Garcia v. PSI Environmental Systems, et al
Filing
116
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 78 Motion in Limine; granting in part and denying in part 82 Motion in Limine. Signed by Judge Edward J. Lodge. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (dks)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
JUAN GARCIA,
Case No. 1:10-cv-00055-EJL
Plaintiff,
v.
PSI ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS, a
California Corporation, and WASTE
CONNECTIONS, INC., a California
Corporation,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER ON MOTIONS IN LIMINE
Defendant.
INTRODUCTION
The Court has before it plaintiff’s and defendants’ motions in limine (Dkt. 78, 82).
The facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record, and oral
argument will not aid the decision-making process. The Court will therefore rule without
a hearing.
The parties should be aware, however, that in limine rulings are provisional. The
Court might change its mind in the context of the trial, and will therefore entertain
objections to individual proffers of evidence during trial, even if those proffers fall within
the scope of this order. However, the parties are directed to raise these issues in advance,
outside the presence of the jury.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER -
LEGAL STANDARD
Trial judges are afforded wide discretion in determining whether evidence is
relevant. United States v. Alvarez, 358 F.3d 1194, 1205 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing United
States v. Long, 706 F.2d 1044, 1054 (9th Cir. 1983)). Because “[a]n in limine order
precluding the admission of evidence or testimony is an evidentiary ruling,...a district
court has discretion in ruling on a motion in limine.” United States v. Ravel, 930 F.2d
721, 726 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).
As already noted, in limine rulings “are not binding on the trial judge [who] may
always change his mind during the course of a trial.” Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S.
753, 758 n.3 (2000); accord Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 (1984). Further, just
because the Court denies a motion seeking to exclude evidence “does not necessarily
mean that all evidence contemplated by the motion will be admitted to trial. Denial
merely means that without the context of trial, the court is unable to determine whether
the evidence in question should be excluded.” Indiana Ins. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 326
F. Supp. 2d 844, 846 (N.D. Ohio 2004).
PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS IN LIMINE
1.
The Probable-Cause Determination
In his first motion in limine, plaintiff seeks an order allowing him to introduce the
Idaho Human Rights Commission’s probable-cause determination. See May 2009 Letter
and Summary of Investigation (“Probable-Cause Determination”), Ex. A to Plaintiff’s
Motion, Dkt. 79-1.
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In Plummer v. Western International Hotels Co., 656 F.2d 502, 504 (9th Cir.
1981), the Ninth Circuit held that a plaintiff has a “right to introduce an EEOC probable
cause determination in a Title VII lawsuit, regardless of what other claims are asserted, or
whether the case is tried before a judge or jury.” Id. at 505. The Ninth Circuit later
indicated “the Plummer ruling is not restricted solely to EEOC findings of probable cause
but extends to similar administrative determinations, . . . .” Heyne v. Caruso, 69 F.3d
1475, 1483 (9th Cir. 1995).
Notwithstanding Plummer, defendants argue that the Commision’s probable-cause
determination should be excluded because it (1) bears “little to no relevance to Plaintiff’s
only [viable] promotion claim”; (2) is “rife with inaccuracies and is incomplete, internally
inconsistent, and contradicted by sworn testimony – in other words it is untrustworthy”;
and (3) is unduly prejudicial under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. The Court is not
persuaded by these arguments.
a) Relevance
As for the first argument – relevance – defendants note that although Garcia was
passed over for promotion three times (in June 2006, in January 2007, and again in May
2007), he has just one actionable promotion-denial claim, related to the May 2007 denial.
This Court previously ruled that the claims related to the first two promotions are timebarred.
The probable-cause determination, however, discusses all three promotions.
Moreover, defendants interpret the determination as implicitly finding that racial bias did
not motivate the only actionable promotion denial (the May 2007 denial) because (1) the
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report determined that defendants were not liable “concerning the issue of wages” after
May 2007, and (2) elsewhere the report notes that the person who was promoted instead
of Garcia in May 2007 had “both mechanical and supervisory experience” – unlike the
persons who were previously promoted instead of Garcia. Probable-Cause
Determination, at 6, 7. Defendants thus argue that the entire report is irrelevant.
The Court disagrees. First, as defendants seem to concede, the report could be
read as concluding that Mr. Allen discriminated against Garcia with respect to all three
promotion denials – not just the last one. In fact, the report includes a blanket statement
that “national origin was a motivating factor in Mr. Allen’s decision . . . not to promote
Complainant . . . .” Dkt. 79-1, at 7. Second, looking at the issue more broadly, evidence
of the time-barred promotion denials is admissible as background evidence to support the
timely promotion claim.1 See, e.g., Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101,
113 (2006).
b) Trustworthiness
Defendants next contend that the report is not trustworthy and should therefore be
excluded under Rule 803(6) and/or 803(8)(c).
In the Ninth Circuit, the trial court begins with a presumption that the disputed
report is trustworthy. See Montiel v. City of L.A., 2 F.3d 335, 341 (9th Cir.1993); Johnson
v. City of Pleasanton, 982 F.2d 350, 352 (9th Cir.1992). The party opposing introduction
of the evidence must present enough negative factors to persuade the court that the report
This issue is discussed more thoroughly below, in the Court’s ruling on plaintiff’s
Motion in Limine No. 2
1
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should not be admitted. Johnson, 982 F.2d at 352. This is because the court assumes that
public officials perform their duties properly without motive or interest other than to
submit accurate and fair reports. Id. at 352-53. Further, “[t]he role of the court in
determining trustworthiness is not to assess the report’s credibility, but to evaluate
whether the report was compiled or prepared in a way that indicates its reliability.”
Hedgepeth v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 73 F.3d 386 (9th Cir. 1986) (unpublished
disposition) (citing Moss v. Ole S. Real Estate, Inc., 933 F.2d 1300, 1305-08 (5th
Cir.1991)).
The Court is satisfied that the probable-cause determination meets the level of
trustworthiness required. Significantly, the only case authority defendants cite in support
of their trustworthiness argument – Hedgepeth v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, 73 F.3d
386, 1996 WL 29252, at *2 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table disposition) – is easily
distinguishable. In that case, the Ninth Circuit concluded that an administrative finding
issued by the Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries’ Civil Rights Division (BOLI) was
untrustworthy “on its face” because
[t]he report admits the investigator had access to almost no relevant
information from Kaiser because Kaiser “has not permitted an opportunity for
[its nondiscriminatory] reasons to be tested for pretext.” The report simply
concludes “[i]n the absence of satisfactory evidence to the contrary, it appears
that Complainant's age and opposition to unlawful practices were key factors in
Respondent’s decision to terminate Complainant.” Since the author concedes
he was unable to fully investigate the claim, the BOLI determination is
inadmissible under FRE 803(8)(c).
Id. (emphasis added).
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER -
There are no such pervasive problems with the report at issue here. In one
instance, the report indicates that defendant PSI “provided limited wage data . . . .”
Probable-Cause Determination¸at 6 (emphasis added); see also Opp., Dkt. 91, at 4
(indicating that the report only considered four other employees’ salary, when there were
actually 11 other employees). But having access to “limited” wage data is a far cry from
having “almost no relevant information.”
Further, although defendants say the report is “rife” with inaccuracies, many of the
listed inaccuracies are minor. See, e.g., Opp., Dkt. 91, at 7 (observing that the report
wrongly notes, at one point that the plaintiff was hired on October 12, 2005, but
elsewhere correctly notes that plaintiff was hired on November 4, 2005). And while other
inaccuracies are more significant, inaccuracies do not pervade the report, nor are they so
serious as to convince the Court that the report is not trustworthy.
Defendants also point out that: (1) some witnesses said one thing to the
investigator, and then contradicted themselves in their depositions; and (2) other evidence
will undermine the report. But the fact that deponents may have changed their story after
talking to the investigator, or that other witnesses might have contradictory information,
does not mean the report itself was prepared in such a way to indicate it is not
trustworthy.
In sum, defendants’ attacks on the determination go more to the weight the jury
should give to the determination than to its trustworthiness. And as Plummer observed:
The defendant, of course, is free to present evidence refuting the
findings of the EEOC and may point out deficiencies in the EEOC
determination on remand [back to the trial court.] Such evidence
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would go to the weight to be given by the trier of fact to the EEOC
determination.
656 F.3d at 505 n.9.
c)
Rule 403(b)
Finally, the Court overrules defendants’ Rule 403 objection. The Ninth Circuit has
“mandate[d]” that probable-cause determinations by the EEOC and other similar
determinations be admitted into evidence. See Heyne, 69 F.3d at 1483 (referring to “our
mandate regarding the admissibility of administrative determinations outlined in
Plummer”). In issuing that mandate, Plummer conclusively found that the prejudicial
effect of the probable-cause determination far outweighed the prejudicial effect it may
have on a jury. 656 F.3d at 504-05; see also Bradshaw v. Zoological Society, 569 F.2d
1066, 1069 (9th Cir.1978). Plummer thus controls. Moreover, even in the absence of
Plummer, the Court is not persuaded that the prejudicial effect of the probable-cause
determination outweighs its probative value.
2.
The June 2006 and January 2007 Promotion Denials
Garcia’s second motion in limine seeks an order allowing him to introduce
evidence regarding the two time-barred promotion denials.
The Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have held that time-barred conduct may
be offered as evidence of discriminatory intent to support timely claims. See Nat’l R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2006); United Airlines Inc. v. Evans, 431
U.S. 533, 558 (1977); Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002) (time-barred
acts of employment discrimination “relevant as background and may be considered by the
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER -
trier of fact in assessing the defendant’s liability . . . .”).
Garcia’s failure to get promoted in June 2006 and January 2007 involve the same
decision-maker who passed over Garcia for promotion in May 2007. Further, the two
earlier denials occurred within a year of the later, actionable denial. The Court will
therefore allow plaintiff to introduce evidence relating to the earlier promotions as
background evidence relevant to his timely promotion-denial claim.2 Cf. Morgan, 536
U.S. at 113 (“relevant background evidence, such as statements by a decisionmaker or
earlier decisions typifying the retaliation involved, may be considered to assess liability
on the timely alleged action”). The Court has determined that any prejudicial effect of
this evidence is outweighed by its probative value. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. Nevertheless,
to ensure that the jury is not confused as to which claims are actionable in this case, the
Court will read, when necessary, an appropriate limiting instruction.
Finally, the Court rejects defendants’ argument that this evidence should be barred
under Rule 404(b) argument. Rule 404(b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove
the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, . . . intent, . . . .
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2) (emphasis added). As the italicized portion demonstrates, Rule
404(b) actually supports considering the time-barred evidence for purposes of
establishing discriminatory intent. See, e.g. Oest v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 240
Given this ruling, the Court need not address plaintiffs’ argument that this evidence is
independently admissible to support his disparate-treatment claim.
2
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER -
F.3d 605, 614 n.4 (7th Cir. 2001); Pleasants v. Albaugh, 258 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C.
2003).
3.
Single Employer
Plaintiff’s third motion in limine seeks to introduce evidence showing that
defendants PSI and WCI are a “single employer.” Here, plaintiffs refer to the Ninth
Circuit’s four-part single-employer test, which includes these factors: “(1) interrelated
operations, (2) common management, (3) centralized control of labor relations, and (4)
common ownership or financial control.” Morgan v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 884 F.2d 1211,
1213 (9th Cir. 1989).
Defendants’ opposition is not helpful. They concede that “plaintiff can introduce
evidence in an attempt to establish defendants’ liability,” Opp. at 14, but then go on to
argue that the single-employer standard is irrelevant. What they do not do – at least in
their opposition to the motion in limine – is explain what standard applies, and what
evidence is relevant to that standard. In their trial brief, however defendants assert that
plaintiff must satisfy the joint employer test, and they articulate four relevant factors:
“whether the alleged joint employer (1) supervised the employees; (2) had the power to
hire and fire; (3) had the power to discipline; and (4) supervised the employees’
worksite.” Defendants’ Trial Memo., Dkt. 92, at 7 (citing Buttars v. Creekside Home
Health, Inc., No. 07-0204-E-BLW, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75700, at *4 (D. Idaho Sept.
25, 2008)).
In absence of a more thorough explanation from defendants, it appears that the
evidence plaintiff references in his motion is admissible to establish both defendants’
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER -
liability, and the Court will permit such evidence at trial. However, plaintiff’s counsel is
instructed to refrain from using the term “single employer” at trial.
4.
Employment Records
Lastly, plaintiff asks the Court to exclude his employment records related to other
employers, as well as employment records for Tim Bagley and Biff Lee. Plaintiff does
not refer to any specific records; he seeks a blanket exclusionary order. Plaintiff argues
that these types of records are “irrelevant, will waste time, . . . are potentially prejudicial
[and] . . . are inadmissible character evidence . . . .” Mot., at 9. Plaintiff also asserts that
some of the subpoenas used to get these documents were untimely. The Court will
address the timeliness argument first, and then turn to the substantive arguments.
a) Timeliness
The discovery cutoff in this case was March 18, 2011. In late fall 2010,
defendants subpoenaed employment records from several of plaintiff’s former and
subsequent employers. Around the same time, defendants also subpoenaed employment
records from other PSI employees who are friendly to plaintiff. See Ex. H to Plaintiff’s
Motion in Limine.
A few subpoenas came down to the wire; they were issued on March 17, 2011 –
one day before the discovery cutoff – and called for productions in April 2011.
Defendants say they did not serve at least one of these subpoenas until so late because
they did not know about that particular employer until a March 12, 2011 deposition.
Significantly, plaintiff did not promptly complain about these subpoenas or move to
quash them. Instead, he waited until the eve of trial to raise the issue. Under these
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER -
circumstances, the Court will not exclude employment records due to issues surrounding
the timeliness of the subpoenas.3
b) Garcia’s Employment Records
Similarly, the Court will not exclude the employment records (with one specific
exception, discussed below) based on plaintiff’s substantive arguments.
Dealing first with plaintiff’s own records from former employers, the Court finds
these records to be relevant to this dispute, to the extent they bear on Garcia’s mechanic
or supervisory experience (or lack thereof). Specifically, they are relevant to whether
Garcia was qualified for the promotions he did not receive. Garcia asserts he was
qualified for those promotions. Defendants are entitled to refute that assertion. The
Court will therefore deny Garcia’s request for a blanket order excluding all his
employment records.
Garcia argues that some of these records should be excluded as inadmissible
character evidence under Rule 608. Apparently, Garcia did not list all of his former
employers in the appropriate section of his PSI employment application. He argues that
defendants are improperly seeking to introduce some of the employment records to show
that he is untruthful. See Fed. R. Evid. 608. Defendants, however, correctly point out
that the documents are admissible for another purpose. Specifically, if plaintiff failed to
list mechanic jobs on his PSI application – and he was fired from those jobs – that
Likewise, the Court is not persuaded to exclude records from Aslett Electric, Inc. (one
of Garcia’s former employers) on the technical grounds plaintiff asserts. The Court will not
engage in a detailed discussion here, however, because it has determined that the Aslett records
are irrelevant. If, however, the Court changes its mind on relevance, suffice it to say that
plaintiff’s technical arguments regarding the Aslett documents are not convincing.
3
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evidence speaks to his qualifications and, thus, may refute plaintiff’s contention that he
was discriminated against. The Court will therefore deny plaintiff’s motion to the extent
it seeks to broadly exclude all employment records.
The Court will, however, exclude records regarding plaintiff’s employment with
Aslett Electric, Inc. (These are the only employment records plaintiff specifically
discussed in his motion.) When Garcia applied for a job with PSI, he did not list Aslett as
a former employer, possibly because he only worked for that company for a couple
months, total, and he was ultimately fired from Aslett. See Employment App., Ex. K to
Opp., Dkt 91-12, at 3.
The Aslett records do not seem relevant to this lawsuit. First, it is unclear what
Garcia actually did for Aslett. The job descriptions are cryptic, describing him first as a
“laborer” and then as an “operator.” He was fired from the “operator” job, and another
cryptic explanation is given for that: “safety hazard.” If Garcia was a mechanic for
Aslett, then the November 2005 firing may be relevant to refute his contention that he
was a qualified mechanic. Otherwise, the records are irrelevant.
Defendants do not explain what Garcia did at Aslett, but they contend that the
Aslett records are relevant because Garcia earned $13 per hour at that company, which
was the exact amount he received when he started working for defendants. This
argument is flawed, however, because defendants presumably did not even know about
Garcia’s employment with Aslett when they decided his starting pay rate.
In sum, the Court will grant plaintiff’s motion to exclude the Aslett records
because they are not relevant. Otherwise, the Court denies plaintiff’s motion to exclude
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER -
employment records.
c) Bagley’s Employment Records
The Court will also deny plaintiff’s motion as it relates to Tim Bagley’s
employment records.4 Bagley testified in his deposition that he did not feel qualified for
the promotion he received instead of Garcia, yet after he left defendants’ employ, he sent
a letter to another prospective employer. Many letters like this contain some degree of
puffery and, apparently, Bagley’s was no exception. He expounded upon his
qualifications. Defendants say this will undermine the plaintiffs’ argument that Garcia
should have received the promotion that went to Bagley. The Court finds that this
evidence is relevant and will therefore allow it.
DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS IN LIMINE
1.
Evidence Relating to Defendants’ Hiring and Compensation Decisions After
Plaintiff’s December 2007 Resignation
In their first motion in limine, defendants ask the Court to exclude evidence
regarding pay and hiring decisions after Garcia’s December 2007 resignation under
Federal Rule of Evidence 402. They also seek to exclude pay and hiring decisions made
by David Grantham. The Court will deny this motion.
As noted, Garcia resigned in December 2007. Up until November 2007, Don
Allen decided what pay Garcia would receive, as well as whether he would be promoted,
with Vice President Eric Merrill having “some input” on those decisions. Allen,
Defendants focused mainly on their intent to introduce Tim Bagley’s employment
records. The Court will therefore restrict this ruling to Bagley at this point, although presumably
the order related to Bagley will provide the litigants with some general guidance on the question
of other employees.
4
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER -
however, quit in November 2007 (the month before Garcia quit) and Merrill moved out of
his role as VP in October 2007. The upshot was that as of around November 2007, David
Grantham decided which mechanics would be hired and what those mechanics would be
paid. Ed McCartney worked with Grantham on these decisions.
Defendants first argue that because Grantham did not make any decisions
regarding plaintiff, his decisions are entirely irrelevant. The Court rejects this argument
because Garcia alleges that in November 2007, Grantham rejected his and McCartney’s
request that Garcia’s pay be increased to the planned rate for new hires.
Next, defendants argue that any decisions after plaintiff resigned are irrelevant.
Here, defendants argue that because Plaintiff cannot seek wages for the post-December
2007 period, pay and hiring decisions post-December 2007 are irrelevant. The Court
rejects this argument as well. Even assuming plaintiff is barred from seeking postDecember 2007 wages, this does not convince the Court that pay and hiring decisions
after that date are irrelevant to plaintiff’s claims that he was paid too little. To give an
obvious example – and this is what plaintiff says happened – if defendants hired
individuals who were essentially equal to plaintiff shortly after he left, but paid them
significantly more, this might tend to prove that plaintiff was in fact discriminated
against.
The Court is not persuaded that this evidence would be “extensive and complex.”
For example, defendants point out that plaintiff wants to introduce evidence of “no less
than four separate mechanic hires in 2008” and then have the jury compare those resumes
with his own. All things are relative, but that does not seem to be a particularly
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER -
“extensive or complex” evidentiary task. The Court will deny defendants’ motion to
exclude this evidence under Rule 403.
2.
Evidence of Emotional Distress
In their second motion in limine, defendants seek to exclude emotional-distress
evidence. Specifically, Garcia alleges he suffered emotional distress after he was passed
over for promotion in May 2007. Defendants argue that this evidence should be excluded
because emotional distress damages are not expressly permitted under the Idaho Human
Rights Act. See Idaho Code § 67-5908 (setting forth a non-exhaustive list of available
remedies). The Court will deny this motion.
The remedies provision of the Idaho Human Rights statute does not limit the type
of remedies available to plaintiffs. See Idaho Code § 67-5908. Rather, before listing
specific remedies, it states that “[s]uch remedies may include, but are not limited to: . . . .”
various listed remedies.5 Id. §67-5908(3). Further, the express purpose of the Idaho
5
In full, Idaho Code § 67-5908(3) states:
In a civil action filed by the commission or filed directly by the person alleging unlawful
discrimination, if the court finds that unlawful discrimination has occurred, its judgment
shall specify an appropriate remedy or remedies therefor. Such remedies may include,
but are not limited to:
(a) An order to cease and desist from the unlawful practice specified in the order;
(b) An order to employ, reinstate, promote or grant other employment benefits to a
victim of unlawful employment discrimination;
(c) An order for actual damages including lost wages and benefits, provided that such
back pay liability shall not accrue from a date more than two (2) years prior to the
filing of the complaint with the commission or the district court, whichever occurs
first;
(d) An order to accept or reinstate such a person in a union;
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Human Rights Act is to execute the policies embodied in the federal Civil Rights Act of
1964, which enacted Title VII. See Idaho Code § 67-5901. As originally enacted, Title
VII did not allow recovery of compensatory damages, but in 1991 Congress amended
Title VII by passing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which specifically allows plaintiffs to
recovery compensatory damages.
Generally speaking, the Idaho Supreme Court has broadly interpreted the remedies
provision of the Idaho Human Rights Act. For example, in O’Dell v. Basabe, 810 P.2d
1082, 1097 (Idaho 1991), the court held that front pay is an admissible element of
damages under the Act, although the Act does not expressly include the term “front pay.”
The court reasoned that “actual damages” – which are a specifically listed remedy – are
“commonly understood as those actual losses caused by the conduct at issue,” which
included front pay. Id.
And, more to the point here, in Paterson v. Idaho, 915 P.2d 724, 733 (Idaho 1996),
the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed emotional distress damages under the Idaho Human
Rights Act. The court rejected defendants’ arguments that such damages were improper
because the trial court had dismissed plaintiff’s separate claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The Court reasoned that while “Paterson’s claim may not have risen
to the level necessary to meet the legal elements required for an intentional infliction of
emotional distress cause of action,” that fact “does not block her recovery for the
(e) An order for punitive damages, not to exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000) for each
willful violation of this chapter.
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embarrassment and humiliation she suffered as a result of her work environment.” Id. at
733.
Defendants correctly point out that in Paterson, (1) the parties assumed
compensatory damages were available and, (2) the defendants did not challenge an
instruction that “directed the jury, upon a finding of liability, to award Paterson
compensatory damages for ‘mental pain and suffering, including mortification,
humiliation, and embarrassment resulting from the hostile working environment.’” Id.
Nonetheless, this Court finds Paterson persuasive for the proposition that emotional
distress damages are recoverable under the Idaho Human Rights Act.
That would be the end of the matter, but for the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in
Stout v. Key Training Corp., 158 P.3d 971 (2007). Stout does not address emotional
distress damages under the Idaho Human Rights Act. But it does find that attorneys’ fees
are not recoverable under the Act because attorneys’ fees – like emotional distress
damages – are not a specifically listed remedy. The court concluded that the Idaho
legislature must not have intended plaintiffs to recover attorneys’ fees because the Human
Rights Act does not include attorneys’ fees, even though the Civil Rights Act did allow
attorneys’ fees at that time. As the court put it,
[T]he federal Civil Rights Act provision allowing for an award of attorney
fees had been enacted long before the Idaho Human Rights Act remedy
provision. Yet, the Idaho legislature chose not to include attorney fees in its
remedy provision.
Id. at 973-74 (internal footnote omitted)
By analogy, the Idaho legislature did not amend the Act to include compensatory
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER -
damages after Congress so amended Title VII. Defendants thus conclude that the
legislature must not intend for plaintiffs to recover emotional distress damages under the
act.
This argument is unavailing. First, Stout does not directly control here as it does
not address emotional distress damages. Second, the Court finds it significant that Stout
focused on attorneys’ fees. Attorneys’ fees are not a component of “actual damages”
suffered by a plaintiff due to the underlying event; they are a cost of enforcing a legal
right. Here, Garcia is not seeking to recover the cost of enforcing the act; he is seeking
“actual damages,” – which are permitted under the Act. See Idaho Code §67-5908(3).
In sum, the Court concludes that Garcia may seek emotional distress damages.
Accord Green v. Bannock Reg’l Med. Ctr., Case No. 91-0149-LMB (Mar. 15, 1993)
(transcript of Judge Boyle’s oral decision permitting emotional distress damages under
the Act).
3.
The Death of Plaintiff’s Daughter
Plaintiff was prompted to move to Idaho after his daughter tragically died. The
Court will exclude this evidence under Rules 401, 402, and 403. The Court is not
persuaded by plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary. See Opp., at 10-11.
4.
Sexual Harassment
The Court will exclude evidence regarding accusations that Don Allen sexually
harassed employees under Rules 401, 402, and 403. In any event, plaintiff indicated that
he did not intend to question Allen regarding these allegations “unless Defendants open
the door on this line of questioning or it becomes relevant for rebuttal/impeachment
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER -
purposes.” Opp., at 11.
5.
Criminal Backgrounds of other WCI or PSI employees
At one point in this litigation, defendants asserted that plaintiff had no claim
because they would have fired him anyway if they had known of information that later
learned (presumably, that he omitted information on his resume). Defendants no longer
need to assert this theory because of the Court’s summary judgment ruling. But they are
now concerned that plaintiff will seek to show that other employees – who, presumably,
have not been fired – omitted information or otherwise lied on their employment
applications.
The Court agrees that this evidence is not relevant to plaintiff’s remaining
claim and will therefore exclude the evidence under Rules 401, 402, and 403. The
Court is not persuaded to admit evidence regarding the falsity of other employees’
applications simply because plaintiff’s applications may be tested within the
bounds of this lawsuit.
6.
Serrano’s Allegations of Discrimination
The fact that another employee, Phillip Serrano, accused Grantham of
discriminating against him around the same time Grantham allegedly discriminated
against Garcia is admissible for the purpose of allowing Garcia to establish discriminatory
intent. See Fed. R. Evid. 402 & 404(b); Heyne v. Caruso, 69 F.3d 1475 (9th Cir. 1995)
(citing Spulak v. K Mart Corp., 894 F.2d 1150, 1156 (10th Cir. 1990) (“As a general rule,
the testimony of other employees about their treatment by the defendant [employer] is
relevant to the issue of the employer's discriminatory intent.”)).
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CONCLUSION
In constructing this Order, the Court has endeavored to provide to the parties as
much guidance as possible regarding the Court’s understanding of the law that applies to
this case and the evidence as the parties have represented they intend to rely upon it at
trial. In doing so, the Court has entered rulings where it can but for the most part the
determination as to the admissibility of particular items of evidence will have to be made
during the course of the trial when the Court able to view the evidence in the context in
which it is being offered. That being the case, the rulings made in this Order are
preliminary. If the evidence presented at trial differs, the Court reserves the right to rule
on the admissibility of the evidence accordingly at trial. The parties are directed to notify
the Court in advance of any evidentiary issues being raised so that the Court can take up
such matters outside of the presence of the jury and to eliminate any undue delay during
the trial.
ORDER
It is ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine (Dkt. 78) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in
part, as explained herein.
2. Defendants’ Motion in Limine (Dkt. 82) is GRANTED in part and DENIED
in part, as explained herein.
DATED: June 20, 2012
Edward J. Lodge, U.S. District Judge
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER -
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