Goodwin et al v. Beckley et al
Filing
107
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER. IT IS ORDERED Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees 103 is GRANTED. The Court will award fees in the amount of $ 7,922.00. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (st)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
DALE GOODWIN; JOHN & NANCY
LINDBERG, husband and wife; ANN
WALCH; and JOHN DOES 1-15
Case No. 1:09-cv-00594-BLW
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER
Plaintiffs,
v.
WAYNE BECKLEY; PAUL
BECKLEY; and BALD MOUNTAIN,
LP
Defendants.
INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorney Fees. (Dkt. 103). For the
reasons explained below, the Court will grant the motion.
BACKGROUND
In 2006, plaintiffs decided to invest money in California real estate. They lent
several hundred thousand dollars to defendants. Defendants said the loans would be
secured with a second-position deed of trust in real property, but they allegedly failed to
grant that security interest. Instead, they allowed other interests to be recorded ahead of
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1
plaintiffs’. Defendants later defaulted on the loans, and in November 2009, plaintiffs
sued. See Compl., Dkt. 1.
In August 2010, this Court entered a default judgment of nearly $426,000 against
defendants. See Default Judgment, Dkt. 32. The Court awarded plaintiffs approximately
$24,000 in attorneys’ fees and costs associated with obtaining that judgment. See Oct.
12, 2010 Decision, Dkt. 38, Nov. 29, 2010 Decision, Dkt. 42. Plaintiffs now seek an
additional fee award of around $8,000. They incurred these fees in connection with their
ongoing efforts to collect on the judgment. More specifically, plaintiffs incurred these
fees when they attempted to garnish certain funds Beckley received from his employer.
Beckley claimed that these funds were exempt as “Social Security or SSI”” and/or
“Retirement, Pension or Profit Sharing Benefits.” See Claim of Exemption, Dkt. 86, at 1.
The Court denied Beckley’s claimed exemption. See Aug. 29, 2013 Order, Dkt. 97.
ANALYSIS
1.
Entitlement to Attorneys’ Fees
Idaho law governs the award of attorney fees in this diversity action. Interform
Co. v. Mitchell, 575 F.2d 1270, 1280 (9th Cir. 1978) (applying Idaho law). Plaintiffs
request attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3), as well the attorneys’ fees provisions
in the promissory notes defendants signed.
The attorneys’ fee provisions in the promissory notes are not restricted to fees
incurred in obtaining judgment on the note. Rather, these provisions broadly state:
“If any default is made hereunder . . . Maker further promises to pay all
costs of collection when incurred, including but not limited to
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2
reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses incurred by Holder
hereof in connection with security the payment [sic] of this Note, or any
such default in any action or other proceeding brought to enforce any of
the provisions of this Note.
Sept. 15, 2006 Note, Ex. B to Compl., Dkt. 1 at 13, § 7; see also Exs. C-E (containing
identical provisions).
“Contractual provisions for payment of attorney fees are enforceable in Idaho.”
Shurtliff v. N.W. Pools, Inc., 815 P.2d 461, 466 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991). Thus, as the
defaulting party on the notes, defendants are bound to pay attorneys’ fees plaintiffs have
incurred in their ongoing collection efforts.
Additionally, this Court previously held that plaintiffs were entitled to attorneys’
fees as prevailing parties on a commercial transaction. See Oct. 12, 2010 Order, Dkt. 38,
at 2 (“In this case, the applicable law is Idaho Code § 12-120, which allows a prevailing
party to recover fees pursuant to a commercial contract.”). If a party is entitled to recover
fees as a prevailing party on a commercial transaction under Idaho Code § 12-120(3),
then “such party shall also be entitled to reasonable postjudgment attorney’s fees and
costs incurred in attempting to collect on the judgment.” Idaho Code § 12-120(5).
Based on these authorities, plaintiffs are entitled to recover their attorneys’ fees in
connection with their most recent collection efforts.
Beckley does not discuss Idaho statutory law on attorneys’ fees or the attorney’s
fees provisions in the promissory notes. Instead, he generally argues that the Court
should decline to award attorneys’ fees because even though his most recent claimed
exemption was not successful, it still presented a “viable question of law that needed to
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3
be decided.” Response, Dkt. 104, at 2. The Court is not persuaded. Most significantly,
Beckley has not only failed to discuss applicable authority, he has not pointed to any
authority that might support his position. Accordingly, based on the language in the
notes, as well as Idaho Code § 12-120(3) and (5), plaintiffs are entitled to a fee award.
2.
Reasonableness of the Claimed Fees
Having determined that plaintiffs are entitled to collect attorneys’ fees, the next
question is whether the fees and costs identified in counsel’s affidavit are reasonable.
“The starting point for determining a reasonable fee is the ‘lodestar’ figure, which is the
number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Gates v.
Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir.1992). In determining a reasonable hourly
rate, the Court considers the “experience, skill and reputation of the attorney requesting
fees,” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 924 (9th Cir.1996), as well as “the prevailing
market rates in the relevant community,” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984).
Once the lodestar amount is determined, the Court “then assesses whether it is
necessary to adjust the presumptively reasonable lodestar figure on the basis of the Kerr 1
factors that are not already subsumed in the initial lodestar calculation.” Morales v. City
1
The Kerr factors are: (1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved, (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4) the preclusion of other
employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is
fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, (8) the amount
involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) the
“undesirability” of the case, (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, and
(12) awards in similar cases.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4
of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363–64 (9th Cir.1996) (footnote omitted). “There is a strong
presumption that the lodestar figure represents a reasonable fee. Only in rare instances
should the lodestar figure be adjusted on the basis of other considerations.” Id. at 363 n.
8. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Here, Plaintiffs seek $7,992 in fees. The hourly rates charged are as follows:
Office
Morrow & Fischer
Morrow & Fischer
Morrow & Fischer
Morrow & Fischer
Morrow & Fischer
Ringert Law Chartered
Person
Julie Fischer
Shelli Stewart
Laura Terrazas
Debbie Howard
Christine Pierce
Laura Burri
Title
Attorney
Attorney
Paralegal
Legal Asst.
Paralegal
Attorney
Rate/Hour
$225.00
$200.00
$115.00
$100.00
$115.00
$190.00
Counsel says these rates are comparable to the reasonable hourly rate for attorneys
of similar experience and similar work in this area, and defendants do not challenge that
assertion. Additionally, the Court already determined that these rates were reasonable in
awarding fees in this case. See Oct. 12, 2010 Order, Dkt. 38, at 3. The Court therefore
finds that the rates charged for the attorneys and paralegals noted above are reasonable.
The Court has also determined that the number of hours billed to plaintiffs’ most recent
collection efforts is reasonable. The Court has determined, however, that the work
performed by Debbie Howard as a legal assistant, .7 hours, should not be billed
separately, but rather is secretarial in nature and should be absorbed in the attorneys’ fees.
See Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 288, n. 10 (1989). This will reduce the total fees
awarded by $70.00.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 5
Therefore, the Plaintiffs are entitled to $6,254.50 in attorneys’ fees and 1,667.50 in
paralegal fees for a total of $7,922.00. The Court finds this amount to be consistent with
the reasonable rates in a case of this nature and in line with the rates prevailing in the
community.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED:
1.
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorney Fees (Dkt. 103) is GRANTED. The Court
will award fees in the amount of $ 7,922.00.
DATED: March 26, 2014
_________________________
B. Lynn Winmill
Chief Judge
United States District Court
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