff alleges violations of Article 27 of
the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“1951
Convention”); the Real ID Act of 2005, 6 C.F.R. § 37.3 et. seq.;
Hawai`i Administrative Rules Section 19-149-2; the Civil Rights
Act of 1964; and Article I, Sections 2 and 5 of the Hawai`i
Constitution. Plaintiff requests that the Court require
Defendants to issue him a Real ID for eight years, to require
Defendants to reconsider Plaintiff’s application to renew his
license, and requests damages, costs, and any other appropriate
relief. [Id. at pgs. 2-4.]
Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 7, 8(a)(2), and 12(b)(6). [Motion to
Dismiss, Mem. in Supp. at 7-13.] Plaintiff requests partial
remand and sanctions for representations made by Defendant in
its memorandum in support of its Motion to Dismiss. [Dkt.
nos. 7, 18.]

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STANDARD
I.

Remand
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) states:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of
Congress, any civil action brought in a State
court of which the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed
by the defendant or the defendants, to the
district court of the United States for the
district and division embracing the place where
such action is pending.
United States District Courts have original

jurisdiction over civil actions: 1) where a federal question is
presented in an action arising under the Constitution, federal
law, or treaty; or 2) where diversity of citizenship and amount
in controversy requirements are met. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332.
28 U.S.C. § 1441, is “strictly construe[d] . . .
against removal jurisdiction.” Hansen v. Grp. Health Coop., 902
F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation and quotation marks
omitted).
If a district court determines at any time that
less than a preponderance of the evidence
supports the right of removal, it must remand the
action to the state court. See Geographic
Expeditions, Inc. v. Estate of Lhotka ex rel.
Lhotka, 599 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010);
California ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375
F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir. 2004). The removing
defendant bears the burden of overcoming the
“strong presumption against removal
jurisdiction.” Geographic Expeditions, 599 F.3d
at 1107 (citation omitted).

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Id. at 1057. “The ‘strong presumption against removal
jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of
establishing that removal is proper,’ and that the court
resolves all ambiguity in favor of remand to state court.”
Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992)
(per curiam)).
II.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
The Ninth Circuit has described the standard

applicable to a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) as follows:
To survive a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim after the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129
S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) and Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.
Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007), the
[plaintiff’s] factual allegations “must . . .
suggest that the claim has at least a plausible
chance of success.” In re Century Aluminum [Co.
Sec. Litig.], 729 F.3d [1104,] 1107 [(9th Cir.
2013)]. In other words, their complaint “must
allege ‘factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Id.
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct.
1937).
Following Iqbal and Twombly, . . . . we have
settled on a two-step process for evaluating
pleadings:
First, to be entitled to the presumption of
truth, allegations in a complaint or
counterclaim may not simply recite the
elements of a cause of action, but must
contain sufficient allegations of underlying
facts to give fair notice and to enable the
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opposing party to defend itself effectively.
Second, the factual allegations that are
taken as true must plausibly suggest an
entitlement to relief, such that it is not
unfair to require the opposing party to be
subjected to the expense of discovery and
continued litigation.
[Eclectic Props. E., LLC v. Marcus & Millichap
Co., 751 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 2014)] (quoting
Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir.
2011)). In all cases, evaluating a complaint’s
plausibility is a “context-specific” endeavor
that requires courts to “draw on . . . judicial
experience and common sense.” Id. at 995–96
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., 765 F.3d 1123, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2014)
(some alterations in Levitt). The Court is not required to
accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause
of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
DISCUSSION
Preliminarily, on October 12, 2023, Plaintiff filed a
“Notice of a significant change in circumstance” (“Notice”)
before the state court. See Gluck Removal Decl., Exh. 1 (dkt.
no. 1-3), at PageID.96-97. In the Notice, Plaintiff states he
received a REAL ID valid for eight years on October 9, 2023 from
the DMV in Lihu`e, Kaua`i. Plaintiff therefore withdrew his
request for injunctive relief seeking the issuance of a REAL ID
for eight years and requiring Defendants to reconsider
Plaintiff’s application to renew his license. [Id.] Therefore,

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the Court deems Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief
withdrawn.
I.

Remand
Plaintiff cites Title 28 United States Code

Section 1441(c)(2) as the basis for partial remand to state
court. [Motion to Dismiss, Mem. in Opp. at 2.]
Section 1441(c)(2) is inapplicable because Defendants removed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) based on federal question
jurisdiction, [Notice of Removal at pgs. 2-3,] and there is no
claim at issue that is not within the original or supplemental
jurisdiction of this district court. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(c)(1)(B). Federal question jurisdiction exists because
Plaintiff alleges violations of federal law, including the REAL
ID Act of 2005 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331; Complaint at pg. 3. Because the Court has federal
question jurisdiction over the federal law claims, it also has
supplemental jurisdiction over the related state law claims. See
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); Complaint at pgs. 2-3. Therefore, removal
was proper, and Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Remand is denied.
II.

Motion to Dismiss
First, Defendants argue that DCS should be dismissed

because it is not a separate legal entity from the City, and the
claims against Mayor Blangiardi and Hashiro in their official
capacities should be dismissed because they are duplicative of
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the claims against the City. [Motion to Dismiss, Mem. in Supp.
at 1-2.] Defendants are correct. DCS is not a separate legal
entity from the City. See Revised Charter of the City and County
of Honolulu §§ 6-401 to 6-402; see also Honolulu v. Toyama, 61
Haw. 156, 161, 598 P.2d 168, 172 (1979) (holding that the City’s
Building Department and Department of Housing and Community
Development are both departments of the City’s executive branch,
and do not constitute separate legal entities from the City). As
to the claims against Mayor Blangiardi and Hashiro, “[t]he
Supreme Court noted decades ago that ‘[t]here is no longer a
need to bring official-capacity actions against local government
officials, for under Monell [v. Department of Social Services of
City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)], . . . local government
units can be sued directly for damages and injunctive or
declaratory relief.’” Long v. Yomes, Civ. No. 11-00136 ACK-KSC,
2011 WL 4412847, at *3 (D. Hawai`i Sept. 20, 2011) (quoting
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985)). Therefore,
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted insofar as Plaintiff’s
claims against DCS, Mayor Blangiardi, and Hashiro are dismissed
with prejudice.
A.

Failure to State a Plausible Claim for Relief
Defendants argue that Plaintiff does not allege a

connection between being denied a REAL ID and the alleged
illegal discrimination: there are no facts to suggest that
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Defendants made any decisions on the basis of national origin or
ancestry, or that Plaintiff was treated differently than a
similarly situated person. [Motion to Dismiss, Mem. in Supp. at
9.] Defendants are correct.
Plaintiff has not pled sufficient factual content to
allow this Court “to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged” regarding
Plaintiff’s claim of discrimination on account of Plaintiff’s
immigration status or nationality. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Plaintiff has alleged: he is an asylee that has a right to live
anywhere in the United States; he was denied a REAL ID renewal;
the DCS Director wrote Plaintiff a letter stating that “your
legal presence in Hawaii is limited” and “beyond the time you
are authorized to be in Hawaii.” [Complaint at pgs. 2-3.]
Plaintiff pleads no facts plausibly suggesting that
discrimination was the reason for the denial of his REAL ID
renewal application. Instead, as Defendants argue, the denial of
Plaintiff’s REAL ID renewal application is more plausibly due to
federal law, i.e. 6 C.F.R. § 37.21(b), preventing the grant of a
REAL ID renewal because Plaintiff’s asylum application was
marked as pending. [Motion to Dismiss, Mem. in Supp. at 7-9;
Reply at 2.] Although unfortunate and undoubtedly frustrating to
Plaintiff, on the facts alleged, the denial of the REAL ID
renewal does not plausibly suggest discrimination. Plaintiff’s
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Complaint “stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of entitlement to relief” as to Plaintiff’s
discrimination claim. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (brackets,
citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff’s
claims of discrimination are therefore dismissed on this basis.
Further, Plaintiff fails to allege facts that state a
plausible claim for relief under Article 27 of the 1951
Convention. Article 27 provides that “[t]he Contracting States
shall issue identity papers to any refugee in their territory
who does not possess a valid travel document.” Here, Plaintiff
was offered an eight-year limited purpose driver’s license.
[Motion, Decl. of Counsel by Daniel M. Gluck (“Gluck Motion
Decl.”), Exh. 1 (letter, dated July 26, 2023, to Plaintiff from
Hashiro) (“As offered to you earlier by our staff, a Limited
Purpose Driver License is still an option. If you would like to
reconsider obtaining this type of license, we would be happy to
assist you.”).]3 Assuming that Article 27 applies to the instant

As a general rule, the Court’s scope of review in
considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is limited to the
allegations in the pleading. See Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics,
Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 998 (9th Cir. 2018). However, a district
court can consider materials beyond the pleadings without
converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary
judgment if either the incorporation by reference doctrine or
Federal Rule of Evidence 201 judicial notice applies. Id.
“[I]ncorporation-by-reference is a judicially created doctrine
that treats certain documents as though they are part of the
complaint itself. The doctrine prevents plaintiffs from
(. . . continued)
3

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case, Defendants did offer identity papers, in the form of an
eight-year limited purpose driver’s license. Plaintiff’s claim
alleging a violation of Article 27 is therefore dismissed.
B.

Defendants’ Other Arguments
Defendants argue that Plaintiff was not entitled to a

REAL ID at the time he filed the Complaint because federal law
prohibited issuing such a document because Plaintiff’s asylum
application was pending as of July 2023. Therefore, Defendants
argue they did not discriminate against Plaintiff, they merely
complied with federal law. [Motion to Dismiss, Mem. in Supp. at
7-9.] Plaintiff disputes that his asylum application was pending
in July 2023, asserting that his asylum application was granted
in October 2021 at which time he was entitled to a REAL ID.
[Motion to Dismiss, Mem. in Opp. at 2.]
The Court may not look at evidence or disputed facts
outside of the Complaint on a motion to dismiss, so this
argument is not appropriate for the Court to consider. The Court
will also not consider Defendants’ arguments that (1) Defendants
did not violate Plaintiff’s substantive due process rights under

selecting only portions of documents that support their claims,
while omitting portions of those very documents that weaken–or
doom–their claims.” Id. at 1002 (citation omitted). The Court
finds that Exhibit 1 is incorporated by reference into the
Complaint because it is referred to in the Complaint, and forms
a large part of the basis of Plaintiff’s allegations of
discrimination.
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the Hawai`i Constitution and (2) the City has no liability under
Monell because the City has no discretion in implementing
federal law, because these arguments hinge on whether
Plaintiff’s asylum application was pending at the time he
applied for a REAL ID. See Motion to Dismiss, Mem. in Supp. at
11-14.
Finally, the Court rejects Defendants’ argument that,
to the extent that Plaintiff brings a procedural due process
claim, such a claim is barred by Hawai`i Administrative Rules
Section 19-122-364, located in subchapter 8. Hawai`i
Administrative Rules Section 19-122-364 relates to hearings in
regard to medical conditions, restrictions, and denials, and is
therefore not inapplicable to the instant case. See Haw. Admin.
R. § 19-122-350 (describing the purpose of subchapter 8 as
relating to medical conditions). Therefore, to the extent
Plaintiff alleges due process violations under the Hawai`i
Constitution, these claims are not dismissed.
C.

Leave to Amend
Plaintiff’s claims alleging discrimination in

violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Hawai`i
Constitution; and Plaintiff’s claims alleging violations of the
1951 Convention are dismissed without prejudice because it is
not clear, based on Defendants’ arguments in the Motion to
Dismiss, that these claims cannot be cured by amendment. See
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Hoang v. Bank of Am., N.A., 910 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2018).
Plaintiff is granted leave to amend his claim of discrimination
and violation of the 1951 Convention because it is not
absolutely clear the defects of that claim cannot be cured by
amendment. See id. Plaintiff’s claims regarding the unlawful
denial of the REAL ID pursuant to the REAL ID Act of 2005 and
Hawai`i Administrative Rule Section 19-149-2; and the due
process violations in contravention of the Hawai`i Constitution
remain.
Plaintiff may file an amended complaint pursuant to
the terms of this Order. If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended
complaint, he must do so by April 5, 2024. Plaintiff’s amended
complaint must include all of the claims that he wishes to
allege, and all of the allegations that his claims are based
upon, even if he previously presented them in the original
Complaint. Plaintiff cannot incorporate any part of his original
Complaint into the amended complaint by merely referring to the
original Complaint. Plaintiff is cautioned that, if he fails to
file his amended complaint by April 5, 2024, the claims that are
dismissed without prejudice in this Order will be dismissed with
prejudice – in other words, without leave to amend. In that
instance, the case would proceed only as to Plaintiff’s claims
regarding the unlawful denial of the REAL ID pursuant to the
REAL ID Act of 2005 and Hawai`i Administrative Rule Section 1914

149-2; and, to the extent Plaintiff brings such claims, the due
process violations in contravention of the Hawai`i Constitution.
III. Sanctions
Finally, Plaintiff argues sanctions pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c) are warranted because
Defendants provided the Court with the allegedly false
information that Plaintiff’s application for asylum was approved
after he filed the Complaint in state court, when in fact his
asylum application was granted in October 2021, and Defendants
stated they could provide supporting documentation of that fact.
[Motion for Sanctions at 2.] Plaintiff refers to Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss, in which Defendants state that their
understanding “based on information provided to the Department
of Customer Services by the Department of Homeland Security – is
that [Plaintiff’s] asylum application was granted after the
Complaint was filed in state court.” [Motion to Dismiss, Mem. in
Supp. at 5.] In a footnote, Defendants note they assume
Plaintiff will not dispute this fact, but, if necessary they
“can provide available documentation to the Court under seal.”
[Id. at 5 n.10.]
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 “provides for the
imposition of sanctions when a filing is frivolous, legally
unreasonable, or without factual foundation, or is brought for
an improper purpose.” Simpson v. Lear Astronics Corp., 77 F.3d
15

1170, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11(b) provides:
By presenting to the court a pleading, written
motion, or other paper – whether by signing,
filing, submitting, or later advocating it – an
attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to
the best of the person’s knowledge, information,
and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable
under the circumstances:
(1) it is not being presented for any
improper purpose, such as to harass, cause
unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase
the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal
contentions are warranted by existing law or
by a nonfrivolous argument for extending,
modifying, or reversing existing law or for
establishing new law;
(3) the factual contentions have
evidentiary support or, if specifically so
identified, will likely have evidentiary
support after a reasonable opportunity for
further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are
warranted on the evidence or, if
specifically so identified, are reasonably
based on belief or a lack of information.
While the Court may impose sanctions for the violation
of this rule, sanctions are unwarranted in this case. Here,
Defendants appear to be mistaken about the date Plaintiff’s
asylum application was granted. This apparent mistaken
information is at the core of the instant matter, as it appears
to have led to the denial of Plaintiff’s REAL ID application
renewal. However, there is no indication that Defendants made
16

this representation for an improper purpose or in bad faith.
Defendants’ offer to provide supporting documentation indicates
that they believed their statements regarding the timing of
Plaintiff’s asylum application approval were “factual
contentions” with “evidentiary support.” See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 11(b)(3). Defendants’ assertion in their Motion to Dismiss
that Plaintiff’s application for asylum was approved after he
filed the Complaint in state court does not warrant sanctions
pursuant to Rule 11. Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions is
therefore denied.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss Complaint, filed October 30, 2023, is GRANTED IN PART
AND DENIED IN PART. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED
insofar as: the claims against DCS, Mayor Blangiardi, and
Hashiro are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and the claims alleging
violations of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and Plaintiff’s claims alleging discrimination in
violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Hawai`i
Constitution are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss Complaint is DENIED insofar as Plaintiff’s other
claims alleging the unlawful denial of his REAL ID renewal
application pursuant to the REAL ID Act of 2005 and Hawai`i
Administrative Rule Section 19-149-2; and the due process
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violations in contravention of the Hawai`i Constitution - to the
extent Plaintiff brings such claims - remain. Plaintiff is
GRANTED leave to file an amended complaint to cure the defects
in his claims that are identified in this Order. If he chooses
to do so, he must file his amended complaint by April 5, 2024,
and it must comply with the rulings in this Order.
Plaintiff’s “Motion on the application of the
provisions of Article 28 U.S. Code § 1441(c)(2),” filed
November 2, 2023, and Plaintiff’s “Motion on the application of
the provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c),” filed November 13,
2023 are DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAII, February 5, 2024.

FIRSOV V. CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU, CV 23-00429 LEK-KJM;
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS COMPLAINT; DENYING PLAINTIFF’S “MOTION ON THE
APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 28 U.S. CODE §
1441(C)(2)”; DENYING PLAINTIFF’S “MOTION ON THE APPLICATION OF
THE PROVISIONS OF FED R. CIV. P. 11(C)”

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