Goodwin et al v. Beckley
Filing
19
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER. IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees 14 is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Court will award fees in the amount of $3,632.50. The request for any additional amounts is denied. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (st)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
In re:
Case No. 1:13-cv-00140-BLW
WAYNE N. BECKLEY and WENDY
M. BECKLEY,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER
Debtors.
_________________________________
DALE GOODWIN; JOHN & NANCY
LINDBERG; and ANN WALCH
Plaintiffs/Appellees,
v.
WAYNE NILES BECKLEY,
Defendant/Appellant.
INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorney Fees. (Dkt. 14). For the
reasons explained below, the Court will grant the motion in part and deny it in part.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1
BACKGROUND
In 2006, plaintiffs lent several hundred thousand dollars to Bald Mountain, LP.
Bald Mountain defaulted on the loan, and in August 2010, this Court entered a default
judgment of nearly $426,000 against Bald Mountain and its general partners, including
defendant Wayne Beckley. See Default Judgment, Case No. 1:09-cv-594-BLW, Dkt. 32.
Beckley filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, and plaintiffs commenced an adversary
proceeding to protect their default judgment. The bankruptcy court granted summary
judgment in plaintiffs’ favor, which prompted this appeal. On appeal, this Court affirmed
the bankruptcy court’s rulings. Plaintiffs now seek to recover attorneys’ fees incurred on
appeal.
ANALYSIS
1.
Entitlement to Attorneys’ Fees
Plaintiffs rely on Idaho Code § 12-120(3), along with the attorneys’ fee provision
in the underlying promissory notes, to support their request for a fee award. Section 12120(3) provides that the prevailing party in any civil action to recover on a note is entitled
to a reasonable attorneys’ fee. Idaho Code § 12-120(3). In this case, plaintiffs initially
commenced a civil action to recover on their notes, and the notes contain the following
attorneys’ fee provisions:
“If any default is made hereunder . . . Maker further promises to pay all
costs of collection when incurred, including but not limited to
reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses incurred by Holder
hereof in connection with security the payment [sic] of this Note, or any
such default in any action or other proceeding brought to enforce any of
the provisions of this Note.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2
Case No. 1:09-cv-594-BLW, Sept. 15, 2006 Note, Ex. B to Compl., Dkt. 1 at 13, § 7; see
also Exs. C-E (containing identical provisions).
“Contractual provisions for payment of attorney fees are enforceable in Idaho.”
Shurtliff v. N.W. Pools, Inc., 815 P.2d 461, 466 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991). Thus, because
plaintiffs prevailed on their action to recover on a note, they are entitled to recover a
reasonable attorneys’ fees, including fees they incur in their ongoing collection efforts.
See id.; Idaho Code § 12-120(5).
This case is procedurally unusual because plaintiffs are asking this Court – which
is sitting as an appellate tribunal – to award attorneys’ fees. Neither side has submitted
any briefing on this issue. Instead, both sides implicitly assume that the Court is
empowered to award fees on appeal. Given the lack of briefing – and the lack of any
objection by the defendant – the Court will assume without deciding that it may award
attorneys’ fees incurred on appeal. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8014 (stating, in part, that
“costs shall be taxed against the losing party on appeal”); Idaho Code § 12-120(3)
(providing that the attorneys’ fee awarded to a prevailing party shall be “taxed and
collected as costs”).
Substantively, Beckley does not dispute that plaintiffs are the prevailing party.
Instead, he generally argues that the Court should decline to award attorneys’ fees
because there was a “reasonable basis” for the appeal and because the appeal “was
warranted to clarify controlling law.” Response, Dkt. 17, at 2. But Beckley has not
discussed the fee provisions in the notes. Nor has he discussed legal authority governing
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3
fee awards. As such, the Court is not persuaded by his arguments. The Court will allow
plaintiffs to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees.
2.
Reasonableness of the Claimed Fees
“The starting point for determining a reasonable fee is the ‘lodestar’ figure, which
is the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly
rate.” Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir.1992). In determining a
reasonable hourly rate, the Court considers the “experience, skill and reputation of the
attorney requesting fees,” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 924 (9th Cir.1996), as well as
“the prevailing market rates in the relevant community,” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886,
895 (1984).
Once the lodestar amount is determined, the Court “then assesses whether it is
necessary to adjust the presumptively reasonable lodestar figure on the basis of the Kerr 1
factors that are not already subsumed in the initial lodestar calculation.” Morales v. City
of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363–64 (9th Cir.1996) (footnote omitted). “There is a strong
presumption that the lodestar figure represents a reasonable fee. Only in rare instances
should the lodestar figure be adjusted on the basis of other considerations.” Id. at 363 n.
1
The Kerr factors are: (1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved, (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4) the preclusion of other
employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is
fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, (8) the amount
involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) the
“undesirability” of the case, (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, and
(12) awards in similar cases.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4
8. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Here, Plaintiffs seek $9,142 in fees. The hourly rates charged are as follows:
Office
Person
Title
Rate/Hour
Ringert Law Chartered Laura Burri
Attorney $190.00
Morrow & Fischer
Julie Fischer
Attorney $225.00
Morrow & Fischer
Laura Terrazas Paralegal $115.00
The rates charged by the respective firms are comparable to the reasonable hourly
rate for attorneys and staff of similar experience and similar work in this area, and
Beckley does not challenge that assertion. Additionally, the Court has determined on two
prior occasions that these rates are reasonable. See Case No. 1:09-cv-594-BLW, Oct. 12,
2010 Order, Dkt. 38, at 3; and Mar. 26, 2014 Order, Dkt. 107, at 5.
As for the amount of time billed to this case, Laura Burri was lead appellate
counsel. The records submitted to the Court show that she billed 16.6 hours to appellate
tasks. See Dkt. 14, at 5-6. This is a reasonable amount of time to spend on the appeal
and the Court will include all these hours in calculating the fee award. Ms. Burri billed
substantial additional time to this matter, but the individual time entries submitted to the
Court show that these tasks were not related to the appeal. See id. (all entries before
March 21, 2013, as well as the entries for April 3, 2013 and May 14, 2013, are unrelated
to this appeal). The Court will therefore exclude these entries in calculating a fee award.
As for time spent by other attorneys and paralegals, the Court has determined that
the vast majority of this time was unrelated to the appeal. Specifically, plaintiffs have
included several hours of Julie Fischer’s time, but most of this time was billed to tasks
unrelated to the appeal. See Client Inquiry Sheet, at Dkt. 15. After excluding all these
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 5
hours, the Court determined that Ms. Fischer spent .9 hours on appellate tasks, see id.
(April 4, April 16, and April 26, 2013 entries) and Ms. Terrazas spent 2.4 hours of
paralegal time to appellate tasks, see id. (April 10, 15, and 17, 2013 entries). The Court
finds these amounts of time reasonable.
Based on these determinations, the Court will award $3,632.50 in attorneys’ fees,
calculated as follows:
Person
Title
Laura Burri
Attorney
Julie Fischer
Attorney
Laura Terrazas Paralegal
Hours
16.6
.9
2.4
Rate/Hour
Total
$190.00
$3,154.00
$225.00
$202.50
$115.00
$276.00
$3,632.50
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorney Fees (Dkt. 14) is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Court will award fees in the amount of
$3,632.50. The request for any additional amounts is denied.
DATED: June 4, 2014
_________________________
B. Lynn Winmill
Chief Judge
United States District Court
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 6
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