Meer v. Dennis Dillon Auto Park & Truck Center, Inc et al

Filing 43

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER denying 31 Amendment of Complaint. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (krb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

WENDI L MEER,
Case No. 1:12-CV-025-BLW
Plaintiff,
vs.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

DENNIS DILLON AUTO PARK & TRUCK
CENTER, INC., NORTHWEST LEASING,
TREASURE VALLEY LEASING, INC.,
DENNIS E. DILLON, JOAN B. DILLON,
BRADLEY B. DILLON, DENNIS T.
MCCURRY, DUANE A. SESSIONS,
JERRON MOORE, CHARLENE SILVA, JEFF
LILLY,
Defendants.

INTRODUCTION
The Court has before it plaintiff Meer’s motion to amend. The motion is fully
briefed and at issue. For the reasons explained below, the Court will deny the motion.
ANALYSIS
Meer, representing herself, has sued the defendants, including Dennis Dillon Auto
Park and Truck Center Inc., over a dispute concerning the financing and payment for a
car she purchased from Dennis Dillon. She brought claims under the Uniform
Commercial Code and the Idaho Consumer Protection Act.
In the motion to amend now before the Court, Meer seeks to add a RICO claim,
alleging that the defendants conspired to take her money and repossess her car in

violation of the various predicate criminal statutes referred to in RICO. She also seeks to
add as a defendant the man who repossessed her car, Keith Foster.
In an earlier decision, the Court denied Meer’s motion to amend finding numerous
flaws in her proposed amendments. The Court explained in detail how the proposed
amendments were “indecipherable.” See Memorandum Decision (Dkt. No. 30) at p. 4.
Meer had failed to explain her RICO claim in sufficient detail so that each defendant
could understand his or her role in (1) the particular predicate act, and (2) the alleged
conspiracy. Id. But because Meer was proceeding pro se, the Court allowed her one
final opportunity to amend her complaint and address the Court’s concerns.
Meer has now filed her revised proposed amendments, and the defendants have
responded. Rule 15(a) directs the Court to “freely give leave [to amend] when justice so
requires.” This Circuit has described Rule 15(a) as “very liberal.” AmerisourceBergen
Corp. v. Dialysis West, Inc., 465 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2006). However, a district court need
not grant leave to amend where the amendment: “(1) prejudices the opposing party; (2) is
sought in bad faith; (3) produces an undue delay in litigation; or (4) is futile.” Id.
It is this last category—futility—that exists here and blocks Meer’s proposed
amendment. On its face, Meer’s RICO claim could not survive a motion to dismiss under
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and hence it would be futile to grant this
amendment.
The proposed amended complaint contains claims against two corporate entities
and nine individuals. Seven of those individuals are named as follows: Dennis E. Dillon,
Memorandum Decision & Order - 2

Joan B. Dillon, Bradley B. Dillon, Dennis T. McCurry, Duane A. Sessions, Jerron Moore,
and Charlene Silva. The proposed amended complaint contains no explanation
whatsoever as to what role these individuals played in the alleged RICO conspiracy. This
is the same flaw identified by the Court in its earlier decision giving Meer another chance
to amend. The motion to amend to add a RICO claim against these seven individuals
must be denied.
Meer does provide some further explanation regarding defendant Jeff Lilly.
However, he was voluntarily dismissed by Meer, and so these claims are no longer valid.
See Memorandum Decision and Order (Dkt. No. 38).
This leaves one individual defendant – Keith Foster, the man who possessed her
car – and three business entities, Dennis Dillon Auto Park and Truck Center Inc., and
Northwest Leasing, and Treasure Valley Leasing, Inc. To pursue a RICO claim against
these defendants under predicate fraud statutes, as Meer has done, she must meet the
strict pleading requirements of Rule 9(b). See Arch Ins. Co. v. Allegiant, 2012 WL
1400302 (C.D.Cal. 2012). The proposed amendments do not meet that strict standard.
They contain mere conclusory statements and fail to explain in any detail how the alleged
conspiracy worked or what the role of each defendant was in that conspiracy.
Even if Rule 9(b) is not applicable to each of the predicate claims under RICO,
Meer has failed to satisfy Iqbal. The complaint must contain more than “threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action supported by mere conclusory statements.”
Doane v. First Franklin Financial, 2012 WL 2129369 (E.D.Cal. 2012) (citing Iqbal in
Memorandum Decision & Order - 3

dismissing RICO claim). Meer’s complaint contains mere conclusory statements that do
not meet the Iqbal standard.
Hence, Meer’s proposed amendments to add a RICO claim, and name Keith Foster
as a defendant, must be denied.
ORDER
In accordance with the Memorandum Decision set forth above,
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the “Amendment of
Complaint” (docket no. 31) be deemed a motion to amend complaint and be DENIED.

DATED: September 24, 2013

_________________________
B. Lynn Winmill
Chief Judge
United States District Court

Memorandum Decision & Order - 4