Pesky et al v. United States of America

Filing 84

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 79 Motion to Dismiss. The United States has twenty days from the date of this Order to file an Amended Counterclaim, if it can do so consistent with this Order. Signed by Judge William B. Shubb. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (krb)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 DISTRICT OF IDAHO 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 ALAN PESKY and WENDY PESKY, 13 Plaintiffs, 14 15 NO. CIV. 1:10-186 WBS MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 16 Defendant. / 17 18 ----oo0oo---- 19 Plaintiffs Alan and Wendy Pesky brought suit against 20 the United States of America seeking a refund for taxes, 21 penalties, and interest assessed against them for the 2003 and 22 2004 tax years. 23 First Amended Complaint, the United States filed counterclaims 24 against the Peskys. 25 States’ counterclaims for civil fraud penalties due to 26 conservation easement fraud and Schedule C expense fraud pursuant 27 to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 28 I. After a stay of the action and the filing of the The Peskys now seek to dismiss the United Factual and Procedural Background 1 1 Alan and Wendy Pesky are husband and wife. The Peskys 2 brought suit against the United States in April 2010 seeking 3 recovery of taxes, penalties, and interest assessed by the United 4 States for the 2003 and 2004 tax years. 5 Peskys then moved for partial summary judgment against the United 6 States, but the motion was denied. 7 September 20, 2011, the United States moved to stay the action 8 under 26 U.S.C. § 7422(e) because the Internal Revenue Service 9 (“I.R.S.”) issued new statutory notices of deficiency against the (Docket No. 1.) (Docket No. 54.) The On 10 Peskys for the 2003 and 2004 tax years. 11 Stay (Docket No. 58).) 12 adjustments to income and expenses as to both Alan and Wendy 13 Pesky, but the notice to Alan Pesky included a civil fraud 14 penalty under 26 U.S.C. § 6663 and additions to tax pursuant to § 15 6662. 16 statutory notice of deficiency against the Peskys for the 2002 17 tax year. 18 (United States’ Mot. to The new notices of deficiency included (Id. at 2, Ex. B.) The I.R.S. also allegedly issued a (Id. at 2; FAC ¶¶ 15-19.) The court stayed the action pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 19 7422(e) on October 13, 2011. 20 request by the parties during a telephonic status conference on 21 September 17, 2012, the court lifted the stay. 22 The Peskys filed their First Amended Complaint on September 24, 23 2012.1 (Docket No. 72.) (Docket No. 61.) After an oral (Docket No. 71.) The United States filed its Answer to 24 25 26 27 28 1 The Peskys appear to have declined to file a petition for redetermination in the Tax Court within the statutory period, thus giving the United States the option of filing a counterclaim. See 26 U.S.C. § 7422(e) (“If the Secretary prior to the hearing of a suit brought by a taxpayer in a district court . . . mails to the taxpayer a notice that a deficiency has been determined in respect of the tax which is the subject matter 2 1 the First Amended Complaint and its Counterclaim against the 2 Peskys on October 9, 2012. 3 (Docket No. 74.) The Counterclaim alleges that, in 1993, Alan Pesky 4 began negotiations to acquire a piece of undeveloped property in 5 Blaine County, Idaho (“Ketchum Property”). 6 14.) 7 Ernest Hemingway’s last home stood (“Hemingway Property”). 8 ¶ 6.) 9 the owners of the Ketchum Property in 1985 (“Hemingway (Countercl. ¶¶ 13- The Ketchum Property is adjacent to another property where (Id. Mary Hemingway is alleged to have granted an easement to 10 Easement”), though the easement was arguably legally defective. 11 (Id.) 12 (“TNC”) allegedly became the owner of the Hemingway Property and 13 disputed the Ketchum Property owners’ right to access the Ketchum 14 Property via the Hemingway Easement. 15 Upon Mrs. Hemingway’s death, The Nature Conservancy (Id. ¶¶ 7-8.) Paul MacCaskill and John Hagestad (“M&H”), the owners 16 of the Ketchum Property at the time, allegedly sued TNC to reform 17 the Hemingway Easement and obtain access to the Ketchum Property. 18 (Id. ¶ 12.) 19 an option to buy the Ketchum property. 20 TNC allegedly responded to the lawsuit by purchasing (Id. ¶ 15.) The United States alleges that Alan Pesky, through his 21 attorney, negotiated and eventually engaged in a transaction with 22 TNC whereby the Peskys would receive the option to buy the 23 Ketchum Property and a perfected easement for a driveway over the 24 25 26 27 28 of taxpayer’s suit, the proceedings in taxpayer’s suit shall be stayed . . . . If the taxpayer files a petition with the Tax Court, the district court . . . shall lose jurisdiction of the taxpayer’s suit to whatever extent jurisdiction is acquired by the Tax Court . . . . If the taxpayer does not file a petition with the Tax Court for a redetermination of the asserted deficiency, the United States may counterclaim in the taxpayer’s suit . . . .”). 3 1 Hemingway Property. 2 alleged to have given TNC payment as well as a conservation 3 easement that limited development of the Ketchum Property to a 4 single home and related buildings. 5 (Id. ¶¶ 15-36.) In exchange, Alan Pesky is (Id.) The United States further alleges that Mr. Pesky 6 attempted to structure the transaction to hide its quid pro quo 7 nature so that he could claim a charitable deduction based on the 8 conservation easement. 9 States alleges that the negotiations were for a single (Id. ¶¶ 27-30.) Specifically, the United 10 transaction, but that the transaction was broken up into separate 11 documents. 12 for $50,000 and the Peskys’ agreement to limit the height of any 13 structures on the property (“Easement Agreement”), TNC allegedly 14 agreed to grant the Peskys the option to purchase the Ketchum 15 Property from M&H and agreed to support Mr. Pesky’s application 16 for driveway approval with the local authorities (“Driveway 17 Easement”). 18 the Pledge Agreement, Mr. Pesky agreed to pay $400,000 to TNC and 19 convey within five years “all right to develop or improve the 20 [Ketchum] Property except for one single-family residence and 21 such accessory buildings as are allowed under applicable zoning.” 22 (Id. ¶ 31, Exs. 21, 25.)2 23 (Id. ¶ 20.) In the Assignment Agreement, in exchange (Id. Exs. 20, 22-24.) In a separate document called Mr. Pesky is alleged to have consulted an accounting 24 firm as early as February 1993 to discuss the effective profit he 25 would make by selling the Ketchum Property once the charitable 26 27 28 2 The Pledge Agreement was allegedly secured by a liquidated damages clause and by Alan Pesky granting deeds of trust to TNC. (Countercl. ¶¶ 31, 35, Exs. 25, 26.) 4 1 deduction for the conservation easement was factored in. (Id. ¶ 2 38.) 3 insistence, the Pledge Agreement was never recorded, (id. ¶ 33), 4 and that Mr. Pesky attempted to keep the Pledge Agreement secret 5 from outside parties, including city officials and even 6 appraisers of the property. 7 Exs. 35-36, 39, 67-71.) The United States also alleges that, at Mr. Pesky’s (Id. ¶¶ 30-34, 56-63, 66, 105-10, 8 Mr. Pesky allegedly exercised his option to purchase 9 the Ketchum Property for $1.6 million, (id. ¶ 36, Exs. 6, 27), 10 and TNC is alleged to have granted Mr. Pesky an Amended Driveway 11 Easement, (id. ¶ 50, Ex. 34). 12 marketing the property soon after obtaining the Amended Driveway 13 Easement and eventually sold the property for around $7 million, 14 (id. ¶¶ 65, 97, Ex. 61). 15 the Pledge Agreement, (id. ¶¶ 70, 76, Exs. 41, 45), 16 allegedly complied with the terms of the Pledge Agreement by 17 granting a conservation easement to TNC in March 2002, just days 18 before selling the property, (id. ¶ 96, Ex. 60). Mr. Pesky is alleged to have begun After extending the time to comply with Mr. Pesky 19 Mr. Pesky allegedly reported a charitable deduction of 20 $3 million--the appraised value of the conservation easement–-on 21 his 2002, 2003, and 2004 tax returns. 22 When the I.R.S. began an audit of Mr. Pesky’s tax deductions, he 23 is alleged to have withheld responsive documents, including the 24 Pledge Agreement. (Id. ¶¶ 112, Ex. 74.) (Id. ¶¶ 113-31.)3 25 26 27 28 3 The scope of the I.R.S.’s investigation was hotly contested and led to multiple petitions in this court. See Pesky v. United States, Civ. No. 1:10-06789 EJL CWD (Dist. Idaho 2010) (Peskys’ petition to quash an I.R.S. summons); United States v. Pesky, Civ. No. 1:10-00143 EJL (Dist. Idaho 2010) (United States’ 5 1 On the basis of these facts, the United States brings 2 four counterclaims: (1) conservation easement fraud under 26 3 U.S.C. § 6663 against Mr. Pesky; (2) Schedule C expense fraud 4 under § 6663 against Mr. Pesky; (3) penalties for failure to file 5 within the time proscribed by law against both Mr. and Mrs. 6 Pesky; and (4) failure to pay assessed amounts under § 6663 or, 7 alternatively, § 6662 against both Mr. and Mrs. Pesky. 8 149-79.) 9 counterclaims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for (Id. ¶¶ The Peskys now move to dismiss the first and second 10 failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 11 II. Discussion 12 To survive a motion to dismiss, a claimant must plead 13 “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible 14 on its face.” 15 (2007). 16 than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully,” 17 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), and “[w]here a 18 complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a 19 defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between 20 possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” 21 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 This “plausibility standard,” however, “asks for more Id. In deciding whether a 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 petition to enforce an I.R.S. summons); United States v. Richey, Civ. No. 1:08-00452 EJL (Dist. Idaho 2008) (United States’ petition to enforce an I.R.S. summons), consolidated with Civ. No. 1:08-10-00143. In one of the suits, the Ninth Circuit overturned the district court’s holding that the entire work file of Mark Richey, the appraiser of the conservation easement, was protected by the attorney-client privilege and by the workproduct doctrine, thus remanding the case back to the district court for an in camera examination of the materials summoned by the I.R.S. in order to determine which documents, if any, were protected from disclosure. United States v. Richey, 632 F.3d 559, 566-68 (9th Cir. 2011). 6 1 claimant has stated a claim, the court must accept the 2 allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable 3 inferences in favor of the claimant. 4 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Davis v. Scherer, 5 468 U.S. 183 (1984); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). 6 A. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. Civil Fraud Penalty under § 6663 7 Section 6663 provides that “[i]f any part of any 8 underpayment of tax required to be shown on a return is due to 9 fraud, there shall be added to the tax an amount equal to 75 10 percent of the portion of the underpayment which is attributable 11 to fraud.” 12 26 U.S.C. § 6663(a). In the context of the seventy-five percent penalty of § 13 6663,4 “fraud is intentional wrongdoing on the part of the 14 taxpayer with the specific intent to avoid a tax known to be 15 owing.” 16 (quoting Akland v. Comm’r, 767 F.2d 618, 621 (9th Cir. 1985)). 17 To establish liability for the civil fraud penalty, “the 18 Government must establish: (1) a knowing falsehood; (2) an intent 19 to evade taxes; and (3) an underpayment of tax.” 20 United States, 683 F.2d 1285, 1286 (9th Cir. 1982). 21 Bradford v. Comm’r, 796 F.2d 303, 307 (9th Cir. 1986) Considine v. The government “must prove fraud by clear and 22 convincing evidence, but intent can be inferred from strong 23 circumstantial evidence.” Bradford, 796 F.2d at 307 (quoting 24 4 25 26 27 28 The Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986), amended 26 U.S.C. § 6653(b) to increase the civil penalty for fraud from fifty percent to seventy-five percent. Cooley v. Comm’r, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1025, 2004 WL 406756, at *7 n.4 (2004). The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106 (1989), subsequently removed the civil penalty for fraud from § 6653(b) and replaced it with § 6663. Id. 7 1 Akland, 767 F.2d at 621 (internal citations omitted)); see 26 2 U.S.C. § 7454(a) (“In any proceeding involving whether the 3 petitioner has been guilty of fraud with intent to evade tax, the 4 burden of proof in respect to such issue shall be upon the 5 Secretary.”). 6 by direct evidence, this court has inferred intent from various 7 kinds of circumstantial evidence. 8 include: (1) understatement of income; (2) inadequate records; 9 (3) failure to file tax returns; (4) implausible or inconsistent 10 explanations of behavior; (5) concealing assets; and (6) failure 11 to cooperate with tax authorities.” 12 omitted). “Because fraudulent intent is rarely established These ‘badges of fraud’ Id. (internal citations 13 1. Conservation Easement Fraud 14 “Section 170(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 15 allows a deduction for charitable contributions . . . .” 16 v. Comm’r, 511 F.2d 1263, 1266 (9th Cir. 1975); see 26 U.S.C. § 17 170(a). 18 charitable organization, made with charitable intent and without 19 the receipt or expectation of receipt of adequate consideration.” 20 Mitchell v. Comm’r, 138 T.C. No. 16, 2012 WL 1109342, at *4 21 (2012) (citing Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 690 (1989); 22 United States v. Am. Bar. Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 116-18; 26 23 C.F.R. § 170A-1(h)(1)-(2)). 24 allowed a charitable deduction for a gift of property consisting 25 of less than an entire estate in that property, an exception is 26 made for a ‘qualified conservation contribution.’” 27 U.S.C. § 170(f)(3)(A), (f)(3)(B)(iii), (h). 28 Collman “A charitable contribution is a gift of property to a “While a taxpayer is generally not Id.; see 26 Here, the United States alleges that Alan Pesky 8 1 underpaid his taxes by fraudulently deducting the full value of a 2 conservation easement as a charitable deduction when the easement 3 was obtained through a quid pro quo transaction with TNC. 4 (Countercl. ¶¶ 151-53.) 5 exhibits that the United States attaches in support of its 6 counterclaims. 7 Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 999 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that a court 8 may “consider materials that are submitted with and attached to 9 the Complaint” on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss). The court has examined over ninety See generally United States v. Corinthian In its 10 counterclaims and attached exhibits, the United States identifies 11 key documents and communications between the various people 12 alleged to have participated in or been affected by the fraud. 13 For example, in support of its allegations that the 14 Assignment Agreement and Pledge Agreement were part of a single 15 transaction, the United States attaches internal memoranda shared 16 with Mr. Pesky that detail the negotiations between TNC and the 17 Peskys’ attorneys. 18 that both the Assignment Agreement and Pledge Agreement were 19 drafted around the same time, (id. Ex. 10), discuss the terms of 20 the Assignment Agreement and the Pledge Agreement in the same 21 memoranda, (id. Ex. 11), as well as have a subject line that 22 refers to the “Nature Conservancy Transaction” in the singular, 23 (id. Exs. 11, 13). 24 out of” and is “integral with” the Assignment Agreement, (id. Ex. 25 25), and the minutes from a zoning board meeting include a 26 statement from Mark Elsbree, a TNC employee, that TNC “had agreed (See id. Exs. 10-16.) The memoranda note The Pledge Agreement notes that it “arises 27 28 9 1 to grant Mr. Pesky a reformed easement,5 conditioned upon the 2 fact that he can build one house (and one guest house) there,” 3 (id. ¶ 46, Ex. 32). 4 The United States also includes specific factual 5 allegations and exhibits regarding Mr. Pesky’s intent to defraud, 6 such as attempts to keep the Pledge Agreement hidden from city 7 officials, real estate agents, and appraisers, (id. ¶¶ 57-63, 66, 8 105-09, Exs. 35-36, 39, 67-71), as well as his refusal, through 9 his attorney, to share the Pledge Agreement and other documents 10 with the I.R.S., (id. 116-47, Exs. 76-95). 11 the subject, Mr. Pesky is alleged to have claimed a near total 12 lack of recall as to anything related to the Pledge Agreement. 13 (Id. ¶ 148.) 14 When questioned on The Peskys argue - and the United States does not 15 contest - that the heightened pleading standard of Federal Rule 16 of Civil Procedure 9(b) applies to the United States’ 17 counterclaims for fraud under § 6663. 18 Corp., USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that 19 averments of fraud must be “specific enough to give defendants 20 notice of the particular misconduct so that they can defend 21 against the charge and not just deny that they have done anything 22 wrong” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Gaughen 23 v. United States, Civ. No. 1:09-2488, 2011 WL 292019, at *2-3 24 (M.D. Penn. Jan. 27, 2011) (applying Rule 9(b) to the 25 government’s answer in a suit by a taxpayer seeking a Rule 12(c) See Vess v. Ciba-Geigy 26 27 28 5 The “reformed easement” here could reasonably be interpreted as referring to the Driveway Easement contained in the Assignment Agreement. 10 1 judgment on the pleadings for a refund of § 6663 penalties). 2 see Payne v. United States, 247 F.2d 481, 485 (8th Cir. 1957) 3 (“We should doubt that [Rule 9(b)] has any application to a 4 complaint in a suit to collect assessed tax deficiencies and 5 fraud penalties, of which the taxpayer has administratively been 6 given due notice of determination, assessment, and demand for 7 payment.”). 8 9 But Assuming, arguendo, that the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) apply to the United States’ 10 counterclaims for civil fraud penalties under § 6663, the United 11 States has more than adequately pled facts of particular 12 misconduct regarding the allegedly fraudulent charitable 13 deduction so that the Peskys can adequately defend against the 14 charge. See Vess, 317 F.3d at 1106. 15 The Peskys argue that the United States’ allegations 16 misconstrue the nature of the transactions at issue and that a 17 close reading of the exhibits forecloses any plausible 18 possibility of fraud by Mr. Pesky. 19 accept the allegations as being true’” when “material is attached 20 to the complaint which refutes the allegations contained in the 21 complaint,” Hores v. Mason, 1999 WL 674588, at *4 (Dist. Idaho 22 July 19, 1999) (quoting Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 625 23 (9th Cir. 1991)), the Peskys ask the court to go far beyond this 24 rule and adopt their interpretation of the documents. 25 approach is inappropriate in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion 26 since the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of 27 the claimant. 28 grounds by Davis, 468 U.S. at 191. While the court “‘need not Such an Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 236, overruled on other 11 1 For example, the Peskys argue that exhibits documenting 2 the negotiations show that the Peskys and TNC never negotiated 3 for a one home site restriction in exchange for the option to buy 4 the Ketchum Property, but instead only contemplated a three home 5 site restriction. 6 fact that the attached exhibits may show that the Peskys and TNC 7 discussed alternative arrangements is not inconsistent with the 8 United States’ allegations. 9 have discussed alternatives during their negotiations does not 10 preclude the inference that they eventually settled upon a one 11 home site restriction as part of the exchange for the option to 12 buy the Ketchum property. 13 (See Countercl. Exs. 5, 8, 9.) However, the The fact that the Peskys and TNC may Accepting as true all material allegations in the 14 counterclaims and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of 15 the United States, the United States has adequately pled a 16 counterclaim for a civil penalty under § 6663 based on the 17 Pesky’s allegedly fraudulent charitable deduction for the value 18 of the conservation easement. 19 the United States’ first counterclaim. Thus, the court will not dismiss 20 2. Schedule C Fraud 21 “In general, section 162 allows deductions for ordinary 22 and necessary expenses of carrying on a trade or business.” 23 Shelton v. Comm’r, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 807, 1996 WL 544608, at *4 24 (1996); 26 U.S.C. § 162(a). 25 ‘ordinary’ has been defined as that which is ‘normal, usual, or 26 customary’ in the taxpayer's trade or business.” 27 Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488, 495 (1940)). 28 been construed to mean ‘appropriate’ or ‘helpful’ in the “As used in section 162(a), 12 Id. (citing “‘Necessary’ has 1 development of the taxpayer's business.” 2 Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933)). 3 for, section 162 prohibits deductions for personal, living, or 4 family expenses.” 5 of § 6663, “fraudulent understatement of income may be 6 established by overstatement of Schedule C expenses.” 7 Comm’r, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1025, 2004 WL 406756, at *8 (2004) 8 (citations omitted). 9 Id. Id. (citing Welch v. “Unless expressly provided In an action to impose the civil penalty Cooley v. In stark contrast to its allegations regarding the 10 conservation easement deduction, the United States’ pleadings are 11 conspicuously devoid of factual allegations regarding fraudulent 12 business deductions on the Peskys’ Schedule C forms. 13 Counterclaim includes formulaic allegations of liability under § 14 6663, (Countcl. ¶ 158), and alleges that Alan Pesky wrongly 15 “claimed expenses incurred by himself personally or by entities 16 other than any of his possible sole proprietorships as ordinary 17 and necessary expenses,” including “as a non-exhaustive 18 example[,] . . . expenses for accounting services.” 19 60.) 20 sole proprietorship that incurred the Schedule C expenses on his 21 2003 and 2004 tax returns, yet it asserts no factual allegations 22 related to the Schedule C expenses, such as what “possible sole 23 proprietorships” and entities are alleged to have be involved, 24 what expenses were deducted, or what facts lead the United States 25 to believe that Mr. Pesky did not operate a sole proprietorship. 26 The United States has not included enough factual allegations to 27 “nudge[] [its] claim[] across the line from conceivable to The (Id. ¶¶ 159- The United States alleges that Mr. Pesky never operated a 28 13 1 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547.6 plausible.” 2 Thus the court will dismiss the United States’ 3 counterclaim for civil penalties under § 6663 due to Mr. Pesky’s 4 allegedly fraudulent reporting of business expenses on his 5 Schedule C forms. 6 Since this is the first motion to dismiss the United 7 States’ counterclaims, and the United States appears to be able 8 to cure the deficiency, it will be granted leave to amend. 9 Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (“In the absence of any See 10 apparent or declared reason--such as undue delay, bad faith or 11 dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to 12 cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue 13 prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the 14 amendment, futility of amendment, etc.--the leave sought should, 15 as the rules require, be ‘freely given.’); Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). 16 17 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Peskys’ motion to dismiss be, and the same hereby is: 18 (1) DENIED as to the United States’ first counterclaim 19 for a civil fraud penalty under 26 U.S.C. § 6663 due to Alan 20 Pesky’s alleged conservation easement fraud; and 21 (2) GRANTED as to the United States’ second 22 counterclaim for a civil fraud penalty under 26 U.S.C. § 6663 due 23 to Alan Pesky’s alleged Schedule C fraud. 24 The United States has twenty days from the date of this 25 Order to file an Amended Counterclaim, if it can do so consistent 26 6 27 28 A fortiori,if the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b) applies, the United States also fails to satisfy Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement for its counterclaim alleging fraudulent reporting of Schedule C expenses. 14 1 with this Order. 2 DATED: January 7, 2013 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 15

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