Filicetti v. State of Idaho et al

Filing 47

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER denying 27 Cross Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 20 Motion for Summary Judgment; Plaintiff is directed submit a proposed Judgment within fourteen (14) days from the date of this decision and order.. Signed by Judge Edward J. Lodge. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by dks)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
CAROL A. FILICETTI,
Case No. 1:10-cv-00595-EJL

Plaintiffs,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE
STATE OF IDAHO; THE IDAHO
STATE TAX COMMISSION,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

Defendant.

INTRODUCTION
This case involves a dispute between the United States and Carol Filicetti, the exwife of taxpayer Joe Filicetti.1 Joe is not a party to this action, but he failed to pay his
2005 federal income taxes and in 2008, the government filed a notice of tax lien against
him. Carol seeks a determination that the tax lien did not attach to her home.
The parties cross-moved for summary judgment (Dkts. 20, 27) and the matter has
been fully briefed. The Court has determined oral argument would not assist the decisionmaking process and will decide this motion without a hearing. For the reasons explained
below, the Court will grant Carol’s motion and deny the government’s motion.

The Court entered default judgment against the State defendants. See Sept. 13, 2011
Memorandum Order, Dkt. 44.
1

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1

FACTS
Carol and Joe Filicetti divorced in December 2005. The divorce decree awarded
the Filicettis’ home to Carol, though she agreed to pay Joe 50 percent of the equity if she
sold it within three years. Specifically, the divorce decree provides:
Carol is awarded the parties’ residence at 2323 Woodlawn.
...
In the event Carol sells the residence within three (3) years from the date of
entry of this Decree, she agrees to split any equity received from said sale
after the payment of the remaining balance on the first mortgage and any
costs associated with the sale of the property equally between her and Joe.
Three years and one day after the Judgment and Decree of Divorce is
entered the property shall be Carol’s and either retained or sold at her
discretion, with her retaining all of the proceeds therefrom.
Divorce Decree, Ex. C to Parker Dec., Dkt. 31-3, ¶ 4.
Carol did not sell the house during the three years after the divorce decree was
entered. But she did not record the divorce decree with the county recorder until October
2010, nearly five years after entry of the divorce decree. Meanwhile, Joe did not pay his
federal income taxes for 2005, and in September 2008, the government filed a notice of
federal tax lien against Joe for unpaid taxes.2 This quiet title action ensued. Carol seeks a
determination that the federal tax lien cannot attach to her home.
ANALYSIS
A.

The Legal Standard
Motions for summary judgment are governed by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. Rule 56 provides that “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the
As of April 2011, Joe owed roughly $40,000 in unpaid taxes for 2005. See Bent Dec.,
Dkt. 30, ¶ 4.
2

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A party asserting that a
fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by: (A) citing to
particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically
stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for
purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine
dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of showing there
are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). Material facts are those
necessary to the proof or defense of a claim, and are determined by reference to
substantive law. Id. at 248. A fact issue is genuine “if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.
Once the moving party has met its initial burden, the nonmoving party has the
burden of presenting evidence to show that a genuine issue of fact remains. The party
opposing the motion for summary judgment may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of her pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial. Id. at 248. If the non-moving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial” then summary judgment is proper as “there can be

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3

no ‘genuine issue of material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof concerning an
essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts
immaterial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986).3
In applying the above standard, the Court must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Additionally, when
parties cross-move for summary judgment, the Court will consider each motions on its
own merits. Fair Housing Council v. Riverside Two, 249 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir.
2001). Nonetheless, in ruling on cross-motions, the Court will consider the entirety of
each party’s evidentiary submission, regardless of which motion (or opposition) the
evidence accompanied. Id. at 1136-37.
B.

The Federal Tax Lien Statute
The government’s tax lien against Joe Filicetti was created by Internal Revenue

Code § 6321. That statute provides:
If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after
demand, the amount (including any interest, . . .) shall be a lien in favor of
the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or
personal, belonging to such person.
I.R.C. § 6321 (emphasis added).
3

See also Rule 56(e) which provides:
If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another
party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

give an opportunity to properly support or address the fact;
consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion;
grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials—including the
facts considered undisputed-show that the movant is entitled to it; or
issue any other appropriate order.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4

Federal courts look to state law to determine what property rights “belong to” the
taxpayer. See Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 512-13 (1960). But application of
state law is restricted to what rights the taxpayer has in the property at issue; creditors’
rights under state law are not relevant to this determination. The Supreme Court
underscored this principle in the landmark decision, United States v. National Bank of
Commerce, 424 U.S. 713, 727 (1985), explaining that the “federal statute relates to the
taxpayer’s right to property and not his creditor’s.”
In National Bank of Commerce, the government attempted to levy a joint bank
account based on one of the account holder’s failure to pay taxes. Id. at 716. The bank
refused to comply with the levy, contending it did not know which portion of the joint
funds belonged to the taxpayer. Id. The Court held that because the taxpayer had the
unqualified right to withdraw all the funds from the joint account, the government had the
same right. Id. at 724. It also specifically rejected the taxpayer’s argument that the
government should not be able to levy the account because, under state law, the
taxpayer’s creditors could not garnish the account. Id. at 727-28 (“the fact[] that under
Arkansas law Roy’s creditors, unlike Roy himself, could not exercise his right of
withdrawal in their favor . . . [is] irrelevant . . . .”).
Under National Commerce, the key inquiry here is what rights, if any, Joe Filicetti
had in the Filicetti home when the government filed its notice of tax lien. The starting
point for this analysis is the divorce decree. The divorce decree was entered well before
the government filed its notice of tax lien and expressly provides that “Carol is awarded

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 5

the parties’ residence . . .” Divorce Decree, Dkt. 33-1, ¶ 4. It goes on to provide that Joe
will receive a payment “[i]n the event Carol sells the property . . . .” Id.
Preliminarily, a divorce decree is effective to transfer title to the spouse who is
awarded the property. See, e.g., Chavez v. Barrus, 192 P.3d 1036, 1044 (Idaho 2008)
(citing Idaho R. Civ. P. 70) (“the divorce decree . . . divided the parties’ community
property, both real and personal, and vested title to the home in Barrus, thus effectuating
the conveyance”). Thus, at the time the government imposed its lien, it had – at best – a
claim to Joe’s contingent, contractual right to a monetary payment if the house sold. See
generally Seaboard Surety Co. v. United States, 306 F.2d 855, 859 (9th Cir. 1962). Joe
did not, however, have any remaining real property rights in the home; his contingent
right to receive a payment was a personal property right. See Chavez, 192 P.3d at 104445 (spouse’s lien in marital home was personal property right, not a real property
interest).
Consequently, the government’s tax lien cannot attach to Carol’s property. After
all, “the tax collector steps into the taxpayer’s shoes.” United States v. Gibbons, 71 F.3d
1496, 1501 (10th Cir. 1995) (explaining National Bank of Commerce). And, more to the
point, the tax collector “‘must go barefoot if the shoes wear out.’” Gardner v. United
States, 34 F.3d 985 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting 4 Boris Bittker, Federal Taxation of
Income, Estates and Gifts ¶ 111.5.4 (1981)). Carol is therefore entitled to summary
judgment on her quiet title claim.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 6

C.

Idaho’s Recording Statutes
The government seeks to avoid this result by invoking Idaho’s recording statute,

see Idaho Code § 55-606, along with two controversial Fifth Circuit decisions – United
States v. Creamer Industries, Inc., 349 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1965) and Prewitt v. United
States, 792 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1986).
Turning first to the Idaho recording statute, the government relies on the
undisputed fact that it won the race to the county recorder’s office. The government filed
its notice of tax lien in September 2008; Carol lagged behind by more than two years,
filing the divorce decree in October 2010.
Idaho Code § 55-606 provides that unrecorded grants and conveyances of real
property can be defeated by an “encumbrancer, who in good faith, and for valuable
consideration, acquires a . . . lien by an instrument that is first duly recorded.” Idaho
Code § 55-606. In other words, if the government is treated as a creditor, it can defeat the
later-filed conveyance of real property to Carol. Significantly, however, the same statute
also provides that “[e]very grant or conveyance of an estate in real property is conclusive
against the grantor . . . .” Id. (emphasis added).4
The divorce decree is therefore “conclusive” against Joe Filicetti. Or, put
differently, Joe cannot claim any rights to the property based on the fact that the decree
4

The statute, in full, provides:
Every grant or conveyance of an estate in real property is conclusive against the grantor, and also
against everyone subsequently claiming under him except a purchaser or encumbrancer, who in good
faith, and for valuable consideration, acquires a title or lien by an instrument that is first duly
recorded.

Idaho Code § 55-606; see also Idaho Code § 55-613 (“encumbrance” includes “taxes,
assessments, and all liens upon real property”).
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 7

was unrecorded. The government concedes this point, but urges the Court to treat it as a
third party creditor, without regard to whether Joe has any claim to the property. See
United States’ Memo, Dkt. 28, at 14.
This argument is, of course, contrary to National Bank of Commerce, which
clarified that the focus is on the taxpayer – not the creditor’s rights under state law. The
government’s argument also bumps up against the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Schmit v.
United States, 896 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1990), which held that a title naming the taxpayer as
a joint owner is not controlling if the taxpayer, in reality, has no interest in the property.
In Schmit, Dorothy Schmit purchased a home entirely with her separate property,
but recorded the title in her name and her husband’s, as joint tenants. Id. at 353. Under
Nevada law, Schmit presumptively gifted one-half of the property to her husband. Id. But
she overcame that presumption by showing that she made all payments from her separate
bank account. Id. at 353-54. Thus, the court held that the government could not impose a
tax lien on the property for taxes owed by her husband:
Schmit’s home was always entirely her separate property under Nevada law.
Regardless of the form of record title, Saligoe [Schmit’s husband] never had
any actual interest in Schmit’s home. Thus, the government’s lien never
attached to the property, and the government cannot levy upon the property.
Id. at 354.
Though brief, Schmit’s logic is drawn from the plain language of Internal Revenue
Code § 6321 and is entirely consistent with National Bank of Commerce. Simply put, if
the taxpayer has nothing, the government has nothing.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 8

Despite this authority, the government urges the Court to follow the Fifth Circuit
cases mentioned above – Creamer and Prewitt.5 In Creamer and Prewitt, divided panels
held that federal tax liens attached to properties that the taxpayers had previously
conveyed in unrecorded instruments. Creamer, 349 F.2d at 628-29; Prewitt, 792 F.2d at
1355-56. The Creamer Court reasoned that “[a]s to the taxes owed to it, the United States
was a ‘creditor’ within the Texas recording statute.” 349 F.2d at 628.
Creamer drew a sharp dissent from Judge Brown, who – much like the later
National Bank of Commerce Court – reasoned that that under Internal Revenue Code
§ 6321, the focus is on what rights the taxpayer has, not on protections afforded creditors
under state recording statutes. See 349 F.2d at 629 (Brown, J., dissenting). As he
explained, “Unless there is property belonging to the taxpayer, the Government’s lien is
nonexistent.” Id. Judge Brown further reasoned that recording statutes were not designed
to allow the federal government to take one person’s property to satisfy another’s tax
debt:
Laws of Texas which are designed to protect innocent persons dealing in
faith on the revelations of title records are twisted to permit the great
national sovereign to take property from one who is the acknowledged
owner of it to apply on the tax debts of another . . . . I do not believe that
Congress ever intended any such result. I do not think that a Court should
lend its hand to anything so demeaning to a sovereign.

In addition to Creamer and Prewitt, the government relies on a 1971 California federal
district court opinion. See Nomellini Constr. Co. v. United States, 328 F. Supp. 1281 (E.D. Cal.
1971). Nomellini cited Creamer, but the Court is not persuaded by this aspect of the Nomellini
decision. Further, Nomellini is distinguishable. Most significantly, the Court found that the
taxpayer in that case had not truly sold the personal property subject to the tax lien. Id. at 1283.
Additionally, regarding the vehicles that were purportedly transferred, the California Vehicle
Code provided that “no interest” passed to the transferee without application for a new title
certificate. Id. at 1284 n.6 (citing Cal. Vehicle Code § 5600).
5

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 9

Id.
The Creamer dissent has been adopted as the law by other circuits that have faced
this issue.6 See United States v. Gibbons, 71 F.3d 1496, 1501 (10th Cir. 1995); Thomson
v. United States, 66 F.3d 160, 163 (8th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. V&E Eng’g &
Constr. Co., 819 F.2d 331, 334 (1st Cir. 1987). Further, Creamer and Prewitt have been
criticized by federal and state courts across the country. See, e.g., Hamilton v. United
States, 806 F. Supp. 326, 334 (D. Conn. 1992) (“the persuasive dissent . . . in Creamer
and the concurrence . . . in Prewitt leave those decisions less than compelling authorities);
Stafford v. Lunsford, 53 S.W. 3d 906, 910 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (“Fortunately, the law is
as Judge Brown would have it in at least three other federal circuits.”) (citing Gibbons, 71
F.3d 1496, Thomson, 66 F.3d 160, and V&E, 819 F.2d 331).
The government minimizes this substantial body of contrary authority, asserting
that it stands only for the unremarkable proposition that federal courts consult state law to
determine the extent of a taxpayer’s interest in any given piece of property. See United
States Memo, Dkt. 28, at 8. More specifically, the government argues that the outcomes
in various circuit cases differed simply because the underlying state law (typically, the
recording statutes) were different.

Creamer and Prewitt remain good law in the Fifth Circuit, however. The Court rejects
plaintiff’s assertion that the Fifth Circuit called Creamer and Prewitt into question in Wagner v.
United States, 545 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2008). See Plaintiff’s Reply, Dkt. 33, at 6; Plaintiff’s
Opposition, Dkt. 36, at 9-10. Wagner simply dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 545
F.3d at 303.
6

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 10

The Court rejects the government’s crabbed view of these cases for two reasons.
First, the statutes at issue in most of the cases are substantially similar.7 See Gibbons, 71
F.3d at 1501 n.5 (quoting the relevant Colorado statute); Thomson, 66 F.3d at 153
(quoting the Minnesota statute) Creamer, 349 F.2d at 628 (quoting the Texas statute).
There are some differences, but the salient feature in the statutes is that they protect
creditors and purchasers from earlier, unrecorded conveyances. The statutes further
provide that unrecorded conveyances are binding upon the parties to that conveyance, see
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-35-109; 19 Vernon’s Ann. Tex. Civ. Stat., art. 6627, or,
alternatively, they do not “vest any property interest . . . in the transferor.” See Thomson,
66 F.3d at 163 (discussing Minn. Stat. § 507.34).
The government’s construction of these cases does find some superficial support in
United States v. V&E Engineering & Construction Co., 819 F.2d 331 (1st Cir. 1987).
V&E decided that Puerto Rican laws differed from Texas’s because the Puerto Rican
statute expressly provided that a sale “between vendor and vendee shall be binding on
both of them, . . . .” Id. (citing P.R. Laws. Ann. tit. 31, § 3746 (emphasis supplied by
V&E). But this was not a meaningful distinction because the Texas statute at issue in
Creamer had a similar provision. See Creamer, 349 F.2d at 628 (citing 19 Vernon’s Ann.
Tex. Civ. St., art. 6627, which provided that land sales “shall be void as to all creditors . .
. but the same as between the parties and their heirs . . . shall be valid and binding.”)
A truly different statute might look like the one at issue in United States v. Hole, 1980
WL 1555 (D. Mass. Mar. 31, 1980), which provided that a conveyance had no effect “in passing
title” until recorded. As the Eighth Circuit observed, under that type of statute, “the transferor
seemingly retains an interest to which the § 6321 lien may attach.” Thomson, 66 F.3d at 163
(discussing Hole).
7

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 11

(emphasis added). Notably, later courts describe V&E as having rejected Creamer. See
Gibbons, 71 F.3d at 1501; Thomson, 66 F.3d at 163. See also IRS Chief Counsel Advisory
201024039, 2010 WL 2465293, at 4 & n.3. (2010) (observing that “while the First Circuit
rejected the conclusion in Creamer Industries by trying to distinguish the statutes in the
cases, the statutory schemes are not meaningfully distinguishable.”)
A second problem with the government’s characterization of contrary circuit
authority is its tendency to focus on minor points in cases, while ignoring their broader
teachings. The government also fails to meaningfully discuss some relevant authority. A
good example is the government’s treatment of Tenth Circuit authority. The most
relevant Tenth Circuit case is United States v. Gibbons, 71 F.3d 1496 (10th Cir. 1995).
Gibbons is directly on point and squarely rejects Creamer. The government, however,
does not discuss this case, focusing instead on another Tenth Circuit case – Gardner v.
United States, 34 F.3d 985 (10th Cir. 1994).8
The government rightly notes that Gardner involved a “unique” aspect of Kansas
law. See Gardner, 34 F.3d at 988. (Specifically, under Kansas law, the act of filing a
divorce decree creates a vested property interest in both spouses, and that property is not
subject to a judgment creditor’s lien during the pendency of the divorce proceedings. Id.)
But Gardner also stands for the broader proposition that a federal tax lien “cannot . . .
extend beyond the property interests held by the taxpayer.” Id. (citing United States v.
Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677 (1982)).
To be fair, the government addressed Gardner in responding to a group of cases cited in
plaintiff’s motion, and plaintiff did not cite Gibbons. See United States Memo., Dkt. 28, at 8.
Nonetheless, the government was a party to Gibbons, and should have been aware of the case,
and that it significantly undermined its argument here.
8

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 12

In sum, the overwhelming majority of courts considering the issue have rejected
Creamer and Prewitt on their merits – not by distinguishing them. This Court also rejects
Creamer and Prewitt. The cases are contrary to the plain language of the federal tax lien
statute, I.R.C. § 6321; they are contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in National Bank
of Commerce; and they are contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Schmit. The Court
therefore declines the government’s invitation to adopt the Fifth Circuit approach.
D.

Tenancy in Common
The government’s fallback argument is that – regardless of whether the divorce

decree was recorded – Joe continued to own the property, as a tenant in common with
Carol, through December 2008. The government cites the following language in divorce
decree – and, specifically, the italicized last sentence – to support this argument:
In the event Carol sells the residence within three (3) years from the date of
entry of this Decree, she agrees to split any equity received from said sale
after the payment of the remaining balance on the first mortgage and any
costs associated with the sale of the property equally between her and Joe.
Three years and one day after the Judgment and Decree of Divorce is
entered the property shall be Carol’s and either retained or sold at her
discretion, with her retaining all of the proceeds therefrom.
Divorce Decree, Dkt. 31-3, ¶ 4.
If the italicized language existed in a vacuum, the government’s argument would
be persuasive. But that sentence, landing as it does in context, simply clarifies that after
three years, Carol is no longer obligated to pay Joe half the equity if she decides to sell the
house. After all, in the same section, the divorce decree unequivocally states: “Carol is
awarded the parties’ residence at 2323 Woodlawn.” The intent of the quoted paragraph is
also plain: Mr. Filicetti had an expectancy of money if Carol sold the property. He had

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 13

no right to compel that sale; that decision was entirely up to Carol. Id. While the divorce
decree could have been more artfully drafted, the parties’ intent is clear – the divorce
decree awarded the house to Carol. Cf. Chavez, 192 P.3d at 1043-44 (parties’ intent in
divorce decree with some similar terms clearly awarded spouse title to the home). The
Court therefore rejects the government’s assertion that the divorce decree “makes no
disposition of the subject property for a period of three years and one day.” United States
Memo., Dkt, 28, at 15. Carol received the home in the divorce and she is not the
delinquent taxpayer here. The government’s lien therefore cannot attach to Carol’s home
and she is entitled to summary judgment.9
ORDER
Plaintiff Carol Filicetti’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 20) is GRANTED.
Defendant The United States’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 27) is
DENIED.
Plaintiff is directed submit a proposed Judgment within fourteen (14) days from
the date of this decision and order.
DATED: February 23, 2012

Honorable Edward J. Lodge
U. S. District Judge

Given the rulings set forth herein, the Court need not address the parties’ remaining
arguments.
9

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 14