Wolf et al v. Otter et al

Filing 85

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER Defendant Reinke's Motion to Dismiss, treated as a motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 46 ), is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Defendant Reinke's Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavits of Wolf, Kruger , and Allison in Support of Plaintiffs' Supplemental Response (Dkt. 84 ) is DENIED. The CCA Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Injunctive Relief Claims (Dkt. 62 ) is GRANTED. All injunctive relief claims against Defendants CCA and Ellis are DIS MISSED. the following Defendants are DISMISSED from this action: Defendants Otter, Wasden, Sandy, Van Tassel, Nielson, Craven, Funaiole, Dressen, Langerak, Matthews, Corizon, and Ellis. Plaintiff Begley is formally DISMISSED from this action. Plainti ffs' Motion for Contempt (Dkt. 81 ) is DENIED. Defendant Reinke's unopposed Motion to Seal (Dkt. 70 ) is RANTED. Plaintiffs' unopposed Motion to Lodge Plaintiff Wolf's Rule 26 Disclosures (Dkt. 74 ) is GRANTED. Defendant Re inke shall file his Answer within 21 days of the date of this Order, after which the Court will issue a scheduling order to govern the remainder of these proceedings. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (jp)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

ANDREW J.J. WOLF, R. HANS
KRUGER, and DAVID S. BEGLEY,1
Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:12-cv-00526-BLW
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

v.
C.L. “BUTCH” OTTER; LAWRENCE
WASDEN; IDAHO STATE BOARD OF
CORRECTIONS; ROBIN SANDY, J.R.
VAN TASSEL; JAY NIELSON; IDAHO
COMMISSION OF PARDONS AND
PAROLE; OLIVIA CRAVEN; BILL
YOUNG; MARK FUNAIOLE; JANE
DRESSEN; NORMAN LANGERAK;
MIKE MATTHEWS; BRENT REINKE;
CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF
AMERICA, INC.; TIM WENGLER;
JASON ELLIS; CORIZON INC., each
sued in their individual and official
capacities and their successors in office,
Defendants.

Plaintiffs, prisoners in the custody of the Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC),
are proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action. Now pending
before the Court are the following motions: (1) Defendant Reinke’s Motion to Dismiss
(Dkt. 46), which will be treated as a motion for summary judgment (see Dkt. 80); (2) a

1

Plaintiff Begley has voluntarily dismissed his claims in this action. (Dkt. 40.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1

Motion to Dismiss Injunctive Relief Claims (Dkt. 62) filed by Defendants CCA and Ellis
(“CCA Defendants”); and (3) Plaintiffs’ Motion for Contempt (Dkt. 81).2
Having fully reviewed the record, the Court finds that the facts and legal
arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record and that oral argument is
unnecessary. D. Idaho L. R. 7.1. Accordingly, the Court enters the following Order
granting in part Defendant Reinke’s Motion, granting the CCA Defendants’ Motion, and
denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Contempt.
INTRODUCTION
The parties are familiar with the factual and procedural history of this case. In its
Initial Review Order, the Court reviewed Plaintiffs’ Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A and concluded that Plaintiffs could proceed on the following claims:
•

Third, Fourth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Claims for
Relief against Defendant Reinke (for injunctive relief
only), based on the alleged denial of adequate
ventilation in Unit 14 of the Idaho State Correctional
Institution (ISCI) and the West Wing Units at the
Idaho Correctional Center (ICC).

•

Fifth, and Sixth Claims for Relief against Defendant
Reinke (for injunctive relief only), based on the alleged
denial of adequate HVAC at Units 7, 9, 10, 11, and 13
at ISCI.

•

Twelfth, Thirteenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-First
Claims for Relief against Defendant Reinke and former

2

Also pending are Defendant Reinke’s unopposed Motion to Seal (Dkt. 70) and
Plaintiffs’ unopposed Motion to Lodge Plaintiff Wolf’s Rule 26 Disclosures (Dkt. 74). These
motions will be granted.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2

Defendant Wengler (for injunctive relief only), as well
as Defendant Corrections Corporation of America
(CCA) (for injunctive relief and monetary damages),
based on the alleged denial of adequate dayroom space
at the ICC West Wing Units and the alleged denial of
adequate out-of-cell time at ICC and ISCI.
•

Twenty-Fourth Claim for Relief against Defendant
Reinke (for injunctive relief only), based on the alleged
failure to protect inmates from attacks by other
inmates.

(Dkt. 27.)3 Plaintiffs’ claims are all based on a central theme: that systematic
overcrowding in the ISCI and ICC prisons has led to allegedly unconstitutional conditions
of confinement.
Defendant Ellis, the current warden of ICC, was later substituted as a Defendant in
place of Defendant Wengler, and Defendant Wengler was dismissed from this action.
(Dkt. 57.) The CCA Defendants have filed an Answer to Plaintiffs’ Complaint (Dkt. 43),
but Defendant Reinke has not.
On March 25, 2014, the Court dismissed Plaintiff Kruger’s claims against the CCA
Defendants because Kruger did not exhaust available administrative remedies within the
ICC grievance system prior to filing suit. (Dkt. 76.) In the meantime, Defendant Reinke
filed a motion to dismiss all of the claims against him on the following grounds: (1)
Plaintiff Kruger did not exhaust available administrative remedies with respect to any of

3

The Court also allowed Plaintiff Begley an opportunity to supplement his claims that he
was denied a timely parole revocation hearing and parole revocation counsel, but Plaintiff Begley
later voluntarily dismissed all of his claims without filing a supplement.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3

his claims; and (2) Plaintiffs’ Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. (Dkt. 46.) The Court notified the parties that it intended to treat Defendant
Reinke’s motion on exhaustion as a motion for summary judgment, and the parties have
now filed supplemental briefs in response. (Dkt. 80, 82, & 83.) The CCA Defendants
have also moved to dismiss all claims for injunctive relief against them on the grounds
that Plaintiffs Wolf and Kruger are no longer incarcerated at ICC and that their claims for
injunctive relief against the CCA Defendants are therefore moot. (Dkt. 62.)
DEFENDANT REINKE’S MOTION TO DISMISS, TREATED AS A
RULE 56 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1.

Standard of Law
Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”),4 prisoners are

required to exhaust all available administrative remedies within the prison system before
they can include the claims in a new or ongoing civil rights lawsuit challenging the
conditions of their confinement. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214,
1220-21 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that a claim may be exhausted prior to filing suit or
during suit, so long as exhaustion was completed before the first time the prisoner sought
to include the claim in the suit). “Proper” exhaustion of administrative remedies is
required, meaning that the prisoner must comply “with [the prison’s] deadlines and other
critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively without
imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548
4

Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, et seq.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4

U.S. 81, 90-91 (2006).
“There is no question that exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA and that
unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007).
The exhaustion requirement is based on the important policy concern that prison officials
should have “an opportunity to resolve disputes concerning the exercise of their
responsibilities before being haled into court.” Id. at 204.
The defendant bears the ultimate burden of proving failure to exhaust. See Brown
v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 936 (9th Cir. 2005). If the defendant initially shows that (1) an
available administrative remedy existed and (2) the prisoner failed to exhaust that remedy,
then the burden of production shifts to the plaintiff to bring forth evidence “showing that
there is something in his particular case that made the existing and generally available
administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Albino v. Baca, ___ F.3d ___,
2014 WL 1317141, *8 (9th Cir. April 3, 2014) (en banc).
Confusing or contradictory information given to a prisoner “informs [the]
determination of whether relief was, as a practical matter, ‘available.’” Brown, 422 F.3d
at 937. Administrative remedies will be deemed unavailable and exhaustion excused if
the inmate had no way of knowing the prison’s grievance procedure, if the prison
improperly processed an inmate’s grievance, if prison officials misinformed an inmate
regarding grievance procedures, if the inmate “did not have access to the necessary
grievance forms within the prison’s time limits for filing the grievance,” or if prison staff

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 5

took any other similar actions that interfered with an inmate’s efforts to exhaust. Albino,
2014 WL 1317141, at *8, 13.
“An inmate has no obligation to appeal from a grant of relief, or a partial grant that
satisfies him, in order to exhaust his administrative remedies.” Harvey v. Jordan, 605
F.3d 681, 685 (9th Cir. 2010). Further, a prisoner is not responsible for ensuring that
“prison officials actually provide the relief that they have promised.” Id.
Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense that may be asserted in a Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, so long as the
prisoner’s failure to exhaust is clear from the face of the complaint and any public records
subject to judicial notice. Albino, 2014 WL 1317141 at *5. If, however, either party relies
on evidence beyond the pleadings and public records, the exhaustion issue should be
brought as, or converted into, a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. Id. In all
cases, “[e]xhaustion should be decided, if feasible, before reaching the merits of a
prisoner’s claim.” Id. at *6.
Defendant Reinke has withdrawn his motion to dismiss Plaintiff Wolf’s claims.
(Dkt. 65 at 6.) Therefore, the only remaining issue in Defendant Reinke’s Motion is
whether Plaintiff Kruger exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to the
various claims in this action. The Court has already determined that Defendant Reinke’s
motion to dismiss Plaintiff Kruger’s claims for failure to exhaust will be treated as a Rule
56 motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. 80.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 6

Summary judgment is appropriate where a party can show that, as to any claim or
defense, “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). One of the principal purposes of the
summary judgment rule “is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or
defenses.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). It is not “a disfavored
procedural shortcut,” but is instead the “principal tool[] by which factually insufficient
claims or defenses [can] be isolated and prevented from going to trial with the attendant
unwarranted consumption of public and private resources.” Id. at 327.
“[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not
defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment . . . .” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). Rather, there must be no genuine
dispute as to any material fact in order for a case to survive summary judgment. Material
facts are those “that might affect the outcome of the suit.” Id. at 248. “Disputes over
irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary judgment.” T.W.
Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).
The moving party is entitled to summary judgment if that party shows that each
material fact cannot be disputed. To show that the material facts are not in dispute, a
party may cite to particular parts of materials in the record, or show that the adverse party
is unable to produce admissible evidence to support the fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)
& (B). The Court must consider “the cited materials,” but it may also consider “other

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 7

materials in the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). The Court is “not required to comb
through the record to find some reason to deny a motion for summary judgment.”
Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, the “party opposing summary judgment must
direct [the Court’s] attention to specific triable facts.” So. Ca. Gas Co. v. City of Santa
Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 2003).
If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, then the burden shifts to the
opposing party to establish that a genuine dispute as to any material fact actually does
exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The
existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party’s position is
insufficient. Rather, “there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for
the [non-moving party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
Material used to support or dispute a fact must be capable of being “presented in a
form that would be admissible in evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). Affidavits or
declarations submitted in support of or in opposition to a motion “must be made on
personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that
the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(4). If a party “fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly
address another party’s assertion of fact,” the Court may consider that fact to be
undisputed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). The Court may grant summary judgment for the

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 8

moving party “if the motion and supporting materials—including the facts considered
undisputed—show that the movant is entitled to it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(3).
The Court does not determine the credibility of affiants or weigh the evidence set
forth by the non-moving party. Although all reasonable inferences which can be drawn
from the evidence must be drawn in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, T.W.
Elec. Serv., Inc., 809 F.2d at 630-31, the Court is not required to adopt unreasonable
inferences from circumstantial evidence, McLaughlin v. Liu, 849 F.2d 1205, 1208 (9th
Cir. 1988).
2.

Grievance Procedure of the Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC)
The IDOC’s grievance process consists of three stages. First, any inmate with a

concern is required to seek an informal resolution by filling out an Offender Concern
Form, addressed to the staff person “most capable of responding to and, if appropriate,
resolving the issue.” (Whittington Aff., Dkt. 46-2, at ¶ 5.) If the issue cannot be resolved
informally through the use of a Concern Form, the inmate must then file a Grievance
Form. (Id. at ¶ 6.)
A Grievance Form must be submitted within 30 days of the incident giving rise to
the grievance. (Id. at ¶ 6.) Grievances must contain “specific information including the
nature of the complaint, dates, places, and names,” and only one issue may be raised in
each grievance. (Id. at ¶ 7.) When the grievance coordinator receives an inmate grievance,
she “enters the grievance information into the Corrections Integrated System (CIS),” an

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 9

electronic database used to track grievances, “if the grievance form is completed
correctly.”5 (Id.) The Grievance Coordinator then assigns the grievance to the staff
member most capable of responding to and, if appropriate, resolving the issue. That staff
member responds to the grievance and returns it to the Grievance Coordinator. The
Grievance Coordinator then logs the staff member’s response into the CIS and forwards
the grievance to a “reviewing authority,” usually a deputy warden. (Id.)
The reviewing authority reviews the grievance, including the staff member’s
response, and must deny, grant, or modify the grievance. The reviewing authority then
returns the grievance to the Grievance Coordinator, who logs the response into the
database and sends the completed grievance back to the inmate. (Id.) If the decision on an
inmate’s grievance is not satisfactory to the inmate, the inmate may appeal that decision.
(Id. at ¶ 8.) The “appellate authority,” or the warden, is the person who usually decides an
inmate’s grievance appeal. (Id. at ¶ 9.)
Not until the completion of all three of these steps—Concern Form, Grievance
Form, and grievance appeal—is the grievance process exhausted. (Id. at ¶ 10.)
3.

Discussion
Defendant Reinke has met his initial burden of showing that Plaintiff Kruger did

not exhaust available administrative remedies with respect to most of his claims. The

5

If the grievance is not correctly completed, the Grievance Coordinator returns the
incorrectly completed grievance to the inmate, and the inmate “may then correct the Grievance
for processing.” (Whittington Aff. at ¶ 7.)
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 10

grievance records submitted by Defendant Reinke show that Plaintiff Kruger did not file
any grievances relating to his claims of inadequate ventilation, inadequate HVAC, and
inadequate dayroom space and out-of-cell time at ISCI. (Whittington Aff. at ¶¶ 13-18 and
Dkt. 46-6 to 46-8.) Plaintiff Kruger has not disputed Defendant Reinke’s evidence as to
these claims. Rather, Plaintiff Kruger alleges that IDOC has a policy of improperly
screening grievances and refusing to process grievances and that, therefore, Kruger was
not required to exhaust these issues. (Dkt. 82 at 6.) In support of this contention, Plaintiffs
Kruger submitted an affidavit, as well as affidavits from other prisoners, including
Plaintiff Wolf, stating that the inmates had, or knew of inmates who had, attempted to
grieve issues but who were not satisfied with the procedures required by the applicable
grievance process. (See Dkt. 82-1 to 82-2.)6 None of these affidavits support the claim
that prison personnel had a policy of improperly screening grievances to ensure
compliance with the grievance procedure. Further, the allegation that some grievances
filed by other inmates were not answered does not give rise to an inference that Plaintiff
Kruger exhausted all available remedies with respect to his claims in this action.

6

Defendant Reinke moves to strike these affidavits. (Dkt. 84.) However, evidence need
not be admissible to be considered on summary judgment; rather, the evidence need only be
capable of being “presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(2). Further, after the 2010 revisions to Rule 56 of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, a
party need not file a separate motion to strike when objecting to the admissibility of evidence
submitted at the summary judgment stage. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, advisory committee’s note.
Therefore, the Motion to Strike will be denied. Defendants may renew any objections at a later
date if this case proceeds to trial. See id. (“[F]ailure to challenge admissibility at the summaryjudgment stage does not forfeit the right to challenge admissibility at trial.”).
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 11

Therefore, all claims by Plaintiff Kruger based on inadequate ventilation, inadequate
HVAC, and inadequate dayroom space and out-of-cell time will be dismissed.
However, Plaintiff Kruger has shown that he did, in fact, exhaust available
administrative remedies with respect to his failure to protect claim. The evidence shows
that in August and September 2012, Plaintiff Kruger sent three concern forms to Warden
Randy Blades at ISCI regarding inmate-on-inmate violence and bullying. (Affidavit of
Dale Koch, Dkt. 69-1, Ex. C.) In response to the first concern form, Warden Blades
responded, “Thank you for the information—we took some measures last week—things
seemed to improve—if not, let me know—Thanks.” (Id.) (emphasis added). Blades
responded to the second concern form as follows: “Mr. Kruger—not having given any
specifics, I’m not quite sure what you mean but do appreciate the input. I know we have
problematic inmates in [administrative segregation] wanting out and may occasionally
make a mistake, but that is not intended—I will study your conclusions.” (Id.) (emphasis
added). Plaintiff Kruger’s third concern form was “forwarded to investigators.” (Id.)
Because these responses by the warden constituted a grant of relief or, at the very
least, “a partial grant that satisfie[d]” Plaintiff Kruger, Kruger was not required to
continue to pursue the issue through the remaining steps in the grievance process. Harvey,
605 F.3d at 685. The responses that Plaintiff Kruger received on his concern forms did
not deny his requested relief, but rather indicated that the prison was addressing the
problem. Kruger was not required to pursue the matter any further. Defendant Reinke’s

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 12

attempts to distinguish Harvey are unpersuasive. (See Dkt. 83 at 5-6.)
Defendant Reinke also argues that the concern forms submitted by Plaintiff Kruger
did not specifically complain that overcrowding contributed to the violence problem
identified by Kruger. Reinke contends, without citation to any legal authority, that
Plaintiff Kruger did not exhaust his administrative remedies because his “concern forms
relate only to allegations of violence in the prison and do not specifically address any
issues related to overcrowding.” (Dkt. 83 at 4.) However, an inmate need not guess as to
the reasons behind a particular problem when exhausting the grievance process. Inmates
will often have little to no information regarding the inner workings and policies of the
prison in which they are confined. Prisoners that have identified a problem within the
prison are not required to investigate and correctly determine the myriad issues that may
have contributed to that problem in order to properly exhaust administrative remedies.
Plaintiff Kruger alerted IDOC officials to violence in the prison by other inmates, and
officials appeared to be addressing the issue—thus leading Plaintiff Kruger to conclude
that further administrative remedies were unnecessary.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff Kruger’s claims against
Reinke only with respect to inadequate ventilation, inadequate HVAC, and inadequate
dayroom space and out-of-cell time for failure to exhaust. Plaintiff Kruger’s failure to
protect claims against Reinke remain at issue in this action.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 13

CCA DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS INJUNCTIVE RELIEF CLAIMS
Plaintiffs are no longer incarcerated at ICC. An inmate’s transfer or release from
prison generally renders his injunctive relief claims moot. See Wiggins v. Rushen, 760
F.2d 1009, 1011 (9th Cir. 1985). Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1369 (9th Cir. 1995).
Therefore, the Court will grant the CCA Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Injunctive Relief
Claims. Because Plaintiffs were allowed to proceed against Defendant Ellis only for
injunctive relief, Defendant Ellis will be dismissed from this action, along with the other
Defendants against whom Plaintiffs have not been allowed to proceed. (See Dkt. 27.)
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CONTEMPT
Plaintiffs request that the Court hold Defendant Reinke and his counsel in
contempt for allegedly failing to comply with two Court Orders: the Court’s June 13,
2013 Initial Review Order (Dkt. 27), and the Court’s January 22, 2014 Order (Dkt. 68).
The Court finds that Defendant Reinke attempted in good faith to initially comply with
the Court’s order to produce all grievance-related correspondence. Plaintiffs then
identified several documents that were missing from this initial production. The Court
ordered Defendant Reinke to produce those documents, and he did so. There is no
evidence that Defendant Reinke or his attorneys acted in bad faith. Therefore, Plaintiffs’
Motion for Contempt will be denied.
CONCLUSION
Although Plaintiff Kruger did not exhaust all available administrative remedies
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 14

with respect to his claims of inadequate ventilation, inadequate HVAC, and inadequate
dayroom space and out-of-cell time, he did exhaust those remedies with respect to his
failure to protect claim. Further, Plaintiffs’ claims against the CCA Defendants for
injunctive relief are moot. Therefore, the Court will grant in part Defendant Reinke’s
Motion and grant the CCA Defendants’ Motion.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED:
1.

Defendant Reinke’s Motion to Dismiss, treated as a motion for summary
judgment (Dkt. 46), is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
Plaintiff Kruger’s claims against Defendant Reinke with respect to
inadequate ventilation, inadequate HVAC, and inadequate dayroom space
and out-of-cell time are DISMISSED. Because Plaintiff Kruger’s claims
against the CCA Defendants have already been dismissed (see Dkt. 76),
Plaintiff Kruger’s only remaining claim is his failure to protect claim
against Defendant Reinke, for injunctive relief only.

2.

Defendant Reinke’s Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavits of Wolf,
Kruger, and Allison in Support of Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Response (Dkt.
84) is DENIED.

3.

The CCA Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Injunctive Relief Claims (Dkt.
62) is GRANTED. All injunctive relief claims against Defendants CCA and

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 15

Ellis are DISMISSED. If Plaintiffs are transferred back to ICC during
course of these proceedings, they may move to renew their injunctive relief
claims against Defendants CCA and Ellis.
4.

For the reasons stated in the Initial Review Order (Dkt. 27), the following
claims are DISMISSED in their entirety: Plaintiffs’ First, Second, Seventh,
Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, Sixteenth, Seventeenth, Eighteenth,
Nineteenth, Twenty-Second, Twenty-Third, Twenty-Fifth, Twenty-Sixth,
Twenty-Seventh, Twenty-Eighth, Twenty-Ninth, and Thirtieth claims for
relief.

5.

For the reasons stated in this Order and in the Initial Review Order (Dkt.
27) the following Defendants are DISMISSED from this action: Defendants
Otter, Wasden, Sandy, Van Tassel, Nielson, Craven, Funaiole, Dressen,
Langerak, Matthews, Corizon, and Ellis. Defendants Reinke and CCA are
now the only Defendants remaining in this action.

6.

In accordance with Plaintiff Begley’s Notice of Voluntary Dismissal (Dkt.
40), Plaintiff Begley is formally DISMISSED from this action.

7.

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Contempt (Dkt. 81) is DENIED.

8.

Defendant Reinke’s unopposed Motion to Seal (Dkt. 70) is GRANTED.
The documents subject to the Motion to Seal (submitted as Dkt. 71) are
hereby SEALED.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 16

9.

Plaintiffs’ unopposed Motion to Lodge Plaintiff Wolf’s Rule 26 Disclosures
(Dkt. 74) is GRANTED.

10.

Defendant Reinke shall file his Answer within 21 days of the date of this
Order, after which the Court will issue a scheduling order to govern the
remainder of these proceedings.

DATED: June 3, 2014

B. LYNN WINMILL
Chief Judge
United States District Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 17