Meridian Joint School District No. 2 v. D.A., et al

Filing 129

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER. NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Attorney Fees 113 is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Defendants are awarded $53,543.00 in attorney fees under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3). Signed by Judge Candy W. Dale. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (st)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

MERIDIAN JOINT SCHOOL
DISTRICT NO. 2,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:11-cv-00320-CWD
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

v.
D.A. and J.A., on behalf of themselves
and as legal guardians and parents of
M.A., a minor individual with a
disability,
Defendants.

Before the Court is a Motion for Attorney Fees (Dkt. 113) under the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. Defendants D.A. and
J.A. are the parents of M.A., a high-school age student diagnosed with high functioning
autism. They claim $73,939.75 in attorney fees as the prevailing parties in this matter.
Plaintiff Meridian Joint School District No. 2 (MSD) opposes Parents’ request, arguing
the Court is without jurisdiction to award attorney fees and, alternatively, that Parents
requested fee award should be substantially reduced.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1

The matter is fully briefed and, because the Court finds the decisional process will
not be significantly aided by oral argument, it will be decided on the briefs. Dist. Idaho
Loc. Civ. R. 7.1. For reasons stated below, the Court will award M.A.’s Parents
$53,543.00 for attorney fees reasonably incurred in litigating this IDEA appeal.
BACKGROUND1
During the 2010-2011 academic year, M.A. was an 11th grade student at
Centennial High School, which is within MSD. Following a longstanding dispute
between the School District and Parents as to whether the District should be providing
M.A. with special education, Parents requested an Independent Education Evaluation
(IEE) to be conducted at public expense under the IDEA. The request for an IEE
triggered the MSD’s responsibility to take one of two actions: (1) “[e]nsure that an
independent educational evaluation is provided”, or (2) “[f]ile a due process complaint to
request a hearing to show that its [original] evaluation [was] appropriate.” 34 C.F.R. §
300.502(b)(2)(i) and (ii).
MSD chose the latter option and filed for a due process hearing on February 2,
2011. After a 15-day due process hearing, Hearing Officer Guy Price (HO Price) found
that MSD failed to conduct an appropriate evaluation and that M.A. was entitled to an
IEE at public expense. HO Price declined to rule on whether M.A. qualified for special
education, finding this determination was premature until an appropriate evaluation was
complete.
1

The underlying facts and procedural history of this case are set forth in more detail in
the Court’s ruling on Defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees, (Dkt. 92), and the Court’s
Memorandum Decision and Order entered March 20, 2013. (Dkt. 63.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2

MSD sought judicial review of HO Price’s decision under 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(i)(2)(A), and Parents counterclaimed for, among other things, the cost of an IEE
of M.A. and attorney fees they incurred in connection with the due process hearing. The
Court affirmed HO Price in a Memorandum Decision and Order dated March 20, 2013.
Thereafter, M.A.’s Parents filed a motion to recover interim attorney fees and costs
associated with the due process hearing before HO Price. Pursuant to MSD’s request, the
Court bifurcated the issues of “entitlement to fees” and the “reasonableness of the fees.”
In June of 2013, the Court found M.A.’s Parents were the prevailing party within the
meaning of 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I) and thus entitled to recover fees incurred
during the due process hearing. And, in mid-October of 2013, the Court awarded Parents
$129,249 in reasonable attorney fees related to the administrative due process hearing.
In late November of 2013, the Court found Parents were entitled to $6,854 for the
expenses of the IEE. In addition, the Court awarded $15,175 in interim attorney fees
pursuant to Parents’ supplemental interim fee request filed October 25, 2013. Following
entry of the Court’s Final Judgment on November 25, 2013, M.A.’s Parents filed on
December 9 the instant motion for attorney fees related to the Court’s judicial review of
HO Price’s decision. 2

2

MSD’s appeal of the Court’s Final Judgment is pending before United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. (See Dkt. 114.)
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3

DISCUSSION
1.

Preliminary Matters
MSD raises two preliminary issues in its opposition to Parents’ motion for fees.

First, it repeats a jurisdictional argument the Court has considered and rejected already in
ruling on whether Parents are entitled to attorney fees as the prevailing party in this
action. Second, MSD contends Parents’ documentation in support of their fee motion
omits information required by Local Rule 54.2. These arguments need not detain the
Court for long.
A.

Jurisdiction to Award Attorney Fees

MSD again argues the Court lacks jurisdiction to award attorney fees unless and
until M.A. is found eligible for special education and related services under the IDEA.
There is no need for a second analysis of this issue. For the reasons stated in its June 25,
2013 Memorandum Decision and Order, (Dkt. 92), the Court finds it has jurisdiction to
award attorney fees upon a finding that M.A.’s Parents are the prevailing party in this
case.
B.

Local Rule 54.2

MSD next complains that M.A.’s Parents have not attached “a statement of
attorney fee contract with the client,” as required by District of Idaho Local Civil Rule
54.2(b). Although Parents’ lead counsel, Charlene Quade, filed a copy of her firm’s
retainer agreement with Parents, MSD notes the Scope of Representation in the
agreement expressly excludes “preparation for, filing, or litigation to appeal or enforce a
Due Process decision or settlement agreement.” (Quade Aff., Ex. C, Dkt. 113-6.) Further,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4

the agreement provides: “Legal representation and/or litigation beyond services listed in
the Scope of Representation require execution of a new Retainer Agreement.” (Id.) Based
on this language, MSD argues the Court cannot infer the nature of the contract for
Parents’ counsel’s services in this litigation.
No such inference is necessary because Parents’ counsel provided an explicit
statement of their fee contract with their clients. According to Quade, Parents agreed to
extend the hourly billing arrangement in the retainer agreement to services rendered by
Quade’s firm in this litigation. (Quade Aff. ¶ 5, Dkt. 113-3). Further, in the spring of
2012, Parents verbally agreed to a contractual arrangement between Quade’s firm and
attorney Scott Learned, whereby the firm would bill Parents $250 per hour for time
Learned spent on this matter. (Id. ¶ 6.) For purposes of Local Rule 54.2, Quade’s
statements adequately3 detail the hourly fee contract between D.A.’s Parents and their
attorneys.
2.

Prevailing Party
The IDEA authorizes an award of reasonable attorney fees “to a prevailing party

who is the parent of a child with disability.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I).4 “A
prevailing party is one who ‘succeed[s] on any significant issue in litigation which
3

It is not necessary for an attorney to reduce an hourly fee agreement to writing so long as
the “basis or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will be responsible [is]
communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after
commencing the representation . . . .” Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(b) (emphasis
added).
4
The Court analyzed the applicability of 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I) in the context of
Parents’ petition for interim attorney fees. (Dkt. 92 at 10-24.) The Court found the statute applies
under the circumstances of this case, notwithstanding the fact that M.A. has not been found
eligible for special education. That analysis applies with equal force in the context of the instant
motion for attorney fees.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 5

achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing the suit.’” Weissburg v.
Lancaster Sch. Dist., 591 F.3d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Van Duyn v. Baker
Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 825 (9th Cir. 2007)). The key to the analysis is whether the
party’s success “materially alter[ed] the legal relationship between the parties.” Id. MSD
filed this lawsuit seeking reversal of HO Price’s decision that M.A. was entitled to an IEE
at public expense. By obtaining an affirmance of HO Price’s decision, M.A.’s Parents
succeeded on a significant issue plainly altering the parties’ legal relationship—had the
result been different, MSD would not be obligated to reimburse M.A.’s Parents for the
cost of the IEE. Therefore, M.A.’s Parents are entitled to an award of reasonable attorney
fees.
3.

IDEA Standards for Calculating Reasonable Attorney Fees
Generally, courts determine reasonable attorneys’ fees by multiplying the number

of hours reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate, a process
known as the “lodestar” calculation. Miller v. Los Angeles County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d
617, 621 (9th Cir. 1987). This lodestar figure “is presumed to be the reasonable fee.”
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983); Id. The fee applicant bears the burden of
documenting the hours expended, and “[t]he party opposing the fee application has a
burden of rebuttal that requires submission of evidence to the district court challenging
the accuracy and reasonableness of the hours charged or the facts asserted by the
prevailing party in its submitted affidavits.” Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 139798 (9th Cir. 1993).

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 6

The “most critical factor” in determining the reasonableness of a fee award under
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) is “the degree of success obtained.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436;
see also Aguirre v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 461 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2006)
(expressly adopting the Hensley “degree of success” standard for the IDEA attorneys’ fee
analysis). If a party “has achieved only partial or limited success, the product of hours
expended on the litigation as a whole times a reasonable hourly rate may be an excessive
amount.” Id. Conversely, the Court should award full compensation if the prevailing
party obtained, as M.A’s Parents did here, “excellent results.”5 Schwarz v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs., 73 F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir. 1995). However, the IDEA prohibits
the Court from using a “bonus or multiplier” to calculate a fee award. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(i)(3)(C).
4.

Lodestar Calculation
The Court begins its lodestar analysis by determining the reasonable hourly rates

for Parents’ counsel and the paralegals who worked on this administrative appeal. The
Court then reviews the hours devoted to this action to determine whether they were
reasonably incurred.
A.

Reasonable Hourly Rates

The IDEA requires attorney fee awards to be “based on rates prevailing in the
community in which the action or proceeding arose for the kind and quality of services
furnished.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(C). The relevant community is the forum in which the
district court sits. See Davis v. Mason County, 927 F.2d 1473, 1488 (9th Cir. 1991). For
5

Here, the Court affirmed HO Price’s decision without limitation. (Dkt. 63.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 7

the purposes of this motion, the Court adopts its previous findings that the relevant
community is the State of Idaho and the relevant legal services are the highly specialized
field of special education law, not general civil litigation. (See Dkt. 101 at 7.) And,
considering the IDEA’s fee-shifting provision exists, in part, to attract competent counsel,
Aguirre, 461 F.3d at 1120, it is also significant that there are relatively few special
education attorneys in Idaho.
M.A.’s Parents request fees for the services of three attorneys—Charlene Quade,
Rebecca Boughton, and Scott Learned—and their supporting paralegals. Two of the
attorneys, Quade and Boughton, also worked on the due process hearing. In its October
16, 2013 Order on interim attorney fees, the Court determined the following hourly rates
were reasonable: $250 for Quade, $185 for Boughton, and $100 for the paralegals. (Dkt.
101 at 9-13.) Notwithstanding MSD’s restatement of its arguments concerning Quade’s
rate, and for reasons stated in the October 16 Order, the Court finds the above rates for
Quade, Boughton, and their paralegals are reasonable for the services rendered in this
administrative appeal as well.
Parents’ third attorney, Scott Learned, did not participate in the due process
hearing, so the Court has not previously determined a reasonable rate for his services.
Learned, a 2001 graduate of the Georgetown University Law Center, had seven years of
civil litigation experience when Parents filed the instant motion. (Learned Aff., Dkt. 1132.) Learned’s first five years of practice focused on employment and insurance law. After
that initial experience, he left the practice of law and worked as a high school math and
science teacher until 2011. In 2011, Learned began a private civil litigation practice that
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 8

includes special education, disability, Medicaid, personal injury, employment, and family
law issues. At the time Parents filed the instant motion, he had roughly one and one half
years of special education law experience. Based on this experience and his general
knowledge of prevailing rates for similar legal services, Learned contends that $250 per
hour is a reasonable rate for his services in this case.
MSD counters that the $250 rate is excessive, noting that the bulk of Learned’s
experience is in general litigation, not special education law. MSD also argues that
Learned’s hourly rate for family law cases—and the maximum hourly rate he may earn
under his contract with Quade’s firm in this case—is $150 per hour. Last, MSD reasons
that Learned’s hourly rate should reflect the fact that he did not practice law for five
years. These considerations, in MSD’s estimation, make $150 per hour a reasonable rate
for Learned’s services.
According to the Affidavit of Merlyn Clark submitted by MSD in its opposition to
Parents’ motion for interim attorney fees, the prevailing rate in the Boise market for
general litigation attorneys with 5 to 15 years’ experience is between $150 and $250 per
hour. (Clark Aff.¶ 4(b), Dkt. 96-2 at 2.) Learned’s litigation experience entitles him to a
rate within this range. But Learned’s hourly rate for family law matters is not probative of
the value of his services in this case, which involves the practice of special education law.
Likewise, the compensation scheme dictated by Learned’s contract with Quade’s firm is,
as MSD admits, “irrelevant,” because the relevant agreement is the one between Quade’s
firm and its clients, M.A.’s Parents. (Dkt. 72 at 8.) The firm’s agreement with M.A.’s
Parents sets the hourly rate for both Learned and Quade at $250 per hour. Compared to
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 9

Quade, however, Learned has relatively limited experience in the special education law
arena—although his five years of experience as a classroom educator has some offsetting
value. Given these competing factors, the Court finds $225 per hour to be a reasonable
rate for Learned’s services in this case.
B.

Hours Reasonably Expended

The next question is whether the hours claimed by Parents’ counsel were
“reasonably expended in pursuit of the ultimate result achieved.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at
431. “A court may reduce the hours requested if it believes that the documentation is
inadequate, the hours duplicative, or the hours excessive or unnecessary.” S.A. v.
Patterson Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 2010 WL 3069204, at *6 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (citing
Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1986)). But, “[b]y and
large, the court should defer to the winning lawyer’s professional judgment as to how
much time [s]he was required to spend on the case.” Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534
F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008).
MSD argues the Court should disallow the following four categories of time
claimed by Parents: (1) time spent preparing Parents’ interim fee petition; (2) time related
to preparation of M.A.’s IEE; (3) time billed for a multi-topic litigation team meeting on
May 11, 2012; and (4) time devoted to filing a motion to compel MSD’s compliance with
HO Price’s decision that M.A. was entitled to an IEE at public expense. The Court
addresses these arguments below.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 10

(1)

Time Preparing the Interim Fee Petition

In its Order on Parents’ initial interim attorney fee petition, the Court awarded
attorney fees for 40.7 hours spent researching Parents’ right to interim fees and preparing
documents to support the interim fee petition. (Dkt. 101 at 15-17.) However, the Court
found Parents’ counsel spent an excessive amount of time on these tasks and admonished
Parents to “not again seek reimbursement for time spent on their interim fee petition.”
(Id. at 17 n.9.) Now, M.A.’s Parents seek reimbursement for an additional 86.16 hours
spent researching, briefing, discussing, and presenting oral argument on Parents’ interim
fee petition. This time was not included in Parents’ supplement to their interim fee
petition filed on October 25, 2013—at which point counsel had spent and billed for all
the time now claimed.
Essentially arguing Parents should not get another bite of the interim fee apple,
MSD maintains this time should be disallowed. The Court agrees, because it has twice
considered Parents’ request for interim fees. While time spent establishing entitlement to
attorney fees is compensable, Clark v. City of Los Angeles, 803 F.2d 987, 992 (9th Cir.
1986), principles of finality and judicial economy weigh against revisiting the interim fee
issue for a third time. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. The Court considered both Parents’ initial
interim fee petition (Dkt. 64) and a supplemental interim fee petition (Dkt. 102), and it
6

Although Exhibit B to the Affidavit of Charlene Quade purportedly lists all time spent
supporting the interim fee petition, the Court’s review of the billing entries in Exhibit A to
Quade’s affidavit reveals 10.4 hours of time related to the interim fee petition. (Quade Aff., Ex.
A, Dkt. 113-4 at 13.) These tasks were completed between March 23 and April 3, 2014—
immediately before M.A.’s Parents filed their interim fee petition. The Court will consider the
10.4 hours in Exhibit A and the 75.7 hours in Exhibit B in connection with MSD’s objection to
hours spent on Parents’ interim fee petition.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 11

entered a Final Judgment that included interim attorney fees claimed in both filings. (Dkt.
112.) Indeed, no motion to amend the Final Judgment was filed within 28 days after entry
of the judgment, as required by Rule 59(e). The Final Judgment is now on appeal to the
Ninth Circuit. Accordingly, the 86.1 hours Parents belatedly claim for work related to
their interim fee petition will be disallowed.
(2)

Time related to the IEE

Next, MSD urges the Court to disallow 19.6 hours related to preparation of M.A.’s
IEE, arguing the time was not related to Parents’ success in this action. The Court finds
this time compensable, as it directly relates to the content—and thus the cost—of the IEE.
The cost of the IEE was the central issue raised in the parties’ briefing on appropriate
relief. (See Dkt. 111.) Therefore, the Court will allow all 19.6 hours.
(3)

Time for the May 11, 2012 Litigation Team Meeting

In addition, MSD objects to 1.8 hours of time Quade and Learned billed for a May
11, 2012 litigation team meeting. According to the billing records, the meeting covered
issues related to Parents’ motion to augment the record, scheduling, and case
management. MSD argues Quade and Learned impermissibly block-billed legal tasks
with scheduling and case management, which are administrative tasks. M.A.’s Parents
respond that the 1.8 hours relate to the litigation team’s discussion of scheduling and case
management issues, not the performance of the associated administrative tasks.
The problem with true block-billing is that the practice makes it impossible to
determine whether the hours claimed are reasonable for the work performed. Mendez v.
County of San Bernadino, 540 F.3d 1109, 1129 (9th Cir. 2008). The billing entries
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 12

challenged here present no such problem, as counsel’s descriptions of the work leave no
doubt that they each spent about 54 minutes conferring on the three listed topics.
Furthermore, because Parents’ counsel utilized a team approach to the litigation, periodic
team meetings are not necessarily unreasonable or duplicative. See M.L. v. Federal Way
Sch. Dist., 401 F.Supp.2d 1158, 1169-70 (W.D. Wash. 2005). Thus, the Court finds these
1.8 hours were reasonably expended.
(4)

Time for Motion to Compel Compliance with HO Price’s Decision

MSD’s final objection pertains to 23.6 hours Parents’ counsel spent preparing a
motion to compel compliance with HO Price’s decision.7 In a brief Order, the Court
found this motion had no basis in law. (Dkt. 20.) Nevertheless, Parents deem the motion
“not unreasonable.” (Dkt. 122 at 10.)
The Court disagrees. A motion with no basis in law is, by definition, legally
unnecessary. It is well-established that the Court may disallow time claimed for legally
unjustified tasks because the time is not reasonably expended in pursuit of the ultimate
result achieved. E.g., S.A., 2010 WL 3069204, at *7-*8. Therefore, the 23.6 hours of time
Parents’ counsel devoted to the unnecessary, legally unfounded motion to compel will be
disallowed.

7

MSD does not specifically identify the billing entries it attacks with this objection.
Instead, it generally directs the Court to entries “found at 7/19/11 (6 entries); 7/21/11 (2 entries);
8/25/11 to 8/29/11 (13 entries).” (Dkt. 117 at 13 n.4.) The Court has reviewed billing entries on
the indicated dates and finds 5 entries on July 19, 2 entries on July 21, 1 entry on August 25, 7
entries on August 28, and 2 entries on August 29, each related to research and briefing on
Parents’ motion to compel. These entries total 23.6 hours. Due to the ambiguity of MSD’s
objection, the Court will evaluate only these 23.6 hours.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 13

C.

Lodestar Summary

According to the analysis above, the Court will disallow 86.1 hours Parents’
belatedly claim for work on their interim fee petition, as well as 23.6 hours spent on their
motion to compel compliance with HO Price’s decision. Multiplying the hours
reasonably expended on this litigation by the reasonable hourly rates for Parents’ counsel
and support staff, the Court’s lodestar calculation yields $53,543.00. The table below
summarizes these findings, and Appendix A provides a complete list of all disallowed
time.

Person

Charlene
Quade
Rebecca
Boughton
Scott
Learned
Paralegals
Totals

5.

Hours
Claimed

Hours Disallowed
Interim
Motion to
Fee
Compel
Petition Compliance

Hours
Reasonably
Expended

Reasonable
Hourly
Rate

Lodestar

70.8

19.3

6

45.5

250

$11,375

133.4

0

16.1

117.3

185

$21,700.50

90.1

30.6

0

59.5

225

$13,387.50

108.5
402.8

36.2
86.1

1.5
23.6

70.8
293.1

100
—

$7,080
$53,543.00

Degree of Success
The final question is whether the presumptively reasonable lodestar figure should

be adjusted to account for the degree of success M.A.’s Parents achieved in this matter.
See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436. Again recycling an argument the Court rejected in the
context of Parents’ interim fee petition, MSD claims the lodestar should be cut by 50%
because Parents did not achieve their ultimate objective—namely, a finding that M.A. is
entitled to special education under the IDEA. As the Court previously explained, MSD’s
argument is fatally flawed because this case does not concern M.A.’s entitlement to
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 14

special education; it concerns his entitlement to an IEE at public expense. Parents clearly
and completely prevailed on that issue when the Court affirmed HO Price’s decision.
Therefore, M.A.’s Parents achieved excellent results in this case and are entitled to a fully
compensatory fee in accordance with the Court’s calculation.
ORDER
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for
Attorney Fees (Dkt. 113) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
Defendants are awarded $53,543.00 in attorney fees under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3).

September 19, 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 15

APPENDIX A – Time Disallowed by Date and Category
The table below shows the disallowed time addressed in Section 4 of this decision.
The billing entries are copied from Exhibits A and B to the Affidavit of Charlene Quade
in Support of Motion for Attorney Fees. (Dkts. 113-4, 113-5.)The following
abbreviations refer to the following professionals: “CQ” is Charlene Quade, “BB” is
Rebecca Boughton, “SL” is Scott Learned, and “CR” and “AS” are paralegals.
Date

3/23/2013

3/25/2013

Person

SL

SL

4/1/2013

AS

4/1/2013

CQ

4/2/2013

CQ

4/3/2013

CQ

4/3/2013

AS

4/3/2013

SL

4/23/2013

AS

4/23/2013

SL

Description of Service
Interim Fee Petition
Research regarding attorney fees; prepare emails
with staff regarding same; telephone call with
CKQ re: same.
Research regarding timing of request for fees;
exchange emails with CKQ re: strategy.
Edit/update Motion and supporting documents for
Attorney Fees and Costs; factual research re:
same.
Review declaration of PG; meet with PG; Call to
MH; Email to RB for purposes of Motion for
Attorney Fees
Draft Motion and Memo for Attorney Fees and
Costs; Receipt and review declaration and
information regarding Becky Boughton.
Finalize Motion and Memo for Attorney Fees and
Costs.
Edit Motion and supporting documents for
Attorney Fees and Costs; factual research re:
same; file.
Review and revise Motion for Attorney Fees and
Costs
Legal research re: client's right to attorney fees
under IDEA
Receive and review Motion to Bifurcate; prepare
email to CKQ re: same

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 16

Hours
Disallowed

0.9

1

2.3

0.3

1.1
0.7
3
1.1
1.5
0.3

4/25/2013

AS

4/27/2013

SL

4/28/2013

SL

4/29/2013

AS

4/29/2013

SL

5/2/2013
5/2/2013
5/3/2013

CQ
SL
AS

5/6/2013

CQ

5/7/2013

CQ

5/7/2013

CQ

5/17/2013
5/19/2013

CQ
CQ

5/20/2013

AS

5/20/2013

CQ

5/21/2013

AS

5/21/2013

CQ

5/21/2013

SL

5/21/2013

SL

5/21/2013

CQ

5/22/2013

CQ

5/22/2013

SL

Draft caption for Response to Motion to
Bifurcate; Email same to SRL.
Research and prepare Response to Motion to
Bifurcate
Research and Prepare Response to Motion to
Bifurcate
Draft, edit and file Response to Motion to
Bifurcate.
Exchange emails regarding Motion to Bifurcate
and right to fees.
Litigation team review of fee issues
Litigation team review of attorney fee issue.
Prepare releases for consulting counsel.
Conference: Confer with P.S. regarding research
needs.
Receipt and review Court filings from Plaintiff re:
fees and remedy.
Legal Research: Correspondence with researching
attorney re: issues related to fees.
Research: Issue of Attorney Fees under IDEA.
Research: Issue of Attorney Fees under IDEA.
Factual research regarding PAT, missing
assignments and school handbook for Reply Brief
in Support of Attorney Fees.
Continued Research on IDEA attorney fees;
Federal Regulation case law and Statute. Review
exhibits and testimony.
Factual research for Reply Brief in Support of
Attorney Fees.
Research on Due Process Rights under IDEA;
Review records for cites; Review MSD Student
Handbook.
Prepare reply memorandum for interim attorney
fees;
Telephone calls with CKQ and consulting
attorney regarding interim fees.
Telephone call with SRL regarding reply
memorandum for interim attorney fees.
Analyze and Review: Record for test on PAT;
Violation of Student Code of Conduct.
Research and prepare memorandum regarding
fees

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 17

0.2
2.4
1.6
0.6
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.5
0.2
1.5
0.8
5

2.1
2
2.5
0.9
0.2
0.2
1.7
5.8

5/22/2013

AS

5/23/2013

AS

5/23/2013

CQ

5/23/2013

SL

5/23/2013

SL

5/23/2013

CQ

6/6/2013

SL

6/6/2013

CQ

6/8/2013
6/11/2013
6/12/2013
6/12/2013
6/13/2013

CQ
AS
AS
SL
AS

6/13/2013

CQ

6/13/2013

SL

6/13/2013

SL

6/13/2013

CQ

6/26/2013

CQ

6/26/2013

CQ

6/26/2013

SL

6/26/2013

SL

8/2/2013

CQ

8/6/2013

AS

Factual research re: Dr. Webb's invoices and
timeline of filings for Reply Brief in Support of
Attorney Fees and Brief regarding Appropriate
Relief.
Review and edit draft and factual research for
Reply Brief in Support of Attorney Fees and Costs
and Brief re: Appropriate Relief.
Analyze and Review Reply Brief: record review,
editing, final review.
Research and prepare memorandum regarding
fees
Conference with CKQ and AS regarding
memorandum re fees
Conference with SRL and AS regarding
memorandum on fees
Conference with CKQ and AS regarding Motion
regarding attorney fees.
Conference with SRL and AS regarding Motion
regarding attorney fees.
Receipt and read Sir [sic] Reply on Fees
Preparation for oral arguments
Preparation for oral arguments
Prepare for hearing regarding motion for fees
Preparation for oral arguments
Prepare for and attend Oral Arguments on Interim
Fees.
Prepare for and attend hearing on motion for fees
Conference with client, staff and CKQ regarding
same.
Conference with client, staff and SRL regarding
hearing on motion for interim fees.
Receipt and review Order on Interim Fees.
Meeting with client, SRL and AS to discuss Order
re: Interim Attorney Fees
Meeting with client, CKQ and AS to discuss
Order re: Interim Attorney Fees
Receive, review and analyze Court's Order
regarding fees.
Receipt and read filings by MSD.
Gather pleadings and requested documentation for
CKQ re: Reply Memo in Support of Motion for
Interim Attorney Fees.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 18

3.9

7.1
1.1
2.9
0.3
0.3
1.3
1.3
0.5
0.6
0.4
2.3
0.1
0.8
1.0
0.5
0.5
0.8
0.2
0.2
1.0
0.5
0.6

8/7/2013

SL

8/7/2013
8/7/2013

SL
CQ

8/12/2013

AS

8/14/2013

AS

8/15/2013

SL

8/15/2013

AS

8/15/2013

AS

8/16/2013

SL

8/16/2013

AS

10/17/2013

SL

10/17/2013

SL

7/19/2011

BB

7/19/2011

BB

7/19/2011

CQ

7/19/2011

CQ

7/19/2011

CR

7/21/2011

BB

Analyze Plaintiff's brief regarding fees and
prepare response.
Litigation team meeting re: strategy.
Litigation team meeting re: strategy.
Factual research for Reply in Support of Motion
for Interim Attorney Fees: Details re: IDEA
hearing and analyze billing.
Factual research re: billing and history of filings
in administrative hearing for Reply Memo in
Support of Motion for Interim Attorney Fees.
Prepare Reply Memorandum regarding Motion
for Interim Attorney Fees.
Factual research for Reply Memo in Support of
Motion for Interim Attorney Fees.
Draft Affidavit of CKQ in Support of Motion for
Interim Attorney Fees.
Revise and finalize Reply Memorandum
regarding Motion for Interim Attorney Fees.
Review, edit and factual research re: Reply Memo
in Support of Motion for Attorney Fees.
Receive, review and analyze court's order granting
interim fees
Research regarding timing of fee request for
district court case.
Motion to Compel Compliance
Analyze and Review case law from 9th Circuit
and other states re: Motion to Compel
Continued research and analysis of case law in
preparation for and drafting Motion to Compel
Research District Court Local Rules re: Motion to
Compel Compliance with HO Order and
Supporting Memorandum of Law
Research and consult and confer with co-counsel
on Motion to Compel Compliance with HO Order
and Answer to Complaint
Review and edit Motion to Compel; correct fact
section and edit history.
Review and compare CKQ Post-Hearing Brief
and opposing counsel's complaint for applicable
points and authorities regarding completion of
Motion to Compel Compliance with Hearing
Officer's Order, and Memorandum in Support of

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 19

1.5
1.4
1.4
2.2

3.5
2.8
0.3
1.1
0.6
1.7
0.3
0.1

1.4
0.6
0.2

2.5
0.8

6.5

7/21/2011

BB

8/25/2011

CQ

8/28/2011

BB

8/28/2011

BB

8/28/2011

BB

8/28/2011

BB

8/28/2011

BB

8/28/2011

BB

8/28/2011

CQ

8/29/2011

BB

Motion. Final research related to Rule 62 (part of
Memo) and deference for hearing officer's ruling.
Preparation of Proposed Orders Granting Motion
to Compel and Motion to Seal Case.
Review Motion to Comply with H.O.'s Order and
Motion to Seal. Review Petitioner's objections
made during IDEA hearing and create outline of
notes.
Teleconference and emails with litigation team re:
strategy related to Student's IDEA appeal matter,
in preparation for our reply(s) to opposing
counsel's Responses to Motion to Seal and Motion
to Compel
Begin review and analysis of opposing counsel's
Response to Defendants' Motion to Compel;
research and analysis of arguments and case
citations and applicability to case at hand and 9th
Circuit in general, and preparation of reply
addressing same.
Review opposing counsel's Response for
inconsistencies; begin fact development and
preparation of preliminary statement for Reply to
opposing counsel's Response to Motion to
Compel
Review and analysis of opposing counsel's
citation to and interpretation of IDAPA rules, and
preparation of Reply to opposing counsel's
Response to Motion to Compel
Review and analysis of opposing counsel's undue
burden argument if Plaintiff is required to comply
with IDEA and hearing officer's decision, and
preparation of Reply to opposing counsel's
Response to Motion to Compel
Review and analysis of opposing counsel's Fed. R.
Civ. P. Rule 62 argument and our of circuit
citations (shepardized), and research of parallel
and applicable IRCP Rule 84 in preparation of
Reply to opposing counsel's Response to Motion
to Compel
Draft reply to Objection to Motion to Compel.
Confer with attorney RLB regarding the same
Continued and final review and analyze of

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 20

0.9

1.5

0.4

1.7

1.3

0.6

0.6

1.3

1.8
0.8

8/29/2011

CR

opposing counsel's Response to Defendant's
Motion to Compel; research and analysis of
arguments and case citations; fact development
and applicability to case at hand in general in
preparation of Reply
Review and edit Motion to Compel

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 21

0.7