williams v. Astrue

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER re: 1 Petition for Review, ORDER DISMISSING CASE. Signed by Judge Larry M. Boyle. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by krb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
MELISSA WILLIAMS,
Case No. 1:10-cv-00374-LMB
Petitioner,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner for
the Social Security Administration,
Respondent.

Currently pending before the Court is Melissa Williams’s Petition for Review
(Docket No. 1). Williams seeks review to set aside the final decision of Respondent
denying her claims for Title II Social Security disability benefits. She brings this action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g). The parties consented to having the United States
Magistrate Judge conduct all further proceedings in this case. (Docket No. 14). Having
carefully reviewed and considered the pleadings, briefs and administrative record, and
being otherwise fully advised, the Court enters the following Memorandum Decision and
Order.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
Williams (“Petitioner” or “Claimant”) filed for Social Security disability insurance
benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (the “Act”) on December 8, 2006. (AR
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER -1-

64). Petitioner alleges disability in the form of several impairments, or combination
thereof, including depression, bipolar II, anxiety and diabetes. (AR 87). Petitioner also
has mild asthma and is obese, which are taken into consideration when examining the
combined effects of her claimed disabilities. In her petition she alleges an onset date of
April 20, 2006. (AR 82).
The Commissioner denied Petitioner’s application initially on June 29, 2007, (AR
13), and upon reconsideration on December 28, 2008. (Id.). Petitioner filed a timely
request for a hearing which took place before Administrative Law Judge Lloyd Hartford
on August 10, 2009. (AR 557). Petitioner is represented by attorney Jacob Bernhardt.
(AR 550). Also present at the hearing were Medical Expert, Dr. James Bruce, and
Vocational Expert Anne Aastum. (AR 557).
On December 9, 2009, the ALJ denied Petitioner’s claim based on a finding that
Petitioner “has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from
April 20, 2006, through the date of” the ALJ’s decision. (AR 29).
Petitioner timely requested the Appeals Council review the ALJ’s decision.
Petitioner’s appeal included letters from Petitioner and her attorney complaining of the
way that ALJ Hartford spoke to Williams during the hearing. Petitioner went as far as to
complain that the ALJ made her feel like she wasn’t even human. Petitioner’s attorney,
Jacob Bernhardt, requested that the Appeals Council listen to the recording of the hearing,
going as far as to state that “Judge Hartford’s actions in this particular case defy

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER -2-

explanation,” and that he “seemed determined to deny the claim regardless of what was
said by anyone involved, including the medical expert.” (AR 550–56). The Appeals
Council denied review on June 14, 2010, making the AJL’s decision the final decision of
the Commissioner of Social Security. (AR 7).
Having exhausted her administrative remedies, Petitioner filed the instant action.
Petition for Review (Docket No. 1). Petitioner requests that the ALJ’s decision be
reversed or, in the alternative, that this matter be remanded for an ALJ hearing de novo.
BACKGROUND
At the time of the hearing before the ALJ, Petitioner was thirty-seven years old.
(AR 82). She completed high school, and attended two years of college. (AR 94).
Further, Petitioner has worked as a cashier, housekeeper, babysitter and office worker.
(AR 96). Petitioner has stated that due to her disability, she has been unable to perform
any of these past jobs, or any other for that matter. (AR 64).
The ALJ determined that Petitioner has the following severe impairments: bipolar
disorder, post traumatic stress disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, diabetes mellitus,
and obesity. (AR 17 (citing 20 CFR 404.1520(c)). Notwithstanding, the ALJ concluded
that Petitioner had not met her burden of proving that she has been under a disability as
defined by the Social Security Act during the period under consideration and denied her
application for benefits accordingly. (AR 17-19).

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STANDARD OF REVIEW
It is undisputed that the burden of proof rests upon the Petitioner to establish
entitlement to disability benefits. Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir. 1999).
In evaluating the evidence at an administrative hearing, the ALJ must follow a five-part
sequential process. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2005). If the Commissioner’s
decision is supported by substantial evidence and based upon proper legal standards, then
it will be upheld. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2000); Matney ex rel. Matney v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d
1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992); Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1990).
Findings of fact by the ALJ are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 42
U.S.C. § 405(g); Vidal v. Harris, 637 F.2d 710, 712 (9th Cir. 1981). In other words, if
there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s factual determinations, they must be
upheld, even in the face of conflicting evidence. Hall v. Sec’y of Health, Educ. &
Welfare, 602 F.2d 1372, 1374 (9th Cir. 1979).
Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971);
Tylitzki v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 1411, 1413 (9th Cir. 1993); Flaten v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995). This standard requires “more than a
scintilla,” but “less than a preponderance,” Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 183 (9th Cir.
1990), and “does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence,” Pierce v.
Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988).

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With respect to questions of fact, the role of the Court is to review the record as a
whole to determine whether it contains evidence that would allow a reasonable mind to
accept the conclusions of the ALJ. See Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401; Matney, 981 F.2d at
1019. The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical
testimony, Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984), resolving ambiguities, see
Vincent ex. rel. Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1394–95 (9th Cir. 1984), and drawing
inferences logically flowing from the evidence, Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642
(9th Cir. 1982). When the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation
in a disability proceeding, the reviewing court may not substitute its judgment or
interpretation of the record for that of the ALJ. Flaten, 44 F.3d at 1457; Key v. Heckler,
754 F.2d 1545, 1549 (9th Cir. 1985).
With respect to questions of law, the ALJ’s decision must be based on proper legal
standards and will only be reversed for legal error. Matney, 981 F.2d at 1019. The ALJ’s
construction of the Social Security Act is entitled to deference if it has a reasonable basis
in law. See id. However, reviewing courts “will not rubber-stamp an administrative
decision that is inconsistent with the statutory mandate or that frustrates the congressional
purpose underlying the statute.” Smith v. Heckler, 820 F.2d 1093, 1094 (9th Cir. 1987).
Reviewing courts must bear in mind that the Social Security Act is remedial and should
be construed liberally and “not so as to withhold benefits in marginal cases.” Id. at 1095
(citations omitted).

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There are two issues presented in the instant appeal. First is whether the ALJ’s
determination that Petitioner’s testimony was not entirely credible is adequately supported
in his findings of fact. Second is whether the AJL abused his discretion in not finding
that Petitioner had not met the listing criteria for a chronic affective disorder. 20 C.F.R.
Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.04C. The Court reviews the Commissioner’s determination
to ascertain if it is supported by substantial evidence and whether the findings are based
on application of proper legal standards.
DISCUSSION
A.

Conduct of ALJ During Hearing
As an initial matter, Petitioner and her counsel both submitted letters to the Appeals

Council regarding the claimed attitude of the ALJ during the hearing. Petitioner stated
that the ALJ was “very rude,” and that she was “mistreated and humiliated by this judge.”
(AR 555–56). Petitioner’s attorney alleges that the “hearing itself felt like a battle,” and
the ALJ “insisted that [Petitioner] submit additional evidence to verify her testimony, and
required any argument concerning the listings to be in writing.” (AR 550—51).
The Court has reviewed the transcript of the hearing, and has not found anything
that would suggest that the ALJ was unusually confrontational, rude or engaged in any
activity that would “defy explanation,” as argued by Petitioner. (AR 550). The Court
recognizes that a cold transcript does not always reveal the nuances of voice, demeanor,
manner of speech, tone or intonation, facial expressions or body language. However,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER -6-

there is nothing in the record to cause the Court to conclude that the decision of the ALJ
was motived by bias.1
Administrative decision makers must be impartial and the right to a hearing before
an unbiased decision maker is a basic tenant of due process. See Trident Seafoods, Inc. v.
N.L.R.B., 101 F.3d 111 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The Federal Administrative Procedure Act
states clearly that administrative hearings must be conducted in an impartial manner. 5
U.S.C.A. § 556(b). However, evidence of actual prejudice must be presented to establish
a due process violation. Accordingly, the determination by the Commissioner will not be
disturbed or overruled on these grounds.
B.

Sequential Process
When evaluating evidence presented at an administrative hearing, the ALJ must

follow a five-step sequential process in determining whether a person is disabled within
the meaning of the Act. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. “The burden of proof is on
claimant as to steps one through four[, but] as to step five, the burden shifts to [the]
Commissioner.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 1999).
The first step of the sequential process requires the ALJ to determine whether the
claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so,
Petitioner is not disabled, and benefits are denied. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). Here, the

1

Petitioner does not make this argument in her appeal to this Court, but because of the
seriousness of the allegations, the Court has reviewed the record to determine if the ALJ exhibited bias or
questionable behavior during the hearing.
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ALJ concluded that Petitioner has not performed substantial gainful activity since April
20, 2006. (AR 16).
The second step requires the ALJ to determine whether the claimant’s impairment
or combination of impairments are severe. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If the answer
is in the negative, disability benefits are denied. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). Here, the ALJ
found that Petitioner has the following severe impairments: bipolar disorder, post
traumatic stress disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, diabetes mellitus, and obesity. (AR
17).
At the third step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant’s impairments meet
or equal a listed impairment under the 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. If so, the
claimant is disabled, and entitled to disability insurance benefits. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(d). “If the claimant’s impairment neither meets nor equals one of the
impairments listed in the regulations, then the claimant’s case cannot be resolved at step
three and the evaluation proceeds to step four.” Lounsburry v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 1111,
1114 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d)). In the instant action, the ALJ
examined the listing requirements for diabetes mellitus (9.08), obesity,2 and mental
impairments (12.00) and concluded that Petitioner “does not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed
impairments.” (AR 17-19).
2

There is no listing for obesity. However, pursuant to Social Security Ruling 02-1p, the ALJ is
required to consider the potential combined effects of obesity.
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The fourth step of the evaluation process requires the ALJ to determine whether the
claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC) is sufficient for the claimant to perform
past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so, the claimant is “not disabled”
and thus not entitled to disability insurance benefits. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). “If the
claimant cannot do any work he or she did in the past, then the claimant’s case cannot be
resolved at step four and the evaluation proceeds to the fifth and final step.” Lounsburry,
468 F.3d at 1114.
In this regard, the ALJ concluded that Petitioner retains “the residual functional
capacity to perform light work,” with some exections. (AR 19) Specifically, the ALJ
found Petitioner able to lift twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently, stand
and/or walk or sit about six hours in an eight hour workday, with normal breaks. (AR 1920). He further found that she cannot climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds, and should avoid
even moderate exposures to machinery and heights. (Id.) With respect to her mental
impairments, the ALJ found Petitioner “moderately limited in her ability to perform
activities within a schedule, maintain regular attendance, and be punctual within
customary tolerances; sustain an ordinary routine without special supervision.” Further,
the ALJ found her to be “mildly limited in her ability to work in coordination with or
proximity to others without being distracted by them.” (Id.)
Concluding his analysis at step four, the ALJ found Petitioner capable of
performing her past relevant work as a cashier-checker, cashier II, and

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER -9-

cleaner/housekeep[er].” (AR 28). The ALJ further concluded that no past relevant work
requires the performance of work-related activities precluded by Petitioners’ functional
capacity. (Id.) Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Petitioner “has not been under a
disability, as defined by the Social Security Act, from April 20, 2006, through the date of
[his] decision.” (AR 29).3
C.

Analysis
Petitioner challenges the Commissioner’s final determination on two grounds.

First, Petitioner claims the ALJ failed to properly support his findings that the Petitioner
is not credible, and improperly disregarded her pain testimony. Petitioner’s Brief, p.
12–16. Second, Petitioner claims the ALJ committed reversible error in step three of the
sequential process by failing to find that Petitioner met or equaled listing 12.04 C2. Id. at
16–18.
Respondent responds generally that the ALJ’s determination is supported by
substantial evidence in the record, Respondent’s Brief, p. 6. Respondent directly refutes

3

Had the ALJ concluded that Petitioner was not able to perform past relevant work, and
proceeded to step-five, he would have then considered if the claimant is able to do any other work. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(f)(1). On the fifth step, the burden shifts to the ALJ. Id. If the ALJ finds that
claimant cannot work, then the claimant is “disabled” and entitled to disability insurance benefits. Id. If
the ALJ determines that the claimant can work, the ALJ must then establish that there are a significant
number of jobs in the national economy that claimant can do in her condition. Id. “If the Commissioner
cannot meet this burden, then the claimant is . . . entitled to disability benefits.” Lounsburry, 468 F.3d at
1114. The ALJ can meet this burden by soliciting the testimony of a vocational expert, or the ALJ can
reference the Medical-Vocational Guidelines at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2. Id.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER -10-

Petitioner’s claims that the ALJ erred in determining Petitioner’s credibility, id. at 12-15,
and that she meets the listing requirement under 12.04. (Id. at 7–12).
Respondent concludes, therefore, that the Commissioner’s decision is based on
substantial evidence and does not result from legal error. Id. at 15. This Court agrees and
therefore dismisses this matter with the opinion set forth below.
1.

Credibility

Petitioner argues that the ALJ failed to properly support his finding that Petitioner
was not credible generally, and specifically regarding her pain testimony. Petitioner’s
Brief, pp. 12–16. Petitioner contends that the ALJ based his credibility determination on
“several questionable inferences.” Specifically, Petitioner argues that the ALJ “appears
to blame family stressors rather than [Petitioner’s] bipolar disorder for her two most
recent psychiatric hospitalizations.” Id. at 14. Further, Petitioner alleges that the ALJ
“seems to discount [Petitioner’s] testimony concerning her difficulties with panic attacks
and going out in public out of hand because no panic disorder diagnosis is made in the
record. Id. Additionally, though it does not directly relate to the ALJ’s credibility
determination, Petitioner argues that the ALJ improperly found that she “does not, and
has not, decompensated.” Id. at 15. Finally, Petitioner questions the weight the ALJ
assigned to various GAF scores, arguing that he “conveniently disregarded” the two GAF
scores of 30. Id. at 15–16.

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Resolution of conflicts in the testimony and of credibility questions is a function
solely of the ALJ. Russell v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 81, 83 (9th Cir. 1988). Furthermore, “if the
ALJ’s credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record,” the Court
“may not engage in second-guessing.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir.
2002). The ALJ is in the best position to make such credibility determinations and, for
this reason, the ALJ’s credibility determinations are entitled to great weight. Anderson v.
Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1121, 1124 (9th Cir. 1990). Indeed, “[c]redibility determinations are
the province of the ALJ.” Fair, 885 F.2d 597, 604 (9th Cir. 1989).
Here, the ALJ determined that the Petitioner’s “medically determinable
impairments could reasonably be expected to cause [her] alleged symptoms; however,
[her] statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these
symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with [the RFC] assessment.”
(AR 21).
Where, as here, the ALJ finds the claimant’s pain testimony to be not entirely
credible, the Ninth Circuit has held that “the ALJ may reject the claimant’s testimony
regarding the severity of her symptoms only if the ALJ makes specific findings stating
clear and convincing reasons for doing so,” and he “must state specifically which
symptom testimony is not credible and what facts in the record lead to that conclusion.”
Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284; see also Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998);
SSR 96-7p.

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Specifically, in determining whether the claimant’s subjective testimony regarding
the severity of her symptoms is credible, “the ALJ may consider claimant’s reputation for
truthfulness, inconsistencies either in claimant’s testimony or between his testimony and
his conduct, claimant’s daily activities, claimant’s work record, and testimony from
physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity and effect of the symptoms of
which claimant complains.” Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 791 (9th Cir. 1997).
The ALJ may also consider “unexplained, or inadequately explained, failure to seek
treatment or follow a prescribed course of treatment.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 635
(9th Cir. 2007) (citing Fair, 885 F.2d at 603; see also Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958-59).
The petitioner’s statements about the intensity or persistence of her pain “may not
be disregarded solely because they are not substantiated by objective medical evidence.”
SSR 96-7p. The ALJ must make findings “sufficiently specific to make clear to the
individual to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the individual’s
statements and the reasons for that weight.” Id.
In evaluating this case, the ALJ made specific findings regarding which alleged
symptoms he determined were not credible, and how much weight was given to any such
statement and his reasons therefore. The ALJ discredited Petitioner’s statements
concerning the severity of her bipolar condition, as well as her alleged anxiety disorder,
and found them not to be consistent with the objective medical evidence contained in the
record. In addition, the ALJ found Petitioner’s subjective testimony to be inconsistent

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER -13-

with her reports of activities of daily living, social functioning, concentration, and reports
of decompensation.4 (AR 18–19). For these reasons, the ALJ found Petitioner “credible
only to the extent that they are inconsistent with the [ALJ’s] residual functional capacity
assessment.” (AR 21).
Where the ALJ has made specific findings in support of his decision to discount
and reject certain allegations made by Petitioner regarding symptoms and their functional
effect on daily activities, and those findings are supported by substantial evidence in the
record, as the Court concludes they are in this action, the Court’s role is not to
second-guess that decision. Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959. In this case, the ALJ’s findings to
reject Petitioner’s credibility are sufficiently specific to allow the Court to conclude that
the ALJ’s decision is based on permissible grounds and that the ALJ did not arbitrarily
discredit Petitioner’s testimony. See Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 345.
Regarding Petitioner’s allegations of a panic disorder, the ALJ clearly considered
her testimony and gave it some weight. However, without supporting medical testimony,
the ALJ is under no obligation to assign it any weight. Put another way, the ALJ properly
rejected this portion of testimony because it was not supported by adequate evidence.
In this case, the ALJ correctly listed the relevant factors that should be considered
in assessing the credibility of claimant’s subjective complaints. Further, the ALJ
considered Petitioner’s daily activities, her prior work record, observations by treating
4

“Decompensation” relates directly to Petitioner’s claims regarding the listing requirements of
12.04. Accordingly, it will be discussed more in depth there. See supra section B2.
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physicians, the duration and frequency of her symptoms, the precipitating and aggravating
factors, the effectiveness of medication, and functional restrictions. Accordingly, no error
arises from the ALJ’s evaluation of Petitioner’s subjective complaints of pain.
The ALJ’s reasoning to support discrediting Petitioner’s pain testimony is set forth
in sufficient specificity for adequate judicial review; appears to be supported by clear and
convincing evidence in the record; and appears to utilize competent evidence in support
of his conclusions.
2.

Step Three: Listing Requirements Under the Regulations.

At step three of the sequential process, the ALJ was required to determine whether
Petitioner’s impairments, or combinations thereof, meet or equal an impairment listed in
the regulations. Petitioner argues that the ALJ erred in step three by failing to address
whether the Petitioner met or equaled Listing 12.04 in regard to her chronic affective
disorder. Petitioner’s Brief, 16 (Docket No. 15). Petitioner takes the position that the
ALJ erred in his conclusion that Petitioner did not meet the requirements of 12.04 C2.
Specifically, Petitioner argues that the ALJ erred in concluding that the 12.04 C2 required
a showing that a claimant had experience an episode of decomenstation of extended
duration. Instead, Petitioner argues that she met the requirements of 12.04 C2, arguing
that she would likely decompenstae if presented with minimal menal demands or changes
to her environment.

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Section 12.04 describes the circumstances under which an affective disorder will
constitute a “disability” under the Act, and in relevant part reads:
The required level of severity for these disorders is met when the requirements
in both A and B are satisfied, or when the requirements in C are satisfied.
****
C. Medically documented history of a chronic affective disorder of at least 2
years' duration that has caused more than a minimal limitation of ability to do
basic work activities, with symptoms or signs currently attenuated by
medication or psychosocial support, and one of the following:
1. Repeated episodes of decompensation, each of extended duration; or
2. A residual disease process that has resulted in such marginal
adjustment that even a minimal increase in mental demands or change
in the environment would be predicted to cause the individual to
decompensate; or
3. Current history of 1 or more years' inability to function outside a
highly supportive living arrangement, with an indication of continued
need for such an arrangement.
20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App.1. The Court has reviewed the evidence provided that
establishes her impairments could meet the Listing 12.04 C2 requirements. However, there is
also evidence that supports the ALJ’s contrary conclusion that Petitioner’s impairment failed to
meet or equal the criteria in the Listing.
The record establishes that the ALJ considered 12.04 C2 and found that the
evidence supporting such a listing “rest heavily upon the claimant’s subjective testimony
regarding her limitations which is not credited to the degree alleged.” With specific
regard to the C2 criteria, the ALJ concluded that the Petitioner would not decompensate

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER -16-

to the degree required under C2, citing to specific examples of when Petitioner was faced
with increases in mental demands or changes in her environment, the many problems with
her 15-year old daughter, working at Wal-Mart, and office work. Petitioner’s allegation
that the ALJ makes no distinction between decompensation and episodes of
decompensaiton of extended duration, finds no support in the record.
Instead, the ALJ adequately supports his finding that Petitioner does not meet the
Listing requirements of 12.04C. The ALJ notes that Petitioner has handled significant
life issues with minimal impact that resolve fairly quickly. The ALJ concluded that, based
on his examination of the evidence in the record, Petitioner has a mild degree of limitation in
activities of daily living; a mild difficulty in maintaining social contact; and moderate limitations
of concentration, persistence and pace. (AR 18-19). In sum, although there was some evidence
to the contrary, the ALJ’s conclusions about Petitioner’s mental impairments were supported by
the substantial evidence and will not be disturbed on review.
In order for the ALJ’s disability determination to be upheld, the ALJ has the burden
of showing that his decision is based on substantial evidence. See Embrey v. Bowen, 849
F.2d 418, 421 (9th Cir. 1988). “The ALJ can meet this burden by setting out a detailed
and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his
interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Id. (citing Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403,
1408 (9th Cir.1986)). In this regard, the ALJ concluded that Petitioner had not met her
burden of proof regarding her claims of disability, a conclusion that, to be upheld, must
be based on substantial evidence and supported by the record. Roberts v. Shalala, 66 F.3d
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER -17-

179, 182 (9th Cir. 1995) ( In any claim for disability, the initial burden of proof rests upon
the claimant).
Although there is some evidence tending to support Petitioner’s position, and
reasonable minds could disagree, Petitioner’s primary contentions appear to be that the
ALJ gave too much weight to the evidence upon which he relied and did not give enough
weight to other evidence favorable to Petitioner. Petitioner argues that the record
supports a conclusion that she was disabled within the meaning of the Act.
However, as discussed in this decision, the ALJ is the fact finder and is solely
responsible for weighing and drawing inferences from facts and determining credibility.
Allen, 749 F.2d at 579; Vincent on Behalf of Vincent, 739 F.2d at 1394; Sample, 694 F.2d
at 642. If the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of
which is the ALJ’s, as exists here, the Court may not substitute its interpretation for that
of the ALJ. Key, 754 F.2d at 1549. With all of the foregoing in mind, the Court
concludes that the evidence upon which the ALJ relied can reasonably and rationally be
relied upon to support his conclusion, despite the fact that such evidence may be
susceptible to a different interpretation.
The Court finds, and thus concludes, that the Commissioner’s determination that
Petitioner is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act is supported by
substantial evidence in the record and is based upon an application of proper legal

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER -18-

standards. Accordingly, the Court will not substitute its interpretation or judgment for
that of the ALJ in reaching his decision. The Commissioner’s decision is upheld.
V. ORDER
Based on the foregoing, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED and this
action is DISMISSED in its entirety with prejudice.
DATED: September 13, 2011.

Honorable Larry M. Boyle
United States Magistrate Judge

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