Hill v. Reinke et al
Filing
66
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER. NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: Plaintiff's Motion 40 is DENIED. Plaintiff's Motion 42 is DENIED. Plaintiff's Motion 48 is DENIED as MOOT. Plaintiff's Motion 50 is DENIED. Defendants 9; Motion 44 is DENIED as MOOT. Defendant Corizon's Motion 34 is GRANTED. The IDOC Defendants' Motion 37 is GRANTED. Defendant Lake is hereby DISMISSED from this action. The Court hereby certifies that any appeal from this Order wo uld be frivolous and therefore taken in bad faith. For this reason, Plaintiff's in forma pauperis status is REVOKED. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (st)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
DAVID TYLER HILL,
Case No. 1:13-cv-00038-BLW
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER
v.
BRENT REINKE, SHANE EVANS,
JANE DOE I, JANE DOE II, CORIZON
(a/k/a CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL
SERVICES), RANDY BLADES,
VICKI HANSEN, SHANNON
BLACKBURN, RICHARD CRAIG, and
CLAUDIA LAKE,
Defendants.
Plaintiff David Tyler Hill, a prisoner in the custody of the Idaho Department of
Correction (IDOC), is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action.
Pending before the Court are Defendant Corizon’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt.
34); Defendants Brent Reinke’s, Shane Evans’s, Randy Blades’s, Vicky Hansen’s,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1
Shannon Blackburn’s and Richard Craig’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 37) 1;
Plaintiff David Hill’s Motion to Amend Complaint (Dkt. 40) and his Motion for Judicial
Notice (Dkt. 42); the IDOC Defendants’ Motion to Strike, in which Defendant Corizon
joins (Dkt. 44); Plaintiff Hill’s Motion to File a Response to Motion (Dkt. 48); and
Plaintiff Hill’s renewed motion for appointment of counsel (Dkt. 50).
Having fully reviewed the record, the Court finds that the facts and legal
arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record and that the decisional
process would not be significantly aided by oral argument. Accordingly, the Court will
decide this matter on the record without oral argument. D. Idaho L. R. 7.1. For the
reasons that follow, the Court concludes that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and that Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore,
the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. All other motions are
denied as explained below.
INTRODUCTION
The present lawsuit is the second lawsuit filed by plaintiff concerning the
treatment provided to him on C-Block, Tier Three, located within the Secure Mental
Health Unit (MHU) at Idaho Maximum Security Institution (IMSI) beginning on April
11, 2011. See Hill v. Wamble-Fisher et al., Case 1:11-cv-00101-REB. This tier is known
as C-3. C-3 is a specialized mental health treatment unit, which is located within IMSI.
The unit is “designed to help identify an offender’s acute mental health needs and to
1
Defendant Claudia Lake is alleged to be the Mental Health Unit’s head psychologist and employed by
Defendant Corizon to provide medical services at the IDOC. She was never served in this matter. It appears Plaintiff
no longer desires to include Lake in his complaint, as he filed a motion to amend/correct that indicated he wished to
“drop” her as a defendant. (Dkt. 40.) The individually named defendants will be referred to as the IDOC Defendants.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2
initiate appropriate treatment. Placement in C-3 is by referral only.” (Eliason Aff. ¶ 8,
Dkt. 34-3 at 3). The decision for an inmate to be admitted into C-3 is made by the IDOC
mental health treatment team supervised and under the direction of psychologist Richard
Craig. Id.
Defendant Richard Craig is the Chief Psychologist for the IDOC, and coordinates
the care of patients at IMSI. Id. ¶ 7. In 2011, C-3 was staffed by a psychologist from the
IDOC, Dr. Craig, and Corizon staff, which included two psychiatrists, a nurse
practitioner, social workers, psychiatric technicians, and a mental health coordinator. Id.
¶ 10. Psychiatrist Scott Eliason was part of the treatment team in 2011 when Hill was
housed at C-3. Dr. Eliason describes the treatment and behavioral system in C-3 as
follows:
Offenders are expected to take all prescribed medications and
respect all staff and treatment team members as well as other
offenders. They are also expected to follow the directions of
the treatment and custody staff and the Idaho Department of
Correction’s rules and regulations.
***
All offenders entering the Mental Health Unit are initially
placed on Tier 3. Offenders housed in C-3 are subject to a
level system that was designed to keep them and staff safe
and secure. Levels are assigned based on offender behaviors,
security risk, level of functioning, program compliance,
treatment participation and psychiatric presentation. There are
four levels with Level 1 being the most restrictive and, nonlevel, the least restrictive. Level 2 does not allow personal
property, which includes reading books, photo albums, bibles,
personal letters and paper, although legal paperwork is
allowed. Phone privileges and access to security pens and
writing paper are coordinated by treatment team staff.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3
Offenders are not allowed any contact with other offenders.
Showers and linen exchanges are done on schedule.
Level status is discussed by the treatment team on a weekly
basis and adjusted depending upon an offender’s behavior,
progress with treatment, and participation for the prior week.
If an offender has not engaged in any disruptive, aggressive
or threatening behavior, has been compliant with his
treatment plan, which includes medication adherence, and
establishes appropriate activities of daily living, then their
offender level could be assessed for moving to a less
restrictive level.
Id. ¶ 10-12.
Hill alleges that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment, and to adequate mental health care during his time in C-3,
as well as his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by transferring him to C-3
without a hearing.
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT
Hill filed a motion to amend his complaint on May 29, 2014. He proposes to
correct the misspelled names of the Defendants; identify the Doe Defendants; dismiss
Defendant Claudia Lake; dismiss his due process claim; include additional factual details
against Corizon; and explain the injunctive relief he is seeking. (Dkt. 40.)
The Court’s case management order, entered on September 18, 2013 (Dkt. 27),
required the parties to amend pleadings and join parties within 90 days after entry of the
scheduling order, and for discovery to be completed within 150 days. Dispositive motions
were due within sixty days after the close of discovery, and were timely filed by
Defendants on April 15 and 16, 2014. Defendants oppose Hill’s motion on the grounds
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4
that it was untimely made, citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b). Hill contends he was unaware of
Rule 16(b)’s requirements.
Motions to amend a pleading filed after the scheduling order deadline has expired
are governed by the restrictive provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b), which require a
showing of “good cause.” Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 608 (9th
Cir. 1992). A court should find good cause only if the moving party shows he “could not
reasonably meet the established timeline in a scheduling order despite [his] diligence.”
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Busdon, No. CV–04–265–S–LMB, 2005 WL 1364571, at * 1 (D.
Idaho June 8, 2005). Rule 16 was designed to facilitate more efficient disposition of cases
by settlement or by trial. Johnson, 975 F.2d at 610–11. If disregarded, it would
“undermine the court's ability to control its docket, disrupt the agreed-upon course of the
litigation, and reward the indolent and the cavalier.” Id.; see also Rule 16 Advisory
Committee Notes (1983 Amendment). The moving party’s diligence governs the good
cause standard. Johnson, 975 F.2d at 608. “When determining whether to grant a motion
to amend a scheduling order, a court may also consider “the existence or degree of
prejudice to the party opposing the modifications.” Id. But if the moving party “was not
diligent, the inquiry should end.” Id.
Here, the only grounds Hill cited in support of his motion were his general
unawareness of Rule 16(b)’s requirements, and his desire to remedy the technical
requirements of his complaint in light of Defendants’ motions for summary judgment.
The Court is mindful that Hill is proceeding pro se and is incarcerated. “Pro se prison
inmates, with limited access to legal materials, occupy a position significantly different
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 5
from that occupied by litigants represented by counsel.” Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d
1362, 1365 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). Courts have a duty to liberally construe
the pleadings of pro se litigants, particularly those filed by pro se prisoners. See Zichko v.
Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001). But, pro se litigants are nonetheless bound
by “the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants,” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565,
567 (9th Cir. 1987), including Rule 16(b)’s requirements.
The Court can discern no good cause based upon Hill’s rationale that he will
correct deficiencies in his Complaint. First, he proposes to add defendants by naming the
Doe Defendants. Hill has offered no explanation why those defendants could not have
been named earlier. Next, he proposes to “add” factual information. But, Hill has not
offered any legitimate reason why he could not have included these facts prior to the
deadline for amending pleadings. And finally, granting Hill’s motion would unfairly
prejudice Defendants in this matter, given that discovery is now closed and Defendants
have timely filed their respective motions for summary judgment.
The Court is therefore not inclined to amend its case management order
considering the lack of good cause to do so and Hill’s neglect in proposing to file his
proposed amended complaint after the deadline. The motions for summary judgment will
therefore proceed based upon the initial Complaint filed in this matter, and the Motion to
Amend will be denied.
However, the Court will construe Hill’s motion to amend as a motion to dismiss
Defendant Claudia Lake. Lake was never served with the original complaint, and Hill has
not continued to prosecute this matter against her. See Response brief at 2 (Dkt. 39 at 2)
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 6
(indicating Lake has not been served). Lake may be dismissed from this action for failure
to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). Further, Hill’s motion explains he intends to “drop”
Lake from his complaint. Accordingly, Defendant Claudia Lake will be dismissed from
this action.
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE
Hill requests the Court to take judicial notice of Idaho Code §§ 66-326, 335, and
1301-1318. Hill argues the statues are relevant and applicable to his complaint, because
the Idaho Secure Medical Facility constitutes a “Mental Health Unit” covered by the
statutes. Defendants oppose Hill’s motion for judicial notice, asserting that Idaho statutes
are not proper “adjudicative facts” to which Fed. R. Evid. 201 applies. Defendant further
asserts that the Idaho code sections cited are irrelevant to Hill’s federal constitutional
claims.
Title 66, Chapter 3 of Idaho Code applies to govern the voluntary or involuntary
admittance of mentally ill individuals, including prisoners, to any public or private
hospital designated as a covered “facility” pursuant to board of health and welfare rules
and regulations. Idaho Code §§ 66-317(7), 66-315. Hill did not identify any violations of
state law in his complaint. Nor has Hill provided evidence, beyond his own speculation,
that the acute mental health unit at IMSI constitutes a “facility” as defined by Idaho Code
§ 66-371(7). Moreover, the Idaho code sections cited are irrelevant to the federal
constitutional claims alleged in Hill’s complaint and allowed to proceed pursuant to the
Court’s Initial Review Order (Dkt. 3.) Finally, violation of state law does not lead to
liability under Section 1983. Campbell v. Burt, 141 F.3d 927, 930 (9th Cir. 1998).
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 7
Hill’s motion will therefore be denied.
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO FILE OBJECTION TO REPLIES
Hill explains in his third motion that he does not wish to file a sur-reply to
Defendants’ reply memorandums filed in support of their motions for summary
judgment, but rather to object to the untimely and late-filed reply memorandums. Hill
argues that, because Defendants objected to his late filed response brief, he should be
permitted the opportunity to object to Defendants’ untimely reply briefs and have them
stricken from the record. Defendants do indeed complain that Hill filed his response brief
late. The Court will therefore address the relative timeliness of the briefs as they pertain
to Defendants’ motions for summary judgment.
Corizon timely filed its motion for summary judgment on April 15, 2014, (Dkt.
34), and the IDOC Defendants timely filed their motion for summary judgment on April
16, 2014, (Dkt. 37). 2 Because of the interplay among Fed. R. Civ. P. 5, 6, and Dist. Idaho
L. Rule 7.1, a party has twenty-one days, plus an additional three days, within which to
file a response brief. Thus, Hill’s response to Corizon’s Motion was due Friday, May 9,
2014, and his response to IDOC Defendant’s motion was due Monday, May 12, 2014.
Hill’s “objection” to Defendants’ motions for summary judgment is dated May 16, 2014,
and was received by the Court and filed on May 20, 2014. (Dkt. 39.) Hill’s response brief
was therefore untimely.
2
The Court’s Order required the parties to file all motions for summary judgment within 60 days after the
close of discovery, which was February 15, 2014 (150 days from September 18, 2013, the date of the Scheduling
Order). Thus, the last day upon which to file a motion for summary judgment was April 16, 2014.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 8
Defendants’ reply briefs were due within seventeen days (14 days plus an
additional 3 days) after service of Hill’s (tardy) response brief. Dist. Idaho L. Rule
7.1(b)(3); Fed. R. Civ. P. 5, 6. That deadline expired on Monday, June 2, 2014.
Defendants’ respective replies were indeed filed late, on June 3, 2014, and June 5, 2014.
(Dkt. 43, 45.) Reply briefs are, however, optional under Dist. Idaho L. Rule 7.1(b).
The Court sees no reason to strike any party’s brief on the grounds of untimeliness
under the circumstances. While the Court does not condone lackadaisical adherence to
generally applicable procedural rules, the Court cannot grant a motion for summary
judgment solely because the opposing party has failed to file an opposition, or in this
case, a tardy opposition that Defendants seek to have this Court ignore as if never filed.
Cristobal v. Siegel, 26 F.3d 1488, 1494-95 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1994) (unopposed motion may
be granted only after the court determines there are no material issues of fact); see also
United States v. Real Property at Incline Village, 47 F.3d 1511, 1520 (9th Cir. 1995)
(local rule cannot mandate automatic entry of judgment for moving party without
consideration of whether motion and supporting papers satisfy Fed. R. Civ.P. 56),
overruled on other grounds by Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 116 S.Ct. 1777, 135
L.Ed.2d 102 (1996); see also Marshall v. Gates, 44 F.3d 722, 725 (9th Cir. 1995)
(summary judgment may not be granted simply because opposing party violated a local
rule, if movant did not meet burden of demonstrating absence of genuine issue for trial).
Thus, the Court must still determine if Defendants have met their burden.
Consideration of Hill’s arguments and the relevant authority cited in that regard will aid
the Court, as will Defendants’ respective reply briefs. Although the Court would be well
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 9
within its authority to not consider Hill’s response brief or defendants’ replies, in the
exercise of its discretion, and in light of Ninth Circuit authority, it declines to do so here
and will reach the merits of the summary judgment motions giving consideration to Hill’s
arguments advanced in his response brief, and Defendants’ arguments in their reply
briefs. Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion will be denied as moot.
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
Unlike criminal defendants, prisoners and indigents in civil actions have no
constitutional right to counsel unless their physical liberty is at stake. Lassiter v. Dept. of
Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981). Whether a court
appoints counsel for indigent litigants is within the court’s discretion. Wilborn v.
Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1330–31 (9th Cir. 1986); Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015,
1017 (9th Cir. 1991).
The Court finds none of the factual information contained in Hill’s new Motion
shows that the earlier decision denying appointment of counsel should be disturbed. See
Order (Dkt. 32). 3 Hill generally cites the difficulties he has had conducting discovery,
contending that Defendants have failed to “reveal” information relevant to Hill’s claims
in their respective initial disclosures. But, nothing prevented Hill from propounding his
own discovery, which would have allowed Hill to draft and serve written discovery upon
Defendants relevant to his claims and thereby obtain the documents he complains are in
3
Defendants also generally oppose Hill’s motion because Hill now has more than three outstanding motions,
contravening the Court’s order prohibiting any party from having more than three pending motions before the Court
at one time. Order (Dkt. 8.) Although Defendants are correct, and violation of the Court’s order would be sufficient
grounds to deny Hill’s motion for appointment of counsel, the Court nevertheless considered the merits given the
context and the issues raised.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 10
Defendants’ custody and control. Second, Hill asserts he is having difficulty in presenting
his response to Defendants’ motions for summary judgment, contending he is unable to
present the evidence properly before the Court in light of Defendants’ motion to strike.
Hill further contends he has no access to the relevant law, which appointment of counsel
would alleviate.
There is no doubt that it is difficult to litigate from a prison cell and that pro se
individuals do not have the legal training or resources to do what they could if they were
lawyers or had lawyers. However, prisoner status and lack of legal expertise are not
enough to warrant appointment of counsel. Here, Hill’s inability to more fully litigate his
claims is an “incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequence[] of conviction and
incarceration.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606
(1996). Accordingly, Hill’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel will be denied.
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STRIKE
The Court has reviewed the motion to strike filed by IDOC Defendants, and joined
by Defendant Corizon, directed at Hill’s affidavit and various other submissions filed in
opposition to Defendants’ summary judgment motions. (Dkt. 44.) In addition to the
untimeliness of Hill’s submissions, the Court finds the remaining contested portions of
the affidavit and other documents are not relevant to resolving the motions for summary
judgment. While the contested statements are speculative and based upon hearsay, and
the documents lack the requisite foundation, the Court has determined it need not
consider the contested portions of the Affidavit of David Beckett or the Affidavit of Tyler
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 11
Hill, as well as Exhibits A, B, D, H, and K attached thereto. The motion to strike will be
denied as moot.
DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1.
Factual Background
This section includes facts that are undisputed and material to the resolution of the
issues in this case. Where material facts are in dispute, the Court has included Plaintiff’s
version of facts, insofar as that version is not contradicted by clear documentary evidence
in the record. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (“When opposing parties tell
two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no
reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for
purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”)
Corizon is a private corporation under contract to provide medical services to
inmates in the custody of certain Idaho Department of Correction facilities. Corizon
contracts with medical doctors and other care providers who provide care to inmates in
the custody of IDOC facilities.
Dr. Richard Craig is the Chief Psychologist for the IDOC, and Corizon staff
members who were part of the treatment team at IDOC included psychiatrist Dr. Scott
Eliason, psychologist Claudia Lake, and psychiatric technicians Micaela Cathey and Julie
Keller. Dr. Eliason assisted in the development of treatment plans and coordinated the
care of patients with Dr. Craig and the treatment team. Dr. Eliason was personally
involved with the care and treatment provided to Hill while incarcerated at IMSI in April
and May of 2011. Eliason Aff. ¶ 6 (Dkt. 34-3.) Dr. Eliason authenticated Hill’s medical
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 12
records from his stay at IMSI, and submitted them attached to his affidavit. Eliason Aff.
Ex. A (Dkt. 34-3).
IMSI’s MHU is generally referred to as IMSI’s C-block, which is comprised of
two tiers: Tier 2 (C-2) and Tier 3 (C-3). C-2 is less restrictive, focusing on providing
group therapy and education to prisoners who have moved through the level system while
housed in C-3 and established compliance with their individualized treatment plan and
with appropriate activities of daily living. Upon arriving at the MHU unit, prisoners were
placed in C-3, so that staff could identify the individual prisoner’s acute mental health
needs and initiate appropriate treatment. Aff. of Bennett ¶ 5, 6 (Dkt. 37-3 at 2). Prisoners
housed in C-3 were given a green jumpsuit, underwear, t-shirt, socks, shower shoes and
canvas tennis shoes, as well as hygiene items as needed. Id. ¶ 7.
Hill was confined to the MHU from April 11, 2011, to May 27, 2011. Defendant
Richard Craig ordered the transfer from ICC upon referral from social worker Alexander
Black. Eliason Aff. ¶ 13. Black evaluated Hill on April 11, 2011, noting that Hill had
been admitted to the medical observation cell four times since March 20, 2011, for
cutting on himself, thoughts of suicide, anxiety, and depression. Black noted that the
reason for referral was due to continued instability of moods and inability to manage
depression and anxiety. At the time he was admitted, Hill had self-inflicted a superficial
wound on his right inner thigh, and for that, he was placed in an isolation cell for
observation for 23 hours. (Dkt. 34-4 at 10.) Black’s notes reflect that he observed Hill,
who appeared as if he had not slept, had dark circles under his eyes, and moved slowly.
Black noted that Hill had a flat affect and his voice lacked emotion. Hill was thereafter
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 13
placed on C-3. Although Hill denied any suicidal intent, hallucinations or delusions at the
time, Hill indicated to Black that, if given the opportunity, Hill would engage in selfharm. (Dkt. 34-4 at 7.) In Dr. Craig’s opinion, an emergency condition existed on April
11, 2011. Aff. of Craig ¶ 17 (Dkt. 37-4 at 6.) Prior to his admittance to MHU, Hill had
been seeing mental health clinicians twice weekly, and had not been compliant with his
behavior contract. (Dkt. 37-5 at 9.
Hill signed a consent for treatment form on April 11, 2011, authorizing
Correctional Medical Services employees to diagnose and treat him. (Dkt. 34-4 at 2.) On
that date, IMSI’s intake form indicated Hill was diagnosed with Bipolar disorder and
depression. (Dkt. 34-4 at 3.) Black also noted Hill was currently taking Paxil and Elavil.
Eliason Aff. ¶ 13.
Hill next underwent an intake mental health screening on April 12, 2011, which
was reviewed on April 14, 2011, by Claudia Lake, Psy.D. Eliason Aff. ¶ 13. Dr. Lake
made a mental health referral and scheduled Hill to be seen by Dr. Eliason on April 19,
2011. Id. ¶ 15. Medication orders for Elavil and Paxil were continued, and Hill was then
released from segregation on April 13, 2011. Id. ¶ 15. Dr. Lake, in conjunction with other
treatment team members Micaela Cathey and Julie Keller, created a thirty day treatment
plan on April 14, 2011. Id. ¶ 16. (Dkt. 34-4 at 16.) The treatment plan noted the reason
for Hill’s referral to IMSI C-Block was due to his decrease in coping skills, increase in
suicidal ideation, and behavioral issues. Id. The plan indicated the short term goal for Hill
was to display appropriate behavior and medication compliance, with a long term goal of
moving to a less restrictive environment. Hill did not agree with the treatment plan.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 14
During the treatment plan review, Hill became argumentative and threatened to hang
himself. Hill was moved to medical and placed on suicide watch. (Dkt. 34-4 at 18.)
IDOC clinician Vicki Hansen evaluated Hill and performed a suicide risk
assessment on April 14, 2011. (Dkt. 34-4 at 14.) In her report, she noted Hill was
currently housed in the medical holding cell at IMSI. Hansen noted that his past
diagnoses included several Axis I disorders of Bipolar mood disorder, and depression.
Hill was referred for assessment because he threatened to harm himself, believed he
should be living on C-2 and not C-3, and staff had observed him beginning to tear up his
sheets. During the assessment, Hill stated that he refused to be returned to C-3. Hanson’s
review of psychological factors noted Hill was adamant he would be determining his own
housing. Although Hanson questioned Hill’s intent to die, Hanson assessed Hill as having
a high risk for suicide.
The next day, on April 15, 2011, Vicki Hansen again assessed Hill for suicide risk.
(Dkt. 34-4 at 20.) During the interview, Hill reported he was cold, and he was no longer
threatening self-harm or demanding to determine his housing. Hansen determined Hill
was a low suicide risk, and observed Hill as being more subdued than the prior day.
Hanson recommended Hill be reduced to close observation and kept in medical over the
weekend.
On April 18, 2011, Hill completed a Health Services Request (HSR) seeking
medication for his eczema. Hill was seen for that complaint on April 19, 2011 and
received instructions regarding how to apply the prescription ordered for him.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 15
On April 19, 2011, Dr. Eliason personally assessed Hill. (Dkt. 34-4 at 22.) During
Dr. Eliason’s examination, Hill reported eating well and being concerned about the side
effects from Elavil. Hill stated to Dr. Eliason that “I won’t kill myself if they would just
put me where I need to go.” Dr. Eliason noted that the reason for Hill’s referral to IMSI
was because of Hill’s threats of suicide, unless he was sent to the BHU. Dr. Eliason noted
that Hill had been difficult to manage and he would attempt to get Hill off his
medications to see how he did in order to improve the team’s ability to accurately
diagnose him. In Dr. Eliason’s opinion, Hill’s mood problems could be primarily Axis II,
which is characterized by a personality disorder that would not be responsive to
medication. Eliason Aff. ¶ 20. Personality disorders are characterized by rigid, inflexible,
and maladaptive behavior patterns that impair an individual’s ability to function in
society, as well as in the correctional setting. Id. The plan was to taper Hill’s medication
(Paxil and Elavil), and have him return to clinic in three weeks. Dr. Eliason noted that the
treatment plan was for medication and follow up only, with the short-term goal being
medication compliance and the long term goal to improve Hill’s ability to function in a
less restrictive environment. (Dkt. 34-4 at 22.)
The MHU Treatment Team met on April 19, 2011, as well. Treatment team notes
indicate Hill was housed at C-3 on level 2 status, and was in medical. On April 26, 2011,
staffing notes indicate Hill had written on the walls with food, and cut his wrists after
returning from the shower. (Dkt. 34-5 at 25.)
On April 29, 2011, at Hill’s request, Micaela Cathey submitted a Health Service
Request Form to address Hill’s complaints of back pain. Bruce Cooper, CMS, evaluated
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 16
Hill on May 2, 2011. (Dkt. 34-5 at 1.) Hill submitted another Health Service Request
Form on May 1, 2011, requesting his topical ointments prescribed for his eczema be
provided to him at pill call that evening. (Dkt. 34-5 at 4.) The response to Hill’s request
indicated the medication had been ordered.
Staff notes from C-Block on May 3, 2011, reflect Hill had regular level 2 status.
(Dkt. 34-5 at 26.) It was noted Hill did not need medication, and that Dr. Lake would be
performing tests and considering whether to discharge Hill from the unit.
On May 6, 2011, technician Micaela Cathey evaluated Hill to follow up on Hill’s
complaints about his placement in C-Block and his complaint that he was taken off his
medications. Cathey noted that Hill stated, “I won’t be here much longer. I’m not going
to kill myself or anything but you guys took me off my meds and the thoughts are there.”
(Dkt. 34-5 at 6.) Cathey noted also that Hill presented with an appropriate affect and was
clear speaking, and that Hill was attempting to rile up staff.
On May 9, 2011, Vicki Hansen evaluated Hill for suicide risk, determining that it
was low. (Dkt. 34-5 at 8.) It was noted that Hill stated he was suicidal to “get off the
tier,” but retracted that statement after being taken to medical. He was placed on suicide
watch at that time. Hansen determined Hill’s status would be changed to close
observation and Hill would be kept in the medical unit. Following Hansen’s visit with
Hill, Hill found a screw in his quarters and used it to superficially scratch his leg. Hill
was then moved to another medical cell for closer observation.
On May 10, 2011, Dr. Eliason evaluated Hill because of his continued behavioral
problems. (Dkt. 34-5 at 10.) Hill indicated he had found a screw while he was in the
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 17
medical unit and used it to scratch on his leg. At that time, Hill was dressed in a suicide
smock. Hill claimed he was not eating well, had low energy and was depressed to the
point that he could not read a newspaper without crying. But Dr. Eliason’s notes
indicated Hill did not have access to a newspaper, staff reported Hill was eating well, and
Hill appeared to be misreporting his symptoms. Dr. Eliason’s examination reported Hill’s
behavior was not indicative of an active mood episode, and noted Hill’s suicidal threats
appeared primarily to be made to control his environment. (Dkt. 34-5 at 10.)
Nevertheless, Dr. Eliason ordered that Paxil be restarted, because it might calm down
Hill’s impulsivity and irritability and help Hill’s Axis II pathology to not be quite as bad.
Dr. Eliason’s treatment plan was again for medication and follow-up only.
The weekly staffing minutes dated May 10, 2011, indicated Hill was in medical
and was going back on anti-depressants. (Dkt. 34-5 at 27.) It was noted Hill would be
sent to segregation and remain in medical until discharge. Dr. Craig ordered a behavior
plan to be prepared, as it was apparent to Dr. Craig that Hill would not succeed in the
MHU because Hill would not work through the C-3 levels. Aff. of Craig ¶ 43 (Dkt. 37-4
at 18.) According to Dr. Craig, because of Hill’s behavior and apparent lack of mental
illness, it appeared Hill would be more successful in an administrative setting with a
behavioral plan to follow. Id.
On May 11, 2011, Vicki Hansen met with Hill, noting he had been on suicide
watch since May 9, 2011, after threatening self-harm. (Dkt. 34-5 at 11.) During their
meeting, Hill provided a list of institutions in which he demanded to be housed. It was
determined at the meeting that Hill would have to remain on suicide watch because of his
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 18
behavior cutting on himself with the screws he found in his cell. At one point during the
evaluation, Hill became verbally abusive to Hansen. He was later escorted back to his
quarters. Hansen recommended Hill continue on suicide watch with daily follow up until
released. Hansen also indicated she would follow up with Dr. Claudia Lake regarding
discharge from C-3.
Psychology technician Cathey met with Hill on May 12 and 17, 2011, but reported
no new information regarding Hill’s mental health condition. The May 17, 2011, weekly
staffing meeting minutes reflect Hill was still in medical; that Dr. Lake was working on
preparing a behavior plan and discharge; and that Hill was not an appropriate candidate
for C Block. (Dkt. 34-5 at 28.)
On May 24, 2011, Dr. Lake met with Hill and completed a discharge summary. At
the time of discharge, Dr. Lake was of the opinion that Hill had an Axis II diagnosis of
“personality disorder with borderline features.” (Dkt. 34-5 at 16.) She noted that since
Hill’s arrival at IMSI, Hill had “continued to use self-harming behavior as a means to
cope and deal with his environment, as well as a form of manipulating placement and
staff.” In relation to his return to IMSI in April of 2011, Dr. Lake noted the following:
Mr. Hill returned to IMSI in April of 2011. Since this time, he has been
placed in the medical unit for suicidal threats and self-harming behavior on
three occasions and is currently housed there. Mr. Hill has not been
cooperative with the policies and treatment plan on C-3. He remains
aggressive with staff and has flooded mental health and custody staff with
letters, grievances, and concern forms attempting to force his placement at
ISCI BHU. During his stay at IMSI he has not displayed any signs of
depression, anxiety, or mental illness. He demands treatment for Borderline
Personality Disorder and yet does not provide any attempt at cooperating
with any treatment and behavioral options. . . . Discussion with psychiatry
and at the 5/17/11 staffing concluded that placement in a secured
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 19
environment with a behavior plan may control his acting out behavior and
prepare him for a GP setting, which is the most appropriate placement for
an individual without an Axis I disorder.
Dr. Lake determined that Hill’s behavior, lack of mental illness, and aggressiveness made
placement in C-3 inappropriate.
In Dr. Eliason’s opinion, based upon his education, training, and experience, and
his personal knowledge of Hill’s mental condition, the care and treatment provided to
Hill at IMSI in April and May of 2011 was a reasonable and appropriate course of action.
Eliason Aff. ¶ 32 (Dkt. 34-3 at 13).
2.
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate where a party can show that, as to any claim or
defense, “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). One of the principal purposes of the
summary judgment rule “is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or
defenses.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). It is not “a disfavored
procedural shortcut,” but is instead the “principal tool[] by which factually insufficient
claims or defenses [can] be isolated and prevented from going to trial with the attendant
unwarranted consumption of public and private resources.” Id. at 327. “[T]he mere
existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise
properly supported motion for summary judgment . . . .” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). Rather, there must be no genuine dispute as to any material
fact in order for a case to survive summary judgment. Material facts are those “that might
affect the outcome of the suit.” Id. at 248. “Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 20
will not preclude a grant of summary judgment.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec.
Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).
The moving party is entitled to summary judgment if that party shows that each
material fact cannot be disputed. To show that the material facts are not in dispute, a
party may cite to particular parts of materials in the record, or show that the adverse party
is unable to produce admissible evidence to support the fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)
& (B). The Court must consider “the cited materials,” but it may also consider “other
materials in the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). The Court is “not required to comb
through the record to find some reason to deny a motion for summary judgment.”
Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, the “party opposing summary judgment must
direct [the Court’s] attention to specific triable facts.” So. Ca. Gas Co. v. City of Santa
Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 2003).
If the moving party meets this initial burden, then the burden shifts to the opposing
party to establish that a genuine dispute as to any material fact actually does exist.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The
existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party’s position is
insufficient. Rather, “there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for
the [non-moving party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
Material used to support or dispute a fact must be “presented in a form that would
be admissible in evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). Affidavits or declarations submitted
in support of or in opposition to a motion “must be made on personal knowledge, set out
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 21
facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is
competent to testify on the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). If a party “fails to
properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion
of fact,” the Court may consider that fact to be undisputed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). The
Court will grant summary judgment for the moving party “if the motion and supporting
materials—including the facts considered undisputed—show that the movant is entitled
to it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(3).
The Court does not determine the credibility of affiants or weigh the evidence set
forth by the non-moving party. Although all reasonable inferences that can be drawn
from the evidence must be drawn in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, T.W.
Elec. Serv., Inc., 809 F.2d at 630-31, the Court is not required to adopt unreasonable
inferences from circumstantial evidence, McLaughlin v. Liu, 849 F.2d 1205, 1208 (9th
Cir. 1988).
3.
Section 1983 Standard
Plaintiff brings his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the civil rights statute. To
succeed on a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish a violation of rights protected
by the Constitution or created by federal statute proximately caused by the conduct of a
person acting under color of state law. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir.
1991). Prison officials are generally not liable for damages in their individual capacities
under § 1983 unless they personally participated in the alleged constitutional violations.
Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 22
662, 677 (2009) (“[E]ach Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only
liable for his or her own misconduct.”).
“A defendant may be held liable as a supervisor under § 1983 ‘if there exists either
(1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient
causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional
violation.’” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Hansen v. Black,
885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)). This causal connection “can be established by setting
in motion a series of acts by others, or by knowingly refusing to terminate a series of acts
by others, which the supervisor knew or reasonably should have known would cause
others to inflict a constitutional injury.” Id. at 1207-08 (internal quotation marks, citation,
and alterations omitted).
4.
Standard of Law for Eighth Amendment Claims
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects prisoners
against cruel and unusual punishment. To state a claim under the Eighth Amendment, a
prisoner must show that he is “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of
serious harm,” or that he has been deprived of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities” as a result of Defendants’ actions. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834
(1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). An Eighth Amendment claim requires a
plaintiff to satisfy “both an objective standard—that the deprivation was serious enough
to constitute cruel and unusual punishment—and a subjective standard—deliberate
indifference.” Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2012).
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 23
The Eighth Amendment includes the right to adequate medical care in prison, and
prison officials or prison medical providers can be held liable if their “acts or omissions
[were] sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.”
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). The Eighth Amendment right to adequate
prison health care includes adequate mental health treatment, and the standards are the
same whether the treatment is considered physical or mental. Doty v. County of Lassen,
37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994).
Regarding the objective standard for prisoners’ medical care claims, the Supreme
Court of the United States has explained that “[b]ecause society does not expect that
prisoners will have unqualified access to health care, deliberate indifference to medical
needs amounts to an Eighth Amendment violation only if those needs are ‘serious.’”
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992).
The Ninth Circuit has defined a “serious medical need” in the following ways:
failure to treat a prisoner’s condition [that] could result in
further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain[;] . . . [t]he existence of an injury that a
reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy
of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition
that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or the
existence of chronic and substantial pain . . . .
McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal citations omitted),
overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997)
(en banc).
As to the subjective standard, a prison official or prison medical provider acts with
“deliberate indifference . . . only if the [prison official] knows of and disregards an
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 24
excessive risk to inmate health and safety.” Gibson v. Cnty. of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d
1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Under this
standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of facts from which the inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person ‘must also
draw the inference.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).
“If a [prison official] should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the
[official] has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.”
Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1188 (citation omitted). However, “whether a prison official had the
requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in
the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence, . . . and a factfinder
may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the
risk was obvious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842; see also Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d
410, 421 (9th Cir. 2003) (deliberate indifference to medical needs may be shown by
circumstantial evidence when the facts are sufficient to demonstrate that defendant
actually knew of a risk of harm). Deliberate indifference can be “manifested by prison
doctors in their response to the prisoner’s needs or by prison guards in intentionally
denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment
once prescribed.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05 (footnotes omitted).
Differences in judgment between an inmate and prison medical personnel
regarding appropriate medical diagnosis and treatment are not enough to establish
deliberate indifference. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). “[T]o prevail
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 25
on a claim involving choices between alternative courses of treatment, a prisoner must
show that the chosen course of treatment ‘was medically unacceptable under the
circumstances,’ and was chosen ‘in conscious disregard of an excessive risk’ to the
prisoner’s health.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004) (alteration
omitted) (quoting Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996)).
Mere indifference, medical malpractice, or negligence will not support a cause of
action under the Eighth Amendment. Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th
Cir. 1980) (per curiam). A delay in treatment does not constitute a violation of the Eighth
Amendment unless the delay causes further harm. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060.
Summary judgment is appropriate if medical personnel have been “consistently
responsive to [the inmate’s] medical needs,” and there has been no showing that medical
personnel had “subjective knowledge and conscious disregard of a substantial risk of
serious injury.” Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1061.
5.
Standard of Law Applicable to Fourteenth Amendment Claims
Other than claims involving a property interest—which are not at issue here—only
claims involving a “liberty interest” are actionable under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Because liberty interests are “generally limited to freedom from
restraint,” a prisoner asserting a due process claim must show that he has suffered an
“atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). In Sandin, the Supreme Court held that, in
order for a district court to determine whether there is such a liberty interest, it must
analyze three factors: (1) whether disciplinary segregation was essentially the same as
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 26
discretionary forms of segregation; (2) whether a comparison between the plaintiff’s
confinement and conditions in the general population showed that the plaintiff suffered
no “major disruption in his environment”; and (3) whether the length of the plaintiff's
sentence was affected. Id. at 486-87.
In Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005), the United States Supreme Court
underscored the severity of the conditions required to meet the liberty interest test:
For an inmate placed in OSP, almost all human contact
is prohibited, even to the point that conversation is not
permitted from cell to cell; the light, though it may be
dimmed, is on for 24 hours; exercise is for 1 hour per day, but
only in a small indoor room. Save perhaps for the especially
severe limitations on all human contact, these conditions
likely would apply to most solitary confinement facilities, but
here there are two added components. First is the duration.
Unlike the 30-day placement in Sandin, placement at OSP is
indefinite and, after an initial 30-day review, is reviewed just
annually. Second is that placement disqualifies an otherwise
eligible inmate for parole consideration. While any of these
conditions standing alone might not be sufficient to create a
liberty interest, taken together they impose an atypical and
significant hardship within the correctional context. It follows
that respondents have a liberty interest in avoiding
assignment to OSP.
Id. at 223-24 (citations omitted).
“[T]he stigmatizing consequences of a transfer to a mental hospital for involuntary
psychiatric treatment, coupled with the subjection of the prisoner to mandatory behavior
modification as a treatment for mental illness, constitute the kind of deprivations of
liberty that requires procedural protections.”). Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980)
“Segregation of a prisoner without a prior hearing may violate due process if the
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 27
postponement of procedural protections is not justified by apprehended emergency
conditions.” Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 11 (1980).
6.
Analysis
A.
Defendant Corizon
To succeed on his claims against Corizon as an entity, Hill must meet the test
articulated in Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-94 (1978); see Tsao
v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012) (applying Monell to private
entities). Under Monell, the requisite elements of a § 1983 claim against a municipality or
private entity performing a state function are the following: (1) the plaintiff was deprived
of a constitutional right; (2) the municipality or entity had a policy or custom; (3) the
policy or custom amounted to deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s constitutional right;
and (4) the policy or custom was the moving force behind the constitutional violation.
Mabe v. San Bernardino Cnty., 237 F.3d 1101, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2001). An unwritten
policy or custom must be so “persistent and widespread” that it constitutes a “permanent
and well settled” practice. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144, 167-168 (1970)). “Liability for improper custom may not be predicated on
isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be founded upon practices of sufficient duration,
frequency and consistency that the conduct has become a traditional method of carrying
out policy.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996).
Hill has failed to present facts indicating a basis for holding Corizon liable for a
violation under the Eighth Amendment and the standard articulated in Monell. Hill has
not presented evidence of any Corizon custom or policy that caused his alleged injuries.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 28
The undisputed facts indicate the policy for treatment at C-3 was developed by IDOC,
not Corizon. And, Corizon does not itself provide medical care. Rather, its contracted
physicians and medical care providers dispensed medical care. Finally, Hill admits in his
brief that he cannot challenge Corizon’s motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. 39 at 2.)
Therefore, summary judgment will be granted to Corizon.
B.
IDOC Defendants 4
(1)
Conditions of Confinement
In his complaint, Hill alleged that he received inadequate out-of-cell time, that the
suicide watch cells are dirty, ant infested, unsanitary, and cold, and that he was permitted
to shower only three times per week. Hill further alleges that the conditions in the suicide
watch cells are unconstitutional because prisoners are exposed to bright lighting 24 hours
per day, and inmates are stripped nude and given a smock suit or suicide blanket with
paper underwear. Hill alleges also that the behavioral modification system, or level
system, is unconstitutional.
Hill has not presented evidence that any of the IDOC Defendants knew of and
disregarded an excessive risk to Hill’s health or safety by knowingly denying him
humane conditions of confinement. First, there is no evidence Hill’s concerns about his
cell conditions were ever voiced. Hill submitted several offender concern forms while in
4
IDOC Defendants argue that Hill’s claims must be dismissed in their entirety under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), because Hill has not alleged or shown any physical injury, citing Oliver v.
Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 627 (9th Cir. 2002). However, Oliver does not so hold. Rather, Oliver holds that a prisoner
may not seek damages for emotional injury unless the prisoner has suffered more than a de minimus physical injury.
But, Section 1997e(e) does not bar actionable claims for compensatory, nominal or punitive damages premised upon
violation of one’s constitutional rights, and not on any alleged mental or emotional injuries. Oliver, 289 F.3d at 630.
Hill seeks compensatory damages for violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Therefore, Section
1997e(e) does not bar Hill’s claims.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 29
the MHU, none of which complained about the conditions of his confinement. All of his
offender concern forms were addressed by IDOC staff members. The absence of any
concern forms addressing the alleged unsanitary, dirty, ant infested, cold, or other
conditions of which Hill complains equate to a lack of any facts suggesting that any
IDOC Defendants were aware Hill was placed in a dirty or unsanitary cell and then acted
with deliberate indifference to this condition.
While Hill did claim he was placed in a suicide watch cell on one occasion when
the cell was cold and he was provided inadequate clothing, Hill failed to submit any
evidence that the IDOC Defendants were personally aware of that condition and were
deliberately indifferent to the same. Although Hill reported to Hansen on April 15, 2011,
that he was cold, there is no evidence Hansen ignored his concern, or that Hill submitted
an offender concern form to address the temperature in his cell. Rather, the evidence in
the record does establish that when Hill submitted his concern forms, they were
addressed. The lack of any concern forms about the conditions in the MHU Hill
experienced indicates a lack of any evidence establishing Hill’s Eighth Amendment
claims.
Next, Hill has not supported his claim that his lack of out-of-cell-time was
detrimental to his mental health condition while in MHU. The records establish that
Hill’s behavior while in MHU was difficult to manage, and his limited out-of-cell time
was for Hill’s personal safety and the safety of staff because of his continued suicide
threats and self-harming behaviors. An Eighth Amendment violation does not arise when
the short-term deprivation of certain basic necessities of life result from an emergency
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 30
situation. See Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1315 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[I]n an
emergency, prison officials are not culpable when they put an inmate who imminently
threatens or attempts suicide temporarily in a place where he cannot hurt himself.”). The
record indicates Hill had threatened suicide four times in the twenty-one day period
before being transferred to the MHU, and that while there, he used objects to harm
himself and continued to threaten suicide. Under the circumstances, the temporary
deprivation of certain privileges, such as out-of-cell time or more frequent showers, does
not constitute deliberate indifference to Hill’s conditions of confinement.
In his brief, Hill claims his conditions of confinement were unconstitutional
because the IDOC should have a “safe room” for the placement of suicidal inmates. But
Hill’s argument cannot pass muster. Hill has failed to present evidence that he was
subjected to an unreasonable risk of safety while on suicide watch at the MHU, or that
the lack of a safe room caused an unreasonable risk of safety. 5 The record indicates Hill
was evaluated regularly while housed in the MHU and kept under observation for selfharming behaviors or suicidal ideation.
Hill fails also to present evidence that the level system created an inhumane
condition of confinement. Hill argues that, because of his diagnosis of personality
disorder, the level system as applied to him was cruel and unusual punishment. But Hill
offers nothing more than mere speculation and his own opinion. Further, the medical
5
Nor does the Court believe Hill would actually want to be placed in a safe room. In Anderson, the safe
room utilized for suicidal inmates consisted of a padded cell with a pit toilet covered by a grate, no furniture of any
kind, and violent suicidal inmates were shackled over the pit toilet. Anderson, 45 F.3d at 1313. In that case, the court
held the temporary use of a safety cell for placement of prisoners in response to severe safety concerns did not
violate the Eighth Amendment.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 31
team either met with Hill or checked in with him on a regular basis to determine his
mental health status. There is therefore insufficient evidence to defeat IDOC’s summary
judgment motion on Hill’s Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim.
(2)
Mental Health Care
Hill contends the IDOC Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious
medical need because he was subjected to blanket behavioral modification treatment,
which was insufficient to treat his borderline personality disorder, and he was not allowed
access to programing, counseling, or other related mental health services except for the
level system. However, while housed in the MHU, Hill was evaluated thirteen times, by
Dr. Claudia Lake (4/14, 5/24), Dr. Scott Eliason (4/19, 5/10), psychology technician
Micaela Cathey (4/21, 4/26, 5/6, 5/12, and 5/17), and by Vicki Hansen, M. Ed. (4/14,
4/15, 5/9, 5/11). Each provider performed an individual assessment of Hill’s mental
health condition as it existed at the time and attempted to engage Hill in his treatment.
These formal evaluations were in addition to the meetings of the members of his
treatment team where Hill’s behavioral and treatment plan were discussed. The treatment
team meetings occurred weekly, on April 19 and 26, and May 3, 10, and 17. Additional
evidence establishes that when Hill did not approve of his treatment, he threatened
suicide and engaged in self-harm by cutting on himself with objects he found in his cell.
He engaged in these behaviors in an apparent attempt to manipulate his cell placement.
Thus, the evidence establishes that Hill refused to cooperate in his own mental health
treatment, which caused him to be placed on suicide watch while at the MHU as a result
of his own behavior choices.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 32
There is also more than sufficient evidence that Dr. Eliason was treating Hill in a
sufficient and medically acceptable manner. Dr. Eliason’s treatment plan was to wean
Hill off medication treating his depression, so the treatment team could better understand
Hill’s mental health diagnosis, thereby enabling the team to better treat his condition.
This is in contrast to Hill’s prior treatment plan developed on April 3, 2009, which was
designed primarily to address Hill’s behavior. See Supp. Aff. of Craig (Dkt. 46 at 8.)
Hill’s disagreement with his treatment plan recommended by his mental health treatment
team and with the level system in C-3 was just that—a disagreement, which is not
actionable under Section 1983. See Sanchez, 891 F.2d at 242. The burden thus shifts to
Hill to raise a genuine issue that the level system and the behavioral and treatment plan
were “medically unacceptable under the circumstances” or were “chosen in conscious
disregard of an excessive risk” to Hill’s mental health. Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Hill has not met this burden. The IDOC Defendants dealt with Hill’s behavior as
best they could, responding to his threats of suicide and self-harm by placing Hill in the
medical unit or on suicide watch. They assessed his status regularly as Hill was tapered
off his medications. As a result of the treatment plan, Dr. Eliason ultimately determined
Hill would not benefit from anti-depressant medications, and changed his diagnosis from
Bipolar disorder to personality disorder. Staff attempted also to help Hill manage his
behavioral and mental health issues. Although Hill claims he was subjected to the same
treatment plan as all other individuals housed in C-3, the record refutes Hill’s contention.
Hill was offered an individualized treatment plan, focused on Hill’s particular mental
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 33
health needs at the time of placement in the MHU. Hill, however, did not wish to follow
it, and his own behavior (threats of suicide and self-harm) landed him in the suicide
watch cells within the MHU. Hill has not shown that a genuine dispute of material fact
exists, and the IDOC Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
The Court briefly mentions IDOC Defendants Reinke, Evans, Blades, and
Blackburn separately. Hill has failed to present evidence that any of these individuals
personally participated in his medical care or had knowledge of and were deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical needs. Hill’s Section 1983 claims will be dismissed.
(3)
Due Process
Hill alleges that his right to due process was violated by the failure to provide a
hearing prior to his transfer to the MHU. He also claims that being forced to participate in
the mandatory behavioral modification program and having to take psychotropic drugs on
a coerced-compliance basis violates due process.
The segregation of a prisoner without a prior hearing may violate due process if
the postponement of procedural protections is not justified by apprehended emergency
conditions. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 US 5, 11 (1980). Here, Hill’s medical care providers
were responding to emergency conditions that existed at the time. Hill had been
transferred four times between March 20, 2011, and April 11, 2011, to the medical
observation cell because of Hill’s unstable moods and self-injurious behavior, as well as
threats of suicide. Medical staff determined the need to transfer him to the MHU for
further evaluation and treatment, both for Hill’s safety and staff safety. Hill has not
presented any evidence to contradict the facts in the record.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 34
Hill contends the reasoning in Hughes is inapplicable under Vitek v. Jones, 445
U.S. 480 (1980), because the MHU is a “mental hospital” to which he was transferred.
Hill claims this Court must determine whether the MHU is a mental hospital before it can
rule on IDOC’s summary judgment motion. But Hill’s arguments are misplaced.
The holding in Vitek does not apply to the facts present here. In Vitek, the plaintiff
was involuntarily transferred from the prison to a state agency run mental hospital that
was not under the auspices of the department of corrections. 445 U.S. at 488.
Additionally, the prisoner was transferred because of a mental health diagnosis that the
prison could not treat, not because any emergency justified the transfer. Id. at 484. Under
those circumstances, the United States Supreme Court held that the plaintiff’s involuntary
transfer to a mental hospital for the purpose of psychiatric treatment implicated a liberty
interest protected by the Due Process Clause. Id. at 494.
Here, in contrast, Hill was not transferred to a state agency run mental hospital.
Rather, the MHU is part of the department of corrections. The MHU is a part of an IDOC
prison, IMSI, and over which the IDOC has custody and control. The MHU inmates were
treated by medical care providers contracted by IDOC to provide care to IDOC inmates.
And Hill was not transferred to the MHU because of a mental health diagnosis IDOC
could not treat. Rather, Hill was transferred because his mental health had deteriorated to
the point that care providers determined an emergency existed. The purpose of the
transfer was clearly expressed, and was for the purpose of conducting diagnostic work to
determine the nature of Hill’s mental health diagnosis so as to provide better treatment to
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 35
him. Under those facts, Vitek does not control here, and Hill’s due process rights were not
violated on account of the transfer.
Next, Hill has not presented contrary facts to suggest that his treatment plan was
anything other than specifically tailored to Hill’s medical condition and needs at the time.
The goals of Hill’s treatment plan were to wean Hill from his anti-depressant medications
and determine the source of his behavior issues. The behavioral component was designed
to address Hill’s inappropriate behavior so he could transfer to a less restrictive
environment. The plan was therefore tailored to Hill’s medical needs, and Hill’s due
process rights were not violated.
Finally, Hill’s contention that he was forced to take psychotropic medications is
unfounded. The record establishes Hill’s treatment plan indicated discontinuance of his
medication to enable medical care providers to accurately diagnose and treat Hill.
Therefore, the allegation that Hill’s due process rights were violated is without merit.
CONCLUSION
The mental health treatment that Plaintiff received while he was housed in C-3
satisfied the Eighth Amendment. Further, there are no facts to suggest an Eighth
Amendment violation based upon the conditions of Hill’s confinement in the MHU. And
finally, Vitek does not apply here, resulting in no due process violation. Therefore,
Defendants’ motions for summary judgment will be granted.
ORDER
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.
Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Complaint (Dkt. 40) is DENIED.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 36
2.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Judicial Notice (Dkt. 42) is DENIED.
3.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Objection to Defendants’ Replies (Dkt.
48) is DENIED as MOOT.
4.
Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel (Dkt. 50) is DENIED.
5.
Defendants’ Motion to Strike (Dkt. 44) is DENIED as MOOT.
6.
Defendant Corizon’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 34) is
GRANTED.
7.
The IDOC Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 37) is
GRANTED.
8.
Defendant Lake is hereby DISMISSED from this action.
9.
The Court hereby certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any
appeal from this Order would be frivolous and therefore taken in bad faith.
See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). For this reason,
Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status is REVOKED. Any further request to
proceed in forma pauperis on appeal should be directed on motion to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in accordance with
Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
DATED: December 18, 2014
_________________________
B. Lynn Winmill
Chief Judge
United States District Court
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 37
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