Edmiston v. Idaho State Liquor Division et al

Filing 66

MEMORANDUM DECISION & ORDER the motion in limine (docket no. 60 ) is DENIED without prejudice to Andersons right to object to evidence at trial. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (jp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
MARGO M. EDMISTON,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:11-CV-395-BLW

v.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

IDAHO STATE LIQUOR DIVISION, a
department of the State of Idaho, and JEFFREY
R. ANDERSON, Director of the Idaho State
Liquor Division, in his individual and official
capacity
Defendants.

INTRODUCTION
The Court has before it defendant Anderson’s motion in limine. The motion is
fully briefed and at issue. For the reasons explained below, the Court will deny the
motion.
ANALYSIS
Anderson’s motion in limine asks the Court to exclude any testimony or evidence
of an alleged vendetta between plaintiff Edmiston and State officials and employees of
the Idaho State Liquor Division (ISLD). Anderson argues that the vendetta evidence is
irrelevant under Rule 402 and unduly prejudicial under Rule 403.
The trial in this case will answer a simple question: Why was Edmiston fired? If
she was fired for reasons personal to her – and not as part of an agency-wide reduction-

Memorandum Decision & Order – page 1

in-force (RIF) – she was entitled to due process protections that she admittedly did not
receive.
Evidence of a vendetta would be relevant to whether she was fired for reasons
personal to herself. This evidence includes testimony from Anderson’s immediate
predecessor as ISLD Director, James Nally, that there was a “personal vendetta” between
Edmiston and officials at the Department of Human Resources (DHR) and the
Department of Financial Management (DFM). See Nally Deposition at p. 20. During
this “long-standing feud of 20 years,” these officials were “watching [Edmiston] like a
hawk, much more than they watched other employees, trying to find something wrong . .
. watching to try to catch a mistake, to get a reason to fire her for cause.” Id. at pp. 20-21,
22. Nally recalled DHR officials stating that “we’re going to need to get several people
in this reduction to make it look like we’re not retaliating against [Edmiston].” Id. at p.
29.
Anderson alleges he knew nothing about the vendetta and it played no part in his
firing of Edmiston. But is it likely that a two-decade long vendetta of that intensity ended
without a trace the day Anderson took over from Nally?1 This evidence challenges
Anderson’s credibility and is relevant under Rule 402 for that reason. Its probative value
is high enough that it is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
and so is not excluded by Rule 403.
1

The Court must assume the truth of Nally’s statements at this stage of the
proceedings. Obviously the jury will ultimately determine the credibility of both Nally
and Anderson without any such presumptions.
Memorandum Decision & Order – page 2

Anderson argues that his subjective intent is irrelevant in determining whether he
is entitled to qualified immunity. While that might be true for some cases, it is not true
when the underlying constitutional claim is a due process violation: “For instance, unlike
in Fourth Amendment cases, plaintiffs’ due process claim is based on a subjective, rather
than objective standard of culpability.” A.D. v. California Highway Patrol, 712 F.3d 446,
458 (9th Cir. 2013). In a due process case like this one, the Court ultimately makes the
qualified immunity determination but “must apply the qualified immunity framework to
the facts that the jury found including the defendant’s subjective intent.” Id. at 459. In
this case, it matters why Anderson fired Edmiston, a question of fact for the jury. If he
fired her due to pressure from superiors motivated by a vendetta against her personally –
rather than as part of an agency-wide RIF – then he clearly owed her due process
protections that were not provided. That is highly relevant to whether Anderson is
entitled to qualified immunity, a question for the Court, based on the jury’s findings.
Of course, this analysis is necessarily general in nature, and any particular
evidence must be reexamined at trial in context. But at this point, the Court cannot find
that all vendetta evidence should be excluded. The Court will deny the motion in limine,
without prejudice to Anderson’s right to object to any evidence at trial.
ORDER
In accordance with the Memorandum Decision set forth above,
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the motion in limine
(docket no. 60) is DENIED without prejudice to Anderson’s right to object to evidence at
trial.
Memorandum Decision & Order – page 3

DATED: May 22, 2014

_________________________
B. Lynn Winmill
Chief Judge
United States District Court

Memorandum Decision & Order – page 4