Aman v. Astrue

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM DECISIONS AND ORDER re 1 Petition for Review;. Signed by Judge Mikel H. Williams. The Commissioners decision finding that the Petitioner is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act be AFFIRMED and that the petition for review be DISMISSED. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by dks)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

MOHAMMAD Z. MOHAMMAD
AMAN,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:10-cv-00426-MHW
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner
for the Social Security Administration,
Respondent.

INTRODUCTION
Currently pending before the Court for its consideration is Petitioner Mohammed Z.
Mohammad Aman’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for Review (Docket No. 1) of the Respondent’s
denial of social security benefits, filed August 23, 2010. The Court has reviewed the Petition for
Review and the Answer, the parties’ memoranda, and the administrative record (AR), and for the
reasons that follow, will affirm the decision of the Commissioner.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY
Petitioner filed an application for Supplemental Security Income on April 2, 2007,
alleging disability due to right hip arthrodesis, degenerative joint disease of the lumbar spine,
degenerative joint disease of the hips and knees bilaterally, osteopenia of the lumbar spine, and
meniscal tears in the right knee. Petitioner’s application was denied initially and on
reconsideration, and a request for a hearing was timely filed.

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Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Michael A. Kilroy held a hearing on May 15, 2009,
taking testimony from Petitioner and vocational expert Anne Aastum. (AR 22-64.) An
interpreter for Petitioner participated by telephone. (AR 24.) Petitioner submitted a written
closing statement, including an objection to the adequacy of the translation, on May 18, 2009.
(AR 179-81.) ALJ Kilroy issued a decision finding Petitioner not disabled on August 31, 2009.
(AR 10-21.)
Petitioner filed a timely appeal to the Appeals Council which denied his request for
review on June 24, 2010, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner.
(AR 1-3.) Petitioner appealed this final decision to this Court. The Court has jurisdiction to
review the ALJ’s decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
At the time of the hearing, Petitioner was 52 years old. He has a college education with a
degree in chemical engineering, and his past relevant work includes manager, store; cashierchecker; and sales representative, door to door.
SEQUENTIAL PROCESS
The Commissioner follows a five-step sequential evaluation for determining whether a
claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. At step one, it must be determined
whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity. The ALJ found Petitioner had
not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 2, 2007, the application date.
At step two, it must be determined whether claimant suffers from a severe impairment.
The ALJ found Petitioner’s status post right hip arthrodesis, degenerative joint disease lumbar
spine, bilateral hips and knees, osteopenia lumbar spine, and right knee meniscal tear are
“severe” within the meaning of the Regulations.

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Step three asks whether a claimant’s impairments meet or equal a listed impairment. The
ALJ found that Petitioner’s impairments or combination of impairments did not meet or equal
the criteria for the listed impairments.
If a claimant’s impairments do not meet or equal a listing, the Commissioner must assess
the residual functional capacity (RFC) and determine at step four whether the claimant has
demonstrated an inability to perform past relevant work. The ALJ found Petitioner was able to
perform his past relevant work as a cashier-checker.
If a claimant demonstrates an inability to perform past relevant work, the burden shifts to
the Commissioner to demonstrate at step five that the claimant retains the capacity to make an
adjustment to other work that exists in significant levels in the national economy, after
considering the claimant's residual functional capacity, age, education and work experience.
Although finding at step four that Petitioner was not disabled, the ALJ proceeded to step five to
provide an alternative finding. At step five, he found that Petitioner could perform occupations
such as document preparer microfilming and table worker.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Petitioner bears the burden of showing that disability benefits are proper because of
the inability “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which . . . has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382c(a)(3)(A); Rhinehart v. Fitch, 438 F.2d 920, 921 (9th Cir. 1971). An individual will be
determined to be disabled only if his physical or mental impairments are of such severity that he
not only cannot do his previous work but is unable, considering his age, education, and work

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experience, to engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
On review, the Court is instructed to uphold the decision of the Social Security
Commissioner if the decision is supported by substantial evidence and is not the product of legal
error. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Universal Camera Corp. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 474
(1951); Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir. 1999) (as amended); DeLorme v.
Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 846 (9th Cir. 1991). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 401 (1971). It is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance, Jamerson v
Chater, 112 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1997), and “does not mean a large or considerable amount
of evidence.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988).
The Court cannot disturb the Commissioner’s findings if they are supported by
substantial evidence, even though other evidence may exist which supports the petitioner’s
claims. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Flaten v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457
(9th Cir. 1995). Thus, findings of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, shall be conclusive. Id. It is well-settled that if there is substantial evidence to support
the decision of the Commissioner, the decision must be upheld even when the evidence can
reasonably support either affirming or reversing the Commissioner’s decision, because the Court
“may not substitute [its] judgment for that of the Commissioner.” Verduzco v. Apfel, 188 F.3d
1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 1999).
In reviewing a case under the substantial evidence standard, the Court may question an
ALJ’s credibility assessment of a witness’s testimony; however, an ALJ’s credibility assessment

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is entitled to great weight, and the ALJ may disregard self-serving statements. Rashad v.
Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1990). Where the ALJ makes a careful consideration of
subjective complaints but provides adequate reasons for rejecting them, the ALJ’s well-settled
role as the judge of credibility will be upheld as based on substantial evidence. Matthews v.
Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 679-80 (9th Cir. 1993).
DISCUSSION
Petitioner believes the ALJ erred by failing to provide proper support for his finding that
Petitioner can ambulate effectively; that he improperly denied Petitioner’s claim by finding that
he could return to his past work as a cashier-checker; that he failed to cite a light level job that
was within petitioner’s assessed residual capacity; and that the translation services provided to
Petitioner, an Afghani refugee who speaks Farsi, during his hearing were not sufficient to
provide Petitioner with due process. The Court will address each of these arguments in turn.
A.

Failure to Provide Proper Support in his finding that Petitioner Can Ambulate
Effectively.
Petitioner notes that the key question in finding whether he meets listing 1.02 is whether

he has an inability to “ambulate effectively.” As relevant here, the listing is as follows:
1.02 Major dysfunction of a joint(s) (due to any cause):
Characterized by gross anatomical deformity (e.g., subluxation,
contracture, bony or fibrous ankylosis, instability) and chronic
joint pain and stiffness with signs of limitation of motion or other
abnormal motion of the affected joint(s), and findings on
appropriate medically acceptable imaging of joint space
narrowing, bony destruction, or ankylosis of the affected joint(s).
With:
A. Involvement of one major peripheral weight-bearing joint (i.e.,
hip, knee, or ankle), resulting in inability to ambulate effectively,
as defined in 1.00B2b . . . .
20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 § 1.02 (emphasis added).
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Inability to ambulate effectively, in turn, is defined in §1.00B2b as follows:
(1) Definition. Inability to ambulate effectively means an extreme
limitation of the ability to walk; i.e., an impairment(s) that
interferes very seriously with the individual's ability to
independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities. Ineffective
ambulation is defined generally as having insufficient lower
extremity functioning (see 1.00J) to permit independent
ambulation without the use of a hand-held assistive device(s) that
limits the functioning of both upper extremities. . . .
(2) To ambulate effectively, individuals must be capable of
sustaining a reasonable walking pace over a sufficient distance to
be able to carry out activities of daily living. They must have the
ability to travel without companion assistance to and from a place
of employment or school. Therefore, examples of ineffective
ambulation include, but are not limited to, the inability to walk
without the use of a walker, two crutches or two canes, the
inability to walk a block at a reasonable pace on rough or uneven
surfaces, the inability to use standard public transportation, the
inability to carry out routine ambulatory activities, such as
shopping and banking, and the inability to climb a few steps at a
reasonable pace with the use of a single hand rail. The ability to
walk independently about one's home without the use of assistive
devices does not, in and of itself, constitute effective ambulation.
20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 1.00B2b.
Petitioner contends that his testimony demonstrated that he cannot ambulate effectively
because he has significant difficulties climbing multiple steps (AR 33), he must put one foot on
the step and push the other foot on the step while holding onto the rail (AR 46), and that he is
unable to walk at a “normal rate with the normal people” (AR 46). He further contends that
there were many references in the record to his limp with the descriptions ranging from
“significant” to “mild.” (AR.188, 250, 262.)
The Court notes that Petitioner focused on the first portion of the definition of inability to
ambulate effectively. While it does mean an extreme limitation on the ability to walk that
interferes very seriously with an individual’s ability to initiate, sustain, or complete activities, the
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second portion of the definition is applicable as well. That includes having insufficient lower
extremity functioning to permit independent ambulation without the use of a hand-held assistive
device that limits the functioning of both upper extremities. Likewise, Petitioner focuses on only
one of the several examples in subparagraph (2) – the inability to walk at a reasonable pace. The
Court recognizes that the ability to walk independently in one’s home without the use of an
assistance device does not, standing alone, constitute effective ambulation. However, there is
substantial evidence in the record, including the reports of his medical providers and therapists,
to support the ALJ’s conclusion that Petitioner does not meet the listing because he can ambulate
effectively both inside and outside the home.
It is apparent that Petitioner walks with a limp and otherwise has some difficulty
walking. However, his testimony that he cannot walk a “normal” rate with “normal” people does
not dictate a finding that he cannot walk at a “reasonable rate.” Furthermore, the record reflects
that he can perform many of the tasks that people who cannot ambulate effectively cannot
perform. He does not require the use of an assistive device. (AR 188, 229, 245, 250, 253, 254,
and 262.) He is able to use public transportation, drive a car, shop in stores, take care of his
children, and perform household chores. (AR 42 (drive), 43 (drive), 131 (shop twice a week),
and 191 (chores, stairs, drive).) He is able to climb stairs independently (AR 191, 253) albeit at
with a single handrail (AR 33, 46, 291, 292).
The ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and was not the product of legal
error on the issue of whether Petitioner meets a listing.

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B.

Improper Denial of Petitioner’s Claim by Finding that Petitioner Could Return to
His Past Work as a Cashier-Checker
Petitioner contends that because his past work was part-time and highly accommodated,

the ALJ’s finding that he could return to his work as a cashier-checker was erroneous. His past
work in his small shop in Tajikistan was limited to four to five hours per day during which he
would take a 45-minute break to rest at a nearby home. (AR 47, 49.) In later years of his shop
ownership, his son would take over for him after school until closing time, and he would open
his shop later and close it earlier if an employee was unable to work. (AR 50-51.) Furthermore,
his contends that his condition had progressively worsened over a five-year period. (AR 244.)
The Respondent contends that the ALJ properly relied on the Vocational Expert’s
opinion that based on his Residual Functional Capacity, Petitioner could perform his past
relevant work as he actually performed it.
“A job qualifies as past relevant work only if it involved substantial gainful activity.”
Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 515 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560, 404.1565,
416.960 and 416.965). Part-time work may be substantial work. Katz v. Secretary of Health &
Human Services, 972 F.2d 290, 292 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572(a)). Therefore,
it follows that part-time work may qualify as past relevant work. The claimant has the burden of
showing that he can no longer perform past relevant work. Lewis v. Barnhart, 281 F.3d 1081,
1083 (9th Cir. 2002).
The ALJ must examine the claimant’s residual functional capacity and physical and
mental demands on his past relevant work when determining whether the claimant can perform
that work as actually performed or as generally performed in the national economy. Id. To
determine the work as actually performed, the ALJ may look to the claimant’s own testimony
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and a properly completed vocational report. Id. at 1083-84. In doing so, the ALJ must
determine credibility and resolve conflicts and ambiguity. Id.
Here, the ALJ found that Petitioner has the residual functional capacity to perform a
limited range of light work. More specifically, he found:

The claimant requires the opportunity to alternate between
sitting, walking and standing and could do so for 8 hours. He
could walk for up to but no more than 1/2 mile at a time or 1/2
hour at a time; the most he could stand at one time would be
somewhere between 10 to 30 minutes; and the most he could
sit at one time would be somewhere between 1 to 2 hours. He
could occasionally lift 20 pounds and frequently lift 10
pounds. He could not crawl or climb ladders or scaffolding.
He could do stooping, crouching and kneeling only seldom.
He could do stair climbing by only using one step to the stair
followed by the second and then only a few stairs at a time.
He could balance at least occasionally. Further, he has
limitations in social interaction and in concentration,
persistence or pace but only based on English language
difficulties as follows: He is able to deal with the public on a
brief, superficial basis or on an occasional basis as long as the
people he talks to are very small numbers, somewhere
between 1 to 3 or 4 people. Regarding concentration,
persistence or pace, he is not limited except if the job requires
English beyond brief conversations or brief bits of reading,
then the job would be excluded. This means, for instance,
that if he has to learn something new during the work period,
it would need to be learned either, through visual
demonstration or the opportunity to read the requirements
before he would have the chance to do the work and with the
opportunity to ask questions.
AR 13-14.
An ALJ’s determination of a claimant’s residual functional capacity will be
affirmed if he applied the proper legal standard and his decision is supported by

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substantial evidence. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005). Here, the
ALJ considered Petitioner’s testimony and medical evidence and found “that the
claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the
alleged symptoms and that his “statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and
limiting effects of these symptoms are fairly credible except to the extent they are
inconsistent with the above residual functional capacity assessment.” (AR 16.)
The ALJ recognized that claimant is not pain free but determined that his
statements were “not indicative of disabling pain,” that he had not mentioned
uncontrolled pain to his physicians, and that he had not had significant adverse side
effects from medication prescribed to alleviate the pain. (AR 16.) He noted that
Petitioner’s treatment had been conservative in nature; that Dr. Marsh indicated that he
was doing “fairly well” despite not taking “a lot” of his medication; that his medications
had been fairly effective when taken; and that none of his treating physicians, including
specialists, had determined that he was disabled. (AR 17.)
The ALJ also considered the KEY Functional Capacity Assessment noting that
Petitioner had “provided less than full effort” and that the “sub-maximal effort
represented the level the client perceives as his capability.” (AR 17.) The results of the
assessment were that Petitioner had the ability to function at a light work level. (AR 17.)
Finally, the ALJ considered the residual functional capacity assessment for a range
of light work from the State agency reviewing medical consultants at the initial and
reconsideration level. (AR 17.) The ALJ noted the medical reasons for the opinion but
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also imposed additional limitations such as:
. . . the opportunity to alternate sitting, standing and walking
positions and a greater degree of postural limitations due to
additional evidence and testimony received at the hearing
level not before the State agency and due to further
consideration of the combined effect of the claimant’s
impairments and the claimant’s subjective complaints. The
undersigned also imposed limitations in social interaction and
concentration, persistence or pace in the work setting due to
English language difficulties.
AR 17-18.
After considering all of the above, the ALJ concluded:
While the claimant has chronic pain and functional limitations
as a result of his impairments, the evidence and testimony did
not support a conclusion that he suffers from disabling pain
that would completely limit him from all work or restrict him
to only part time work. Further, the above residual functional
capacity accommodates many of the claimant's subjective
complaints concerning his pain and physical capabilities.
AR 18.
The Court finds that the ALJ’s determination regarding Petitioner’s residual
functional capacity is well supported by substantial evidence with due consideration for
his subjective complaints.
The ALJ then relied on the vocational expert’s opinion that Petitioner could
perform his past relevant work as a cashier-checker. The ALJ may rely on an vocational
expert’s answer provided he poses a hypothetical that “contained all of the limitations that
the ALJ found credible and supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Bayliss, 427
F.3d at 1217-18.
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The vocational expert testified that Petitioner performed the job of store manager
and cashier-checker at the sedentary level. (AR 55.) The ALJ recited his residual
functional capacity assessment, including limitations cited above, in the hypothetical
directed to the vocational expert. She found that an individual with the restrictions in the
hypothetical would be able to perform the job of cashier/checker although the number of
jobs in the national economy would be reduced given the English language limitations in
the hypothetical. (AR 56.) Based on the vocational expert’s opinion, the ALJ found that
Petitioner’s impairments do not prevent him from performing his past relevant work as
cashier-checker as he actually performed it which was at a sedentary level. (AR 18.)
The Court finds that the ALJ properly relied on the vocational expert’s answer to
the hypothetical that he provided containing all of the limitations that the he found
credible and supported by substantial evidence in the record. Furthermore, part time
work can qualify as past relevant work, and the limitations in the residual functional
capacity approximated the “highly accommodated” conditions of his past relevant work.
Accordingly, the Court affirms at step 4 the ALJ’s determination that Petitioner is not
disabled because he could perform his past relevant work as a cashier-checker at the
sedentary level.

C.

Failure to Cite a Light Level Job that was Within Petitioner’s Assessed Residual
Functional Capacity.
The ALJ found that three sedentary jobs – document preparer, microfiliming, and table

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worker – existed for Petitioner. Petitioner contends that the ALJ erred by not providing specific
light level jobs within Petitioner’s residual functional capacity for light work rather than
sedentary work. The ALJ made this determination during his alternative findings at step five.
Because the Court has affirmed the ALJ’s finding of not disabled at step four, the Court need not
address this argument.
D.

Translation Services Provided to Petitioner During the Hearing Were Not Sufficient
to Provide Petitioner with Due Process.
1.

Factual Background

On the day of the hearing, the Farsi interpreter who was to have appeared at the hearing
and translated was not available. Accordingly, the AJL arranged for an interpreter to translate via
telephone. After the hearing, Petitioner and counsel complained that the translation was
inadequate. (AR 179-81; 182-83.) The ALJ overruled the objection “given the fact that the
claimant and translator both spoke Farsi and there was no substantiation the claimant’s responses
were materially mischaracterized.” (AR 10.)
More specifically, counsel’s closing statement to the ALJ complained that it was
“extremely frustrating” because the interpreter was not present with Petitioner. He indicated that
there was “clear confusion,” that Petitioner attempted to answer questions not directed to him,
that the interpreter “held conversations” with Petitioner rather than translating, and that he was
not able to adequately communicate with his client.1 (AR 179-81.) He asked for a supplemental
hearing with proper translation services if the ALJ were inclined to find against him.
Petitioner himself also submitted a letter through counsel two days later. In his

1

Counsel regrets not asking for a postponement until adequate interpretation was available. He
had been so confident in his case that he did not expect the hearing to be overly complicated.
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statement, Petitioner stated that he was confused throughout the hearing, he had a very difficult
time hearing the translator over the phone, he could not understand him very well when he did
hear him, that the translator spoke with an accent that was not familiar to him, that he was
stopped during the hearing to allow the interpreter to translate, but he was not allowed to resume
his response most of the time, and that the translation contained mistakes about his education and
work experience. (AR 182-83.)
2.

Applicable Law

The Social Security Administration’s Hearings, Appeals, and Litigation Law Manual
(“HALLEX”) at I-2-6-10 addresses the use of foreign language interpreters:
If a claimant has difficulty understanding or communicating in
English, the ALJ will ensure that an interpreter, fluent in both
English and a language in which the claimant is proficient, is
present throughout the hearing.
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OP_Home/hallex/I-02/I-2-6-10.html
HALLEX is an “internal guidance tool” for use by ALJs and other staff members, is not
published in either the Federal Register or the Code of Regulations, and does not have the force
of law. Moore v. Apfel, 216 F.3d 864, 868-69 (9th Cir. 2000). “However, traditional notions of
due process would suggest that without an interpreter, a claimant unable to communicate in
English would hardly receive ‘a full hearing . . . in accordance with the beneficient purposes of
the [Social Security] Act.’” Martinez v. Astrue, 2009 WL 840661 at *2 (D.Conn. 2009) (citing
Echevarria v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 685 F.2d 751, 755 (2d Cir. 1982)).
To borrow from the context of immigration hearings, to succeed on a due process claim
of inadequate translation, a petitioner must show that a better translation would have affected
the outcome of the hearing. Acewicz v. U.S. I.N.S., 984 F.2d 1056, 1063 (9th Cir.1993) (citing
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Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 727 (9th Cir. 1980). Evidence of incompetent translation
claims includes direct evidence of incorrectly translated words, unresponsive answers by the
witness, and a witness’s apparent difficulty understanding what is said to him. Perez-Lastor v.
I.N.S., 208 F.3d 773, 778 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted) (finding both incompetent
translation where transcript showed that alien’s responses evidenced a lack of understanding of
the questions and resulting prejudice deprived alien of due process).
To prevail on an incompetent translation claim, a party must show prejudice. “[T]he
standard is whether ‘a better translation would have made a difference in the outcome of the
hearing.’” Id. at 780 (citing Acewicz, 984 F.2d at 1063). “The standard is onerous, but not
insurmountable.” Id. Notably, however, the Ninth Circuit has denied an incompetent translation
claim in a variety of circumstances: where the translation was at times nonsensical and where
clarification or repetition was at times required where in each instance the misunderstanding was
rectified to the apparent satisfaction of the parties; where there were isolated passages of
garbeled testimony; where the interpreter spoke too softly for the microphone to pick up on
several occasions and had difficulty with certain questions and answers but the IJ intervened
each time to ensure that the words were translated, heard, and understood; and where the
translator spoke broken English, but there was no evidence of a faulty translation. Id. n.5
(quotations and citations omitted).

3.

Discussion

Petitioner notes that from the beginning of the hearing, there were technical
difficulties with the telephone connection with the interpreter that continued throughout
the hearing. Indeed, a review of the transcript confirms that there were either incidents
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with the telephone connection itself resulting in “feedback,” difficulties with the
interpreter and/or the ALJ not hearing what was said, and several times when the
interpreter was not translating word for word but rather speaking in the third person all of
which are detailed more specifically in Petitioner’s and counsel’s statements and in
Petitioner’s brief. The Court found the transcript difficult to follow at times and the
whole process at the hearing less than ideal. While the transcript is not a “word for
word” translation of the questions and answers, the Court was able to follow the general
tenor of the questions and answers and found no glaring inconsistencies between the two.
Furthermore, an examination of the record reveals that Petitioner was not prejudiced by
the questionable translation.
As the Respondent points out, the instances cited by Petitioner regarding the
translation do not support a finding that a better translation would have made a
difference, that he does not assert that the answers were not his answers, that the ALJ
found Petitioner less than credible, and that the ALJ relied also on the medical and other
evidence to support his finding that Petitioner was ambulatory and his determination of
Petitioner’s residual functional capacity.
Petitioner has demonstrated some instances of the interpreter speaking
conversationally rather than translating word for word, Petitioner’s unresponsive answers
to questions, and his difficulty understanding the interpreter that would be evidence of
incompetent translation. However, the ALJ intervened in instances where there was
difficulty hearing or understanding and apparently resolved the situations to Petitioner’s
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and counsel’s satisfaction given their lack of objection during the hearing. Furthermore,
the ALJ noted that Petitioner occasionally started to answer a question in English without
waiting for the interpreter which was consistent with reports that he spoke in English to
his doctors and others, an indication that he was not totally dependent on the interpreter.
(AR 19.)
Despite issues with the translation services at Petitioner’s hearing, the Court finds
that Petitioner was not prejudiced by that translation. Accordingly, the Court finds no
due process violation and affirms the ALJ’s decision.
CONCLUSION
Based on its review of the entire record, the Court finds that the Commissioner’s
decision is supported by substantial evidence and is not the product of legal error.
Therefore, the Commissioner’s decision finding that the Petitioner is not disabled within
the meaning of the Social Security Act will be affirmed.

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ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, the Court being otherwise fully advised in the premises,
it is hereby ORDERED that the Commissioner’s decision finding that the Petitioner is
not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act be AFFIRMED and that the
petition for review be DISMISSED.
DATED: September 28, 2011

Honorable Mikel H. Williams
United States Magistrate Judge

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