Alamar Ranch, LLC v. County of Boise

Filing 176

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER on Defendant's Motions in Limine, granting in part and denying in part and reserving in part 113 Motion in Limine. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by cjm)

Alamar Ranch, LLC v. County of Boise

Doc. 176

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT F O R THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

A L A M A R RANCH, LLC, an Idaho lim ite d liability company; and YTC, L L C , an Idaho limited liability company, P la in tif f s , v. C O U N T Y OF BOISE, a political s u b d iv is io n of the State of Idaho, D e f e n d a n t.

C a s e No. 1:09-cv-004-BLW M E M O R A N D U M DECISION AND O R D E R ON DEFENDANT'S M O T I O N S IN LIMINE (Dkt. 113)

B e f o re the Court is Defendant's Motions in Limine 1-8 (Dkt. 113). The motion h a s been fully briefed. The Court being familiar with the record and pleadings rules as f o llo w s . A N A L Y S IS B e f o re the Court are Defendant's eight motions in limine. Defendant seeks to e x c lu d e from voir dire, opening statements, and at trial, the following evidence and a rg u m e n t: (1) that Defendant's process for approving Plaintiffs' conditional use permit (C U P ) application was improper; (2) that Defendant violated the Idaho's Open Meeting L a w s ; (3) that Defendant is responsible for the actions of people who opposed Alamar;
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(4) privileged information in or references to materials that the Court previously ordered to be returned to attorney Dennis Charney, who represented opponents of Alamar; (5) em a ils referencing purported comments by Patti Burke; (6) newspaper articles; (7) u n re la te d claims, proceedings, or lawsuits; and (8) Defendant's conduct during litigation. 1. Defendant's Process For Approving Plaintiffs' Application for CUP A c c o rd in g to Defendant, any challenge to Boise County's process or procedure in a p p ro v in g Plaintiffs' CUP application is an issue that should be left to state rather than f e d e ra l court. In support, Defendant cites a United States Supreme Court decision in w h ic h Justice Kennedy noted that "elaboration of administrative law . . . is one of the p rim a ry responsibilities of the state judiciary." Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 5 2 1 U.S. 261, 276 (1997). According to Defendant, argument that Defendant used an im p ro p e r process would tend to confuse or mislead the jury here, and should therefore be p re c lu d e d . P la in tif f s respond that Defendant has not identified exactly what improper process o r procedure it seeks to preclude. It appears that Defendants seek to broadly exclude any c h a lle n g e to Defendant's CUP approval process. Without knowing the precise scope or c o n te x t of what Defendant is moving to exclude at trial, the Court is unable to render a f u lly informed decision on the motion, and is thus not inclined to grant such request. As n o te d by the Plaintiffs, evidence that a governing body violated its accepted procedures in ta k in g some action, is probative on the issue of whether the body acted with
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discriminatory animus. Also, as noted by Plaintiffs, the Court in Coeur d'Alene Tribe c o n s id e re d a suit directly challenging state administrative action. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 5 2 1 U.S. at 276. Here, Plantiffs' complaint does not include a claim for relief from im p ro p e r administrative procedures. Rather, Plaintiffs indicate intent to potentially argue th a t improper administrative procedures by Boise County is evidence that it acted in v io la tio n of the FHA. The Court is not persuaded that Defendant is entitled to a blanket exclusion of any e v id e n c e that Defendant failed to follow proper administrative procedures. Defendant's f irs t motion in limine will therefore be denied at this time. Defendant is free, of course, to raise an appropriate objection once the nature of the proffered evidence is clear and the c o u rt has an evidentiary context in which to determine whether the evidence is relevant a n d whether its admission would be unduly prejudicial. 2. V io la tio n Of Idaho's Open Meeting Law D e f e n d a n t moves to exclude any assertions that Defendant violated Idaho's Open M e e tin g law, noting that Idaho law provides a process by which a party may challenge a lle g e d violations of the Open Meeting Act. I.C. § 67-2347(6). Plaintiffs counter that th e y are not seeking relief for violation of the Open Meeting Act; Plaintiffs further assert th a t the statute of limitations for pursuing relief under the Open Meeting Act does not bar e v id e n c e of a violation of the Act to demonstrate violations of another law ­ here, the FH A .
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The Court distinguishes between argument that violation of the Open Meeting Act is evidence of a FHA violation, and argument in support of a claim for relief under the O p e n Meeting Act. Thus, to the extent that Defendant seeks to preclude Plaintiffs from a rg u in g that Defendant violated the Open Meeting Act, because the statute of limitations f o r a claim under that Act has run, the motion is denied. However, as articulated in the C o u rt's Order on Plaintiffs' Motions in Limine, Dkts. 100 and 105, the evidence now b e f o re the Court tends to support that Boise County's executive sessions satisfied Idaho C o d e § 67-2345(1)(f); Plaintiffs have not produced sufficient evidence to the contrary. Plaintiffs suggest that the evidence at trial will also show other violations of the O p e n Meeting Act by the County and its employees. For example, they contend that B o is e County Planning & Zoning (P&Z) Administrator Patti Burke "provided opponents o f Alamar with inside information and offered advice how the opposition of Alamar R a n c h could ensure that the project would not be built." Pl. Opp'n, Dkt. 124 at 7. According to Plaintiffs, the evidence will also show that Boise County Commissioners " c o a c h [ e d ] the opponents on how to get the information into the record" to enable C o m m is s io n e rs to place conditions on Alamar's CUP that would, in turn, render the p ro je c t unprofitable and force Plaintiffs to move the project elsewhere. Id. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that such evidence may be relevant to show that th e Commissioners and other County employees acted with discriminatory intent. However, it is difficult to determine its probative value or potential prejudice without
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some context. Therefore, the Court will defer ruling on this issue until the evidence is o f f e re d during trial. In summary, in the absence of other evidence beyond that already identified, Plaintiffs will be precluded from asserting that Defendant violated the Open Meeting Law b y going into executive sessions. However, the Court will reserve ruling on the a d m is sib ility of other evidence of violations of the Open Meeting Act, until it has the o p p o rtu n ity to consider such evidence in context. 3. E v id e n c e Or Argument That Defendant Is Responsible For Actions Of O p p o n e n ts Of Alamar D e f e n d a n t moves to prohibit Plaintiffs from offering evidence or argument that D e f e n d a n t engaged in wrongful activity "by allowing opponents of Alamar to present te s tim o n y and submit information." Def. Mot., Dkt. 113-1 at 5. Plaintiffs respond that th e y do not intend to assert at trial that Boise County "should have prevented the o p p o n e n ts from speaking their mind." Pl. Opp'n, Dkt. 124 at 8. However, Plaintiffs c o n te n d that, "whether [opponents'] discriminatory animus motivated Boise County's d e c is io n " is highly probative. Id., fn. 4. Thus, according to Plaintiffs, evidence of the n o n -p a rtie s ' opposition is admissible to show discriminatory intent by Defendant. The courts have held that circumstantial, as well as direct, evidence may be offered to prove that a discriminatory reason "more likely than not motivated the challenged d e c is io n ." Budnick v. Town of Carefree, 518 F.3d 1109, 1114 (9th Cir. 2008). Thus,

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Plaintiffs will be precluded from arguing that Defendant improperly permitted opponents f ro m voicing their opposition, but will be allowed to present evidence of the non-parties' a c tio n s in opposing Alamar. Defendant's motion will therefore be granted in part and d e n ie d in part. 4. T h e Charney Privileged Documents T h e parties appear to be in agreement as to this motion by Defendant. Accordingly, the Motion will be granted. 5. E -m a ils Referencing Comments Purportedly Made By Patti Burke D e f e n d a n t moves to preclude Plaintiffs from introducing e-mails that reference c o m m e n ts allegedly made by Patti Burke, Boise County's P&Z Administrator. Plaintiffs a s s e rt, in response, that the motion is premature, because statements are not hearsay w h e re not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted; whether the e-mails will be o f f e re d for this purpose cannot be determined until trial, when the context of the case has f u lly developed. Plaintiffs further argue that statements by Patti Burke are not hearsay b e c a u s e they are statements of a party opponent, under the theory of agency. Plaintiffs ra ise a number of other exceptions to hearsay that they assert apply to at least one p a rtic u la r e-mail. Because Defendant has failed to specifically identify the e-mails that it s e e k s to preclude, Plaintiffs ask that the Court deny Defendant's motion. T h e Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the motion is premature. Without the p a rtic u la r e-mails, the Court is unable to analyze whether any exceptions to hearsay apply.
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The motion is more appropriately raised at trial when the full context of the evidence, as w e ll as the purpose for which the evidence is being offered, will be apparent. Ruling on d e f e n d a n t's motion will therefore be deferred until trial. 6. N e w s p a p e r Articles D e f e n d a n t seeks to exclude any newspaper articles from being admitted at trial, a rg u in g that such evidence is hearsay. Plaintiffs note in response that Defendant fails to id e n tif y what articles it seeks to exclude, and that not every newspaper article would be h e a rs a y, where such article is not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Ultimately, Defendant's relief requested is that, where Plaintiffs "intend to refer to or u tiliz e any newspaper article," that the issue be raised outside the presence of the jury to d e te rm in e whether an exception to hearsay exists. As stated, the Court will grant the m o tio n : Plaintiffs will notify Defendant of their intent to use or refer to any newspaper a rtic le outside of the jury's presence, preferably outside of the scheduled trial day. 7. U n r e la te d Claims, Proceedings, or Lawsuits D e f e n d a n t seeks to exclude, as irrelevant, any evidence or argument of unrelated c la im s , proceedings, or lawsuits against Defendant and its employees. The Court finds th a t Defendant's challenge here goes to the weight, rather than the admissibility of such e v id e n c e . The Court will therefore deny Defendant's motion. The Court will, however, p e rm it Defendant to re-raise the issue at trial, and will grant Defendant's request that P la in tif f s be required to notify Defendant of their intent to admit such evidence so that the
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matter can be considered by the Court outside the presence of the jury. 8. C o n d u c t During Litigation D e f e n d a n t seeks an order precluding Plaintiffs from introducing any evidence of D e f e n d a n t's conduct during litigation. Absent specificity as to the conduct that D e f e n d a n t wishes to preclude, the Court will reserve ruling until the context of its request is more fully developed. ORDER I T IS ORDERED: 1. D e f e n d a n t's Motion in Limine (1) to exclude evidence regarding its CUP p ro c e ss is DENIED. 2. D e f e n d a n t's Motion in Limine (2) to exclude argument that Defendant v io la te d Idaho's Open Meetings Act is GRANTED to the extent that P la in tif f may seek to argue or offer evidence that the County C o m m is sio n e rs improperly conducted business in executive sessions; P la in tif f s will, however, be permitted to request reconsideration if the e v id e n c e at trial supports a contrary conclusion. The motion is R E S E R V E D as to other evidence that the County Commissioners or county e m p lo ye e s violated the Open Meeting Act. 3. D e f e n d a n t's Motion in Limine (3) to exclude evidence or argument that D e f e n d a n t is responsible for actions by opponents of Alamar is GRANTED
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in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiffs are precluded from arguing that D e f e n d a n t improperly permitted opponents of Alamar from voicing their o p p o s itio n , but Plaintiffs will be allowed to present evidence of the nonp a rtie s ' actions in opposing Alamar. 4. D e f e n d a n t's Motion in Limine (4) regarding the Charney privileged d o c u m e n ts is GRANTED. 5. D e f e n d a n t's Motion in Limine (5) regarding e-mails referencing comments p u rp o rte d ly made by Patti Burke is RESERVED until trial, when the c o n te x t of the evidence and Defendant's objection is apparent. 6. D e f e n d a n t's Motion in Limine (6) to exclude newspaper articles is G R A N T E D to the extent that Plaintiffs must notify Defendant of their in te n t to use or refer to any newspaper article outside of the jury's presence; o th e rw is e , the Court's ruling on Defendant's motion is RESERVED until tr ia l. 7. D e f e n d a n t's Motion in Limine (7) to exclude unrelated claims, proceedings, o r lawsuits is GRANTED to the extent that Plaintiffs must notify D e f e n d a n t of their intent to admit such evidence, outside the presence of the ju ry; otherwise, the Motion is DENIED without prejudice. 8. D e f e n d a n t's Motion in Limine (8) regarding conduct during litigation is R E S E R V E D until trial.
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DATED: December 5, 2010

Honorable B. Lynn Winmill Chief U. S. District Judge

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