Smith v. Wengler

Filing 43

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER. IT IS ORDERED: The Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 22 is DENIED and DISMISSED with prejudice. The Court does not find its resolution of this habeas matter to be reasonably debatable, and a certificate of appealability will not issue. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (st)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

CHARLES E. SMITH,
Petitioner,

Case No. 1:12-cv-00539-BLW

vs.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

RANDY BLADES, Warden,
Respondent.

The Court recently provided Petitioner Charles E. Smith with additional state court
records that he requested and permitted Petitioner to file a supplemental reply, if
necessary. (Dkt. 42.) Petitioner has filed nothing further. Therefore, the Court considers
the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus fully briefed and ripe for adjudication.
(Dkt. 22, 34, 35.) Having reviewed the record in this matter, including the state court
record, and having considered the arguments of the parties, the Court enters the following
Order denying the Petition and dismissing this action with prejudice.
BACKGROUND
After a jury trial, Petitioner’s judgment of conviction for driving under the
influence (DUI) was entered on December 4, 2007, in the Fourth Judicial District Court
in Ada County, Idaho.1 Because the action was bifurcated and Petitioner waived his right

1

An amended judgment was entered on August 13, 2008.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1

to a jury in the second proceeding, the Honorable Deborah Bail was the factfinder in the
matter and found him guilty of having been convicted of a prior DUI charge, which
elevated the current charge from a misdemeanor to a felony. In addition, Judge Bail
found him to be a persistent violator. (State’s Lodging A-1, pp. 86-87; see State’s
Lodging B-19, p. 2.)
After conviction, Petitioner’s counsel filed a direct appeal brief for Petitioner.
However, because Petitioner was dissatisfied with the content, the Idaho Court of
Appeals permitted counsel to withdraw and Petitioner to file a supplemental pro se brief.
(State’s Lodgings B-6 to B-19.) The direct appeal ultimately was unsuccessful.
Petitioner next filed a Rule 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence, raising a
double jeopardy argument; the motion was denied by the state district court. (State’s
Lodging C-1.) Petitioner filed an appeal, which was unsuccessful. (State’s Lodgings D-1
through D-9.)
Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition raising a second double jeopardy
argument. The state district court denied the petition. (State’s Lodgings E-1, E-2.) That
claim also was rejected by the Idaho Court of Appeals. (State’s Lodgings F-1 through F17.)
In this action, Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on October
26, 2012, followed by an Amended Petition on November 24, 2014. He brings two
related double jeopardy claims, which the Court will now address.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2

STANDARD OF LAW
Where the petitioner challenges a state court judgment in which the petitioner’s
federal claims were adjudicated on the merits, Title 28 U.S.C.§ 2254(d), as amended by
the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), applies. Title 28
U.S.C.§ 2254(d) limits relief to instances where the state court’s adjudication of the
petitioner’s claim:
1.

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or

2.

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A federal habeas court reviews the state court’s “last reasoned
decision” in determining whether a petitioner is entitled to relief. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501
U.S. 797, 804 (1991).
Though the source of clearly established federal law must come only from the
holdings of the United States Supreme Court, circuit precedent may be persuasive
authority for determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable application of
Supreme Court precedent. Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir. 2000).
However, circuit law may not be used “to refine or sharpen a general principle of
Supreme Court jurisprudence into a specific legal rule that th[e] [Supreme] Court has not
announced.” Marshall v. Rodgers, 133 S. Ct. 1446, 1450 (2013).
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment includes three basic
protections: it protects a defendant from (1) “a second prosecution for the same offense
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after acquittal,” (2) “a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction,” and (3)
“multiple punishments for the same offense.” Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 498 (1984).
This case involves the third protection—Plaintiff claims that only one enhancement
should have been applied.
The protection against cumulative punishments “is designed to ensure that the
sentencing discretion of courts is confined to the limits established by the legislature.”
Johnson, 467 U.S. at 499. Thus, “the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent
the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended.”
Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983). The Double Jeopardy Clause is not
implicated if the legislature intended to impose multiple or cumulative punishments. Id.
at 367-68.
DISCUSSION
1.

Claim One – Application of Two Penalty Enhancements
Petitioner alleges that his conviction and sentence violate the Double Jeopardy

Clause because I.C. § 18-8005(7) is an enhancement provision, like the persistent violator
enhancement in I.C. § 19-2514, that “authorizes increased punishment based entirely
upon the premise of prior [DUI] convictions.” (Dkt. 22, pp. 4-6.)
The Idaho Court of Appeals rejected this argument on appeal from the denial of
the Rule 35 motion. The court explained that I.C. § 18-8005(7) is a charging
enhancement (even though it is termed a “penalty” in the statute heading), while I.C. §
19-2514 is a sentencing enhancement. The charging enhancement provides for an
additional element of the crime—commission of another felony DUI within the past 15
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years—which serves to elevate the crime from a misdemeanor to a felony. As a result,
“the crimes of felony DUI and misdemeanor DUI are separate substantive crimes that
have some elements in common,” the Court of Appeals explained. (State’s Lodging D-5,
p. 4.)
A sentencing enhancement, on the other hand, authorizes an increased penalty
under certain circumstances, “but it does not create a separate substantive crime.” (State’s
Lodging D-5, pp. 3-4.)
The Idaho Court of Appeals also explained that the legislature had two different
purposes for the enhancements. Section 18-8005(7) removes repeat DUI offenders from
the roadways and deters other potential multiple DUI offenders. On the other hand, the
purpose of section 19-2514 is “deterring felony recidivism by subjecting recidivists to
more severe punishment than a first-time offender would be.” (State’s Lodging D-4, p. 45.) Importantly, the Court of Appeals noted that “neither section contains language that
would limit the application of both the charging enhancement and the sentencing
enhancement. (Id.)
This Court concludes that the Idaho Court of Appeals’ opinion is not contrary to,
or an unreasonable application of, United States Supreme Court precedent governing the
interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. It is clear that the charging enhancement is
for committing two felony DUI infractions, while the sentencing enhancement is for
committing three felonies (of any nature). There is no United State Supreme Court
precedent forbidding application of two different enhancements to the same criminal act.
As to sentencing enhancements, the United States Supreme Court explained:
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 5

Historically, we have found double jeopardy protections inapplicable to
sentencing proceedings, see Bullington, 451 U.S., at 438, 101 S.Ct., at
1857-1858, because the determinations at issue do not place a defendant in
jeopardy for an “offense,” see, e.g., Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738,
747, 114 S.Ct. 1921, 1927, 128 L.Ed.2d 745 (1994) (noting that repeatoffender laws “‘penaliz[e] only the last offense committed by the
defendant’”). Nor have sentence enhancements been construed as additional
punishment for the previous offense; rather, they act to increase a sentence
“because of the manner in which [the defendant] committed the crime of
conviction.” United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 154, 117 S.Ct. 633, 636,
136 L.Ed.2d 554 (1997) (per curiam); see also Witte v. United States, 515
U.S. 389, 398-399, 115 S.Ct. 2199, 2205-2206, 132 L.Ed.2d 351 (1995).
An enhanced sentence imposed on a persistent offender thus “is not to be
viewed as either a new jeopardy or additional penalty for the earlier crimes”
but as “a stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is considered to be an
aggravated offense because [it is] a repetitive one.” Gryger v. Burke, 334
U.S. 728, 732, 68 S.Ct. 1256, 1258, 92 L.Ed. 1683 (1948); cf. Moore v.
Missouri, 159 U.S. 673, 678, 16 S.Ct. 179, 181, 40 L.Ed. 301 (1895)
(“[T]he State may undoubtedly provide that persons who have been before
convicted of crime may suffer severer punishment for subsequent offences
than for a first offence”).
Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 728 (1998).2 Accord, Witte v. United States, 515 U.S.
389, 400 (1995) (“In repeatedly upholding such recidivism statutes, the Court has
rejected double jeopardy challenges.”).
Based on this reasoning, the sentencing enhancement does not place Petitioner in
jeopardy at all, nor is it an additional punishment, because it merely provides for a greater

2

Monge was altered by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), to the extent that the United States
Supreme Court held that, in a circumstance where a fact enhances the sentence above the statutory
maximum not proven in the original prosecution, the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the
fact be submitted to jury and proved beyond reasonable doubt. Id. In Petitioner’s case, Apprendi (not a
double jeopardy case) was applied by the state district court to require the factfinder (Petitioner waived a
jury trial) to find the added elements to meet the enhancements. The state court conclusions in Petitioner’s
case are not contrary to either Monge (a Fifth Amendment double jeopardy case) or Apprendi (a
Fourteenth Amendment due process and Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial case). See Apprendi, 530
U.S. at 488 n. 14 (explaining interplay of Monge and Apprendi).

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 6

penalty for the third felony crime. Thus, Petitioner is left to argue that the charging
enhancement is double jeopardy because he was already charged and penalized for the
prior DUI, which is his second claim.
2.

Claim Two – Two Guilt Findings or Two Punishments for the Earlier Crime
Plaintiff asserts that he was subjected to a second prosecution for the same

offense, when, in his bifurcated trial on the second DUI, the jury first found that he was
guilty of the current misdemeanor DUI charge, and next the court found he had
previously been convicted of a felony DUI, which elevated the current misdemeanor DUI
to the level of a felony. (Dkt. 22, p. 10; State’s Lodging F-13, p.4.)
The Idaho Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner’s argument, explaining that he
“was not actually prosecuted for two offenses. He was charged and tried only for
felony DUI.” (State’s Lodging F-13, p.5.) Petitioner cannot take advantage of the fact
that, for his own benefit, the trial on the felony DUI charge “was separated into two parts,
with the jury first being asked to determine whether the State had proven the elements of
misdemeanor DUI, and upon the jury making a finding favorable to the State, the trial
continued on the further element of prior DUI convictions.” (State’s Lodging F-13, p.5.)
This procedure did not constitute separate prosecutions for the same offense, as Petitioner
argues. Rather, it was “a single trial, separated into two parts.” (State’s Lodging F-13,
p.5.)
Petitioner’s argument also falls short because it is unsupported by United States
Supreme Court precedent. In Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), the
Supreme Court was required to determine whether the same offense, charged under two
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federal statutes, amounted to a constitutional violation. The Court held that multiple
punishments cannot be imposed for two offenses arising out of the same criminal
transaction unless each offense requires proof of a fact which the other does not. Courts
have “consistently relied on [this rule] ever since to determine whether Congress has in a
given situation provided that two statutory offenses may be punished cumulatively.
Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 691 (1980).
If Congress’ intent is clearly to punish twice, then the Blockburger rule does not
apply to prevent that outcome. Id. at 691-94. In Whalen, the Court emphasized that the
legislature is “clearly free to fashion exceptions to the [Blockburger] rule,” but a “court,
just as clearly, is not.” Id. at 695.
A federal court is bound by a state court’s construction of the statute, and can
review the determination only to ensure that it constitutional. Missouri v. Hunter, 459
U.S. 359, 367 (1983). For example, recognizing that the task of “preventing and dealing
with crime is much more the business of the States than it is of the Federal Government,”
the United States Supreme Court warned that federal courts “should not lightly construe
the Constitution so as to intrude upon the administration of justice by the individual
States.” Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201 (1977) (citations omitted). “In a
statutory construction case, the beginning point must be the language of the statute, and
when a statute speaks with clarity to an issue[,] judicial inquiry into the statute’s
meaning, in all but the most extraordinary circumstance, is finished.” Estate of Cowart v.
Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475 (1992).

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 8

Petitioner has not met the Blockburger test because his second offense required the
additional element of commission of a prior offense. The Idaho legislature intended to
provide for an enhancement of the charges when one reaches his or her second felony
DUI charge, because that is clear from the face of the statute—which provides for
different treatment of first, second, and third charges. In addition, there is no legislative
intent prohibiting application of both enhancements, and the purpose of each
enhancement is different. Therefore, habeas corpus relief is not warranted under any
double jeopardy theory (being punished for two enhancements, twice punished for the
earlier DUI charge, or punished in each phase of a two-part trial) because there is no
United States Supreme Court precedent supporting Petitioner’s arguments.
CONCLUSION
Petitioner’s claims fail under any Double Jeopardy Clause theory. The Idaho Court
of Appeals’ decisions on Petitioner’s claim is not contrary to, or an unreasonable
application of, United States Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, the Amended
Petition will be denied, and this case dismissed with prejudice.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED:
1. The Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dkt. 22) is DENIED and
DISMISSED with prejudice.
2. The Court does not find its resolution of this habeas matter to be reasonably
debatable, and a certificate of appealability will not issue. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c); Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. If Petitioner
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files a timely notice of appeal, the Clerk of Court shall forward a copy of the
notice of appeal, together with this Order, to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Petitioner may seek a certificate of appealability
from the Ninth Circuit by filing a request in that court.

DATED: January 8, 2016

_________________________
B. Lynn Winmill
Chief Judge
United States District Court

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