Community House, Inc. et al v. City of Boise, et al
Filing
439
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER denying 388 Defendants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, for Remittitur, or In the Alternative, New Trial. Signed by Judge Candy W. Dale. (klw) Modified on 1/30/2014 to edit text to reflect complete order caption (cjm).
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
COMMUNITY HOUSE, INC., et al.,
Case No. 1:05-cv-00283-CWD
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER
v.
CITY OF BOISE, Idaho; JIM
BIRDSALL and BRUCE
CHATTERTON, in their official
capacities,
Defendants.
INTRODUCTION
The Court has before it Defendant City of Boise’s Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict, and Motion for Remittitur or, in the alternative, New Trial,
filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) and 59. (Dkt. 388.) The motion was fully briefed,
and the Court conducted a hearing on the motion on May 15, 2013. For the reasons more
fully explained below, the Court will deny the City’s motion in its entirety, as the Court
finds the verdict was supported by substantial evidence.
BACKGROUND
After a long and protracted history which included two appeals to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, this matter was tried before a jury in
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1
September 2012. Of the seven counts remaining for trial before the jury, 1 the jury found
that Plaintiffs Community House, Inc. (“CHI”), Marlene Smith, and Jay Banta 2 proved
their claim that Defendants discriminated against them on the basis of gender or familial
status in violation of the Fair Housing Act, and that CHI proved its claim that Defendants
interfered with CHI in violation of the Fair Housing Act. The jury concluded also that
Plaintiffs proved Defendants violated the Free Exercise clause of the Idaho State
Constitution.
The jury returned a special verdict on September 12, 2012, awarding Plaintiff CHI
$1,000,000 in damages for the Defendants’ conduct in violation of the Fair Housing Act. 3
The individual Plaintiffs Jay Banta and Marlene Smith were awarded no damages for
their claims. 4 The City of Boise now seeks alternative relief, either in the form of a
judgment as a matter of law, a new trial, or remittitur.
ANALYSIS
1.
Legal Standards
A.
Rule 50
Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 governs a request for a renewed motion for judgment as a
matter of law, and may include an alternative or joint request for new trial under Rule 59.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). The Court may allow judgment on the verdict; order a new trial; or
direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law. Id. The motion may be made at any time
1
Additional equitable claims were tried before the Court on May 13 and 14, 2013. The Court’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law are forthcoming.
2
Ms. Smith and Mr. Banta were the only remaining named Plaintiffs.
3
The damages for the Idaho Constitutional violation remained for the Court to determine as part of its ruling
regarding equitable relief.
4
In connection with their individual disability discrimination claims, the jury found Smith and Banta failed to prove
their accommodation claims. Plaintiffs Banta and Smith have not contested the verdict.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2
before the case is submitted to the jury, and if the Court declines to grant the motion at
that time, the Court is considered to have submitted the action to the jury subject to the
Court later deciding the legal questions raised by the motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(2), (b).
The failure to make a Rule 50(a) motion before the case is submitted to the jury
forecloses the possibility of the Court later considering a Rule 50(b) motion. Tortu v. Las
Vegas Metropolitan Police Dep’t., 556 F.3d 1075, 1083 (9th Cir. 2009).
A Court can grant a Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law only if
“there is no legally sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that
issue.” Krechman v. County of Riverside, 723 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing
Jorgensen v. Cassiday, 320 F.3d 906, 917 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 149 (2000)). “[I]n entertaining a motion for
judgment as a matter of law, the court ... may not make credibility determinations or
weigh the evidence.” Go Daddy Software, Inc., 581 F.3d at 961 (quoting Reeves, 530
U.S. at 150). And although taking a motion under submission and ruling on it after the
jury returns a verdict is proper practice, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) advisory committee’s
note, the Court “may not substitute its view of the evidence for that of the jury.”
Krechman v. County of Riverside, 723 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Winarto
v. Toshiba Am. Elecs. Components, Inc., 274 F.3d 1276, 1283 (9th Cir. 2001)).
A jury’s verdict must be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence. Wallace
v. City of San Diego, 479 F.3d 616 (9th Cir. 2007). “Substantial evidence is evidence
adequate to support the jury's conclusion, even if it is also possible to draw a contrary
conclusion from the same evidence.” Id. at 624. In making this determination, the Court
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3
must not weigh the evidence, but should simply ask whether the party presented
sufficient evidence to support the jury’s conclusion. Id. While the Court must review the
entire evidentiary record, it must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that
the jury is not required to believe. Id. The evidence must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor
of that party. Id.
B.
Rule 59
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 permits the Court to alter or amend a judgment, or order a new
trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a), (e). “Rule 59 does not specify the grounds on which a motion
for a new trial may be granted.” Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir.
2007) (quoting Zhang v. Am. Gem Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003)).
Rather, the court is “bound by those grounds that have been historically recognized.” Id.
Historically recognized grounds include, but are not limited to, claims “that the verdict is
against the weight of the evidence, that the damages are excessive, or that, for other
reasons, the trial was not fair to the party moving.” Molski, 481 F.3d at 729 (quoting
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 251 (1940)). In the Ninth Circuit,
“[t]he trial court may grant a new trial only if the verdict is contrary to the clear weight of
the evidence, is based upon false or perjurious evidence, or to prevent a miscarriage of
justice.” Molski, 481 F.3d at 729 (quoting Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer
Prods., 212 F.3d 493, 510 n. 15 (9th Cir. 2000)).
The Court has “the duty ... to weigh the evidence as [the court] saw it, and to set
aside the verdict of the jury, even though supported by substantial evidence, where, in
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4
[the court’s] conscientious opinion, the verdict is contrary to the clear weight of the
evidence.” Molski, 481 F.3d at 729 (quoting Moist Cold Refrigerator Co. v. Lou Johnson
Co., 249 F.2d 246, 256 (9th Cir.1957)). The determination of “the clear weight of the
evidence” is a fact-specific endeavor, and there must only be some “reasonable basis” for
the jury’s verdict. Molski, 481 F.3d at 729. “Although the court’s ruling on an alternative
motion for a new trial involves the exercise of some discretion, a stringent standard
applies when the motion is based on insufficiency of the evidence.” E.E.O.C. v. Pape
Lift, Inc., 115 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir.1997). A motion will be granted on this ground only
if the verdict “is against the great weight of the evidence, or it is quite clear that the jury
has reached a seriously erroneous result.” Id.
C.
Remittitur
In considering the City’s alternative motion for remittitur, the Court must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to CHI as the non-moving party. See Fenner v.
Dependable Trucking Co., 716 F.2d 598, 603 (9th Cir. 1983). Further, it is settled beyond
reasonable dispute that the jury’s verdict must be upheld if supported by substantial
evidence. Pavao v. Pagay, 307 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is
relevant evidence reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support the jury’s
conclusion, even if it is also possible to draw a contrary conclusion. Watec Co., Ltd. v.
Liu, 403 F.3d 645, 651 n. 5 (9th Cir. 2005). The Court cannot weigh the evidence or
assess the credibility of witnesses in determining whether substantial evidence exists. Id.
Ultimately, the Court must determine if the damage award is “grossly excessive or
monstrous, clearly not supported by the evidence, or only based on speculation and
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 5
guesswork.” Los Angeles Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 791 F.2d
1356, 1360 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. Monterey, 95
F.3d 1422, 1435 (9th Cir. 1996).
The Court has discretion to grant a remittitur, reducing the damages to the
maximum authorized under the evidence, and then offer the plaintiff the choice of
accepting a remittitur (a reduction) of the award in lieu of a new trial on the issue of the
damages only. Morgan v. Woessner, 997 F.2d 1244 (9th Cir. 1993); Munguia v. Grelyn of
Maui, LLC, 2011 WL 1364026, *26 (D. Haw.2011).
2.
The Parties’ Motions At Trial
On September 6, 2012, at the conclusion of Plaintiffs’ presentation of evidence,
the City moved for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a) on three issues. First,
with respect to individual Plaintiff Jay Banta, the City contended that his disability claim
for failure to accommodate should be dismissed because he did not request an
accommodation. Second, regarding Marlene Smith’s individual disability discrimination
claim, the City argued the evidence established she was not entitled to any reasonable
accommodation because she was not a tenant or resident. Finally, the City argued CHI’s
establishment clause claim should be dismissed because there was insufficient evidence
that the City gave aid or assistance to the Boise Rescue Mission. The Court denied the
motion at that time.
At the conclusion of the City’s evidence on September 11, 2012, the City again
moved for judgment under Rule 50(a), on the grounds that there was no evidence of
CHI’s future damages. The City asked also for a ruling that the construction costs to build
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 6
the Community House shelter and transitional housing rooms 5 could not be awarded as
an element of CHI’s damages. The Court granted the City’s motion that CHI’s damages
could not include construction costs, and jury Instruction number 32 instructed the jury
that CHI’s damages could include “[a]n amount that will reasonably compensate for any
loss of personal property or liquid assets other than the building itself, or the loss of use
of any personal property, as a result of any retaliation or other violation of the Fair
Housing Act.” The jury was cautioned that its award must not be based upon speculation,
guesswork or conjecture. Further, the jury was instructed that it could award damages for
the value of business opportunities and revenue, less expenses, lost as a result of any
retaliation “which are reasonably related in time to” CHI’s filing of the FHA complaint in
August of 2003.
Also on September 11, 2012, Plaintiffs moved for a judgment as a matter of law
prior to submission of the matter to the jury. Plaintiffs requested a ruling that Ordinance
6404, passed by the City, was facially discriminatory because it stated a preferential
treatment to serve men, and the ordinance was incorporated by reference in the lease
between the City and the Boise Rescue Mission. The Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion,
resulting in jury Instruction number 20, 6 which the City now contends was error.
5
The shelter building will be referred to as Community House. Community House Inc. (CHI) operated the shelter
under the terms of a lease and operating agreement with the City. Construction of the building itself commenced in
1994.
6
Instruction number 20 stated, in pertinent part, that “[t]he Court has found that Ordinance 6404 (Exhibit 333)
was… unlawful under the Fair Housing Act. Therefore, …you must find in favor of the plaintiffs on this claim. I
will instruct you in later instructions regarding damages you may award the plaintiffs on this claim.”
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 7
3.
Analysis
The jury found Plaintiffs proved their claim that the City discriminated against
them on the basis of gender or familial status in violation of the Fair Housing Act, and
that CHI proved its claim that the City interfered with it in violation of the Fair Housing
Act. The jury found also that Plaintiffs proved their claim that the City violated the Free
Exercise Clause of the Idaho State Constitution. 7 The jury did not differentiate the
amount of damages it awarded on any specific claim, nor was it asked to. It simply
awarded CHI the gross sum of one million dollars and no damages to the individual
Plaintiffs.
The City makes the following arguments in support of its renewed motion under
Rule 50(b), and its alternative motions under Rule 59 or for remittitur: (1) there was no
evidence of retaliation; (2) CHI did not have standing to claim damages for diversion of
resources and frustration of mission; and (3) the damage award was not supported by the
evidence, because (a) there was no specific evidence of CHI’s lost business opportunities
and revenue; and (b) the award was not supported by the evidence of CHI’s personal
property and liquid assets lost. Further, the City contends the Court erroneously granted
Plaintiffs’ Rule 50(a) motion and instructed the jury that City Ordinance 6404 was
unlawful under the Fair Housing Act. See Instruction No. 20 (Dkt. 374.) And finally, the
City claims the state constitutional claims are preempted by Federal law.
7
The jury was instructed not to award damages for this claim. The Court considered the issue of equitable relief at
the later bench trial on May 13 and 14, 2013.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 8
A.
Waiver
Plaintiffs initially argue that the City waived all grounds for a renewed motion for
judgment as a matter of law because the City failed to so move at the close of evidence.
However, the City made two motions at different times---the first at the close of
Plaintiffs’ case, and the second at the close of all the evidence. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)
requires only that the motion be made at “any time” before the case is submitted to the
jury, and the motion may be renewed and combined with a motion for new trial under
Rule 59. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b).
The damage issue was squarely presented in the City’s motion. And, if not entirely
fleshed out during the oral motions, the City alternatively argues post-verdict that CHI’s
damages should be reduced, because the jury’s verdict must have been based upon
speculation. The Court finds the City’s motion in that regard is proper.
Second, Plaintiffs argue that the City waived its objection to damages by not
requesting a special verdict on each element of damages. In other words, because the
Special Verdict Form did not require the jury to assign an amount corresponding to the
alternative claims for relief, the Court cannot speculate how the jury calculated the
damages awarded for each claim. The jury found for Plaintiff CHI on two claims--- first
for discrimination on the basis of gender or familial status in violation of the FHA, and
second being the retaliation claim. 8 The jury awarded a collective sum of $1,000,000 to
CHI, with no breakdown between the two claims for relief.
8
All Plaintiffs were included in Question 1 regarding the discrimination claim, while only CHI was included in
Question 7 regarding the retaliation claim and only the individual Plaintiffs were included in questions 5 regarding
their individual disability discrimination claims. Question 1, the discrimination claim, related to Ordinance 6404.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 9
When a verdict form fails to request that the jury allocate damages between
alternative theories of relief, the verdict is to be construed as responsive to any and all
material issues in the case, including alternative theories of damages. Landes Const. Co.,
Inc. v. Royal Bank of Canada, 833 F.2d 1365, 1374 (9th Cir. 1987). When considering
the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict, the Court must view the evidence in
a light “most favorable to the prevailing party, accepting as established all facts which the
evidence reasonably tended to prove and giving to the prevailing party the benefit of all
inferences which may be reasonably drawn from the evidence.” Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust
& Sav. Ass’n. v. Hayden, 231 F.2d 595, 603 (9th Cir. 1956).
Here, the jury was tasked with considering damages under two alternative theories
of relief---retaliation and discrimination---under the FHA. It awarded a general verdict
for CHI in the sum of $1,000,000. There was no separate damage award for each cause of
action or theory of recovery under the FHA. Accordingly, the verdict is to be construed
as responsive to any and all material issues in the case, including the alternative theories
of damages. It was the jury’s task to sort through the evidence and determine the basis for
the award and amount of damages suffered. The Court cannot now second guess how the
jury arrived at the sum of one million dollars, but may consider only whether substantial
evidence supports the award.
B.
Retaliation Claim
The City asserts that the jury’s verdict in favor of CHI finding retaliation under the
FHA was not supported by substantial evidence. The Court notes that the City did not
include this theory in its motions, discussed above, prior to submission of the case to the
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 10
jury. Because a Rule 50(b) motion is a renewal of a pre-verdict motion, it may be granted
only on grounds advanced in the pre-verdict motion. Cmt., 2006 Amendment, Fed. R.
Civ. P. 50(b). Accordingly, the City waived grounds to assert, post-verdict, an argument
that the evidence did not support a claim for retaliation. Notwithstanding such an
omission, the Court finds that substantial evidence was presented to the jury upon which
the jury could find retaliation.
CHI’s retaliation claim asserted that the City, by its conduct, unlawfully coerced,
intimidated, threatened, or interfered with CHI on account of having aided or encouraged
other persons in the exercise or enjoyment of the rights granted or protected by the FHA.
Jury instructions explained that the FHA makes it unlawful for the City to coerce,
intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on
account of his having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his having aided or
encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or
protected by the FHA. Instruction number 27 outlined that CHI was required to prove it
engaged in a protected activity under the FHA; actions or conduct by the City coerced,
intimidated, threatened or interfered with CHI’s exercise of a protected activity; and a
causal link between the protected activity that CHI engaged in, and the coercive,
intimidating, threatening, or interfering actions or conduct of the City. See Brown v. City
of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003).
The Court instructed the jury regarding conduct that could be considered unlawful.
Instruction number 27 stated that unlawful conduct includes coercing a person, either
orally, in writing, or by other means, to deny or limit the benefits provided that person in
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 11
connection with the sale or rental of a dwelling because of sex or familial status;
threatening, intimidating, or interfering with persons in their enjoyment of a dwelling
because of sex or familial status; threatening an employee or agent with dismissal for any
effort to assist a person seeking access to the rental of a dwelling because of sex or
familial status of the person; intimidating or threatening any person because the person is
engaging in activities to make others aware of their rights under the FHA; or retaliating
against a person because that person has made a complaint, or participated in any manner
in a proceeding under the FHA. See also 24 C.F.R. § 100.400.
The language of the FHA is “broad and inclusive.” Brown, 336 F.3d at 1192. It is
enough to threaten a person in the exercise or enjoyment of a right protected by the FHA,
so long as an injury occurred as a result of the threat. Id. at 1192-93. The injury could
consist of either the giving up of one’s rights under the FHA, or some other injury which
resulted from the refusal to give up rights, or from the threat itself. Id. at 1193.
The City argues CHI’s retaliation claim was based upon allegations that, in
January 2004, CHI’s request to the City for emergency funding was rejected. The City
contends it had no obligation, under the terms of its lease and operating agreement with
CHI, to provide emergency funding, or any funding at all, to CHI; consequently, the City
argues the jury’s verdict was not supported by the evidence because the City’s decision to
refuse CHI’s request for emergency funding did not violate the FHA. The City argues
additionally that it did not interfere with any resident continuing to live in the Community
House shelter, because the City continued to operate the shelter after March of 2004.
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The evidence at trial established that CHI was protesting the City’s negotiations
with the Boise Rescue Mission in 2003 to assume operation of Community House, which
precipitated CHI’s filing of the August 2003 FHA complaint with HUD. The City makes
much of its argument that negotiations with the Boise Rescue Mission did not violate the
FHA, and therefore the filing of the 2003 FHA complaint was not a protected activity.
The City relies upon the holding in Intermountain Fair Housing Council v. Boise Rescue
Mission Ministries, 657 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 2011). In IFHC, the Ninth Circuit held that the
plaintiffs’ religious discrimination claims asserted against the Boise Rescue Mission
failed because the Mission, as a private religious organization, is exempt from the
discrimination provisions of the FHA. IFHC, 657 F.3d at 996. In turn, because the
plaintiffs’ interference claims were dependent upon the validity of their religious
discrimination claims, the court concluded the plaintiffs could not maintain a claim for
interference because neither plaintiff had exercised a protected right.
Here, CHI’s retaliation claim is not dependent upon its claim for discrimination.
Rather, CHI’s retaliation claim relates to its filing of the August 2003 FHA complaint
with HUD, which CHI filed upon learning the City was engaged in private negotiations
with the Boise Rescue Mission, a men-only shelter, to assume operations of Community
House when CHI had an existing lease and operating agreement with the City. The filing
of a complaint with HUD constitutes a protected activity in the sense that it constitutes
opposition to statutorily prohibited discrimination.
In this case, CHI filed its FHA complaint because the City’s negotiations with the
Boise Rescue Mission, if they had come to fruition in 2003, fell within the prohibitions of
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 13
42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)—Community House would no longer be available to “any person”
because of the well-known men-only policy of the Boise Rescue Mission. In contrast,
CHI’s discrimination claim under the FHA arises from conduct that occurred after
August of 2003, and is based upon the publication of Ordinance 6404 in July of 2005,
and the eventual lease and sale of the Community House Shelter to the Boise Rescue
Mission in September of 2005. Considering these events did not precede the events
giving rise to the retaliation claim, CHI’s retaliation claim is not dependent upon the
validity of its discrimination claim and the holding in IFHC does not apply.
Further, the evidence at trial indicated the relationship between the City and CHI
deteriorated in 2003 and 2004, which the jury could have concluded was causally and
temporally related to CHI’s August 2003 filing of the FHA complaint with HUD. See
Regional Economic Community Action Program, Inc. v. City of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35,
54 (2nd Cir. 2002) (“The causal connection needed for proof of a retaliation claim can be
established indirectly by showing that the protected activity was closely followed in time
by the adverse action.”). In early January of 2004, CHI notified the City that it lacked
sufficient resources to meet its financial obligations, and requested financial assistance
from the City. Shortly thereafter, a meeting occurred at which CHI representatives
Deanna Watson and Peggy Sedivy, and City Council Members Vern Bisterfeldt and
Mary Ann Jordan, were present. Ms. Watson testified about statements made by City
Council Member Vern Bisterfeldt at that meeting. During the course of the conversation,
Mr. Bisterfeldt recommended that the FHA complaint filed by CHI against the City be
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 14
dropped, and that “things would be a whole lot better if you [CHI] would just drop that
complaint.” 9
Then, on February 20, 2004, CHI held a special board meeting at which Theresa
McLeod, on behalf of the City, indicated the City was ordering CHI to turn over
operations to it lest CHI incur financial obligations it lacked the resources to pay. Ms.
Watson, a CHI board member, testified that all of CHI’s books, records, assets, bank
accounts, and other property were turned over to the City as a result of the vote at the
board meeting, because otherwise Community House residents would have no shelter.
There was evidence and testimony from Mr. Bruce Chatterton, a City employee, and Ms.
Watson, that the City had been able to loan funds or provide funding advances to CHI
before, 10 but that it refused to do so beyond the $55,000 the City used to pay certain CHI
obligations related to Community House in February of 2004. 11
The City’s reliance upon its contractual lease agreement and operating agreement
with CHI, and its argument that its acts may have been contractually permitted, does not
bar a suit for retaliation. Walker v. City of Lakewood, 272 F.3d 1114 1126 (9th Cir.
2001). 12 CHI was required only to present evidence at trial that the City’s decision to
refuse further funding was motivated by CHI’s participation in a HUD approved (and
protected) activity, which in this case was the filing of the FHA complaint to protest the
9
Ms. Watson testified as to Mr. Bisterfeldt’s statements on August 29, 2002, on day three of the trial.
Ms. Watson testified about Exhibit 534, which was a letter written by City employee Jim Fackrell in 2003 that the
City could enter into a funding agreement with CHI prior to the City receiving its federal grant funds and “float” a
loan to CHI to cover its operating expenses, and that such a loan would not affect the City’s finances.
11
There was evidence that CHI may have been solvent, and did not require further funds from the City. However, it
is not for the Court to second-guess the jury’s determination.
12
In Walker, the court explained that at-will employees are permitted to pursue retaliation claims against an
employer after their employment was terminated, because the FHA prohibits employers from canceling an at-will
contract in retaliation for fair housing advocacy. Id.
10
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 15
possible turnover of Community House to the Boise Rescue Mission. See Def.’s Brief at
15 (Dkt. 388-1.) (citing San Pedro Hotel Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 159 F.3d 470, 475
(9th Cir. 1988)). Although the City continued to operate Community House after
February 20, 2004, there was substantial evidence presented, as discussed above, for the
jury to find that the City engaged in unlawful retaliation against CHI because CHI filed a
complaint under the FHA, and that the City engaged in threats directly attributable to the
FHA complaint. Soon after, the City demanded CHI transfer all of its assets to the City,
or close the doors of the Community House shelter, because the City’s financial
assistance to CHI was ending.
Based upon the evidence at trial, there was substantial evidence to support the
jury’s finding of retaliation.
C.
Rule 50(a) Motion
The Court directed a verdict that Ordinance 6404 was facially discriminatory
under the FHA because it stated a preferential treatment to serve men. Evidence was
introduced at trial regarding the September 2005 lease agreement and purchase option
between the City and the Boise Rescue Mission. Although the lease contained a provision
that the Boise Rescue Mission was to operate “an emergency homeless shelter with a
capacity to serve not fewer than sixty-six (66) guests,” Ordinance 6404, which had not
been repealed at the time of trial, required that Community House be operated as “a
shelter for a minimum of 66, single, homeless men, ages 18 years or older.” Evidence at
trial established that City Resolution 18765, approving the lease of Community House to
the Boise Rescue Mission, specifically incorporated the restrictions of City Ordinance
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 16
6404. Moreover, evidence at trial established the City knew the Boise Rescue Mission
had no intent to allow women and families to stay at its shelter, and that it planned to
operate Community House as a men-only shelter.
The Court’s ruling was based upon Community House, Inc. v. City of Boise,
(Community House I) 490 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2007). In that appeal, the Ninth Circuit
held the City’s “men-only policy is facially discriminatory” under the FHA, specifically
referring to Ordinance 6404. 490 F.3d at 1045-46. The appellate court further held that
Plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of facial discrimination under the Fair
Housing Act “because they have explicitly been excluded from Community House based
on their gender and familial status.” Id. at 1050. The court did not foreclose the
possibility that, at trial, the City could establish its affirmative defense to the
discrimination claim. Id. at 1051. But at trial, the City failed to do so.
The City now argues Ordinance 6404 did not prohibit the Boise Rescue Mission
from operating Community House as a family shelter, only that it required Community
House to provide shelter for at least 66 men. Further, the City contends the jury’s
determination that the lease and sale to the Boise Rescue Mission “did not violate the Fair
Housing Act” cannot be reconciled with the Court’s directed verdict ruling. But the
City’s arguments ignore the context in which the Ordinance was enacted and the lease
approved, as well as the Ninth Circuit’s holding and the Court’s instructions. Further, the
jury’s verdict regarding discrimination can be reconciled with its alternate determination
that the lease and sale did not violate the Fair Housing Act.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 17
First, the City ignores the express language of the FHA, and the context of events.
The starting point is the language of the FHA and the specific instruction to the jury.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c), it is unlawful to “make, print, or publish, or cause to be
made, printed or published any notice, statement or advertisement, with respect to the
sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination
based on . . . sex, . . . familial status, . . . or an intention to make any such preference,
limitation, or discrimination.” (emphasis added). Instruction number 20 was based upon §
3604(c), instructing that Ordinance 6404 (Exhibit 333) “was such a statement” and that
Plaintiffs had “proven the elements of this claim . . . .” In response to Question 1 on the
Special Verdict Form, the jury determined that Plaintiffs proved their claim that the City
had discriminated against them on the basis of gender or familial status in violation of the
FHA, and that the City did not prove its affirmative defense.
Under the FHA and the instruction given, as well as the holding in Community
House I, the mere act of publishing the statement granting a preference to single men, and
the context in which it was published, constituted a violation under § 3604(c). The City
intended to lease the building to the Boise Rescue Mission, and evidence at trial
established that the Boise Rescue Mission had no intent to allow women, families, or
children to reside or seek shelter at Community House. The evidence established also that
the City knew the Rescue Mission’s intent was to operate a men-only shelter. See note 5,
supra. Against that backdrop, the Court’s directed verdict was proper and consistent with
the evidence at trial, as was the jury’s verdict.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 18
Second, the City is incorrect that the jury’s finding conflicts with its other finding
that no violation of § 3605 of the FHA occurred. Under 42 U.S.C. § 3605, the FHA
makes it unlawful for an entity whose business includes engaging in residential real
estate-related transactions to discriminate against any person in making available such a
transaction because of sex or familial status. The jury was instructed that Plaintiffs
claimed discrimination on the grounds enumerated in § 3605. Instr. No. 22 (Dkt. 374.)
The jury was informed that the term “residential real estate-related transaction” means
providing “financial assistance for purchasing, constructing, improving, repairing, or
maintaining a dwelling; or the selling of residential real property.” See 42 U.S.C. §
3605(b). The jury was informed further that Plaintiffs had to establish the City’s business
included engaging in residential real estate-related transactions; and the City
discriminated against Plaintiffs because of gender or familial status. The jury determined,
in response to Question 3 on the Special Verdict form, (Dkt. 375), that Plaintiffs did not
prove the City discriminated against them on the grounds of gender or familial status in
the terms of a residential real estate-related transaction.
The jury’s verdict finding against Plaintiffs on Question 3 is consistent with the
evidence presented at trial, and consistent with the jury’s finding in favor of Plaintiffs on
Question 1 regarding discrimination. The jury heard evidence about the lease and sale of
Community House to the Boise Rescue Mission, and the price the Boise Rescue Mission
paid for Community House when the Boise Rescue Mission exercised its purchase option
under the lease. However, the jury also heard evidence concerning the public auction of
Community House, which Sue Cobley attended on behalf of CHI and made a credit bid
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 19
that the City rejected as nonconforming. The auction occurred prior to the lease
negotiations with the Boise Rescue Mission.
The jury’s verdict is consistent with the evidence at trial, because the only
evidence of the City engaging in a residential real estate-related transaction at which the
public was invited to purchase the property was the public auction, which the evidence
established was open to anyone who submitted a Request for Proposal. 13 By the time the
Boise Rescue Mission exercised its purchase option, the City had entered into a lease
with the Boise Rescue Mission contractually giving it the exclusive right to purchase the
property under the terms of its agreement with the City. Considering the auction had
already occurred, the jury could have determined, consistent with the evidence, that the
City was no longer engaged in a public transaction affecting other groups by the time the
Boise Rescue Mission exercised its option to purchase Community House.
Accordingly, the jury’s verdict is consistent with the evidence at trial, and the
Court finds that the two provisions under which CHI sought damages are not mutually
exclusive under the facts presented at trial.
D.
Damages
When construing the evidence in a light most favorable to CHI, the nonmoving
party, the Court finds there is substantial evidence to uphold the jury’s verdict awarding
$1,000,000 in damages to CHI. The Court’s damage instruction (No. 32) allowed the jury
to consider four components comprising damages: frustration of mission; past and future
13
Mr. Eberle testified on September 11, 2012, that there was no limitation preventing participation in the IFP/RFP
process.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 20
diversion of resources; the reasonable value of business opportunities and revenue, less
expenses, lost; and personal property or liquid assets. The various components of the
damage award contested by the City are addressed in further detail below.
(1)
Past and Future Diversion of Resources and Frustration of
Mission (Standing)
Instruction number 18 instructed the jury that CHI, as an organization, is permitted
to sue under the Fair Housing Act on its own behalf for injuries or damages it sustained
as a result of any discriminatory housing practices and for injury to its ability to carry out
its efforts to assure equal access to housing and to eliminate housing discrimination.
Instruction number 32 stated that damages could include damages for past and future
diversion of resources, including out-of-pocket expenses, and any other expenses that
could be attributed to the drain on the organizations’ resources related to any violation of
the Fair Housing Act. The instruction stated also that damages could include what it
would cost the organization to redress the harm done by the defendants to the community
at large and to the organization’s mission as a result of the retaliation or any other
violation of the Fair Housing Act.
The City argues CHI lacked representational standing, because CHI did not
operate as an advocacy or other organization that investigated or carried out efforts to
assure equal access to housing and to eliminate housing discrimination. The City further
alleges CHI failed to substantiate the damages suffered as a result of its frustration of
mission.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 21
The City defines frustration of mission too narrowly. In Havens Realty Corp. v.
Coleman, the United States Supreme Court held that Congress intended standing under
the FHA to “extend to the full limits of Article III,” and that “the courts lack the authority
to create prudential barriers to standing in suits brought under that section. Thus the sole
requirement for standing to sue under § 812 is the Article III minima of injury in fact:
that the plaintiff allege that as a result of the defendant’s actions he has suffered ‘a
distinct and palpable injury.’” Havens, 455 U.S. 363, 372 (1982). CHI was required,
therefore, to demonstrate a “demonstrable injury to the organization’s activities” and a
“consequent drain on the organization’s resources.” Fair Housing of Marin v. Combs,
285 F.3d 899, 903 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Havens, 455 U.S. at 379).
CHI defined its mission as a non-profit corporation that provided housing services
to homeless and low income persons, which included men, women, and families.
Testimony at trial by Mr. Brown on August 28, 2012, established that, upon his tenure as
manager of the Community House shelter, both in 1994 and again in 2004 after the City
assumed operations, there was no restriction regarding sex, gender, or familial status for
either shelter occupancy or single family residency occupancy at Community House.
Additional testimony established no other organization provided such comprehensive
services in Boise prior to Community House’s opening in November of 1994, and that no
organization provided similar services after the City leased Community House to the
Boise Rescue Mission on September 2, 2005.
There was conflicting evidence at trial concerning the events culminating in the
City’s assumption in March of 2004 of the Community House shelter operations. But
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 22
CHI introduced evidence and testimony supporting its contention that the City increased
hostilities toward CHI after CHI filed its Fair Housing Act complaint with HUD in
August of 2003 alleging discrimination based on sex and familial status upon learning
that the City had been discussing a deal with the Boise Rescue Mission to assume
ownership of Community House. Further, evidence was introduced that the City never
intended to continue operating Community House after it stepped in to operate
Community House in March of 2004.
Once the City assumed operation of Community House on March 2, 2004, there
was evidence that CHI expended resources to regain control of Community House, by
submitting a proposal for consideration by the City under its Request for Proposal
Process, attending and bidding at the public auction on July 15, 2005, testifying at public
hearings, and advocating against the City’s lease of the Community House shelter
building to the Boise Rescue Mission.
CHI’s activities---filing the FHA Complaint, participating in the RFP process, and
attending the auction---certainly fall within the concept of standing articulated in Havens.
And the City’s actions can reasonably be viewed as impairing CHI’s ability to provide
the services to the homeless it was formed to provide. Mr. Bruce Chatterton testified on
September 10, 2012, that the City understood that there would be “service gaps” to the
homeless population because the Boise Rescue Mission was going to operate Community
House as a men only shelter, and there was no other service provider operating in 2005
providing homeless services for intact families or single parents with opposite sex
children over 12 years of age. By eliminating CHI as a participant in the provision of
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 23
comprehensive services to the homeless, including men, women, and intact families, the
evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict that CHI suffered frustration to its
mission of providing those services. With that being the case, “there can be no question
that the organization suffered injury in fact.” El Rescate Legal Servs., Inc. v. Executive
Office of Immigration Review, 959 F.2d 742, 748 (9th Cir. 1991).
As for substantial evidence to support the damage award, on September 11, 2012,
the jury heard testimony from Ms. Mary Ann Jordan, the City’s own witness, that the
City was spending over one million dollars in unanticipated funds to annually operate the
Community House shelter during 2004 and 2005. Ms. Jordan was asked also to clarify
the composition of the $2.5 million dollar public auction bid price for the shelter
building. She testified that the $2.5 million dollar figure included the value of the service,
which service, she explained, was the provision of shelter services in the community. Ms.
Jordan explained that the value of the building, “with no attendant services,” was “around
$850,000” per the assessment that was done. Ms. Jordan confirmed that the Community
House property was ultimately sold for $2 million in cash. Ms. Jordan was then asked to
calculate the difference to arrive at the value of the “service” provided by subtracting the
value of the building from the sales price. Ms. Jordan subtracted the value of the building
($850,000) to arrive at the value of the “service” provided by taking the sale price of two
million dollars and subtracting $850,000. She arrived at a figure of $1,150,000.
The jury could easily have performed the same math calculation as Ms. Jordan.
That they may have chosen to round the figure to one million dollars cuts against the
City’s request for remittitur. The Court therefore finds that substantial evidence was
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 24
presented to the jury upon which it could find damages of one million dollars, and that no
reduction is warranted. 14
(2)
Lost Business Opportunities and Revenue
The jury was asked to consider the reasonable value of business opportunities and
revenue, less expenses, lost as a result of any retaliation or other violation of the Fair
Housing Act reasonably related in time to CHI’s filing of the Fair Housing Act complaint
in August of 2003 and the events that occurred thereafter. The City argues CHI failed to
present any evidence of specific lost business opportunities or lost profits, and contends
that the damage award was, therefore, based upon speculation.
However, evidence was introduced at trial regarding CHI’s revenue and expenses
related to operating the Community House shelter. Ms. Frances Wray testified about lost
rental income from CHI’s duplex, which was a separate building from the Community
House shelter. CHI lost rent collected for the transitional housing units located on one
floor of the Community House shelter, in which tenants resided for up to eighteen
months, in the amount of $51,000. (Ex. 606-617.) CHI presented evidence about the
revenue it collected from donations and other fundraising activities (Ex. 554) and the
revenue obtained through government grants administered by the City (Ex. 554). CHI
introduced its 2004 budget, indicating it expected to recognize income in 2004. (Ex. 554.)
Tax returns for several years prior to February of 2004 were introduced in evidence.
CHI’s 2002 tax return indicated net income of $63,102. (Ex. 841.) CHI’s 2004 tax return
14
Further, it is unclear how the jury incorporated CHI’s alternative theories of relief for either retaliation or
discrimination, or the other components of damages, such as the loss of personal property and cash. It would appear
that those items of damages are included in the jury’s award, again undercutting the City’s contention that a
remittitur is in order.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 25
indicated it reported revenue of $165,166 and expenses of $129,818 for net earnings of
$35,348. (Ex. 843.) And pro-forma projections of operating expenses and income were
given to the City in January of 2004 showing a positive cash flow. The jury heard also
from the City’s witnesses about how much it cost the City to run the Community House
shelter once it began managing the facility (both the shelter and transitional housing) in
February of 2004.
Further, once the City assumed operations of Community House in February of
2004, the jury could have determined that CHI was, effectively, out of business. With no
building, no further grant funding from the City, and no center of operations, CHI
essentially lost the opportunity to continue in business at all. 15
Although the City presented its own evidence disputing the veracity of CHI’s
financial data and providing its interpretation of the evidence, the jury was not required to
believe it. The City contends CHI should have hired an expert to calculate its damages
with more certainty. But if a tort is of such a nature that the amount of damages may not
be proven with certainty, it is enough if the evidence shows “the extent of the damages as
a matter of just and reasonable inference, although the result be only approximate.” Story
Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931). “Thus,
while a plaintiff seeking to recover lost profits must ordinarily prove the fact of injury
with reasonable certainty, proof of the amount of damages may be based on a reasonable
15
There was conflicting evidence at trial about CHI’s duplex building, or CHDO, which CHI claimed was seized by
the City in February of 2004, and later returned. Ms. Francis Wray testified that CHI did not regain control of the
duplex until 2006, and at that time it was badly damaged and in need of repairs. The City presented alternate
evidence that title to the duplex remained in CHI’s name. Again, the jury was not required to believe the City’s
version of the evidence.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 26
estimate.” Samaritan Inns, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 114 F.3d 1227, 1235 (D.C. Cir.
1997). See also DSPT Intern., Inc. v. Nahum, 624 F.3d 1213, 1222 (9th Cir. 2010)
(finding the financial statements and the corporate president’s testimony about the
financial impact of the tort sufficient to support the plaintiff’s claim for damages). CHI
presented such evidence in the form of its tax returns and revenue projections, as well as
the testimony of its officers and managers.
Therefore, the jury had sufficient evidence of CHI’s income and expenses from
which to consider damages.
(3)
Personal Property and Liquid Assets
The City argues that the Court’s admission of the Memorandum of Understanding
(“MOU”) into evidence (Ex. 503) contributed to the jury’s speculative award. The MOU
referred to CHI’s initial obligation to contribute $1,000,000 toward construction costs of
the Community House shelter building. The MOU was signed on February 8, 1994, and
later incorporated by reference in the terms of the lease agreement between CHI and the
City, which was executed on November 2, 1994. Because the jury’s award is equivalent
to the one million dollar figure in the MOU, the City contends the jury must have
erroneously considered the MOU when it determined CHI’s damages.
The jury, however, was instructed that damages must be based upon evidence and
not upon speculation, guesswork or conjecture. Concerning the specific component of
damages for loss of personal property and liquid assets, the damage instruction stated that
the amount had to be based on something other than the loss of the building itself, and be
causally related to any retaliation or other violation of the FHA. See Instr. No. 32 (Dkt.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 27
374.) The Court will not second guess the jury and assume, as the City has, that the jury
disregarded the Court’s instruction that evidence had to support the damage award, and
the jury was not to award damages for the loss of the building. See U.S. v. Cook, 497 F.2d
753, 761 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding the court must presume that the jury did not wilfully
disobey the judge’s instructions).
Moreover, there was evidence presented to the jury of the value of personal
property lost and the amount of CHI’s liquid assets. When the City assumed operation of
Community House in February of 2004, the City obtained all of the personal property
belonging to CHI located inside the Community House shelter building, and assumed
control over CHI’s bank accounts. These assets included cash on hand in various bank
and investment accounts of over $95,000, and personal property located inside the shelter
building and the kitchen area, with estimated values for the property. Ex. 570-575 and
836-37. Exhibit 836 documented personal property estimated at $37,201. The City never
returned these assets or accounted for them, nor did it contest the estimated value of them
at trial.
G.
Constitutional Claim
In Instruction number 31, the Court instructed the jury that, to prove its claim that
the City violated the Idaho State Constitution, Plaintiffs must prove that the City made an
appropriation, or paid from any public fund or public monies, anything in aid of a
religious society or for a religious purpose; or the City required a person to attend or
support any ministry or place of worship, religious sect, or denomination; or the City
gave a preference by law to any religious denomination or mode of worship.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 28
The City contends the Court’s instruction to the jury should have been limited
with an instruction directing the jury that the Idaho Constitution would not apply if it
would cause the City to violate federal law. The City contends that it could not
discriminate against a religious organization—in this case, the Boise Rescue Mission—
simply because it is religious. In other words, the City was required to consider the
Mission’s proposal, and could not refuse to enter into negotiations with the Boise Rescue
Mission for the lease of Community House. The City argues the Idaho Constitutional
claim is preempted by federal law, in this case the FHA, if it would cause the City to
discriminate against the Boise Rescue Mission.
Plaintiffs argue that the City waived this particular argument because it never
raised the issue in its oral motions before the case was submitted to the jury. However,
the City did argue that CHI’s establishment clause claim should be dismissed because
there was insufficient evidence that the City gave aid or assistance to the Boise Rescue
Mission. The Court finds the issue regarding insufficiency of the evidence was raised,
albeit in the context of the Establishment Clause claim, but that the City never raised a
preemption argument or the other arguments presented in its renewed motion prior to
submission of the case to the jury. 16 In any event, the Court indicated it would consider
the legal issue in the context of the equitable phase of the trial. For purposes of the instant
motion, however, the Court will limit its discussion to whether there was substantial
evidence to support the state constitutional claim.
16
The City raised an objection to the Court’s proposed instruction on the grounds that Federal law preempted
Plaintiffs’ Idaho Constitutional claim. The Court at that time indicated it would consider the legal issue presented in
the context of its determination on remedies during the equitable phase of the trial, because this was the first time the
City raised a preemption argument.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 29
During the course of the trial, evidence was presented that the City engaged in
negotiations with the Boise Rescue Mission during 2003, and again in 2004-2005 during
the RFP process. The RFP process was intended to be a public process. However, there
was evidence of e-mails and communications between City officials and the Boise
Rescue Mission regarding how to proceed under the RFI/RFP process, which e-mails
other participants in the RFP process did not receive---such as the valuation of the
building, possible rent terms, and the like. Ultimately, the City considered the public
auction, which CHI attended and submitted a credit bid, unsuccessful because CHI’s bid
was not cash. The failed auction enabled the City to engage in negotiations with the Boise
Rescue Mission exclusively. And, it was no secret that the Boise Rescue Mission was a
faith based, Christian organization.
The jury certainly could have inferred from the negotiations and conversations
between the City and the Boise Rescue Mission that the City intended all along to enable
the Boise Rescue Mission to wind up with the Community House facility. Mr. Eberle, a
City Councilmember, testified that it was the City’s intent to find another operator to
manage the facility as soon as possible after February of 2004. Mayor Beiter testified that
he began receiving inquiries from the Boise Rescue Mission as early as March of 2004
about the City’s plans for the Community House property, and the Mission’s plans for
expansion. (Ex. 853). The jury saw also an e-mail from the Mayor in March of 2005 (Ex.
755) indicating that the City would be in a “world of hurt” if it could not transfer
Community House to the Boise Rescue Mission. These communications occurred prior to
the conclusion of the RFP process and the later public auction.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 30
Mr. Eberle testified also that another nonprofit, specifically Giraffe Laugh, was
not treated as favorably as the Boise Rescue Mission. Giraffe Laugh had submitted a
proposal during the RFP process for running the daycare that CHI provided at
Community House. The jury heard evidence that in August of 2005, after the RFP
process had concluded, Giraffe Laugh sought to rent a city owned property, and it was
charged $300 per month after the first year of occupancy for a smaller building. In
contrast, the Boise Rescue Mission continued to enjoy a $1.00 per year lease rate for the
larger Community House facility. Mr. Eberle testified that the primary objective in
setting lease rates was to meet certain needs in the community, but also to charge “as
close to market rate” for city owned property to protect taxpayers. In contrast, Mr. Eberle
testified that the lease with the Boise Rescue Mission of $1.00 per year for the first four
years was to incentivize the Mission to the “greatest degree possible to accelerate the
purchase of the property by putting a disincentive clause in there that the purchase price
goes up the longer they kept it in lease status.”
Finally, the jury could have inferred from the timing of the passage of Ordinance
6404, which contained the deed restriction requiring Community House to be operated as
a homeless shelter for a minimum of 66 homeless men, and the communications with the
Boise Rescue Mission throughout 2004 and 2005, that the Ordinance was intended to
facilitate the sale to the Boise Rescue Mission. The City Council passed the Ordinance on
June 28, 2005, and it was signed by the Mayor on July 12, 2005. At that time, the City
knew that the Boise Rescue Mission was looking for properties to expand their shelter for
homeless men. No other organization had, during the RFP process in the spring of 2005,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 31
submitted a proposal to operate a homeless shelter for such a large population of single
men. The Mayor testified that the Boise Rescue Mission was the only shelter he was
aware of that was exclusively for men. Then, the auction was held in mid-July 2005, with
no cash bidders. Yet communications continued with the Boise Rescue Mission
thereafter. In August of 2005, City employees received an e-mail from the Boise Rescue
Mission that it “wouldn’t locate sex offenders at Community House.” 17 The lease was
executed with the Boise Rescue Mission on September 2, 2005.
The Court finds, based upon the above, that there was substantial evidence from
which the jury could infer that the City provided aid or gave a preference, albeit
indirectly, by law to a faith based, religious organization during what was otherwise
portrayed to be a public RFP and auction process.
CONCLUSION
The Court cannot grant a new trial simply because it may have arrived at a
different verdict. Nor can Defendants advocate for a new trial because they believe the
jury should have believed Defendants’ interpretation of the evidence. If the jury’s verdict
is not against the clear weight of the evidence, the Court should not grant the request for a
new trial. Here, the weight of the evidence is not grossly imbalanced, and there are no
grounds for granting a new trial.
The jury had substantial evidence upon which to base its determination and its
finding in favor of CHI for damages in the amount of $1,000,000. The Court finds no
reason to reduce it. Because the amount of the verdict is not “so excessive as to indicate
17
Mayor Beiter testified regarding an e-mail received on August 8, 2005, from Mr. Bruce Chatterton addressed to
him regarding an update from the Boise Rescue Mission.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 32
passion and prejudice on the part of the jury,” and can be accounted for based upon the
evidence, the Court has no basis to substitute its judgment regarding the damage award.
Dixon v. City of Coeur d’Alene, No. 2:10–cv–00078–LMB, 2012 WL 2923149 *9 (D.
Idaho July 18, 2012).
ORDER
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1) Defendants’ Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, for
Remittitur, or In the Alternative, New Trial (Dkt. 388) is DENIED.
January 30, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 33
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