Ridgley v. Smith

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER denying 17 Motion for Reconcideration [sic] Concerning the Summery [sic] Dismissal/Partial Summery [sic] Judgment Failure to Exhaust Idaho Supreme Court Remedy; denying 3 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, and this entire action is DISMISSED with prejudice. The Court does not find its resolution of this habeas matter to be reasonably debatable, and a certificate of appealability will not issue. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (cjm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

LELAND A. RIDGLEY,
Case No. 1:11-cv-00563-BLW
Petitioner,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

v.

JOHANNA SMITH, Warden,
Respondent.

Pending before the Court is Petitioner Leland A. Ridgley’s Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus (Dkt. 3). Respondent has filed an Answer and Brief in Support of
Dismissal (Dkt. 20), and Petitioner has filed a Reply (Dkt. 22). The Court takes judicial
notice of the records from Petitioner’s state court proceedings, lodged by Respondent on
June 26, 2012; April 25, 2013; and May 9, 2013 (Dkt. 12, 19, 21). See Fed. R. Evid.
201(b); Dawson v. Mahoney, 451 F.3d 550, 551 (9th Cir. 2006).
Also pending is Petitioner’s request that the Court reconsider its March 5, 2013
Order granting Respondent’s motion for partial summary dismissal and dismissing all
claims in the Petition except Claims 1(a)-(c).
Having carefully reviewed the record, including the state court record, the Court
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1

finds that the parties have adequately presented the facts and legal arguments in the briefs
and record and that the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral
argument. Therefore, the Court will decide this matter on the written motions, briefs and
record without oral argument. D. Idaho L. Civ. R. 7.1(d). Accordingly, the Court enters
the following Order denying Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, denying the Petition,
and dismissing this case with prejudice.
BACKGROUND
The facts underlying the conviction, as well as the procedural background of
Petitioner’s criminal proceedings, are set forth clearly and accurately in Ridgley v. State,
227 P.3d 925 (Idaho 2010). Petitioner is currently serving a sentence of 10 years to life in
prison.
Petitioner pleaded guilty in the First Judicial District in Boundary County, Idaho,
to one count of lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor under the age of sixteen, in
return for the dismissal of other charges. Petitioner entered his plea on February 26, 2002,
only sixteen days after the death of his wife.1 Id. at 927-28. However, before sentencing,
Ridgley moved to withdraw his plea on the grounds that
appointed counsel had not adequately represented and advised
him prior to entry of the guilty plea, but the district court
denied his motion. In an unpublished opinion, the Idaho Court
of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision.
On April 4, 2005, Ridgley filed a petition for
1

Petitioner was initially suspected of being involved in the death of his wife, but those
charges were later dropped.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2

post-conviction relief. Ridgley’s petition alleged that his
defense counsel’s performance was deficient because counsel
had met with him for less than one hour before Ridgley pled
guilty, failed to provide Ridgley with a copy of the police
report, failed to contact potential witnesses, failed to watch or
listen to tapes of interviews of the victim, failed to advise
Ridgley of potential defenses, and failed to take steps to
determine whether Ridgley’s severe grief and depression
rendered him incompetent or unable to make a rational
decision about pleading guilty.
The State answered the petition and, in its answer,
moved for summary dismissal, arguing that the issues
presented in Ridgley’s petition were “essentially identical” to
the issues advanced in support of Ridgley’s earlier motion to
withdraw his plea. After Ridgley requested a trial setting on
his petition, the State renewed its motion for summary
dismissal, again asserting that the bases for post-conviction
relief advanced in the petition were identical to those that had
been decided previously. The district court then issued notice
of its intention to summarily dismiss the action pursuant to
I.C. § 19-4906. In that notice, the district court observed that
Ridgley had included a transcript of the testimony produced at
the hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In light
of the evidence produced at that hearing—that Ridgley had
told his attorney that he wished to plead guilty—the district
court stated that there was an insufficient showing of deficient
performance by trial counsel. The district court further
observed that there was “a total lack of evidence that, but for
counsel’s alleged deficiencies, [Ridgley] would have insisted
on going to trial.”
Ridgley thereafter filed a response to the notice,
supported by his affidavit and two other affidavits. These
responsive filings focused on the final claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, i.e., counsel’s failure to take steps to
evaluate Ridgley’s mental condition prior to his plea of guilty.
In his affidavit, Ridgley averred that he informed his attorney
that he was suffering from severe depression and did not
understand the proceedings. He further averred that his
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3

attorney did not discuss with him the possibility of obtaining
an evaluation to determine his competence. He also asserted
that, if successful in obtaining post-conviction relief, he
intended to go to trial. Ridgley's attorney’s first affidavit
advanced his opinion that trial counsel’s performance was
objectively unreasonable and appended a report prepared by a
psychologist, Dr. Jonelle Timlin. Dr. Timlin prepared this
report approximately nine months after Ridgley pled guilty.
After reviewing Ridgley’s response, the district court
summarily dismissed Ridgley’s petition.
Ridgley appealed the district court’s decision. The
court of appeals affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the
first five claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. However,
the court of appeals reversed the grant of summary dismissal
regarding counsel’s failure to request a competency
evaluation prior to Ridgley’s plea. This Court granted the
State’s petition for review.
Id. at 928.
The Idaho Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals with respect to the
competency issue and affirmed the district court’s judgment, albeit on different grounds
than those given by the district court. Id. at 930-33.
Petitioner also pursued a state petition for a writ of habeas corpus on similar
grounds, which was dismissed by the district court. (State’s Lodging E-1, pp. 16-41.) The
Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, and the Idaho Supreme Court denied
review. (State’s Lodging E-2; F-3.)
Petitioner next filed the instant Petition, asserting several grounds for relief. On
March 5, 2013, the Court granted Respondent’s motion for partial summary dismissal and
dismissed as procedurally defaulted all of Petitioner’s claims except his claims of
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4

ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to (a) address Petitioner’s
severe depression or to seek a competency evaluation before the guilty plea, (b)
adequately investigate the case, and (c) adequately communicate with Petitioner. (Dkt.
16.)
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Petitioner asks the Court reconsider its previous ruling dismissing Claims 1(d), 2,
3, and 4 as procedurally defaulted. Courts have the “inherent procedural power to
reconsider, rescind, or modify an interlocutory order for cause seen by it to be sufficient.”
City of Los Angeles v. Santa Monica Baykeeper, 254 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2001)
(internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). Although courts have authority to
reconsider prior orders, they “should be loathe to do so in the absence of extraordinary
circumstances such as where the initial decision was ‘clearly erroneous and would work a
manifest injustice.’” Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp. 486 U.S. 800, 817
(1988) (quoting Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 n. 8 (1983)).
The Court stated in its March 5, 2013 Memorandum Decision and Order that
Petitioner, who filed a state habeas petition with in state court, did not petition for review
of the Idaho Court of Appeals decision affirming the dismissal of that petition. Petitioner
correctly states that he did file such a petition for review. The Court was mistaken
because the petition for review was not lodged with the Court. Respondent has now
supplemented the lodging of state court records to include the petition for review,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 5

Petitioner’s brief in support of his petition for review, and the Idaho Supreme Court’s
order denying the petition. (See Dkt. 19.)
However, the fact that Petitioner filed a petition for review regarding his state
habeas petition does not alter the Court’s conclusion with respect to procedural default.
The Court’s analysis on this issue was as follows:
Finally, Petitioner raised numerous issues in a state
habeas corpus petition, but the Idaho Court of Appeals upheld
the lower court’s dismissal on the ground that Petitioner was
attempting to challenge his conviction and sentence
improperly in a state habeas action rather than through a
direct appeal and post-conviction proceeding. (State’s
Lodging E-2.) Petitioner does not assert that this procedural
rule is not firmly established or consistently followed by the
Idaho state courts. See, e.g., Dionne v. State, 459 P.2d 1017,
1019 (Idaho 1969) (holding that the proper mechanism for
challenging a conviction or sentence is via direct appeal or
post-conviction action). In any case, Petitioner did not file a
petition for review in the Idaho Supreme Court.
(Dkt. 16 at 7).
The Court incorrectly stated that Petitioner did not petition for review with respect
to his state habeas petition only after it had already held that Claims 2, 3, and 4 were
procedurally defaulted because Petitioner (1) had not raised any federal claims in his
direct appeal, and (2) had not filed a petition for review of the Idaho Court of Appeals’
decision on direct appeal. (Id. at 6.) Additionally, Claim 1(d), a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel based on counsel’s waiver of a preliminary hearing, was
procedurally defaulted because it was not raised on appeal from the trial court’s dismissal

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 6

of Petitioner’s postconviction petition. (Id. at 6-7.) Finally, that the Court was mistaken in
its belief that Petitioner had not petitioned for review with respect to his state habeas
petition does not change the fact that the Idaho Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of
that petition based on an adequate and independent state procedural bar. (Id. at 7.)
Therefore, although Petitioner is correct that he did, in fact, petition the Idaho
Supreme Court for review of the Idaho Court of Appeals’ decision upholding the
dismissal of his state habeas petition, all of the claims except Claims 1(a), 1(b), and 1(c)
are still procedurally defaulted. The Court sees no cause to reconsider its prior Order.
MERITS DISCUSSION OF CLAIMS 1(a), 1(b), AND 1(c)
1.

Standard of Law
Federal habeas corpus relief may be granted on claims adjudicated on the merits in

a state court judgment when the federal court determines that the petitioner “is in custody
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(a). A federal habeas court reviews the state court’s “last reasoned decision” in
determining whether a petitioner is entitled to relief. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,
804 (1991).
Under § 2254(d), as amended by the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), federal habeas relief is generally limited to instances where the
state court’s adjudication of the petitioner’s claim
(1)

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 7

established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2)

resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light
of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
When a party contests the state court’s legal conclusions, including application of
the law to the facts, § 2254(d)(1) governs. Section 2254(d)(1) has two clauses, each with
independent meaning. That section consists of two alternative tests: the “contrary to” test
and the “unreasonable application” test.
Under the first test, a state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established
federal law “if the state court applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in
[the Supreme Court’s] cases, or if it decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court]
[has] done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694
(2002).
Under the second test, to satisfy the “unreasonable application” clause of
§ 2254(d)(1) the petitioner must show that the state court—although identifying “the
correct governing legal rule” from Supreme Court precedent—nonetheless “unreasonably
applie[d] it to the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case.” Williams v. Taylor, 529
U.S. 362, 407 (2000). A federal court cannot grant habeas relief simply because it
concludes in its independent judgment that the decision is incorrect or wrong; rather, the

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 8

state court’s application of federal law must be objectively unreasonable to warrant relief.
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003); Bell, 535 U.S. at 694. The standard of
§ 2254(d) is onerous and is satisfied only if “there is no possibility fairminded jurists
could disagree that the state court’s decision conflicts with [Supreme Court] precedents.”
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011).
Though the source of clearly established federal law must come from the holdings
of the United States Supreme Court, circuit precedent may be persuasive authority for
determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable application of Supreme
Court precedent. Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir. 1999). However,
circuit law may not be used “to refine or sharpen a general principle of Supreme Court
jurisprudence into a specific legal rule that th[e] Court has not announced.” Marshall v.
Rodgers, 133 S. Ct. 1446, 1450 (2013).
When a petitioner contests the reasonableness of the state court’s factual
determinations, a federal court must undertake a § 2254(d)(2) analysis. To be eligible for
relief under § 2254(d)(2), the petitioner must show that the state court decision was
“based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding.” The United States Supreme Court has admonished that a
“state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas
court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.” Wood v. Allen, 130
S. Ct. 841, 849 (2010).

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 9

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has identified four types
of unreasonable factual determinations in state court proceedings: (1) when state courts
fail to make a finding of fact; (2) when state courts mistakenly make factual findings
under the wrong legal standard; (3) when “the fact-finding process itself is defective”; or
(4) when state courts “plainly misapprehend or misstate the record in making their
findings, and the misapprehension goes to a material factual issue that is central to
petitioner’s claim.” Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d. 992, 1000-01 (9th Cir. 2004). If the state
court’s decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, then the Court
is not limited by § 2254(d)(1), but proceeds to a de novo review of the petitioner’s claims,
which may include consideration of evidence outside the state court record. Maxwell v.
Roe, 628 F.3d 486, 494-95 (9th Cir. 2010).
2.

Standard of Law for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
The standard for ineffective assistance of counsel claims was identified in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). A petitioner asserting ineffective
assistance of counsel must show that (1) “counsel made errors so serious that counsel was
not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment,” and
(2) those errors “deprive[d] the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”
Id. at 687.
Whether an attorney’s performance was deficient is judged against an objective
standard of reasonableness. Id. at 687-88. A reviewing court’s inquiry into the

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 10

“reasonableness” of counsel’s actions must not rely on hindsight:
Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be
highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to
second-guess counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse
sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining
counsel’s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to
conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was
unreasonable. A fair assessment of attorney performance
requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting
effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of
counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct
from counsel’s perspective at the time. Because of the
difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must
indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance;
that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that,
under the circumstances, the challenged action might be
considered sound trial strategy. There are countless ways to
provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best
criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular
client in the same way.
Id. at 689 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
If a petitioner shows that counsel’s performance was deficient, the next step is the
prejudice analysis. “An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not
warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on
the judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. To satisfy the prejudice standard, a petitioner
“must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. As the
Strickland Court instructed:
In making this determination, a court hearing an
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 11

ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the
evidence before the judge or jury. Some of the factual
findings will have been unaffected by the errors, and factual
findings that were affected will have been affected in
different ways. Some errors will have had a pervasive effect
on the inferences to be drawn from the evidence, altering the
entire evidentiary picture, and some will have had an isolated,
trivial effect. Moreover, a verdict or conclusion only weakly
supported by the record is more likely to have been affected
by errors than one with overwhelming record support. Taking
the unaffected findings as a given, and taking due account of
the effect of the errors on the remaining findings, a court
making the prejudice inquiry must ask if the defendant has
met the burden of showing that the decision reached would
reasonably likely have been different absent the errors.
Id. at 695-96. To show prejudice based on deficient performance of counsel in a case
where, as here, the petitioner pleaded guilty, the petitioner “must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and
would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
When evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a federal habeas
proceeding under § 2254(d)(1), the Court’s review of that claim is “doubly deferential.”
Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011).
3.

Analysis of Claims 1(b) & 1(c): Counsel’s Investigation of the Case and
Counsel’s Communication with Petitioner
In its opinion affirming the district court’s denial of state postconviction relief, the

Idaho Supreme Court addressed only the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis. The
court appropriately cited Strickland and Hill and determined that Petitioner had not
established “a causal connection between the alleged deficiencies of his attorney’s
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 12

performance and his decision to plead guilty”:
In the present case, Ridgley did not attempt to show
that the relatively brief contact with his trial attorney
contributed to his decision to plead guilty or that greater
contact may have dissuaded him from pleading guilty. He did
not show that information contained within the police reports
may have given him some reason to go to trial. Similarly, he
did not identify any evidence from potential witnesses or that
was contained in the tape recording of the victim’s interview
that may have led him to decide against pleading guilty. He
did not identify any potential defense to the charge that may
have resulted in a different decision. In short, Ridgley simply
made no effort to link his claims of deficient performance
with his plea of guilty.
Ridgley, 227 P.3d at 931 (emphasis added).
The Idaho Supreme Court’s resolution of Petitioner’s claims that he would not
have pleaded guilty but for the limited contact he had with counsel and counsel’s failure
to further investigate the case was a reasonable application of Strickland and Hill. The
state district court held a hearing on Petitioner’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, at
which both Petitioner and his former counsel testified. (State’s Lodging A-3 at 5-78.) On
the basis of the evidence and argument presented at that hearing, the court found that
Petitioner told his counsel that he wanted to plead guilty:
[I]n obtaining the plea bargain, [Petitioner’s counsel] was
following his client’s wishes. Whether the police reports
should have been reviewed with Defendant is not relevant
because Defendant was eager to plead guilty to avoid further
injury to the victim and the take advantage of the plea
bargain. Under the circumstances of this case, there was no
requirement to engage in discovery once Defendant informed
his counsel of his desire to plead guilty.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 13

(State’s Lodging A-1 at 47.)
Petitioner does not appear to challenge the district court’s finding that he told his
attorney he wished to plead guilty. Rather, he argues that his attorney misled him: “[M]y
first Public Defender spent less than an hour with me explained nothing and scared me to
death about everything! My wife had died 36 hours before my arrest, which I thought was
on suspicion of her Murder! That is all he talked about! I remember nothing about a
preliminary hearing nor did I find out about any plea being entered until much later.” (Pet.
Reply, Dkt. 22, at 1.) But this argument does not establish that, even if Petitioner’s
attorney had performed deficiently under Strickland, Petitioner suffered prejudice. A
mere statement that he would not have pleaded guilty is not sufficient. Similarly,
Petitioner’s claim that his attorney was later found “incompetent” by an Idaho court (id. at
2) does not establish a reasonable probability that, absent counsel’s alleged errors,
Petitioner “would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill,
474 U.S. at 59.
Further, to the extent Petitioner does challenge the trial court’s finding that he
informed his counsel he wanted to plead guilty, he submits no evidence tending to show
that the court’s finding was unreasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The court made
that finding after hearing testimony from Petitioner and from his former counsel. There is
nothing in the record that would permit this Court to second-guess the state court’s
credibility determinations.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 14

Petitioner also claims that there is no transcript of his plea hearing and that,
therefore, his guilty plea “must be fabricated.” (Pet. Reply, Dkt. 22, at 3.) Petitioner is
mistaken. The transcript of the plea hearing was lodged by Respondent and is found in the
record at State’s Lodging A-2. During the hearing, the court engaged Petitioner in the
following plea colloquy:
THE COURT:

Are you pleading guilty because you are
guilty? . . .

[PETITIONER]:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

Okay, has anyone made any threats or
promises to you other than those that
have been recited on the record here
today to get you to plead guilty?

[PETITIONER]:

No, sir.

THE COURT:

Do you understand by pleading guilty
you’re giving up and waiving all the
rights and defenses that you would
otherwise have, retaining only your right
to appeal whatever sentence the District
Judge imposes and your right to be
represented by your attorney at all
significant stages of the proceedings? Do
you understand that?

[PETITIONER]:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

Are you under the influence of any
alcohol, drugs, or medication that could
be affecting your decision to plead guilty
at this time?

[PETITIONER]:

No.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 15

THE COURT:

You have been thoroughly advised by
your attorney of the potential maximum
penalty for this or pleading guilty to this
charge, which is up to life in prison?

[PETITIONER]:

Yes, sir.

(State’s Lodging A-2 at 3.)
After going through each of the trial rights Petitioner would be waiving by
pleading guilty, the court asked, “Have you discussed those rights with you [sic] lawyer
and do you have any questions about your rights?” (Id. at 4.) Petitioner responded, “I have
and I don’t, sir.” (Id.)
Petitioner had no questions for the judge or his attorney at the time he entered his
plea. He did not state that he felt his attorney had not spent the time required on the case,
that he felt pressured into pleading guilty, or that he did not understand the proceedings.
These facts support the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision that Petitioner could not show
prejudice from any error by his attorney with respect to investigation of the case or
communication with Petitioner.
4.

Analysis of Claim 1(a): Counsel’s Failure to Seek a Competency Evaluation
Before Petitioner Pleaded Guilty
“A criminal defendant may not be tried unless he is competent, and he may not

waive his right to counsel or plead guilty unless he does so competently and intelligently.”
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396 (1993) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted). A defendant will be deemed competent so long as he has “the capacity to

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 16

understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel,
and to assist in preparing his defense.” Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975).
When a habeas petitioner argues that his attorney was ineffective to failing to seek
a competency hearing prior to the petitioner’s guilty plea, the prejudice inquiry boils
down to one question: “[W]as there a reasonable probability that [the petitioner] would
have been found incompetent to plead guilty?” Deere v. Cullen, 718 F.3d 1124, 1145 (9th
Cir. 2013). The Idaho Supreme Court applied a similar standard, citing the Fifth Circuit’s
decision in Bouchillon v. Collins, 907 F.2d 589, 594 (5th Cir. 1990). This standard is
simply an extension of the Strickland prejudice analysis; therefore, the Idaho Supreme
Court’s citation of the Fifth Circuit’s decision was not “contrary to” Strickland. See
Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 784 (stating that “a state court need not cite or even be aware of
our cases” to meet the standard of § 2254(d)).
The Idaho Supreme Court determined that Ridgley had failed to establish a
reasonable probability that he would have been found incompetent to plead guilty:
In discussing whether Ridgley’s trial counsel should
have ordered an evaluation, the district court stated that
[t]he only evidence offered in this case that
Ridgley was emotionally distraught, in a state of
shock, and incompetent are the allegations of
Ridgley’s own affidavit. Ridgley’s own
conclusory and bare assertions, alone, are not
sufficient to survive summary dismissal....
While Ridgley’s affidavit does raise the fact
issue that he was emotionally distraught when
he entered the guilty plea, the affidavit offers no
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 17

more than a mere conclusion that he was not
competent to understand the nature of the
proceedings and knowingly enter into a guilty
plea, and is unsupported by any facts as to the
alleged mental incompetency.
The [district] court further stated that
without something in the record suggesting that
an examination in February 2002 would have
shown [that Ridgley was incompetent] to
proceed, there is nothing to satisfy the prejudice
prong of Strickland.
We note that the district court was not entirely accurate
in saying that Ridgley offered nothing more on the issue of his
incompetency than his own statements. Ridgley also offered
the psychological evaluation prepared by Dr. Timlin for
sentencing purposes nine months after Ridgley’s plea in
support of his claim that he was not competent to plead guilty.
Despite noting that Ridgley suffers from some indications of
depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and anxiety
disorder, the report also states that Ridgley is “‘oriented to
person, place and time.’” More importantly, the report
addressed only Ridgley’s mental state at the time it was
prepared; the report says nothing about Ridgley’s mental state
at the time he entered his plea—nine months earlier.
Ridgley, 227 P.3d at 932 (emphasis added) (alterations in original).
This decision was eminently reasonable. It is not disputed that when Petitioner was
arrested, he was severely emotionally distraught. He was charged with lewd and
lascivious conduct against one of his daughters, his wife had just died, and he was
suspected of having something to do with her death. However, Petitioner has not
established a reasonable probability that he was so distraught he had no ability to

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 18

understand the proceedings against him. His attorney testified at the hearing on the
motion to withdraw the guilty plea that Petitioner seems alert and “knew exactly what he
was doing and what the plea bargain was and what he was assuming.” (State’s Lodging
A-3 at 42.) And as the Idaho Supreme Court noted, nothing in Dr. Timlin’s report
suggested incompetence at all, much less incompetence at the time of Petitioner’s guilty
plea.
Further, in denying the motion to withdraw the plea, the trial court found that
Petitioner
was informed that the potential maximum penalty [for the
lewd conduct charge] was life imprisonment. He also was
informed that the plea agreement would not be binding on the
district court. The record shows that [Petitioner] expressed no
confusion and sought no clarification about the charges or his
rights during the plea hearing. He further admitted the
allegations against him in the criminal complaint and waived
the right to have an information filed against him.
(State’s Lodging A-1 at 47.) The court also noted that Petitioner received a benefit from
the plea agreement in that additional charges were dismissed. (Id.) None of these findings
was unreasonable.
Though it is clear that Petitioner was under substantial stress and emotional
upheaval at the time of his guilty plea, he has simply not shown a reasonable probability
that, had counsel requested a competency hearing, Petitioner would have been found

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 19

incompetent to stand trial or to plead guilty.2
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny the Petition and dismiss this case
with prejudice.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED:
1.

Plaintiff’s Request for Reconcideration [sic] Concerning the Summery [sic]
Dismissal/Partial Summery [sic] Judgment Failure to Exhaust Idaho
Supreme Court Remedy (Dkt. 17) is DENIED.

2.

The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dkt. 3) is DENIED, and this entire
action is DISMISSED with prejudice.

3.

The Court does not find its resolution of this habeas matter to be reasonably
debatable, and a certificate of appealability will not issue. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c); Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. If Petitioner
files a timely notice of appeal, the Clerk of Court shall forward a copy of
the notice of appeal, together with this Order, to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Petitioner may seek a certificate of

2

To the extent Petitioner challenges his guilty plea on the grounds that it was not
knowing and voluntary, see Godinez, 509 U.S. at 401 n.12, the plea colloquy, as detailed above,
shows that Petitioner understood the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty and that no one
had promised him anything (with the exception of the dismissal of other charges as set forth in
the plea agreement) in exchange for pleading guilty. Thus, he is not entitled to relief on that
basis.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 20

appealability from the Ninth Circuit by filing a request in that court.

DATED: January 27, 2014

Honorable B. Lynn Winmill
Chief U. S. District Judge

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 21