Woolen v. Ramos et al
Filing
4
ORDER DISMISSING PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT WITH PARTIAL LEAVE GRANTED TO AMEND re #1 - Signed by JUDGE LESLIE E. KOBAYASHI on 5/8/2024. (1) The Complaint, ECF No. 1, is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). (2) All of Woolen's claims against CO Ramos and the unnamed sergeant in their official capacities are DISMISSED with prejudice. (3) Woolen must file any amended pleading on or before June 7, 2024. (4) Failure to timely file an amended pleading may result in AUTOMATIC DISMISSAL of this suit without further notice, and Woolen may incur a strike under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). (5) ALTERNATIVELY, Woolen may voluntarily dismiss this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1), and such a dismissal will not count as a strike under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). (eta)COURT'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE - Andrew Thomas Woolen shall be served by First Class Mail to the address of record listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) on May 9, 2024. A blank prisoner civil rights complaint form shall be included in the mailing to Plaintiff..
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
ANDREW THOMAS WOOLEN,
#A6120248,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CIVIL NO. 24-00158 LEK-KJM
ORDER DISMISSING PRISONER
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT WITH
PARTIAL LEAVE GRANTED TO
AMEND
ETHAN RAMOS; et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER DISMISSING PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT WITH
PARTIAL LEAVE GRANTED TO AMEND
Before the Court is a Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint (“Complaint”), ECF
No. 1, filed by pro se Plaintiff Andrew Thomas Woolen (“Woolen”) pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. In the Complaint, Woolen alleges that prison officials violated
his constitutional rights during his incarceration at the Hawaii Community
Correctional Center (“HCCC”) in Hilo, Hawaii.1 Specifically, Woolen alleges that
Correctional Officer (“CO”) Ethan Ramos used excessive force (Count I), and that
an unnamed sergeant threatened his safety (Count II). ECF No. 1 at PageID.5–
PageID.6. Woolen also alleges that unidentified individuals retaliated against after
1
According to Woolen, he is now incarcerated at the Halawa Correctional Facility. See
ECF No. 1 at PageID.1.
he reported an assault by prison staff (Count III). ECF No. 1 at PageID.7. For the
following reasons, the Complaint is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b)(1) with partial leave granted to amend. If Woolen
wants this action to proceed, he must file an amended pleading that cures the noted
deficiencies in his claims on or before June 7, 2024. In the alternative, Woolen
may voluntarily dismiss this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1), and he will
not incur a “strike” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
I. STATUTORY SCREENING
The Court is required to screen all in forma pauperis prisoner complaints
filed against government officials, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and
1915A(a). See Byrd v. Phx. Police Dep’t, 885 F.3d 639, 641 (9th Cir. 2018).
Claims or complaints that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or
seek damages from defendants who are immune from suit must be dismissed. See
Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Rhodes v.
Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010).
Screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a) involves the same
standard as that used under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Rosati v.
Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). Under this standard, a
complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
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(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A claim is “plausible” when the
facts alleged support a reasonable inference that the plaintiff is entitled to relief
from a specific defendant for specific misconduct. See id.
In conducting this screening, the Court liberally construes pro se litigants’
pleadings and resolves all doubts in their favor. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338,
342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). The Court must grant leave to amend if it
appears the plaintiff can correct the defects in the complaint. See Lopez, 203 F.3d
at 1130. When a claim cannot be saved by amendment, however, dismissal with
prejudice is appropriate. See Sylvia Landfield Tr. v. City of Los Angeles, 729 F.3d
1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2013).
II. BACKGROUND2
On November 6, 2022, CO Ramos punched Woolen several times in the face
and head and placed him in a chokehold. ECF No. 1 at PageID.5.
In January 2023, an unnamed sergeant moved Woolen into a cell with a
“sentenced parole violator” and a “gang member.” Id. at PageID.6. At the time,
Woolen was a “pre-sentenced” inmate. Id. On an unspecified date, Woolen’s
cellmates severely beat him. Id.
2
Woolen’s factual allegations are accepted as true for purposes of screening. See
Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2014).
3
On an unspecified date, unnamed individuals threatened and intimidated
Woolen after he reported an assault by a prison official. Id. at PageID.7. When
Woolen insisted on pursuing legal action, he was moved to “unsafe housing” and
beaten. Id. When he was moved out of “suicide watch,” Woolen was housed by
himself in a cell with a razorblade that he used to attempt suicide. Id.
Woolen commenced this action by signing the Complaint on March 18,
2024. Id. at PageID.8. In the Complaint, Woolen alleges that CO Ramos used
excessive force, and that the unnamed sergeant threatened his safety. Id. at
PageID.5–PageID.6. Woolen also alleges that unidentified individuals retaliated
against him after he reported an assault by prison staff. Id. at PageID.7. Woolen
seeks, among other things, $500,000 in damages. Id. at PageID.8. On April 9,
2024, the Court granted, ECF No. 3, Woolen’s Application to Proceed In Forma
Pauperis by a Prisoner, ECF No. 2.
III. DISCUSSION
A.
Legal Framework for Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
“Section 1983 provides a cause of action against ‘[e]very person who, under
color of’ law deprives another of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution.’” Cornel v. Hawaii, 37 F.4th 527, 531 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 1983) (alteration in original). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws
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of the United States was violated; and (2) that the alleged violation was committed
by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
(1988); Park v. City & County of Honolulu, 952 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2020).
B.
Eleventh Amendment
Woolen names Defendants CO Ramos and an unnamed sergeant in both
their individual and official capacities. See ECF No. 1 at PageID.1–PageID.2.
“The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages in federal court
against a state, its agencies, and state officials acting in their official capacities.”
Aholelei v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation
omitted); see Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101–03
(1984). It does not bar official-capacity suits against state officials for prospective
relief to enjoin alleged ongoing violations of federal law. See Wolfson v.
Brammer, 616 F.3d 1045, 1065–66 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of
State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n.10 (1989). Nor does it bar suits for damages
against state officials in their personal capacities. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21,
30–31 (1991); Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 491 (9th Cir. 2003).
To the extent Woolen seeks damages from CO Ramos and the unnamed
sergeant in their official capacities, those claims are barred by the Eleventh
Amendment and DISMISSED with prejudice. See Mitchell v. Washington,
818 F.3d 436, 442 (9th Cir. 2016) (“The Eleventh Amendment bars claims for
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damages against a state official acting in his or her official capacity.” (citation
omitted)). The Eleventh Amendment does not bar Woolen from seeking damages
against these defendants in their personal capacities. See id. (explaining that the
Eleventh Amendment does not “bar claims for damages against state officials in
their personal capacities”).
C.
Improper Joinder
Woolen alleges in Count I that CO Ramos used excessive force during an
incident on November 6, 2022. ECF No. 1 at PageID.5. In Count II, Woolen
alleges that an unnamed sergeant threatened his safety by housing him with a
“sentenced parole violator and gang member” in January 2023. Id. at PageID.6. In
Count III, Woolen alleges that unidentified individuals retaliated against him after
he reported an assault by prison staff. Id. at PageID.7.
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a), governing joinder of claims, a plaintiff may
bring multiple claims, related or not, in a lawsuit against a single defendant. To
name different defendants in the same lawsuit, however, a plaintiff must satisfy
Fed. R. Civ. P. 20, governing joinder of parties. Rule 20(a)(2) allows joinder of
defendants only if the following two requirements are met: (1) any right to relief is
asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or
arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences; and (2) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will
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arise in the action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(A)–(B); Stribling v. Tobias, 690 F.
App’x 972, 973 (9th Cir. 2017). Unrelated claims involving different defendants
belong in different suits. See What v. Honolulu Police Dep’t, Civil No. 13–00373
HG–RLP, 2014 WL 176610, at *4–5 (D. Haw. Jan. 13, 2014).
Here, there is no apparent connection between the Complaint’s three counts
other than the fact that the underlying events occurred at the HCCC. This is not
enough to satisfy the joinder rules. See Woods v. Curry, No. C 10-1859 JSW (PR),
2013 WL 12222362, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2013) (concluding that prisoner
improperly joined claims “based on a wide variety of unrelated events that
occurred at his prison”). Woolen may not pursue a combination of unrelated
claims against various defendants in a single suit. See Char v. Kaiser Hosp., Civ.
No. 18-00345 JAO-RLP, 2019 WL 80890, at *3 (D. Haw. Jan. 2, 2019)
(“Unrelated claims involving different defendants must be brought in separate
actions.”). He may, however, raise any unrelated claims in a separate action or
actions. See D’Agirbaud v. Kam, Civ. No. 20-00139 JAO-KJM, 2020 WL
3258408, at *5 (D. Haw. June 16, 2020) (explaining that dismissing complaint for
misjoinder allowed plaintiff “to decide which related claims he will pursue in this
action, and which claims he will bring in a new action”).
If Woolen decides to file an amended pleading, any claim asserted therein
must be permitted by either Rule 18 or Rule 20. Woolen may state a single claim
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against a single defendant. Pursuant to Rule 18, Woolen may then add any
additional claims to his action that are against the same defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P.
18. Woolen may also add any additional claims against other defendants, if those
claims arise from the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions as his
original claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). Any attempt to join claims that are not
permitted by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will result in those claims being
dismissed as improperly joined and, at a minimum, will result in delay in their
adjudication. In deciding whether to file an amended pleading, Woolen should
also consider the following legal standards.
D.
Excessive Force
Woolen alleges in Count I that CO Ramos used excessive force on
November 6, 2022. ECF No. 1 at PageID.5. Woolen does not say, however, if he
was a pretrial detainee or a convicted inmate at the time of the incident.
If Woolen was a pretrial detainee, his excessive force claim is analyzed
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. As the Supreme Court
has stated, “the appropriate standard for a pretrial detainee’s excessive force claim
is solely an objective one.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015).
Under this standard, “a pretrial detainee must show only that the force purposely or
knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 396–97.
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If Woolen was a convicted inmate, then his excessive force claim is
analyzed under the Eighth Amendment. “In excessive force cases brought under
the Eighth Amendment, the relevant inquiry is ‘whether force was applied in a
good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to
cause harm.’” Hughes v. Rodriguez, 31 F.4th 1211, 1221 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)). The Ninth Circuit has identified the
following five factors to consider when determining whether a use of force was
malicious and sadistic: “(1) the extent of injury suffered by an inmate; (2) the need
for application of force; (3) the relationship between that need and the amount of
force used; (4) the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials; and (5)
any efforts made to temper the severity of the forceful response.” Furnace v.
Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1028–29 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
E.
Threat to Safety
Woolen alleges in Count II that an unnamed sergeant threatened his safety
by housing him with a “sentenced parole violator” and a “gang member.” ECF
No. 1 at PageID.6. Although Woolen says that he was “pre-sentenced” when this
occurred, it is not apparent if he was a pretrial detainee or if he had been convicted
and was awaiting sentencing.
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If Woolen was a pretrial detainee, then his threat to safety claim “arise[s]
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, rather than under the
Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.” Gordon v. County
of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). To establish a threat-to-safety claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the plaintiff must show that:
(1) [t]he defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the
conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (2) [t]hose
conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm;
(3) [t]he defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate
that risk, even though a reasonable officer in the circumstances would
have appreciated the high degree of risk involved—making the
consequences of the defendant's conduct obvious; and (4) [b]y not
taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injuries.
Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc)
(formatting and footnoted omitted).
“With respect to the third element, the defendant's conduct must be
objectively unreasonable, a test that will necessarily turn on the facts and
circumstances of each particular case.” Id. (internal quotation marks, brackets, and
citations omitted). A pretrial detainee who asserts a threat to safety claim must
“prove more than negligence but less than subjective intent—something akin to
reckless disregard.” Id.
If Woolen was convicted and awaiting sentencing, then the Eighth
Amendment applies. See Norbert v. City & County of San Francisco, 10 F.4th
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918, 927 (9th Cir. 2021) (“For [a plaintiff], who is convicted and awaiting
sentencing, the Eighth Amendment supplies the relevant standard.”). The Eighth
Amendment imposes on prison officials a duty to “take reasonable measures to
guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832
(1994) (quotation marks and citation omitted). A prison official violates the Eighth
Amendment, however, only when two requirements are met. “First, the
deprivation must be objectively, sufficiently serious[.]” Id. at 834. “For a
claim . . . based on a failure to prevent harm, the inmate must show that he is
incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id.
Second, the plaintiff must show deliberate indifference—that is, that “the [prison]
official [knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate . . . safety.” Id. at
837. “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be
drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference.” Id.
F.
Retaliation
Woolen alleges in Count III that unidentified individuals retaliated against
him after he reported an assault by prison staff. ECF No. 1 at PageID.7.
“[A] prisoner can make a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation by
alleging five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse
action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and
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that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights,
and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.”
Chavez v. Robinson, 12 F.4th 978, 1001 (9th Cir. 2021) (quotation marks and
citation omitted).
G.
Doe Defendants
Woolen refers to an unnamed sergeant in Count II and unidentified
individuals in Count III. ECF No. 1 at PageID.6–PageID.7.
Rule 10(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires the plaintiff to
include the names of the parties in the action. As a practical matter, it is
impossible in most instances for the United States Marshal or his designee to serve
a summons and complaint or amended complaint upon an unknown or anonymous
defendant. The use of doe defendants is therefore generally disfavored in federal
court. See Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980).
If the names of individual defendants are unknown at the time a complaint is
filed, a plaintiff may refer to the unknown defendants as Defendant John Doe 1,
John Doe 2, John Doe 3, and so on, but he must still allege facts to support how
each particular Doe defendant violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. If
Woolen can cure the deficiencies in his claims, he may use the discovery processes
for a limited period set by the Court to obtain the names of Doe defendants whom
he believes violated his constitutional rights and seek leave to amend to name those
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defendants once identified, unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover the
identities, or that the complaint would be dismissed on other grounds. Wakefield v.
Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642
(9th Cir. 1980)).
IV. LEAVE TO AMEND
The Complaint is DISMISSED with partial leave granted to amend. Woolen
must file any amended pleading on or before June 7, 2024. Woolen may not
expand his claims beyond those already alleged herein or add new claims, without
explaining how those new claims relate to the claims alleged in the Complaint.
Claims that do not properly relate to those in the Complaint are subject to
dismissal.
Woolen must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Local Rules for the District of Hawaii. Local Rule 10.4 requires that an amended
complaint be complete in itself, without reference to any prior pleading. An
amended complaint must be short and plain, comply with Rule 8 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and be submitted on the Court’s prisoner civil rights
form. See LR99.2(a). An amended complaint will supersede the preceding
complaint. See Ramirez v. County of San Bernardino, 806 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th
Cir. 2015). Defendants not renamed and claims not realleged in an amended
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complaint may be deemed voluntarily dismissed. See Lacey v. Maricopa County,
693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012).
V. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)
If Woolen fails to file an amended complaint or is unable to amend his
claims to cure their deficiencies, this dismissal may count as a “strike” under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(g). Under this “3-strikes” provision, a prisoner may not bring a
civil action or appeal a civil judgment in forma pauperis,
if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or
detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the
United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,
unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
VI. CONCLUSION
(1) The Complaint, ECF No. 1, is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b).
(2) All of Woolen’s claims against CO Ramos and the unnamed sergeant in
their official capacities are DISMISSED with prejudice.
(3) Woolen must file any amended pleading on or before June 7, 2024.
(4) Failure to timely file an amended pleading may result in AUTOMATIC
DISMISSAL of this suit without further notice, and Woolen may incur a strike
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
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(5) ALTERNATIVELY, Woolen may voluntarily dismiss this action
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1), and such a dismissal will not
count as a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, May 8, 2024.
ANDREW THOMAS WOOLEN VS. ETHAN RAMOS; et al.; CV 24-00158
LEK-KJM; ORDER DISMISSING PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS
COMPLAINT WITH PARTIAL LEAVE GRANTED TO AMEND
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