Naum v. Idaho Department of Health and Welfare et al

Filing 55

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER denying 50 Motion to Dismiss; denying 51 Motion to Join B. Lynn Winmill as a Third Party Defendant; denying 52 Motion to Disqualify Judge. The Clerk of Court shall forward the 16 Amended Complaint, the 24 Secon d Review Order, this Order, and a Waiver of Service of Summons to counsel for Defendant Dana McGrew, Attorney Michael Edward Kelly, who has appeared in this matter. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by cjm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

JAMES NAUM,
Case No. 1:09-CV-633-BLW
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

v.
DANA McGREW; EDWARD
LOCKWOOD; DOE Is.
Defendants.

INTRODUCTION
Before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss Responses (Dkt. 50), to Motion
to Join B. Lynn Winmill as a Third Party Defendant (Dkt. 51), and Motion to Disqualify
Judge B. Lynn Winmill (Dkt. 52). For the following reasons, the Court will deny the
motions.
DISCUSSION
1.

Motion to Dismiss Responses
Plaintiff asks the Court to dismiss Defendants’ Answers under Rule 12(a)(1)(A).

Under that rule, a defendant must serve an answer within 21 days of being served, or
within 60 days after a request for waiver was sent, if the defendant has timely waived
service. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A). No answers have yet been filed by either Defendant

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1

here.
An order that Defendant Dana McGrew would be allowed to waive service was
entered November 4, 2010. Order, Dkt. 25. The Clerk of Court mailed the notice,
complaint, and waiver of service forms to the Attorney General’s Office accordingly.
Certificate of Clerk, Dkt. 26. Although counsel appeared on behalf of Ms. McGrew, no
waiver of service has been filed. Notice, Dkt. 37. Absent waiver, or service of summons,
no deadline for Ms. McGrew’s responses is triggered. Thus, the Court will direct the
Clerk of Court to send copies of the notice, complaint, and waivers of service to counsel
for Ms. McGrew. Counsel will have 10 days after receipt of the documents to return the
waiver, or Defendant may be required to incur costs of service under Rule 4(d)(2)
As to Defendant Edward Lockwood, the Clerk of Court sent a request for waiver
on March 3, 2011. Certificate of Clerk, Dkt. 42. Mr. Lockwood’s waiver was timely
filed on March 8, 2011. Waiver, Dkt. 44. Under Rule 12(a)(1)(A)(ii), the deadline for
Mr. Lockwood’s answer is May2, 2011.
Neither Defendant currently named and remaining in this action has missed the
deadline to file a response. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss or strike answers will be
denied.
2.

Motions to Name Judge as Third Party Defendant
Plaintiff cites Rule 14(a)(3) and (b) in support of his motion, which provides that

the plaintiff “may assert against the third party defendant any claim arising out of the
transaction or OCCURRENCE that is the subject [m]atter of [t]he plaintiff’s claim.”
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2

Motion, Dkt. 51 (emphasis by Plaintiff). The subject matter of this action is the denial of
Plaintiff’s application for safety-net benefits by the regional Department of Health and
Human Services and Idaho Department of Health and Welfare. Plaintiff here has failed to
raise any plausible claim against the undersigned judge that arises out of the subject
matter of his underlying claim.
Under the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity, a judge is not liable for monetary
damages for acts performed in the exercise of his judicial functions. Stump v. Sparkman,
435 U.S. 349 (1978). This is based on the rationale that judges should be free to engage
in “principled and fearless decision-making.” Meek v. Cy. of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962,
965 (9th Cir. 1999)(citing Pierson v. Ray., 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)). To determine
whether an act is judicial in nature so that immunity would apply, a court looks to “the
nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to
the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial
capacity.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 362.
Here, Plaintiff asserts that the undersigned judge is “acting as an advocate for the
Defendants herein, and has joined their conspiracy in so doing.” Motion, Dkt. 51.
Plaintiff further contends that this judge took the case away from a previously assigned
judge and has demonstrated bias in favor of Defendants for political reasons. Motion,
Dkt. 52. It appears that the actions complained of by Plaintiff are the undersigned’s
decisions in this matter, which are squarely within the scope of absolute judicial
immunity. Plaintiff’s motion to join this judge will therefore be denied.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3

3.

Motion to Disqualify Judge
A judge should disqualify himself when “his impartiality might reasonably be

questioned,” or “where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 455(a). The test for recusal in the Ninth Circuit is “whether a reasonable person with
knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge's impartiality might reasonably
be questioned.” Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. of Am., 902 F.2d 703, 714 (9th
Cir. 1990) (internal citation omitted). “The alleged prejudice must result from an
extrajudicial source; a judge’s prior adverse ruling is not sufficient cause for recusal.”
U.S. v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Mayes v. Leipziger, 729 F.2d
605, 607 (9th Cir. 1984)). A challenge to the Court’s impartiality based upon its rulings
is “the basis for appeal, not recusal.” In re Focus Media, Inc., 378 F.3d 916, 930 (9th Cir.
2004).
Plaintiff here has made no showing of prejudice due to an extrajudicial source, nor
that the “court’s substantive rulings were products of deep-seated favoritism or
antagonism that made fair judgment impossible.” Focus Media, 378 F.3d at 930 (internal
citation and punctuation omitted). Despite Plaintiff’s obvious disagreement with the
Court’s decisions thus far in this case, such disagreement does not form a legitimate basis
for disqualification of this judge. Plaintiff makes conclusory allegations of bias “for
political reasons,” Motion (Dkt. 52), but cites no factual allegations to support his claims.
Plaintiff having failed to establish any reasonable basis to question the undersigned’s
impartiality, the motion to disqualify will be denied.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4

ORDER
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss or Strike Responses (Dkt. 50) is DENIED.

2.

The Clerk of Court shall forward copies of the Amended Complaint (Dkt.
16), the Court’s Second Review Order (Dkt. 24), this Order, and a Waiver
of Service of Summons to counsel for Defendant Dana McGrew, Attorney
Michael Edward Kelly, who has appeared in this matter (Dkt. 37).

3.

Defendant Dana McGrew shall within 10 days after receipt of documents
named in paragraph 2 above, file a Waiver of Service, or may incur costs of
service under Rule 4(d)(2).

4.

Plaintiff’s Motion (Dkt. 51) to Join B. Lynn Winmill as a Third Party
Defendant is DENIED.

5.

Plaintiff’s Motion (Dkt. 52) to Disqualify Judge B. Lynn Winmill is
DENIED.

DATED: April 14, 2011

Honorable B. Lynn Winmill
Chief U. S. District Judge

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 5