Cantrell v. Astrue

Filing 18

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER. Petitioners Petition for Review (Dkt. 1 ) is DENIED, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED, and this action is DISMISSED in its entirety, with prejudice. Signed by Judge Ronald E. Bush. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (cjm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF IDAHO

STEVEN CANTRELL,
Case No. 1:12-cv-00464-REB
Petitioner,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

vs.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Respondent.

Pending before the Court is Petitioner Steven Cantrell’s Petition for Review (Dkt.
1), seeking review of the Social Security Administration’s final decision to deny his claim
for Supplemental Security Income benefits. The action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g). Having carefully reviewed the record and otherwise being fully advised, the
Court enters the following Memorandum Decision and Order:
I. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
In July of 2009, Steven Cantrell (“Petitioner” or “Claimant”) applied for disability
insurance benefits, alleging that he became disabled on June 20, 2000. AR 129–30. His
date last insured is March 31, 2002 (AR 44), so in order to be entitled to benefits he must
demonstrate a disability—severe enough to prevent him from working—existed between
June 20, 2000 and March 31, 2002.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1

Petitioner’s claim was initially denied and denied again on reconsideration. AR
71–72, 91. Petitioner timely filed a Request for Hearing before an Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”). On November 4, 2010, ALJ John T. Molleur held a hearing in Boise,
Idaho, at which time Petitioner, represented by attorney Barbara Beehner-Kane, appeared
and testified. (AR 19). A vocational expert, Anne F. Aastum, and the claimant’s mother,
Debra June Olive, also appeared and testified at the hearing. Id.
On December 8, 2010, the ALJ issued a decision, denying Petitioner’s claims,
finding that Petitioner was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.
(AR 19–33). Petitioner timely requested review from the Appeals Council on December
8, 2010, and submitted new evidence for the Council’s review. (AR 1). On July 11,
2012, the Appeals Council denied Petitioner’s request for review (AR 1), making the
ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security.
Having exhausted his administrative remedies, Petitioner timely files the instant
action, arguing that the ALJ did not support his decision, particularly by failing to
properly (1) consider a treating physician’s opinion and (2) support findings that
Petitioner failed to follow medical advice and had a gap in medical treatment. See Pet.’s
Br., p. 6 (Dkt. 15).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
To be upheld, the Commissioner’s decision must be supported by substantial
evidence and based on proper legal standards. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Matney ex. rel.
Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992); Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2

1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1990). Findings as to any question of fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, are conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). That is, if there is substantial evidence to
support the ALJ’s factual decisions, they must be upheld, even when there is conflicting
evidence. Hall v. Sec’y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 602 F.2d 1372, 1374 (9th Cir. 1979).
“Substantial evidence” is defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,
401 (1971); Tylitzki v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 1411, 1413 (9th Cir. 1993); Flaten v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995). The standard requires more
than a scintilla but less than a preponderance of evidence, Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514
F.2d 1112, 1119 n. 10 (9th Cir. 1975); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir.
1989), and “does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence.” Pierce v.
Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988).
With respect to questions of fact, the role of the Court is to review the record as a
whole to determine whether it contains evidence that would allow a reasonable mind to
accept the conclusions of the ALJ. See Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401; see also Matney,
981 F.2d at 1019. The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility and resolving
conflicts in medical testimony, Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984),
resolving ambiguities, see Vincent ex. rel. Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1394-95 (9th
Cir. 1984), and drawing inferences logically flowing from the evidence, Sample v.
Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982). Where the evidence is susceptible to more
than one rational interpretation in a disability proceeding, the reviewing court may not
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3

substitute its judgment or interpretation of the record for that of the ALJ. Flaten, 44 F.3d
at 1457; Key v. Heckler, 754 F.2d 1545, 1549 (9th Cir. 1985).
With respect to questions of law, the ALJ’s decision must be based on proper legal
standards and will be reversed for legal error. Matney, 981 F.2d at 1019. The ALJ’s
construction of the Social Security Act is entitled to deference if it has a reasonable basis
in law. See id. However, reviewing federal courts “will not rubber-stamp an
administrative decision that is inconsistent with the statutory mandate or that frustrates
the congressional purpose underlying the statute.” Smith v. Heckler, 820 F.2d 1093, 1094
(9th Cir. 1987).
III. DISCUSSION
A.

Sequential Processes
In evaluating the evidence presented at an administrative hearing, the ALJ must

follow a sequential process in determining whether a person is disabled in general (see 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920) – or continues to be disabled (see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1594,
416.994) – within the meaning of the Social Security Act.
The first step requires the ALJ to determine whether the claimant is engaged in
substantial gainful activity (“SGA”). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i).
SGA is defined as work activity that is both substantial and gainful. “Substantial work
activity” is work activity that involves doing significant physical or mental activities. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1572(a), 416.972(a). “Gainful work activity” is work that is usually done
for pay or profit, whether or not a profit is realized. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1572(b),

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4

416.972(b). If the claimant has engaged in SGA, disability benefits are denied, regardless
of how severe his physical/mental impairments are and regardless of his age, education,
and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If the claimant is not
engaged in SGA, the analysis proceeds to the second step. Here, the ALJ found that
Petitioner had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date.
(AR 22).
The second step requires the ALJ to determine whether the claimant has a
medically determinable impairment, or combination of impairments, that is severe and
meets the duration requirement. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). An
impairment or combination of impairments is “severe” within the meaning of the Social
Security Act if it significantly limits an individual’s ability to perform basic work
activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). An impairment or combination of
impairments is “not severe” when medical and other evidence establish only a slight
abnormality or a combination of slight abnormalities that would have no more than a
minimal effect on an individual’s ability to work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521, 416.921. If the
claimant does not have a severe medically determinable impairment or combination of
impairments, disability benefits are denied. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). Here,
the ALJ found that Petitioner had the following severe impairments: Type 1 Diabetes
Mellitus and Psoriasis. (AR 22).
The third step requires the ALJ to determine the medical severity of any
impairments; that is, whether the claimant’s impairments meet or equal a listed
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impairment under 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the answer is yes, the claimant is considered
disabled under the Social Security Act and benefits are awarded. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If the claimant’s impairments neither meet nor equal one of the
listed impairments, the claimant’s case cannot be resolved at step three and the evaluation
proceeds to step four. Id. Here, the ALJ concluded that Petitioner does not have an
impairment (or combination of impairments) that meets or medically equals a listed
impairment (AR 22).
The fourth step of the evaluation process requires the ALJ to determine whether
the claimant’s residual functional capacity is sufficient for the claimant to perform past
relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). An individual’s
residual functional capacity is his ability to do physical and mental work activities on a
sustained basis despite limitations from his impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545,
416.945. Likewise, an individual’s past relevant work is work performed within the last
15 years or 15 years prior to the date that disability must be established; also, the work
must have lasted long enough for the claimant to learn to do the job and be engaged in
substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(b), 404.1565, 416.960(b), 416.965.
Here, the ALJ determined that Petitioner is capable of performing light work, except he is
unable to climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, and can only occasionally balance. He also
could operate foot controls no more than occasionally, is unable to drive, and cannot walk
on uneven surfaces or be exposed to extreme cold temperatures or workplace hazards
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 6

such as heights and machinery. Finally, Petitioner requires the ability to alternate
positions between sitting and standing throughout his work shift. (AR 25).
In the fifth and final step, if it has been established that a claimant can no longer
perform past relevant work because of his impairments, the burden shifts to the
Commissioner to show that the claimant retains the ability to do alternate work and to
demonstrate that such alternate work exists in significant numbers in the national
economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v), 404.1520(f), 416.920(f); see
also Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 681 (9th Cir. 1993). If the claimant is able to do
other work, he is not disabled; if the claimant is not able to do other work and meets the
duration requirement, he is disabled. Here, the ALJ found that Petitioner was unable to
perform any past relevant work. (AR 31). However, considering Petitioner’s age,
education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, the ALJ concluded that
there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Petitioner
could have performed. (AR 31).

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B.

Analysis
Petitioner raises several issues related to the ALJ’s determination that Petitioner

was not disabled during the relevant time period. That period is a very short window of
time in Petitioner’s many years of suffering from diabetes and psoriasis, as well as
experiencing other medical issues. Thus, although there are several years of medical
records to consider, the focus is on June 20, 2000 through March 31, 2002—the time
period relevant to the disability decision at issue. Petitioner’s conditions progressed to a
point where his primary physician opined in 2009 to 2010 that Petitioner could not
maintain employment due to his ailments; however, the conditions must have been
disabling during the June 20, 2000 through March 31, 2002 time period for Petitioner to
qualify for benefits. The ALJ ruled that Petitioner was not disabled during that time
period, and for the reasons described below, the ALJ properly supported his decision
finding that Petitioner’s impairments, although chronic and progressive, were not
disabling, as defined by the Social Security Regulations, prior to March 31, 2002.
1.

The ALJ appropriately considered a treating physician’s opinions.

Petitioner argues that the ALJ “should have considered the opinion and evidence
of Dr. Barry Cusack, Petitioner’s primary treating physician concerning Petitioner’s
medical limitations.” Pet.’s Br., p. 11 (Dkt. 15). Dr. Cusack’s opinions that are
referenced by Petitioner date from 2009 through 2010—at least seven years after
Petitioner’s date last insured. The ALJ considered the opinions, but accorded them little

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 8

weight, finding them “irrelevant to the determination as to whether claimant was suffering
from a disability” prior to March 31, 2002. AR 29. More specifically, with regard to a
March 3, 2009 letter (AR 549–60), the ALJ concluded that “[t]he impairments listed by
Dr. Cusack include impairments” Petitioner either did not suffer from prior to the date last
insured, “or did not suffer from to the extent he did when the letter [written years later]
was authored.” AR 29. Similarly, the ALJ found that a letter from Dr. Cusack dated
August 23, 2010—opining that the claimant was “unable to work at the present time” due
to several progressive, chronic medical conditions, AR 827—“offers no information or
opinion regarding the presence or severity of claimant’s impairments for the time relevant
to this decision,” AR 29.1
The ALJ recognized that Petitioner’s impairments were chronic and progressive,
but found “there is no logical basis to infer that limitations present in 2008 and later were
present at the same level six years earlier.” Significantly, as the ALJ noted, the “record
does not contain any opinions from treating or examining physicians indicating that the
claimant had limitations greater than those determined in this decision prior to the
claimant’s date last insured.” AR 30 (emphasis added).

1

Petitioner acknowledges that one of Dr. Cusack’s letters “clearly” sheds “little light on
Petitioner’s medical state prior to [his date last insured],” but argues that it demonstrates the
chronic and progressive nature of Petitioner’s conditions. Pet’s Br., p. 12 (Dkt. 15). As
discussed throughout this Order, the ALJ agreed that Petitioner suffers from chronic and
progressive conditions, but he concluded that such conditions were not disabling prior to the
date last insured. See, e.g., AR 30.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 9

Thus, although a treating physician’s medical opinion is entitled to special
consideration and weight, here the ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons,
supported by substantial evidence in the record, to support his decision as to the proper
consideration and weight to give to Dr. Cusack’s opinions. See Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876
F.2d 759, 761 (9th Cir. 1989).
2.

The ALJ appropriately considered Petitioner’s treatment records and
any misapprehension about the treatment Petitioner received after his
date last insured is harmless.

Petitioner argues that “the ALJ’s mistaken belief [that] Petitioner’s impairments
were not perceived to be sufficiently severe prior to DLI, is not based upon substantial
evidence.” Pet.’s Br., pp. 7–8 (Dkt. 15). The ALJ found that the “records clearly indicate
that during the time period relevant to this determination [from June 2000 through March
2002], claimant’s impairments had not reached a severity which limited his ability to
function beyond” the assessed RFC of light work with some restrictions. AR 26. As part
of his RFC assessment, the ALJ considered that “[t]here is a gap in treatment, from
approximately April, 2002, until approximately June, 2008, where claimant’s treatment
activity appears to be limited to obtaining prescription refills.” AR 26. The ALJ made
these statements as part of his conclusion that, although “[t]here is no dispute that
claimant has suffered from uncontrolled diabetes mellitus and psoriasis since [the] alleged
onset date,” prior to his date last insured “it had not reached disabling severity.” AR 26.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 10

Petitioner argues that there was no gap in treatment from April of 2002 to June of
2008 and submitted additional medical records from this time period to the Appeals
Council on appeal from the ALJ’s decision. These records detail more significant
treatment activity from 2002 to 2008 than the records submitted to the ALJ. See AR
963–80. The Appeals Council considered the records but found the “information does not
provide a basis for changing” the ALJ’s decision. AR 1–2. The Court agrees that the
ALJ’s disability determination was not based solely on a perceived gap in treatment and,
therefore, the additional records Petitioner submitted did not necessitate reversal of the
ALJ’s decision.
If the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial other evidence, then remand
would be appropriate. Here, however, other substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s
decision. In addition to mentioning a perceived “gap” in treatment, the ALJ noted that
during the relevant time period Petitioner was not facing the level of complications shown
in more recent records, and the ALJ referenced several medical records in support of that
conclusion. E.g., AR 26–27 (describing that Petitioner “exhibited intact cranial nerves,
strength of 5/5, normal muscle tone and normal gait” during a 2000 neurological exam; a
foot care nurse during the relevant time period found no history of foot ulceration; and the
treatment provided for possible foot complications was an exam and education). The ALJ
also considered opinions and records from 2009 through 2010 and made specific mention
that by 2009 Petitioner’s neuropathy had progressed to the point that he was diagnosed

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 11

with mild, non-prolific diabetic retinopathy. Of significance, however, as explained by
the ALJ, this “diagnosis was not established until well after claimant’s date last insured,
and there is no evidence that it existed during the time prior to claimant’s date last
insured.” Instead, the neuropathy progression “occurred well after the date last insured”.
AR 27; see also AR 29–30.
The ALJ also relied on his finding that Petitioner’s “adherence to treatment
recommendations has not been indicative of a person who is disabled.” AR 29.
Petitioner argues that the ALJ “failed to develop the record to support a determination
that Petitioner had a disabling impairment which was amenable to treatment [and] could
be expected to restore Petitioner’s ability to work.” Pet.’s Br., p. 8 (Dkt. 15). However,
the ALJ considered Petitioner’s imperfect compliance with provider recommendations as
part of his credibility determination, not as a basis for finding that Petitioner was not
disabled because treatment could restore his ability to work. In the next sentence after the
ALJ commented about Petitioner not following treatment recommendations, the ALJ
stated that “[a]n unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment of follow
a prescribed course of treatment can cast doubt on a claimant’s sincerity.” AR 29
(emphasis added). Thus, the ALJ was not relying on the imperfect treatment or any gap
in treatment to find that Petitioner was not under a disability, but rather as a reason to find
Petitioner not fully credible about the extent of his limitations.2 See AR 28 (finding that

2

Petitioner was not denied benefits based solely on noncompliance with prescribed
medical treatment, and the policy expressed at Social Security Ruling 82-59 is not applicable
here. See Pet.’s Br., pp. 10–11 (Dkt. 15); SSR 82-59, 1982 WL 31384, *1 (stating that the policy
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 12

Petitioner’s “impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms,
however, the [Petitioner’s] statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limited
effects of these symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with [the
RFC”). And, this is an appropriate consideration in making a credibility determination.
See Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 638 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that “unexplained, or
inadequately explained, failure to seek treatment” may be the basis for an adverse
credibility finding).
Petitioner points to medical records demonstrating that his diabetes was difficult to
control during the relevant time period as evidence that he was disabled during the
relevant time period. See Pet.’s Br., p. 9 (Dkt. 15). Although these records demonstrate
that Petitioner’s diabetes was difficult to manage, other evidence in the record supports
the ALJ’s view that Petitioner’s compliance was imperfect and his impairments were not
disabling during the relevant time period. See AR 610 (referred for diabetic education;
discussed need for exercise and better diet; noted Petitioner needs better blood sugar
control); AR 616 (provider noted “compliance has been imperfect” and that the frequent
instances of blurred vision are related to poor diabetic control and not diabetic

applies when “[a]n individual who would otherwise be found to be under a disability, but who
fails without justifiable cause to follow treatment prescribed by a treating source which the
Social Security Administration (SSA) determines can be expected to restore the individual's
ability to work, cannot by virtue of such “failure” be found to be under a disability”) (emphases
added). Compare Nunley v. Barnhart, 296 F.Supp.2d 702, 703–04 (W.D.Va. 2003) (requiring
the ALJ to provide the petitioner with “a full opportunity to express the specific reasons for his
decision not to follow the prescribed treatment” when the ALJ relied solely on the
noncompliance to deny benefits, after determining that the petitioner’s conditions met or equaled
a listing, which would otherwise entitle the petitioner to benefits).
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retinopathy); AR 650 (Petitioner did not show up for his diabetic education); AR 563
(Petitioner declines diet counseling); AR 554 (Petitioner “takes a supplement . . . at
bedtime despite being advised to avoid the practice”); AR 558 (Petitioner takes insulin
but then “forgets to eat and develops hypos” and was advised to take insulin immediately
after eating if he is unsure when he is going to eat); AR 567.3
It is the role of the trier of fact, not this Court, to resolve conflicts in the evidence.
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 400 (1971). If the evidence supports more than one
rational interpretation, the court must uphold the decision of the ALJ. Thomas v.
Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002).
Accordingly, the ALJ properly supported his determination that Petitioner’s
impairments had not reached a disabling level prior to his date last insured and the
additional records from after the date last insured (provided to the Appeals Council),
although they provide additional evidence about the progression of Petitioner’s
limitations during the years after Petitioner’s date last insured, do not undermine the
ALJ’s determination. Additionally, any error by the ALJ in considering that there was a
“gap” in treatment, was harmless because other evidence supported his credibility and
ultimate disability determinations. Batson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190,

3

See also AR 563–65 (describing Petitioner’s “hit or miss” use of Enbrel to control his
psoriasis and noting Petitioner should “get serious about the program or forget it”); AR 25
(noting flare ups with psoriasis “were due to medication non-compliance”). The Court is aware
that the record also contains instances where the treating physician made note that Petitioner was
using Enbrel as prescribed, and that his psoriasis responded well as a result; however, such
notations are most often in the context of comparing how much less of a problem he had with
psoriasis when he was taking the medication, than when he was not taking it as prescribed.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 14

1195–97 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying harmless error standard where one of the ALJ’s
several reasons supporting an adverse credibility finding was held invalid); Carmickle v.
Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008).
3.

The ALJ properly supported his decision finding that Petitioner was
not disabled during the relevant time period.

Petitioner argues that the ALJ should have (1) considered his vision problems,
calls for emergency medical assistance due to wide blood sugar fluctuations, and
difficulty concentrating, and then (2) made a finding that the Petitioner could not perform
the work identified by the vocational expert as available to him, because of these
limitations. Pet.’s Br., p. 15–16 (Dkt. 15). Although the ALJ did not specifically discuss
that Petitioner had, on occasion, called for emergency medical assistance, and that he
testified he experienced some difficulty concentrating, the ALJ considered the limitations
that were supported by the medical record. For instance, the ALJ discussed that
Petitioner’s “blurred vision was determined to be related to his poor diabetic control
rather than diabetic retinopathy at the time relevant to this decision,” AR 26 (citing AR
649), and that Petitioner reported his blurred vision was “occasional” and any bouts of
blurred vision did not impact his ability to perform certain work activities because “he
was able to complete a college degree.” AR 27. The ALJ also discussed Petitioner’s
“uncontrolled diabetes” and “low” blood sugar. AR 27 (“[C]laimant’s conditions with
respect to his uncontrolled diabetes and peripheral neuropathy worsened over time”).
Moreover, the ALJ acknowledged that, as early as February of 2000, medical records
indicated that Petitioner’s diabetes was not well controlled, but found that Petitioner was
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 15

not facing at that time the same degree of complications that were described in the most
recent medical records from 2009–10. AR 26.
Petitioner points to other evidence—his testimony, his mother’s testimony that
Petitioner became confused when his blood sugar dropped, and medical entries regarding
Petitioner’s emergency medical assistance—to further argue that his conditions were
disabling. The ALJ was not persuaded and appropriately relied on other medical records,
and Petitioner’s imperfect compliance with his physician’s suggestions for helping him
control his conditions, in making his RFC determination. See AR 29. Further, the ALJ
appropriately relied on Petitioner’s activities, which the ALJ found “are not limited to the
extent one would expect,” given his “allegations of disabling symptoms and limitations.”
AR 29. The ALJ noted that Petitioner, well after the date last insured, still participated in
activities such as camping and mowing his lawn, “which indicates that he retained good
locomotion.” AR 24. The ALJ considered Petitioner’s complaint that numbness in his
hands interfered with his ability to hold a steering wheel, but found this undermined by
Petitioner’s report that he remained able to drive well enough to pick up his children from
school, “indicating that even recently his motor skills remained more intact than he
reported.” AR 24. The ALJ also noted that Petitioner’s blurred vision did not appear to
have impacted his ability to function or perform certain type of work because he went to
college in 2001, obtained his degree in 2005, interned for a bail-bond office, and continued
to drive. AR 27–28; see also AR 46–47, 523, 572, 611. Because Petitioner’s disease is
progressive, his ability to go to college, work as in a bail-bond office (whether or not for

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 16

pay), and engage in outdoor activities, at times well after the end of the relevant time
period, provide support for the ALJ’s credibility determination. See Burch v. Barnhart,
400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that when “a claimant engages in numerous
daily activities involving skills that could be transferred to the workplace, the ALJ may
discredit the claimant’s allegations upon making specific findings relating to those
activities”).
While the ALJ could perhaps have rationally found that Petitioner was disabled, or
more limited in his ability to work, the information relied on by the ALJ in formulating the
RFC, and the vocational expert’s testimony finding sufficient jobs in the national economy
for someone with the assessed RFC, provided a rational basis for finding that during the
relevant time period Petitioner could perform available light work, with certain restrictions
to account for some of Petitioner’s limitations, and that such work was available. See
Batson v. Commissioner, 359 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004) (“When the evidence before
the ALJ is subject to more than one rational interpretation, we must defer to the ALJ's
conclusion.”).
IV. CONCLUSION
The ALJ is the fact-finder and is solely responsible for weighing and drawing
inferences from facts and determining credibility. See Allen, 749 F.2d at 579; Vincent ex.
Rel. Vincent, 739 F.2d at 1394; Sample, 694 F.2d at 642. If the evidence is susceptible to
more than one rational interpretation, one of which is the ALJ’s, a reviewing court may not
substitute its interpretation for that of the ALJ. Key, 754 F.2d at 1549.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 17

The evidence upon which the ALJ relied can reasonably and rationally support his
conclusions with respect to most of the issues, despite the fact that such evidence may be
susceptible to a different interpretation. Indeed, in this case, this Court might well have
found differently if was to decide the case de novo. However, such a statement is drawn
from a cold record, and it is not this Court’s role to alter the ALJ’s decision without some
appropriate basis under the law for doing so, consistent with its role as a reviewing court
only. Here, the ALJ’s decision as to Petitioner’s alleged disability is based on proper legal
standards and supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, the Court concludes that the
Commissioner’s determination that Petitioner is not disabled within the meaning of the
Social Security Act is supported by substantial evidence in the record and is based upon an
application of proper legal standards.
Accordingly, the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 18

V. ORDER
Based on the foregoing, Petitioner’s Petition for Review (Dkt. 1) is DENIED, the
decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED, and this action is DISMISSED in its
entirety, with prejudice.
DATED: August 26, 2014

Honorable Ronald E. Bush
U. S. Magistrate Judge

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 19