Ridgley v. Smith

Filing 16

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER granting 11 Motion to Dismiss. Claims 1(d), 2, 3, and 4 in the Petition are DISMISSED with prejudice. No later than 60 days from the date of this Order, Respondent shall file an answer to the remaining claims in the Pe tition. Respondent shall brief all claims within the answer. Within 30 days of receiving Respondents answer, Petitioner shall file a reply (formerly known as a traverse), and Respondent may file a sur-reply within 14 days of receiving Petitioners reply. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (cjm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

LELAND A. RIDGLEY,
Case No. 1:11-cv-00563-BLW
Petitioner,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

v.

JOHANNA SMITH, Warden,
Respondent.

Pending before the Court in this habeas corpus matter is Respondent’s Motion for
Partial Summary Dismissal. (Dkt. 11.) The Court finds that oral argument is not necessary
to resolve this matter, and for the reasons to follow, it will grant Respondent’s Motion
and dismiss, as procedurally defaulted, all claims in the Petition except Claim 1(a)-(c).
BACKGROUND
In 2002, Petitioner pled guilty in state district court to one count of lewd conduct
with a child under the age of sixteen. (State’s Lodging A-1, pp. 20-23.) Before
sentencing, Petitioner filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging that his counsel
had not adequately advised him prior to his decision to enter a guilty plea. (State’s
Lodging A-1, pp. 33-38.) After holding a hearing, the district court denied the motion and
then sentenced Petitioner to life in prison with 10 years fixed. (State’s Lodging A-1, pp.
45-49, 77-80.)
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On appeal, Petitioner argued, on state law grounds, that the district court abused its
discretion in not allowing him to withdraw his guilty plea and in imposing an excessive
sentence. (State’s Lodging B-1.) The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s
denial of the motion to withdraw and upheld its sentence. (State’s Lodging B-3.)
Petitioner did not submit a petition for review in the Idaho Supreme Court. (State’s
Lodging B-4.)
In 2005, Petitioner filed an application for post-conviction relief in state district
court, alleging that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient on a number of grounds,
including because counsel failed to seek a competency evaluation of Petitioner despite
knowing that he was severely depressed due to his wife’s recent death. (State’s Lodging
C-1, pp. 3-7.) The district court dismissed the application summarily, and Petitioner
appealed. (State’s Lodging C-1, pp. 105-11, 152-62.)
The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s dismissal of five claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel, but it reversed the court’s dismissal of the claim alleging
that counsel failed to seek a competency evaluation. (State’s Lodging D-3, pp. 1-6.) The
Idaho Supreme Court granted the State’s petition for review and affirmed the trial court’s
order granting summary dismissal on all claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
(State’s Lodging D-9.)
Petitioner also pursued a state petition for a writ of habeas corpus on similar
grounds, which was dismissed by the district court. (State’s Lodging E-1, pp. 16-41.) The
Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, and Petitioner did not seek review in the
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Idaho Supreme court. (State’s Lodging E-1, pp. 56-58; E-2.)
Petitioner next filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court. (Dkt. 3.)
In his Petition, he raises constitutional claims that all appear to be based on a central
allegation that he was not mentally competent to enter a knowing and voluntary guilty
plea in state court because of his severe depression. (Id. at 2-3.) In particular, the Court
agrees with Respondent’s construction of the Petition as raising the following four claims:
(1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel, with subparts (a)-(d); (2) a violation of
Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to confront his accusers; (3) ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel; and (4) a violation of Petitioner’s due process rights based on the
district court’s failure to allow a guilty plea to be entered without first ordering a
competency evaluation. (Id. at 3-4.)
United States Magistrate Judge Mikel H. Williams conducted an initial review of
the Petition and ordered the Clerk of Court to serve it on Respondent. (Dkt. 7.)
Respondent has now filed a Motion for Partial Summary Dismissal, arguing that
Petitioner failed to properly exhaust all claims in the state courts except claims of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on counsel’s failure to (a) address Petitioner’s
severe depression or to seek a competency evaluation before the guilty plea, (b)
adequately investigate the case, and (c) adequately communicate with Petitioner. (Dkt.
11-1, p. 8.) According to Respondent, because it is to late to return to the state courts and
exhaust the other claims now, they are procedurally defaulted and must be dismissed.
(Id.) The case has been reassigned to the undersigned United States District Judge
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3

because not all parties consented to a magistrate judge exercising jurisdiction. (Dkt. 23.)
As explained below, the Court agrees that, except for certain ineffective assistance
of counsel claims, Petitioner did not fairly present his current habeas claims to the Idaho
Supreme Court, and those claims are now procedurally defaulted.
STANDARD OF LAW
A habeas petitioner must first exhaust his state court remedies before a federal
court can grant relief on a constitutional claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); O’Sullivan v.
Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999). To exhaust state court remedies properly, the
petitioner must have fairly presented his constitutional claims, giving the state courts a
full and fair opportunity to correct the alleged error, at each level of appellate review.
Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27 (2004).
The mere similarity between a federal claim and a state law claim, without more,
does not satisfy the requirement of fair presentation, and vague references in state court to
broad constitutional principles, such as due process, equal protection, and the right to a
fair trial, are likewise insufficient. See Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995)
(similarity of claims is insufficient); see also Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th
Cir. 1999) (appeal to broad principles insufficient). The petitioner must clearly alert the
state court to the federal constitutional provision that supports her claim, or she must rely
on state or federal cases that apply the constitutional rule. Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d
666, 670 (9th Cir. 2000); Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003).
When a habeas petitioner has not fairly presented a constitutional claim to the
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highest state court, and it is clear that the state court would now refuse to consider it
because of the state’s firmly established procedural rules, the claim is said to have been
procedurally defaulted. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 161 (1996). A habeas claim is
also defaulted when the petitioner actually raised the constitutional claim in state court,
but the state court denied or dismissed the claim after invoking a procedural bar that is
independent of federal law and is adequate to support the judgment. Murray v. Carrier,
477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991).
A claim that rests upon an independent and adequate state law ground will not be
considered in a habeas proceeding unless the petitioner can establish cause for his
procedural default and actual prejudice, or he can show a miscarriage of justice in his
case, which means that he is probably innocent. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.
DISCUSSION
The simplest manner in which to resolve the exhaustion and procedural default
status of Petitioner’s constitutional claims is to review which claims were raised and
addressed in the state court appellate proceedings.
During his direct appeal, Petitioner argued, in part, that the trial court should have
granted his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. While Petitioner has raised similar facts in
both state and federal court regarding his mental state before pleading guilty, he did not
frame the legal issue before the Idaho Court of Appeals on direct appeal as one of federal
constitutional dimension. He instead relied solely on Idaho’s legal rules to contend that
the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion. To exhaust a federal
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constitutional claim properly, a habeas petitioner must have presented the claim face up
and squarely so that the state court will recognize the issue as having a federal basis.
Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995).
Equally important, even if Petitioner did raise federal claims during the direct
appeal, he did not seek review of the Idaho Court of Appeals’ opinion in the Idaho
Supreme Court, which is a prerequisite to satisfying the exhaustion requirement properly.
See, e.g., O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 (1999).
During the post-conviction appeal, Petitioner raised constitutional issues of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The Idaho Supreme Court characterized these
allegations as follows:
(1) that [Petitioner’s] attorney met with [him] for less than one hour
before [Petitioner] pled guilty; (2) that his attorney failed to provide
[Petitioner] with a copy of the police report; (3) that his attorney
failed to contact potential witnesses; (4) that his attorney failed to
watch or listen to tapes of interviews of the victim; (5) that his
attorney failed to advise [Petitioner] of potential defenses; and (6)
that his attorney failed to take steps to determine whether
[Petitioner’s] severe grief and depression rendered him incompetent
or unable to make a rational decision about pleading guilty.
(State’s Lodging D-9, p. 4.) The Idaho Supreme Court then proceeded to address and
deny the claims on the merits. (Id. at 5-9.) These claims correspond with Petitioner’s
current Claim 1, subclaims (a) - (c), in his Petition, and the Court agrees that Petitioner
has properly exhausted those issues.
However, Petitioner raises one additional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
here, Claim 1(d), in which he contends that his trial counsel was deficient in waiving a
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 6

preliminary hearing. That claim was not presented to the Idaho Supreme Court and is now
procedurally defaulted.
Finally, Petitioner raised numerous issues in a state habeas corpus petition, but the
Idaho Court of Appeals upheld the lower court’s dismissal on the ground that Petitioner
was attempting to challenge his conviction and sentence improperly in a state habeas
action rather than through a direct appeal and post-conviction proceeding. (State’s
Lodging E-2.) Petitioner does not assert that this procedural rule is not firmly established
or consistently followed by the Idaho state courts. See, e.g., Dionne v. State, 459 P.2d
1017, 1019 (Idaho 1969) (holding that the proper mechanism for challenging a conviction
or sentence is via direct appeal or post-conviction action). In any case, Petitioner did not
file a petition for review in the Idaho Supreme Court.
In his response, Petitioner contends that he did not default any claims because he
offered the state courts a chance, generally, to correct errors before he arrived in federal
court. Petitioner paints with much too broad a brush; he overlooks that he must present
the same federal claims at each level of appellate review, including in the Idaho Supreme
Court through a petition for review. Petitioner did not follow those necessary steps as to
several of his current claims.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Claims 1(d) (ineffective assistance for
waiving preliminary hearing), 2 (right to confront accusers), 3 (ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel), and 4 (trial court’s failure to order a mental health evaluation before
plea) are procedurally defaulted. These claims must be dismissed unless Petitioner can
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establish cause and prejudice to excuse the default.1
To show “cause,” a petitioner must ordinarily demonstrate that some objective
factor external to the defense impeded his or his counsel’s efforts to comply with the state
procedural rule at issue. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). To show
“prejudice,” the petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that the errors “worked to
his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire [proceeding] with errors of
constitutional dimension.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982).
Rather than direct the Court’s attention to external barriers that may have
prevented him from raising his claims in the state courts, Petitioner seems to take issue
with Respondent’s choice to file a motion that seeks dismissal on procedural grounds, and
he argues about how Idaho inmates and defendants are generally treated unfairly. (Dkt.
14.) These are not reasons to excuse his failure to present all of the claims that he now
wishes to raise in this Court in a procedurally proper manner at the appropriate time in
state court. He does not offer any other potential cause for the default, and the Court has
reviewed the record and found none.
For all of these reasons, Respondent’s Motion for Partial Summary Dismissal
will be granted.
ORDER
1.

Respondent’s Motion for Partial Summary Dismissal (Dkt. 11) is

1

There is no compelling evidence in this record of Petitioner’s actual innocence, and the
fundamental miscarriage of justice exception to the doctrine of procedural default will not be discussed.
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GRANTED. Claims 1(d), 2, 3, and 4 in the Petition are DISMISSED with
prejudice.
2.

No later than 60 days from the date of this Order, Respondent shall file an
answer to the remaining claims in the Petition. Respondent shall brief all
claims within the answer. Within 30 days of receiving Respondent’s
answer, Petitioner shall file a reply (formerly known as a traverse), and
Respondent may file a sur-reply within 14 days of receiving Petitioner’s
reply. The Court does not wish to receive motions for summary judgment,
and the matter will be at issue once the additional pleadings have been filed.

DATED: March 5, 2013

Honorable B. Lynn Winmill
Chief U. S. District Judge

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 9