Hereda-Juarez v. Wengler

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER denying 3 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. This entire action is DISMISSED with prejudice. The Court does not find its resolution of this habeas matter to be reasonably debatable, and a certificate of appealability will not issue. Signed by Judge Edward J. Lodge. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (cjs)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

FREDY HEREDIA-JUAREZ,
Petitioner,

Case No. 1:12-cv-00499-EJL
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

v.
TIMOTHY WENGLER,
Respondent.

Pending before the Court is Petitioner Fredy Heredia-Juarez’s Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus (Dkt. 3). The Petition asserts three claims. The Court previously granted
Respondent’s Motion for Partial Summary Dismissal and dismissed Claims 2 and 3 as
procedural defaulted. (Dkt. 12.) Claim 1 is therefore the only claim remaining for
consideration on the merits. Claim 1 has two sub-claims. Claim 1(a) alleges that
Petitioner’s trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance, in violation of the Sixth
Amendment, by coercing Petitioner to plead guilty. Claim 1(b) alleges that Petitioner’s
trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to advise Petitioner that if he took a
polygraph examination, the results could later be used against him at sentencing.
Respondent has filed an Answer and Brief in Support of Dismissal of Claims 1(a)

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1

and 1(b). (Dkt. 13.) Petitioner has not filed a reply. The Court takes judicial notice of the
records from Petitioner’s state court proceedings, lodged by Respondent on July 1, 2013,
and March 20, 2014. (Dkt. 9, 14.) See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); Dawson v. Mahoney, 451 F.3d
550, 551 (9th Cir. 2006).
Having carefully reviewed the record, including the state court record, the Court
finds that the parties have adequately presented the facts and legal arguments in the briefs
and record and that the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral
argument. Therefore, the Court will decide this matter on the written motions, briefs and
record without oral argument. D. Idaho L. Civ. R. 7.1(d). Accordingly, the Court enters the
following Order denying Claims 1(a) and 1(b) and dismissing this case.
BACKGROUND
In December 2006, three individuals—James John, Jesse Coates, and
Petitioner—robbed a credit union. Shortly thereafter, Petitioner and John “became worried
that Coates would inform the police that they had been involved” in the robbery.
Heredia-Juarez v. State of Idaho, Appeal Nos. 38543, 38544, Unpublished Opinion No.
505 (Idaho Ct. App. June 5, 2012) (State’s Lodging D-4) at 1. Petitioner, James John, and
two other individuals “took Coates to a remote location where Coates was fatally shot.”
(Id.) Petitioner ultimately admitted to being involved in Coates’s murder, but he claimed he
did not fire the fatal shot. (Id. at 1-2.) Petitioner agreed to take a polygraph examination
and denied shooting Coates. The results of the polygraph “indicated that his denial was
deceptive.” (Id. at 2.)
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Petitioner pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to one count of first degree
murder and one count of robbery. (State’s Lodging A-1 at 44; A-2 at 5-9, 23, 32.) In
exchange for Petitioner’s guilty plea, the state agreed to dismiss two other robbery counts,
as well as a count of conspiracy to commit murder; the state also agreed to limit its
sentencing recommendation to imprisonment for 35 years to life. (State’s Lodging A-2 at
8.) Petitioner later obtained new counsel and filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, but
that motion was denied. (State’s Lodging A-2 at 175.)
At sentencing, Petitioner objected to the admission of the polygraph examination
results. (Id. at 183-89.) Relying on Idaho Criminal Rule 32, which states that “[i]n the trial
judge’s discretion, the judge may consider material contained in the presentence report
which would have been inadmissible under the rules of evidence applicable at a trial,” the
sentencing court held that the polygraph results were admissible. (State’s Lodging A-2 at
196.) The court noted that although the polygraph results were a part of the record, they
were “just a piece of the puzzle.” (Id. at 197.)
The court sentenced Petitioner to 35 years to life in prison on the first-degree
murder count and 5 to 15 years on the robbery count, the sentences to run concurrently.
(State’s Lodging D-4 at 2.) Petitioner filed a direct appeal, which was dismissed based on
the appeal waiver contained in Petitioner’s plea agreement. (Id.; State’s Lodging B-3.)
Petitioner then filed a state postconviction petition. The state district court dismissed the
petition, and the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed. (State’s Lodging D-4.) Petitioner also
pursued state postconviction remedies, which were unsuccessful.
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DISCUSSION
1.

Habeas Corpus Standard of Law
Federal habeas corpus relief may be granted on claims adjudicated on the merits in a

state court judgment when the federal court determines that the petitioner “is in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
Under § 2254(d), as amended by the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (“AEDPA”), federal habeas relief is further limited to instances where the state
court’s adjudication of the petitioner’s claim
(1)

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2)

resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light
of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A state court need not “give reasons before its decision can be
deemed to have been ‘adjudicated on the merits’” under § 2254(d). Harrington v. Richter,
131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011).
When a party contests the state court’s legal conclusions, including application of
the law to the facts, § 2254(d)(1) governs. That section consists of two alternative tests: the
“contrary to” test and the “unreasonable application” test.
Under the first test, a state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established
federal law “if the state court applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in
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[the Supreme Court’s] cases, or if it decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court]
[has] done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694
(2002).
Under the second test, to satisfy the “unreasonable application” clause of
§ 2254(d)(1) the petitioner must show that the state court—although identifying “the
correct governing legal rule” from Supreme Court precedent—nonetheless “unreasonably
applie[d] it to the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case.” Williams (Terry) v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362, 407 (2000). A federal court cannot grant habeas relief simply because it
concludes in its independent judgment that the decision is incorrect or wrong; rather, the
state court’s application of federal law must be objectively unreasonable to warrant relief.
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003); Bell, 535 U.S. at 694.
In Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 785-86, the United States Supreme Court
reiterated that a federal court may not simply re-determine a claim on its merits after the
highest state court has done so, just because the federal court would have made a different
decision. Rather, the review is necessarily deferential. The Supreme Court explained that
under § 2254(d), a habeas court (1) “must determine what arguments or theories supported
or . . . could have supported, the state court’s decision”; and (2) “then it must ask whether it
is possible [that] fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are
inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this Court.” Id. at 786. If fairminded
jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s decision, then a federal court
cannot grant relief under § 2254(d)(1). Id. The Supreme Court emphasized: “It bears
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repeating that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court’s contrary
conclusion was unreasonable.” Id.
Though the source of clearly established federal law must come from the holdings
of the United States Supreme Court, circuit precedent may be persuasive authority for
determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable application of Supreme
Court precedent. Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir. 1999). However,
circuit law may not be used “to refine or sharpen a general principle of Supreme Court
jurisprudence into a specific legal rule that th[e] Court has not announced.” Marshall v.
Rodgers, 133 S. Ct. 1446, 1450 (2013). A federal habeas court reviews the state court’s
“last reasoned decision” in determining whether a petitioner is entitled to relief. Ylst v.
Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991).
As to the facts, the United States Supreme Court has clarified “that review under §
2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim
on the merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011). This means that
evidence not presented to the state court may not be introduced on federal habeas review if
a claim was adjudicated on the merits in state court and if the underlying factual
determinations of the state court were not unreasonable. See Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d
984, 999 (9th Cir. 2014).
When a petitioner contests the reasonableness of the state court’s factual
determinations, a federal court must undertake a § 2254(d)(2) analysis. To be eligible for
relief under § 2254(d)(2), the petitioner must show that the state court decision was “based
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on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.” The United States Supreme Court has admonished that a “state-court
factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would
have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.” Wood v. Allen, 130 S. Ct. 841,
849 (2010).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has identified five types of
unreasonable factual determinations that result from procedural flaws that occurred in state
court proceedings: (1) when state courts fail to make a finding of fact; (2) when courts
mistakenly make factual findings under the wrong legal standard; (3) when “the
fact-finding process itself is defective,” such as when a state court “makes evidentiary
findings without holding a hearing”; (4) when courts “plainly misapprehend or misstate the
record in making their findings, and the misapprehension goes to a material factual issue
that is central to petitioner’s claim”; or (5) when “the state court has before it, yet
apparently ignores, evidence that supports petitioner’s claim.” Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d.
992, 1000-01 (9th Cir. 2004). State court findings of fact are presumed to be correct, and
the petitioner has the burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing
evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
If the state court factual determination was unreasonable, then the federal court is
not limited by § 2254(d)(1), but proceeds to a de novo review of the claims, which may
include consideration of evidence outside the state court record, subject to the limitations
of § 2254(e)(2). Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 1000 (9th Cir. 2014).
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2.

Standard of Law for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that a criminal

defendant has a right to the effective assistance of counsel in his defense. The standard for
ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) claims is set forth in Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984). A petitioner asserting ineffective assistance of counsel must show
that (1) “counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment,” and (2) those errors “deprive[d] the
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. at 687.
Whether an attorney’s performance was deficient is judged against an objective
standard of reasonableness. Id. at 687-88. A reviewing court’s inquiry into the
“reasonableness” of counsel’s actions must not rely on hindsight:
Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly
deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to
second-guess counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse
sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s
defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a
particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. A fair
assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort
be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to
reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct,
and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the
time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the
evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that
counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome
the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged
action might be considered sound trial strategy. There are
countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given
case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not
defend a particular client in the same way.
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Id. at 689 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Strategic decisions “are virtually unchallengeable” if “made after thorough
investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
Moreover, an attorney who decides not to investigate a potential defense theory is not
ineffective so long as the decision to forego investigation is itself objectively reasonable:
[S]trategic choices made after less than complete investigation
are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable
professional judgments support the limitations on
investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to make
reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that
makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any
ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate
must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the
circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to
counsel’s judgments.
Id. at 690-91.
The Ninth Circuit has provided some insight into the Strickland standard when
evaluating an attorney’s “strategy calls.” These cases are instructive in the Court’s
assessment of whether the state court reasonably applied Strickland. Duhaime, 200 F.3d at
600. First, tactical decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance simply because, in
retrospect, better tactics are known to have been available. Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d
1228, 1241 (9th Cir. 1984). Second, a mere difference of opinion as to tactics does not
render counsel’s assistance ineffective. United States v. Mayo, 646 F.2d 369, 375 (9th Cir.
1981).
If a petitioner shows that counsel’s performance was deficient, the next step is the
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prejudice analysis. “An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not
warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the
judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. To satisfy the prejudice standard, a petitioner
“must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. As the Strickland
Court instructed:
In making this determination, a court hearing an
ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the evidence
before the judge or jury. Some of the factual findings will have
been unaffected by the errors, and factual findings that were
affected will have been affected in different ways. Some errors
will have had a pervasive effect on the inferences to be drawn
from the evidence, altering the entire evidentiary picture, and
some will have had an isolated, trivial effect. Moreover, a
verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record is
more likely to have been affected by errors than one with
overwhelming record support. Taking the unaffected findings
as a given, and taking due account of the effect of the errors on
the remaining findings, a court making the prejudice inquiry
must ask if the defendant has met the burden of showing that
the decision reached would reasonably likely have been
different absent the errors.
Id. at 695-96. To constitute Strickland prejudice, “[t]he likelihood of a different result must
be substantial, not just conceivable.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S. Ct. 770,
792 (2011).
To show prejudice based on deficient performance of counsel in a case where, as
here, the petitioner pleaded guilty, the petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 10

insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
When evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a federal habeas
proceeding under § 2254(d)(1), the Court’s review of that claim is “doubly deferential.”
Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011).
3.

Analysis of Claim 1(a): Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel Based on
Counsel’s Allegedly Coercing Petitioner to Plead Guilty
In rejecting Petitioner’s IAC claims, the Idaho Court of Appeals correctly cited

Strickland v. Washington. (State’s Lodging D-4 at 4.) Therefore, the decision was not
“contrary to” clearly-established Supreme Court precedent. 28 U.S.C. § 2254; see Bell,
535 U.S. at 694. With respect to Claim 1(a)—that Petitioner’s counsel coerced him into
pleading guilty—the state court found that Petitioner had “presented no evidence that his
attorney used any sort of intimidation or other improper tactics to pressure him into
pleading guilty.” (State’s Lodging at 6-7.) Petitioner did not argue that his attorney was
inadequately prepared, ignorant of relevant law, or had any “other shortcomings capable of
objective review.” (Id. at 7.) Thus, the court held that Petitioner “failed to establish either
deficient performance or prejudice.” (Id.)
The Idaho Court of Appeals’ implicit finding that Petitioner was not coerced into
pleading guilty was a reasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
Petitioner has not pointed to any evidence in the record that would call this finding into
question. To the contrary, when asked in his guilty plea advisory form if he understood that
“no one, including your attorney, can force you to plead guilty,” Petitioner answered,

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“Yes.”
Because the finding that counsel did not coerce Petitioner is presumed correct under
§ 2254(e)(1), it necessarily follows that the Idaho Court of Appeals’ decision that
Petitioner’s counsel did not render ineffective assistance with respect to the guilty plea was
a reasonable application of Strickland. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In support of Claim
1(a), Petitioner states only that he “was coerced by counsel to plead guilty.” (Dkt. 3 at 2.)
This is woefully insufficient to establish that Petitioner is entitled to habeas relief.
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Claim 1(a).
4.

Analysis of Claim 1(b): Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel Based on Trial
Counsel’s Alleged Failure to Warn Petitioner, Prior to the Polygraph
Examination, that the Results of the Polygraph Could Be Used Against
Petitioner at Sentencing.
On appeal from the denial of Petitioner’s state postconviction petition, Petitioner

argued that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to explain that the polygraph
results—which indicated that Petitioner was lying when he denied pulling the
trigger—could be used at sentencing. The Idaho Court of Appeals initially stated that
because Petitioner had failed raise this argument in the trial court, the issue had not been
preserved for appeal.
Alternatively, however, the court concluded on the merits that Petitioner could
demonstrate no prejudice from counsel’s alleged failure because he was told by the police,
prior to submitting to the polygraph, that anything Petitioner said could later be used
against him. (State’s Lodging D-4 at 7-8.) Additionally, the court determined that

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 12

Petitioner did not suffer prejudice because his sentence would have been the same,
regardless of whether the polygraph results were considered at sentencing. The trial judge
specifically stated that “whether [Petitioner] pulled that trigger or whether he didn’t does
not alter the decision that I’m going to make here with regard to the ultimate sentence.” (Id.
at 8) (emphasis added). The Idaho Court of Appeals’ rejection of Petitioner’s claim that he
should have been warned that the polygraph results could be used against him at sentencing
was a reasonable application of Strickland.
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Claim 1(b).
CONCLUSION
The Idaho Court of Appeals’ decision that Petitioner received effective assistance of
counsel during plea negotiations and with respect to the polygraph results did not
“involve[] an unreasonable application” clearly established Supreme Court precedent, nor
were the court’s factual determinations underlying that decision unreasonable. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d). Therefore, the Court will deny Claims 1(a) and 1(b), the only claims remaining
in this case, and dismiss this habeas case with prejudice.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED:
1.

The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dkt. 3) is DENIED, and this entire
action is DISMISSED with prejudice.

2.

The Court does not find its resolution of this habeas matter to be reasonably
debatable, and a certificate of appealability will not issue. See 28 U.S.C.

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§ 2253(c); Habeas Rule 11. If Petitioner wishes to appeal, he must file a
timely notice of appeal with the Clerk of Court. Petitioner may seek a
certificate of appealability from the Ninth Circuit by filing a request in that
court.

DATED: April 17, 2015

_________________________
Edward J. Lodge
United States District Judge

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