Brown v. Reinke et al

Filing 22

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER Defendants' Amended Motion to Dismiss 17 based on Plaintiff's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies and failure to state a plausible claim for relief, is Granted. The Complaint is Dismissed. Signed by Judge Mikel H. Williams. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (ja)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

KEVIN BROWN,
Case No. 1:11-cv-00104-MHW
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

v.

BRENT REINKE, et al.,
Respondent.

Plaintiff filed a Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging his constitutional
rights were violated because he was denied access to courts when Defendants opened and
withheld his legal mail. (Dkt. 3.) Defendants now move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint.
(Dkt. 17.) All parties have consented to proceed before a U.S. Magistrate Judge. (Dkt.
15). Having reviewed the record, and for the reasons discussed herein, the Court grants
the Motion to Dismiss and enters the following Order.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is an inmate housed at the Idaho State Correctional Institution (ISCI). All
Defendants are ISCI officials, with the exception of Defendant Loomis, who is a Deputy
Attorney General. All are sued in their individual and official capacities.
Plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Ada County District
Court on January 5, 2010, and as a part of that case, he challenged the Commission of
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1

Pardons and Parole’s decision to not give him credit for the time he spent on parole. (Dkt.
3, p.6.) Plaintiff alleges that in the course of this action, he did not receive important court
papers and documents that were filed in the case, including a motion to dismiss and a
court order that dismissed his petition for writ of habeas after he failed to respond. (Dkt.
3, p.5.) Plaintiff claims that he did not receive his mail because it was being routed to the
Idaho Department of Correction’s (IDOC) central office instead of the ISCI, and the
Defendants were opening and withholding his mail. (Id.)
On May 12, 2010 Plaintiff received legal mail addressed to him, but it contained
legal documents for Cameron Ball and was returned to the sender. (Id.) On that day,
Plaintiff claims he asked Defendant Wright for a copy of the legal mail log, but Wright
would not allow Plaintiff to receive a copy. (Dkt. 3, p.7.)
On May 14, 2010, Plaintiff sent a concern form requesting a copy of the legal mail
log from the mail room. (Id.); see also (Dkt. 3-1). Plaintiff received a denial of his request
on May 18. (Id.) The day after, Plaintiff submitted a grievance on the issue of access to
courts, but failed to attach an offender concern form. (Dkt. 17-2, p.5.) Without a concern
form attached, the grievance did not meet proper grievance procedure, so it was returned
and never processed. (Id.) Plaintiff then filed a grievance with the previous request for
copies of the mail log on June 12, 2010, which was denied by Defendant Yordy. (Dkt. 3,
p.8.) Then on July 4, 2010, Plaintiff’s appeal of that grievance was denied by Defendant
Smith. (Id.)

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On July 22, 2010, after the denial of his requests, Plaintiff filed a Tort Claim with
the Secretary of State against the IDOC for withholding legal mail, claiming that he did
not receive mail and was unable to argue his case, resulting in the dismissal. (Dkt. 3-1,
p.5.) Plaintiff then filed his Complaint on March 15, 2011, claiming that by opening and
withholding his legal mail, Defendants denied him access to courts in violation of his
rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well those under
the First Amendment. (Dkt. 3.)
Defendants now move to dismiss the Complaint on the ground that Plaintiff has
failed to allege facts on which relief could be granted under a constitutional theory that
Defendants denied him access to courts. (Dkt. 17, p.3). Additionally, Defendants contend
that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and has failed to comply
with the Idaho Tort Claims Act prior to filing suit. 1 (Id.)
The Court will first consider whether Plaintiff properly exhausted his
administrative remedies before determining whether he has sufficiently pled a claim for
relief.
DISCUSSION
1.

Legal Standard for Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
An essential prerequisite to filing suit is the exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), exhaustion is mandatory before pro se
1

The Court is unaware of any state law claims in this action, and Defendants have failed to explain why proper
exhaustion of the Idaho Tort Claims Act is a prerequisite for bringing federal claims in a federal lawsuit under 42
U.S.C. §1983. The Court finds that this argument is not applicable to Plaintiff’s claims, and it will therefore not be
addressed further.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3

plaintiffs can bring a claim in court. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007). Requiring
plaintiffs to exhaust their administrative remedies gives prison officials the chance to
“resolve disputes concerning the exercise of their responsibilities before being haled into
court.” Id. at 204. Until exhaustion is completed properly, a prisoner’s case cannot
proceed regardless of the sufficiency of claims.
Proper exhaustion includes a prisoner completing the administrative review
process in accordance with all the procedural rules. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88
(2006). While the procedural rules are fairly standard, the level of detail required for a
proper grievance varies between systems and claims, but is ultimately under the prison’s
control, and not the PLRA. Jones, 549 U.S. at 218. If a prison’s rules do not state the
required detail needed to be considered a proper grievance, a grievance will suffice “if it
alerts the prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought.” Griffin v. Arpaio,
557 F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 2009). Alerting the prison as to the nature of the wrong
does not require inclusion of legal terminology or theories, unless they are necessary to
give notice to officials of the harm being grieved. Id. The grievance does not need to
contain “every fact necessary to prove each element of an eventual legal claim,” but it
must contain enough facts to facilitate a resolution of the problem. Id.
In the Ninth Circuit, a claim that a prisoner failed to exhaust administrative
remedies is an affirmative defense that should be brought as an unenumerated motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315

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F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2002). Defendants have the burden to plead and prove
exhaustion, and the reviewing court may look beyond the pleadings to resolve disputed
issues of fact, if necessary. Id.
2.

The Idaho Department of Correction’s Exhaustion Procedure
The IDOC uses a three-step grievance process that requires a prisoner to first

submit an informal Offender Concern Form describing the problem, then file a formal
Grievance Form if an informal resolution was not reached, and finally complete the
process with an appeal of any adverse decision. (Dkt. 17-2, p.2); see also (Dkt. 17-2,
Exhibit B, pp. 10–27.)
The prisoner begins this process by routing the concern form to the staff member
most capable of addressing the problem. (Dkt. 17-2, p.3.) If the issue is not resolved, the
prisoner then completes a grievance form and files the grievance within 30 days of the
incident. Id. The grievance form must contain specific information regarding the nature of
the complaint, including dates, places, names, and how the offender has been adversely
affected. Id. If the grievance is properly completed, the “grievance coordinator” will route
it to the appropriate staff member, who must respond within 10 days. Id.
After the staff member responds, the grievance coordinator forwards the grievance to the
“reviewing authority,” usually the deputy warden, who reviews the prisoner’s complaint
and the staff member’s response and issues a decision. (Dkt. 17-2, p.4.) If the prisoner is
dissatisfied with the reviewing authority’s decision, he may then appeal within 5 days to

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the “appellate authority,” which is usually the facility head. Id. Once the appellate
authority has issued its decision, the grievance is then routed back to the inmate, thus
concluding the administrative review process. (Dkt. 17-2, p.5.)
3.

Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff did not exhaust the grievance process set forth in

the IDOC policy because he failed to properly grieve his claim that he has been denied
access to courts by Defendant IDOC officials Smith, Yordy, and Wright. Defendants
contend that Plaintiff merely grieved the fact that he needed a copy of the prison mail log,
which did not properly fulfill the exhaustion requirement. Because proper exhaustion is a
requirement under the PLRA before brining suit, these Defendants request dismissal of
Plaintiff’s claims against them.1
Dismissal of claims is warranted if a plaintiff does not put prison officials on
notice of each claim he plans on bringing in court. The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Griffin
v. Arpaio is instructive on the issue presented in the case at hand. There, the plaintiff was
injured as a result of falling from the top bunk in his prison cell. Id. at 1118. In order to
avoid further injury, he filed a grievance requesting a ladder or some sort of permanent
step. Id. A nurse then assigned him a lower bunk, and prison officials noted on his
grievance form that the nurse’s order resolved his problem. Id. at 1119. Because prison
staff disregarded the nurse’s order, the plaintiff appealed his grievance, continuing to
1

Defendants seek dismissal of claims only with respect to those employed directly by the IDOC. Because
Defendant Loomis is an Idaho Deputy Attorney General, it appears that Defendants do not seek dismissal
of Plaintiff’s claims against him on exhaustion grounds.
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demand better access to the top bunk. Id. The Ninth Circuit found that, while notification
did not require allegations of deliberate indifference to suffice, it did require more than a
demand for a ladder. Id. at 1121. The officials responding to the grievance assumed the
nurse’s order resolved the issue, so without more information, prison officials could not
take “appropriate responsive measures.” Id. Therefore, the plaintiff did not alert the
prison to the nature of his problem, and the Ninth Circuit held that his claims were not
properly exhausted. Id.
Here, Plaintiff’s concern form and grievance have the same insufficiencies as the
grievance in Griffin. Plaintiff filed a concern form that said he received legal mail that
contained paperwork for Cameron Ball, and needed a copy of what the official on duty
wrote on the piece of mail. After Defendant Wright said he had no time to find the copy,
Plaintiff filed a grievance that merely asked for a copy of the mail log for an on-going
case because he needed the notation acknowledging that the paperwork inside was for
Cameron Ball. Defendant Wright then responded that he returned the letter to the sender
the same day. Defendant Yordy then responded that the log is for departmental purposes,
and would be provided if the court were to ask for it in the on-going case. On appeal of
the grievance, Defendant Smith agreed with the prior responses and denied copies of the
mail logs.
While the concern and grievance forms stated facts and a possible resolution, they
cannot be held sufficient as to putting the prison officials on notice of the denial of access

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to courts claim Plaintiff now asserts. Defendants assumed that the only reason Plaintiff
needed the mail logs was for an on-going case, a situation in which the court would order
the copies to be given to Plaintiff if needed. While Plaintiff was not required to grieve the
legal theory of denial of access to courts, Defendants needed more specific facts that
would put them on notice to address a claim of withholding legal mail. The grievances
needed to go beyond requesting a copy of the mail log.
Had Plaintiff’s grievance form included an explanation of the mail that was
withheld and the resulting, and allegedly on-going, injury of denial of access to courts,
the prison officials would have been put on notice and could have responded accordingly.
Plaintiff had the knowledge to submit such a grievance because he did so at one time, but
failed to attach a concern form pursuant to the IDOC grievance procedures. This
factually-adequate grievance was never processed because it did not comply with the
prison’s procedure. Therefore, Plaintiff did not grieve his claims properly, and did not
allow prison officials the chance to remedy the situation. Because of this insufficiency,
Defendants have met their burden of showing Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust his
claims and therefore, his Complaint must be dismissed as to the Defendant IDOC
officials.

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4.

Even if the Plaintiff had properly exhausted all administrative remedies, his
Complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted.
The standard for reviewing complaints subject to a motion to dismiss is set forth

by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). There, the Court ruled
that a complaint may survive a motion to dismiss only if taking the well-pleaded facts as
true, there is enough to state a plausible claim to relief. Id. at 678–79. The nonmoving
party, though, may not merely claim that it will discredit the moving party’s evidence at
trial, but must state specific facts that will support a claim to relief. T.W. Elec. Service,
Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). Missing facts
in a complaint will not be presumed in the nonmoving party’s favor, and a nonmoving
party’s subsequent filing of an affidavit or response that contains conclusory, nonspecific
statements will not be sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss. Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife
Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888–89 (1990).
While the general Iqbal standard is considered for all motions to dismiss, there is a
slight variation of the standard for pro se litigants. Inmates that file complaints pro se
“must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, pro se status does not
free a litigant from complying with the applicable rules of procedural and substantive law.
Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 477 (2d Cir. 2006).

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In order for an inmate to state a claim for denial of access to the courts due to
interference with legal mail, he must allege that the defendants were responsible for
actions that interfered with the plaintiff’s ability to pursue a legal claim. Davis v. Goord,
320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 2003). This allegation must include a claim of actual injury,
and show plausibility that the defendants frustrated “the plaintiff’s efforts to pursue a
nonfrivolous claim.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353 (1996). Without this showing of
actual injury caused by the defendants to an underlying nonfrivolous claim, a plaintiff
may not proceed and his complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
In Galeas v. Inpold, the plaintiff failed to allege specific facts to show plausibility
that the defendant’s interference with the plaintiff’s legal mail led to a denial of access to
courts. See 2012 WL 628229, at *2 (W.D. N.C. Feb. 28, 2012). The plaintiff produced
documentation with the defendant’s signature, but made no allegations in reference to the
defendant’s active or intentional interference with the mail. Id. The defendant claimed
that her signature on the document was only a single link in the chain by which mail
moves through the mailroom and to the inmates. Id. Because there were no allegations as
to the specific actions of the defendant that caused denial of access to courts, the
plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed. Id. at *3.
Here, the same problem is presented. Plaintiff merely alleges that Defendants were
those officials in the mailroom, and those who addressed his grievances. Nowhere in the
Complaint does Plaintiff allege facts that show plausibility that any or all defendants were

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the cause of his mail being withheld. Even if a copy of the mail log had been obtained,
Plaintiff would need to link each defendant to the actions recorded on the log. Plaintiff
stated no allegations as to the specific actions of the defendants that caused a denial of
access to courts.
Perhaps more importantly, Plaintiff does not show that the underlying claim is
nonfrivolous. A showing that the defendant interfered with a nonfrivolous case being
pursued in court is an essential part of a denial of access to courts claim. Lewis, 518 U.S.
at 353 (emphasis added). Without that showing, a plaintiff cannot claim he was denied
access to courts because a frivolous case cannot proceed to court regardless of a
plaintiff’s procedural mistakes that may or may not have been caused by a defendant. See
id.
Plaintiff contends that his habeas corpus case was dismissed because Defendants
opened and withheld legal mail that pertained to his on-going case. In this habeas case,
Plaintiff argued that the Idaho Commission of Pardons and Parole’s decision to not give
him credit for time on parole was incorrect and unwarranted. However, according to
Idaho Code § 20-228, it is in the Commission of Pardons and Parole’s discretion to
determine if parole should be deemed part of a prisoner’s sentence. Therefore, the
Commission has the authority to forfeit time spent on parole.
Additionally, in Gibson v. Bennett, the Idaho Court of Appeals ruled that I.C. § 20228 applies to all time spent on parole, not only that spent on suspended parole; and the

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Commission’s authority and discretion is followed in decisions of whether to credit the
time towards a prisoner’s sentence. 108 P.3d 417, 422 (Id. Ct. App. 2005). Because
Idaho’s statutory and case law appears clear on this matter, the fact Plaintiff was unable to
respond to the motion to dismiss because he states he did not receive it is of no import.
There was no argument that he could have made that would have changed this clear
precedent. The dismissal of his habeas corpus matter was not a legally cognizable injury
for which he may pursue relief based on a theory of the denial of access to the courts.
For these reasons, Plaintiff’s Complaint will be dismissed as to all Defendants.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED:
1. Defendants’ Amended Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 17) based on Plaintiff’s failure to
exhaust his administrative remedies and failure to state a plausible claim for relief,
is GRANTED. The Complaint is DISMISSED.

DATED: August 28, 2012

Honorable Mikel H. Williams
United States Magistrate Judge

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