Fields v. Blades

Filing 369

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER denying 342 Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (cjs)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

ZANE JACK FIELDS,
Case No. 1:95-cv-00422-BLW
Petitioner,
CAPITAL CASE
v.
RANDY BLADES, Warden,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

Respondent.

Petitioner Zane Jack Fields is an Idaho state prisoner under a sentence of death.
Currently pending in this habeas corpus matter is Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
(Dkt. 342) of the Court’s March 31, 2015 Memorandum Decision and Order, which
denied Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing on whether Martinez v. Ryan, 132
S. Ct. 1309 (2012), applied to excuse the procedural default of certain claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”). In that decision, the Court determined that, as a
matter of law, Petitioner could not satisfy the requirements of the Martinez exception.1
(Dkt. 318.)

In the same March 2015 decision, the Court deferred its final ruling on Petitioner’s request for an
evidentiary hearing on actual innocence until after the Court addresses the merits of Petitioner’s nondefaulted claims. (Dkt. 318 at 15-17.)
1

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1

Having carefully reviewed the record, including the state court record, the Court
concludes that oral argument is unnecessary. D. Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 9.2(h)(5).
Accordingly, the Court enters the following Order denying Petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.
1.

Standard of Law
The Court has the “inherent procedural power to reconsider, rescind, or modify an

interlocutory order for cause seen by it to be sufficient.” City of Los Angeles v. Santa
Monica Baykeeper, 254 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and
emphasis omitted). Although courts have authority to reconsider prior orders, they
“should be loath to do so in the absence of extraordinary circumstances such as where the
initial decision was ‘clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.’”
Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988) (quoting Arizona
v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 n. 8 (1983)). A motion for reconsideration should not be
used “as a vehicle to identify facts or raise legal arguments which could have been, but
were not, raised or adduced during the pendency of the motion of which reconsideration
was sought.” Jones v. Casey’s Gen. Stores, 551 F. Supp. 2d 848, 854-55 (S.D. Iowa
2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In Martinez v. Ryan, the Supreme Court held that, in limited circumstances,
“[i]nadequate assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral proceedings may establish
cause for a prisoner’s procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance at trial.” 132
S. Ct. at 1315. The familiar prongs of the Martinez test are as follows: (1) the underlying
IAC claim is a “substantial” claim; (2) the “cause” for the procedural default consists of
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2

there being “no counsel” or only “ineffective” counsel during the state collateral review
proceeding; (3) the state collateral review proceeding was the “initial” collateral review
proceeding where the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim could have been
brought; and (4) state law requires that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim be
raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, or by “design and operation” such claims
must be raised that way, rather than on direct appeal. Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911,
1918, 1921 (2013).
2.

Discussion
Petitioner challenges the Court’s March 31, 2015 decision on four grounds. First,

Petitioner argues that (a) because Claim 3(L) is substantially altered from the
corresponding claim raised in state court, the Court incorrectly determined that Claim
3(L) failed the third prong of the Martinez test, and (b) Martinez excuses the procedural
default of Claim 3(L). (Dkt. 342-1 at 4-5, 7-47.)
Second, Petitioner contends that, contrary to the implication in the Court’s March
31 decision, he did not forfeit or waive his Martinez argument as to Claim 3(Q) by failing
to adequately support it in his initial briefs on the motion for an evidentiary hearing. (Id.
at 5-6, 48-51.)
Third, Petitioner asserts that initial postconviction counsel’s alleged conflict of
interest excuses the default of Claims 3(A), 3(E), and 3(F), as well as Claims 3(L) and
3(Q). (Id. at 6, 52-55.) The Court did not address this issue in its March 2015 Order
because it determined that Claims 3(A), 3(E), and 3(F) were not substantial.

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Fourth, Petitioner argues that Claims 10, 11, and 14 (which are not IAC claims), as
well as the “related trial counsel IAC Claim, Claim 3(O),” are excused from procedural
default under a traditional (non-Martinez) cause-and-prejudice analysis. (Id. at 6, 55-59.)
Petitioner also appears to challenge the Court’s decision that Claim 3(O) is insubstantial
and therefore not subject to Martinez.
The Court will address Petitioner’s arguments in turn.
A.

Claim 3(L) Was Defaulted during Post-Conviction Appellate
Proceedings; Nonetheless, the Claim Is Insubstantial

In its March 2015 decision, the Court concluded that Martinez did not apply to
Claim 3(L)—which asserts IAC based on trial counsel’s failure to investigate the inmates
who were in contact with the inmate witnesses (Acheson, Bianchi, and Heistand)—
because Claim 3(L) was defaulted during post-conviction appellate proceedings, rather
than during the initial post-conviction proceeding. (Dkt. 318 at 47-48.) See Martinez, 132
S. Ct. at 1320 (stating that the Martinez exception does not apply to claims defaulted
during “appeals from initial-review collateral proceedings, second or successive collateral
proceedings, [or] petitions for discretionary review in a State’s appellate courts”).
Petitioner objects, claiming that Claim 3(L) is fundamentally altered from the claim that
was presented in Petitioner’s initial post-conviction petition. See Dickens v. Ryan, 740
F.3d 1302, 1319-20 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (holding that Martinez can apply not only
to IAC claims never adjudicated in state court, but also to IAC claims that were
adjudicated on the merits, but were adjudicated on an inadequate record as a result of
PCR counsel’s ineffectiveness, if the claims are fundamentally altered from those

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4

presented in state court). Thus, contends Petitioner, Claim 3(L) was defaulted during
initial post-conviction review (“PCR”) proceedings—not during the appeal of those
proceedings—and Martinez excuses the default.
Petitioner has failed to show that the Court’s decision on Claim 3(L) was clearly
erroneous. As an initial matter, Fields did not argue in his motion for an evidentiary
hearing on Martinez that Claim 3(L) was fundamentally altered from the claim raised in
his initial state post-conviction petition. (Dkt. 275-1, 313.) Rather, Petitioner stated that
“a number of sub-claims in the [Second Amended Petition] contain additional allegations
[from those contained in the First Amended Petition].” (Dkt. 275-1 at 44.) It was
certainly not clear error for the Court to refrain from considering whether Claim 3(L) was
fundamentally altered from the claim raised in state court when Petitioner never asked the
Court to do so. It was Petitioner’s burden to establish all four Martinez prongs. He did
not.
Further, even assuming Claim 3(L) is fundamentally altered from the claim raised
in Petitioner’s post-conviction petition and, therefore, was defaulted in that initial-review
collateral proceeding rather than on appeal from the denial of the initial petition, Claim
3(L) is not substantial. The Court noted in its previous decision that the claim appeared
insubstantial because trial counsel seemed “to have reasonably determined how to
marshal the limited time and resources available in providing Petitioner a defense”;
therefore, deciding “to forego investigating the hundreds of inmates who could have had

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contact with the multiple inmate snitches” appeared to be objectively reasonable. (Dkt.
218 at 48 n.13.)
The Court now holds explicitly that Claim 3(L) is insubstantial. Petitioner has not
rebutted the presumption that trial counsel made a reasonable strategic decision to focus
their investigation on other areas given their limited time and resources. See Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (“[The] court must indulge a strong presumption
that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance;
that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the
challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Petitioner has not established extraordinary circumstances that justify
reconsideration of the Court’s previous decision that Martinez does not apply to excuse
the default of Claim 3(L).
As part of his argument that Claim 3(L) is substantial, Petitioner also contends that
the Court used an “improper standard” in its analysis of whether trial counsel’s
performance with respect to Edson and the inmate witnesses prejudiced Petitioner. (Dkt.
342-1 at 26-27.) Petitioner asserts that this “flawed prejudice analysis” consisted of the
Court using a sufficiency of the evidence approach or an outcome-determinative test in
determining that there is no merit to the claim that trial counsel’s performance prejudiced
Petitioner. (Id. at 26.)
Contrary to Petitioner’s contention, the Court discussed and used the proper
substantiality standard set forth in Martinez and Trevino. When the Court noted that the

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jury “did not have to believe all of the inmate snitch witnesses in order to convict
Petitioner,” the Court was simply explaining that the 2014 Stan Nelson affidavit did not
call into question the testimony of the other inmate witnesses but, rather, was confined to
Acheson’s testimony, and the “additional potential impeachment of [Acheson as set forth
in the Nelson affidavit] does not support a reasonable inference that, had Acheson been
further impeached, there is a reasonable probability that Petitioner would not have been
found guilty.” (Dkt. 318 at 45.)
Petitioner’s contention that the Court failed to appropriately use a “holistic
evaluation of whether the result likely would be different with the new evidence that was
not presented” (Dkt. 342-1 at 26) is not only factually incorrect—it is also irrelevant. The
Court did not rest its Martinez ruling solely on a conclusion that trial counsel’s actions
with respect to Edson and the inmate witnesses were not prejudicial. Rather, the Court
held that trial counsel did not render deficient performance as to any of those witnesses.2
Therefore, Claim 3(L) is insubstantial with respect to both the performance and prejudice
prongs of Strickland.

The Court did note that, with respect to Acheson’s testimony, the new affidavit by Stan Nelson
was insufficient to establish a substantial IAC claim because the affidavit “could diminish Acheson’s
credibility only if Nelson was always present and attentive while Petitioner and Acheson had their
conversations” and that, “when weighed against the substantial impeachment that trial counsel already
achieved, Nelson’s 2014 affidavit does not support a substantial claim that Petitioner was prejudiced by
trial counsel’s failure to investigate and interview Nelson, even assuming that trial counsel should have
done so.” (Dkt. 318 at 44-45.) However, the Court made this statement only after it had already
determined that trial counsel did not perform deficiently with respect to Acheson, given that counsel got
Acheson to change his story on the witness stand and established Acheson’s motive to lie. (Id. at 42-43.)
And, as stated above, the Court also holds that trial counsel’s decision not to investigate the many inmates
who might have had contact with the inmate witnesses “was based on a reasonable investigative strategy”
considering the limited time and resources available to counsel. (Dkt. 318 at 45 n.11.)
2

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B.

Even if Petitioner Did Not Forfeit the Argument that Martinez Excuses
the Default of Claim 3(Q), that Claim Is Insubstantial

In Petitioner’s opening brief in support of his motion for evidentiary hearing on
Martinez v. Ryan, Petitioner included a short, two-sentence argument as to Claim 3(Q)—
a claim of cumulative error from alleged IAC. (Dkt. 275-1 at 60.)
The Court did not address Petitioner’s Martinez argument as to Claim 3(Q) in its
March 2015 decision, and Petitioner objects to the implication that he forfeited his
Martinez argument as to Claim 3(Q). However, regardless of whether the argument was
properly before the Court or not, the Court concludes that Claim 3(Q) is insubstantial.
If a habeas petitioner’s trial counsel committed multiple errors, none of which
alone is sufficient to establish Strickland prejudice, the petitioner may still attempt to
show that the cumulative effect of counsel’s errors was prejudicial. Cooper v. Fitzharris,
586 F.2d 1325, 1333 (9th Cir. 1978) (“If counsel is charged with multiple errors at trial,
absence of prejudice is not established by demonstrating that no single error considered
alone significantly impaired the defense—prejudice may result from the cumulative
impact of multiple deficiencies.”). However, cumulative-error IAC is a prejudice
doctrine, not a performance doctrine. That is, cumulative error presupposes error. If
counsel did not perform deficiently (in more than one area), the cumulative prejudice
doctrine does not apply.
The IAC claims that the Court addressed in its March 2015 decision were Claims
3(A), 3(C), 3(D), 3(E), 3(F), 3(I), 3(J), 3(K), 3(L), 3(N), and 3(O). As to the guilt-phase
IAC claims (represented in Claims 3(A), 3(C), 3(D), 3(E), 3(F), 3(N), and 3(O)), the

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Court determined that trial counsel did not perform deficiently as alleged in those claims.
(Dkt. 318 at 27-46, 51-56.) As explained above, counsel also did not perform deficiently
as alleged in Claim 3(L).
In its Martinez ruling on Claim 3(N), the Court relied on the lack of Strickland
prejudice, stating that Petitioner had offered no support whatsoever for his assertion of
prejudice. (Id. at 48-49.) However, this statement applies equally to the performance
prong of Strickland—Petitioner simply did not make out a meritorious assertion of
deficient performance as to this claim. Therefore, the Court now holds expressly that
Claim 3(N) is insubstantial not only because there is no merit to Petitioner’s assertion that
he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to investigate obtain copies of all police and IDOC
documents, but also because there is no merit to his assertion that counsel performed
deficiently in that respect.
With respect to the Court’s Martinez ruling on the remaining three claims—
Claims 3(I), 3(J), and 3(K), all of which are sentencing IAC claims—the Court did not
explicitly conclude that counsel performed reasonably. The Court stated that Petitioner’s
“brief, vague, and generalized argument does not remotely suggest” entitlement to an
evidentiary hearing on the defaulted sentencing IAC claims, because Petitioner had not
“made a colorable argument, supported by specific evidence, that any particular
defaulted sentencing IAC claim is substantial or that initial PCR counsel was ineffective
in failing to raise it in state court.” (Id. at 57.) Though the Court did not separate its

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analysis into performance and prejudice, it now holds that Petitioner has failed to
establish substantiality as to performance or prejudice with respect to these three claims.
As explained in the Court’s March 2015 Order, and as explained further above,
Petitioner has not established a meritorious claim that trial counsel performed deficiently
as alleged in Claims 3(A), 3(C), 3(D), 3(E), 3(F), 3(I), 3(J), 3(K), 3(L), 3(N), or 3(O).
Not only is each of these individual procedurally-defaulted IAC claims insubstantial, but
Petitioner’s claim of cumulative-error IAC, as set forth in Claim 3(Q), is also
insubstantial. See Runningeagle v. Ryan, 825 F.3d 970, 990 n.21 (9th Cir. 2016) (“We
reject [Petitioner’s] cumulative error argument, which would require us to accumulate a
number of trial-level IAC claims that we have found insubstantial or unsuccessful on the
merits . . . .”).
A criminal defendant is entitled to a reasonably competent attorney—not a perfect
attorney. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Petitioner has not established that the Court’s
decision on Claim 3(Q) was clearly erroneous.
C.

Alleged Post-Conviction Conflict of Interest as Cause to Excuse
Procedural Default of Claims 3(A), 3(E), 3(F), 3(L), and 3(Q)

Because the Court concluded that Claims 3(A), 3(E), and 3(F) were insubstantial,
it did not reach Petitioner’s argument that initial PCR counsel operated under a conflict of
interest that rendered PCR counsel’s assistance ineffective. (Dkt. 318 at 46.) Petitioner
now asks the Court to address that issue, claiming that the Court made “two factual
errors” in its decision on these claims. (Dkt. 342-1 at 51-52.)

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The first purported “factual” error is that the Court “limited its analysis to whether
the conflict would excuse only the defaulted trial IAC claims involving inadequate crossexamination of Edson, Bianchi, Heistand, and Acheson”—Claims 3(A), (E), and (F). (Id.
at 52.) Petitioner argues that the conflict-of-interest issue also excuses the default of
Claims 3(L) and 3(Q). The second purported error is the Court’s statement that PCR
counsel previously represented some of the inmate witnesses, while Petitioner states that
the witnesses were current and former clients of PCR counsel. (Id. at 53.)
Neither of these alleged errors affects the Court’s conclusions—either in its
previous decision or in the instant Order—that Claims 3(A), 3(E), 3(F), 3(L), and 3(Q)
are insubstantial. Post-conviction counsel’s conflict of interest would be implicated in the
second prong of Martinez. The Court did not, and does not, need to reach that issue
because Claims 3(A), 3(E), 3(F), 3(L), and 3(Q) fail the first prong of Martinez—
substantiality. The Court will not repeat its reasoning behind its substantiality
determinations. It suffices to say that Petitioner has not established extraordinary
circumstances to warrant reconsideration on this basis.
D.

Claims 10, 11, and 14, and Related Trial IAC Claim 3(O)

Petitioner has argued that Claims 10, 11, and 14 (which are not IAC claims) are
excused from procedural default under a traditional cause-and-prejudice analysis. The
Court disagreed in its previous decision (Dkt. 318 at 53-54), and Petitioner has not shown
clear error or manifest injustice. In addition, the Court held long ago that the default of
these three claims as set forth in the First Amended Petition—with the exception of the
portion of Claim 11 relating to a letter written by Detective Smith—is not excused. (Dkt.
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109 at 19-20, 22-23, 27-28.) Martinez does not affect the Court’s previous procedural
default ruling with respect to these non-IAC claims.3
Petitioner also appears to argue that Claim 3(O), the trial IAC claim related to
Claims 10, 11, and 14, is substantial under Martinez. The Court’s previous decision
explained the Court’s reasoning for finding the claim insubstantial. (Dkt. 318 at 49-54.)
The Court need not repeat itself here. Petitioner’s argument is simply a disagreement with
the Court’s legal analysis as to the applicability of Martinez—a matter for appeal, not
reconsideration.
CONCLUSION
Petitioner has not established that the Court’s March 31, 2015 decision was clearly
erroneous and would work a manifest injustice. See Christianson, 486 U.S. at 817.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration (Dkt. 342) is
DENIED.
DATED: March 21, 2017

_________________________
B. Lynn Winmill
Chief Judge
United States District Court

3

The Court recognizes that the parties are still briefing the issue of procedural default with respect
to Claim 11 as set forth in the Second Amended Petition. The Court simply reasserts its conclusions that
(1) Martinez has no applicability to Claims 10, 11, or 14, and (2) Petitioner’s fleeting argument on
traditional cause and prejudice—in his reply in support of his motion for an evidentiary hearing—was
insufficient to establish actual and substantial prejudice as to these claims. See United States v. Frady,
456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982).

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