Abbott v. Rosenthal et al
Filing
31
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER. NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 26 is GRANTED. Signed by Judge Candy W. Dale. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (st) Modified on 9/30/2015 to note that this order will be mailed to the Plaintiff on 10/1/2015 (st).
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
DENNIS E. ABBOTT,
Case No. 1:13-cv-00222-CWD
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER
v.
TERRIE ROSENTHAL, RANDY
BLADES, IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTION, IDAHO STATE
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION,
BEN METZGER, MARTY THOMAS,
CPL. DOSLIN, JENNETE HUNTER,
SGT. BLAIR, MISS BASSFORD, and
MARY ELLEN NOURSE,
Defendants.
INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants Randy
Blades, the Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC), the Idaho State Correctional
Institution (ISCI), Ben Metzger, and Marty Thomas, seeking judgment as a matter of law
on all remaining claims asserted by pro se Plaintiff Dennis Abbott. (Dkt. 26.) The Court
previously dismissed Abbott’s individual capacity claims against all Defendants, as well
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1
as all claims asserted against Defendants Doslin, Rosenthal, Hunter, Blair, Bassford, and
Nourse in the Complaint. (Dkt. 22.)
Abbott alleges Defendants, acting in their official capacities, violated his rights
under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.,
and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., by not allowing him
to participate in the Correctional Industries (C.I.) training program because he is confined
to a wheelchair, and by failing to provide a wheelchair-accessible restroom in the C.I.
facilities. Abbott seeks monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief for Defendants’
violations.
All parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States
Magistrate Judge. (Dkt. 12.) In the interest of avoiding delay, and because the Court
conclusively finds the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral
argument, Defendants’ motion will be decided on the record without oral argument. Dist.
Idaho L. Rule 7.1(d). For reasons explained below, the Court will grant summary
judgment.
BACKGROUND 1
At all times mentioned in his Complaint, Plaintiff Dennis Abbott, who uses a
wheelchair due to his disability, was an inmate at the Idaho State Correctional Institution
(ISCI). Since filing this action, Abbott has been released from ISCI custody. See Aff.
Magnelli, Ex. A. (Dkt. 26-7 at 4) (“I have been released on parole.”). Abbott’s claim
1
The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise indicated. When the facts are disputed, they are taken in the
light most favorable to Abbott, the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (recognizing the district court’s obligation to construe the record in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party on motion for summary judgment).
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2
arises from his desire to participate in Correctional Industries, a training and workforce
preparedness program for offenders, while he was in ISCI’s custody.
According to Defendants, C.I. is a self-funded state agency that relies upon
revenues from the sale of its goods and products to sustain its operations See Aff.
Anderson, ¶ 3. (Dkt. 26-6). C.I. does not receive federal funding to operate its programs,
nor does it receive funding from IDOC or the State of Idaho to operate its programs. Id. 2
Acceptance into the C.I. training program is a multi-step process. See Aff.
Walden, ¶ 2. (Dkt. 26-4 at 2.) First, the inmate must be recommended by his case
manager to ensure his employment will not interfere with other rehabilitative programs
the inmate may be involved in. Next, security staff must determine whether the offender
is eligible to participate in offender work programs. 3 If the inmate passes the security
check process, his application is routed to the C.I. training program manager, who then
routes the application to the shop supervisor/trainer where a position is open. At this
point, interviews are conducted. When determining who is the best fit for a given position
in the C.I. training program, in addition to work skills, the interviewer considers whether
the new potential employee can maintain a worker friendly environment with the present
employees. See Aff. Metzger, ¶ 8. (Dkt. 36-3 at 3.) With these criteria in mind, the most
successful offender candidate is offered the position.
Access to the C.I. building is restricted to those inmates who have been selected to
participate in the training program. C.I.’s main entrance, the “clean room,” is accessible
2
Defendants did not assert in their Answer that C.I. does not receive federal funding.
The record does not indicate the eligibility requirements required for the security staff’s approval. Nonetheless, it is
undisputed that Abbott passed this step.
3
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3
by stairs only and is equipped with a metal detector, which offender employees are
required to pass through to gain physical entry into the facilities. 4 See Aff. Anderson, ¶
6. (Dkt. 26-6 at 4.) The C.I. building can be accessed also through a separate entrance
equipped with a handicapped accessible ramp. 5 See Aff. Walden, ¶ 7. (Dkt. 26-4 at 4.)
At all times mentioned in the Complaint, the restrooms in the C.I. building were not
handicapped accessible. Id. at ¶ 8. The closest handicapped accessible restroom to the
C.I. building was located in a nearby dining hall. Id.
In January of 2013, Abbott applied for a clerk position open in C.I.’s upholstery
shop. 6 Ben Metzger, supervisor of the upholstery shop, interviewed Abbott and at least
five other inmates for the position. On his application, under the physical restrictions
section, Abbott listed “none (wheelchair).” Aff. Walden, Ex. A. (Dkt. 26-4 at 7.) For his
interview, Abbott accessed the C.I. building through the main entrance. Because Abbott
uses a wheelchair, he was carried down the stairs by correctional staff, where he was then
interviewed by Metzger. 7 During the interview, Metzger did not discuss Abbott’s
disability with Abbott. See Aff. Metzger, ¶ 6. (Dkt. 26-3 at 3.) When the interview was
over, Abbott was approached by a lead man 8 who told Abbott “[w]e can’t hire anyone in
4
Because the C.I. training program exposes inmates to a variety of tools that could be used as a weapon, the inmate
entrance is secured for safety and security purposes and is monitored to prevent tools from leaving the shops and
becoming accessible to the general population at ISCI. See Aff. Anderson, ¶ 6. (Dkt. 26-6 at 4.)
5
If necessary, an inmate wheelchair pusher could assist a non-ambulatory inmate up or down the ramp. See Aff.
Walden, ¶ 7. (Dkt. 26-4.)
6
Abbott’s application for the position was approved by both his case manager and security.
7
The record does not address what Abbott and Metzger discussed during the interview, nor is it clear what Abbott
listed as his qualifications in his application; the qualifications section of the application in the record are not legible.
See Aff. Walden, Ex. A. (Dkt. 26-4 at 7.)
8
“The term ‘lead man’ is used within the C.I. training program to refer to an offender who has worked in the area
long enough to be experienced in the operation and who may mentor a less experienced trainee.” See Aff. Walden
(Dkt. 26-4 at 4.)
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4
a wheelchair.” 9 Complaint (Dkt. 3 at 9). Metzger did not hear this exchange. See Aff.
Metzger, ¶ 6. (Dkt. 26-3 at 3.)
Before selecting a candidate for the clerk position in the C.I. training program,
Metzger asked the other offender workers and staff members for their thoughts about
Abbott and the other applicants. Regarding Abbott, “one or two were critical of [Abbott]
as a manipulator.” See Aff. Metzger, ¶ 8. (Dkt. 26-3 at 3.) This feedback, coupled with
Abbott’s less than honest answer to one of the questions on Abbott’s application, led
Metzger to select an inmate he considered more qualified than Abbott.
On April 9, 2013, Abbott filed a grievance regarding the denial of his application
to the C.I. training program. See Complaint, Ex. L. (Dkt. 3-13 at 2.) On his grievance
form, Abbott stated: “Americans with Disabilities Act, Title II violation. Correctional
Industries has no passage for offenders who are in wheelchairs to enter the jobsite and
gain employment for such industries. . . .” Id. On the grievance form, under the section
suggesting a “solution for the problem,” Abbott stated: “Give me the job I asked for or
equivalent.” Id. On April 17, 2013, Terri Rosenthal, the ISCI Administrative Support
Manager, responded to and denied Abbott’s grievance. 10 See Complaint, Ex. M. (Dkt. 314 at 4.) She explained: “Your disability is not a determining factor for being accepted
into the training program…. If you are accepted into the training program, we will work
9
Defendants do not dispute this fact.
Abbott’s initial grievance form went through two levels of review. First, Scott Walden, the production manager at
ISCI, submitted an initial response to Abbott’s grievance on April 16, 2013. In his response, he explained C.I. is a
training program, not a job, and participation in the program is a privilege, not a right. Rosenthal’s response, labeled
“reviewing authority response” is the second level of review.
10
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 5
with you and C.I. to accommodate your disability. You are also welcome to apply for
other available jobs throughout the facility.” Id.
On April 19, 2013, Abbott appealed Rosenthal’s denial of his grievance. In his
appeal, Abbott stated, “I am asserting there is a viable discrimination within this facility
in not allowing offenders in wheelchairs to have a pay job. . . . Correctional Industries
only have stairs for offenders to reports for work. There is no ramp for wheelchairs.” Id.
In addition, Abbott’s appeal states, “[m]ake this institution disability friendly.” Id.
During the appeal process, Abbott filed an offender concern form addressed to
Rosenthal on April 21, 2013. In the “concern” section, Abbott wrote: “I am barred from
entering C.I. because of barriers, that being stairs and C.I. is not interested in making
accommodations for offenders in wheelchairs and this is why I must take this to court.”
See Complaint, Ex. K (Dkt. 3-12 at 2.) On the same day, Rosenthal responded and
explained to Abbott, “if you are accepted into the training program we can make a
reasonable accommodation for you to enter CI; however not your wheelchair pusher.” 11
Id.
On April 25, 2013, Defendant Randy Blades, the ISCI warden, denied Abbott’s
appeal. 12 Complaint Ex. M. (Dkt. 3-13 at 4.) Blades explained: “If Correctional Industries
accepts you into the CI program we will make accommodations for your wheelchair issue
into C.I. entry. We can overcome any security concerns.” Id. Blades addressed Abbott’s
11
Defendants contend Abbott was selected for another position in the C.I. training program in December of 2013, on
the glove-line, but Abbott declined the offer because Abbott claimed his legs would fall asleep if he had to sit for
long periods of time. See Aff. Walden, ¶6. (Dkt. 26-4 at 3.) Abbott contends we was never offered the glove-line
position. See Response (Dkt. 29 at 2).
12
The grievance form indicates Blades is a “Level 3 Responder” and Rosenthal is a “Level 2 Responder.”
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 6
concern further, stating: “We met with CI and they are developing essential functions for
the various positions, that way they will be able to see what positions persons with
disabilities can safely apply for. We will also look at disability clean room accessibility,
ADA compliant ramps, and restrooms. This will take some time for research,
development, and construction however.” Id. On May 13, 2013, Abbott filed his
Complaint.
ANALYSIS
1. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 directs the court to “grant summary judgment
if the movant shows there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Critically, “the mere
existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise
properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no
genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48
(1986). “A dispute about a material fact is genuine ‘if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” FreecycleSunnyvale v.
Freecycle Network, 626 F.3d 509, 514 (9th Cir.2010) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at
248).
“The moving party initially bears the burden of proving the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact.” In re Oracle Corp. Secs. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir.2010)
(citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). “Where the moving party
meets that burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to designate specific
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 7
facts demonstrating the existence of genuine issues for trial.” Id. “If a party fails to
properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion
of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . consider the fact undisputed for the
purposes of the motion,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (2), and “the court may grant summary
judgment if the motion and supporting materials—including the facts considered
undisputed—show that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment.” Dist. Idaho
L. Rule 7.1(e).
2. TITLE II OF THE ADA AND SECTION 504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT
The ADA and the Rehabilitation Act are congruent statutes in purpose and in
application. See Clark v. California, 123 F.3d 1267, 1270 (9th Cir. 1997). The evidence
required for bringing a Rehabilitation Act claim is the same as that for an ADA claim,
with the additional requirement that the disability discrimination be committed by an
entity receiving federal financial assistance. See 29 U.S.C. § 794. Therefore, the
standards of an ADA claim apply also to a claim under the Rehabilitation Act.
Title II of the ADA provides that no “qualified individual with a disability shall,
by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of
the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination
by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
A claim under Title II of the ADA requires the plaintiff to establish: (1) he has a
disability; (2) he is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive a public entity’s
services, programs or activities; (3) he was denied the benefits of the services, programs
or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (4) that such
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 8
exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his disability. Weinreich
v. Los Angeles Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir. 1997). Title II of
the ADA extends to prison inmates who are deprived of the benefits of and participation
in prison programs, services, or activities because of a disability. See Pa. Dep’t of Corr.
v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 211 (1998).
Further, “[t]o recover monetary damages under Title II of the ADA or
Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination on the part of the
defendant.” Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001). The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applies the “deliberate indifference”
standard to determine intentional discrimination. See Id. Deliberate indifference requires
the plaintiff to demonstrate the defendant knew that harm to a plaintiff’s federally
protected right is substantially likely and that the defendant failed to act upon that
likelihood. Id; see City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1988).
A plaintiff satisfies the knowledge element of deliberate indifference by
demonstrating he alerted the “public entity to his need for accommodation (or where the
need for accommodation is obvious, or required by statute or regulation).” Id. at 1139.
Upon receiving a request for accommodation, defendants are “required to undertake a
fact specific investigation to determine what constitutes a reasonable accommodation.”
Id. “[A] public entity does not ‘act’ by proffering just any accommodation: it must
consider the particular individual's need when conducting its investigation into what
accommodations are reasonable.” Id. “A failure to act must be a result of conduct that is
more than negligent, and involves an element of deliberateness.” Id.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 9
A. Abbott’s Official Capacity Claim Against Defendants
In his Complaint, Abbott contends Defendants violated both Title II of the ADA
and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, because he was denied the clerk position in the
upholstery unit within ISCI’s C.I. training program due to his disability. Defendants
assert, because participation in the C.I. training program is not a fundamental right, and
because the C.I. training program does not receive federal funding, Abbott’s claims are
barred by sovereign immunity. Alternatively, Defendants argue if sovereign immunity
does not apply, Abbott has nonetheless failed to satisfy the elements of a Title II ADA or
Rehabilitation Act claim.
Abbott does not address directly either argument in his response, nor does he
present an alternative argument for denying summary judgment. In addition, Abbott’s
assertions of disputed facts are not properly supported pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
However, the Court will consider Abbott’s undisputed facts for purposes of deciding the
motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (2).
1. Sovereign Immunity
The Court need not decide whether sovereign immunity applies in this instance. 13
This is because, even assuming a valid abrogation of sovereign immunity in Title II ADA
13
Defendants assume there has been no valid abrogation of sovereign immunity to Title II ADA claims involving
non-fundamental rights. In Tennessee v. Lane, the Supreme Court held Title II of the ADA validly abrogates state
sovereign immunity to cases implicating the fundamental right of access to courts. 541 U.S. 509, 517 (2004). The
Court placed “significant emphasis upon the fact that courthouse access is a fundamental right that implicates not
only disabled persons’ entitlement to equal protection but also their due process rights and their rights under the
First and Sixth Amendments.” Phiffer v. Columbia River Corr. Inst., 384 F.3d 791, 793 (9th Cir. 2004) (J.
O’Scannlain, concurring) (citing Lane, 541 U.S. at 523). However, the Court left “open to question whether Title II
validly abrogates state sovereign immunity where no such fundamental right is at issue.” Id. The Ninth Circuit has
not addressed this issue.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 10
claims, and assuming C.I. receives federal funding, no genuine issue of material fact
exists to support Abbott’s claim of intentional discrimination under the ADA and
Rehabilitation Act.
2. Elements of Abbott’s Claim
Defendants do not dispute the first two elements of Abbott’s claim. Defendants
concede Abbott is a “qualified individual with a disability” and that Abbott is otherwise
qualified to participate in the C.I. training program. However, Defendants argue Abbott
was not excluded from participation in the C.I. training program, but even if he was, he
was not excluded due to his disability. In addition, Defendants contend if discrimination
is found, Abbott’s claim still fails because he is unable to prove Defendants acted with
deliberate indifference to his federally protected right to accommodation.
The Court finds the record is less than clear as to whether Abbott was denied
participation in the C.I. training program. 14 However, there is no dispute Abbott’s
application for the clerk position in the upholstery unit at C.I. was denied. Therefore, the
Court must determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist upon which a
reasonable jury could find Abbott was denied the clerk position in the C.I. training
program because of his disability, and whether Defendants acted with deliberate
indifference to Abbott’s request for accommodations.
14
Defendants argue Abbott was not denied participation in the C.I. training program. They contend Abbott was
afforded the same opportunities to apply to positions within C.I. as other defendants, and declining to hire an inmate
for one job does not ban the inmate from participation in C.I. or from applying to other positions. To the contrary,
Abbott contends Defendants’ failure to hire him for the clerk position constitutes a denial of the opportunity to
participate in the C.I. program in full.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 11
Defendants contend they do not have a policy or practice of denying inmates with
disabilities acceptance into the C.I. training program and Abbott has put forth insufficient
evidence to support the existence of such a policy. However, there is no dispute Abbott
applied and interviewed for a clerk position in the upholstery unit in C.I., and Defendants
explain several reasons why Abbott was not selected for the position—which Abbott does
not dispute.
First, the Defendants present a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason why Abbott
was not hired—because he was not the most qualified applicant. In Metzger’s affidavit,
he states: “After conducting the interviews I chose another candidate for the position.
This person interviewed better, had a better skill set and better interpersonal skills.” See
Aff. Metzeger, ¶ 7. (Dkt. 26-3 at 3.) Next, Metzger explains he felt Abbott was less than
honest on his application for the clerk position, because on Abbott’s application, next to
the line marked “physical restrictions,” Abbott wrote: “none (wheelchair).” 15 Finally,
Metzger explained his concern that Abbott would not get along well with the other
offender employees at the upholstery shop. In Metzger’s affidavit he states:
One goal when interviewing candidates for the C.I. training program is to
maintain a worker friendly environment…To further this end, I usually ask
other inmate workers and staff members about a potential new member of
the crew. I made such inquiries about Mr. Abbott and the other
candidates…. One or two of them were critical of [Abbott] as a
manipulator.
15
This response is ambiguous and it is not clear in the record before the Court what weight Metzger placed on this
factor in finding Abbott less qualified than the successful candidate.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 12
See Aff. Metzeger, ¶ 8. (Dkt. 26-3 at 3.) This feedback, coupled with Metzger’s
evaluation of Abbott’s skills and application, led Metzger to select an applicant he
considered more qualified than Abbott. Id.
Abbott does not dispute Defendant’s evidence. Rather, Abbott’s allegation of
Defendants’ discrimination rests upon allegations made in his Complaint—specifically
including the statement made by the offender lead man in the upholstery shop that C.I.
does not hire offenders in wheelchairs. Defendants do not dispute the lead man’s
statement. See Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 26-1 at 5).
The Court finds there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Abbott was
denied the clerk position in the C.I. program by reason of his disability. Though
Defendants allege a non-discriminatory reason as to why Abbott was not selected for the
clerk position—that a more qualified candidate was selected—Defendants nonetheless
fail to identify the more qualified offender, fail to state his qualifications or state why he
was more qualified for the clerk position compared to Abbott, and fail to indicate whether
the more qualified offender was disabled.
Additionally Defendants do not dispute the lead man made the comment “we can’t
hire anyone in a wheelchair.” Though the lead man is an inmate, it is unclear whether he
had any input in the offender selection process for positions in C.I.
The Court concludes the Defendants have failed, based on the record before the
Court, to prove the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on elements three and four
of Abbott’s claim. This does not stop the Court’s inquiry, however, as the Court must
determine whether the alleged discrimination, if proven, was intentional.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 13
Construing the facts most favorable for Abbott, Abbott asserts he was not hired for
the clerk position because the C.I. facility’s main entrance and restrooms were not
handicapped accessible. 16 However, the record is clear that, had Abbott been accepted
for the clerk position in the C.I. program, ISCI would have made accommodations for
Abbott’s disability so he could enter the C.I. building and have access to a handicapped
accessible restroom.
With regard to entry into the C.I. building, it is undisputed Defendants were
willing to make accommodations for Abbott’s disability so he could enter the C.I.
building. Rosenthal explained in her response to Abbott’s grievance: “We can usually
make a reasonable accommodation if necessary.” Complaint, Ex. M. (Dkt. 3-14 at 4.) In
his appeal, Abbott did not question the feasibility of accommodations; instead, he
asserted that entry into the C.I. facility was only possible by stairs, and insisted that C.I.
should be disability friendly. In response to Abbott’s appeal, Blades stated if Abbott was
accepted into the CI program: “we will make accommodations for your wheelchair issue
into CI entry.” Id. Blades response also went beyond Abbott’s original grievance, which
mentioned only the stairs, and explained: “We will also look at disability clean room
accessibility, ADA compliance ramps, and restrooms.” Id. Defendants’ clear willingness
to accommodate Abbott’s disability is contrary to a finding that Defendants were
deliberately indifferent when making their decision to deny Abbott the clerk position in
the C.I. program.
16
Abbott’s grievance does not specifically mention the lack of handicapped accessible restrooms in the C.I.
building—he includes it for the first time in his Complaint.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 14
In his response, Abbott challenges the reasonableness of Defendants suggested
accommodations for Abbott’s entry into the C.I. building. Specifically, he argues the
alternative entry is against security regulations because it is not equipped with a metal
detector. However, Warden Blades clearly stated in his response to Abbott’s appeal: “We
can overcome any security concern.”
In addition, Abbott challenges the reasonableness of the restroom modifications
raised for the first time by Blades in his grievance response, although Abbott failed to
specifically include them in his grievance. In their motion for summary judgment,
Defendants assert they would have converted C.I.’s restrooms so that they were
handicapped accessible, and while renovations were being made, Abbott could have used
the handicapped restroom in a nearby dining hall. In response, Abbott challenges
Rosenthal’s April 21, 2013 reply to Abbott’s offender form, filed separate from the
grievance, which states: “We can make a reasonable accommodation for you to enter;
however not your wheelchair pusher.”
The Court finds Abbott’s after the fact challenge to the restroom accessibility issue
is in stark contrast to Warden Blades’s April 25, 2013 denial of Abbott’s appeal, where
Blades states: “[w]e will make accommodations for your wheelchair issue into CI entry,”
and will address accessibility issues with the ramps and restrooms. There is no support
for Abbott’s argument that a wheelchair pusher would not have been available as part of
the accommodation for restroom accessibility, interim or otherwise. 17
17
In other words, it is unreasonable to infer that Rosenthal banned the availability of a wheelchair pusher for all of
Abbott’s potential accessibility needs if he was selected for a position in the C.I. program.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 15
Even construing these above facts and arguments in favor of Abbott, they do not
create a genuine issue upon which a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendants
acted with deliberate indifference. Abbott’s failure to raise a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether Defendant’s alleged discrimination was intentional is, therefore, fatal
to his claim under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
B. Abbott’s Claims for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
Abbott requests the Court issue a declaratory judgment establishing that
Defendants violated Abbott’s rights pursuant to Title II of the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act. In addition, he requests the Court enter an injunction prohibiting
Defendants from the continued violation of his rights. Defendants argue Abbott’s claims
for declaratory and injunctive relief are moot because Abbott is no longer incarcerated at
ISCI. Abbott fails to address this argument or offer any alterative argument in response.
The Court agrees with Defendants.
In McQuillon v. Schwarzenegger, 369 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir.2004), the Court
explained the mootness doctrine relative to requests for injunctive and declaratory relief:
A case becomes moot ‘when the issues presented are no longer “live” or the
parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” ’ See Porter v.
Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 489 (9th Cir.2003) (quoting Clark v. City of
Lakewood, 259 F.3d 996, 1011 (9th Cir.2001)). McQuillon's release
extinguishes his legal interest in an injunction because it would have no
effect on him. See Bernhardt [v. County of Los Angeles], 279 F.3d 862
Id. at 1095.
Because Abbott is no longer an inmate at ISCI, he is not entitled to injunctive or
declaratory relief. Ordering Defendants to provide Abbott with a position in the C.I.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 16
training program and making accommodations for his entry into the building would not
afford Abbott any relief because he is no longer imprisoned. Moreover, Abbott’s claims
do not challenge an ongoing prison policy nor are they part of a class action claim, which
might otherwise trigger an exception to the mootness doctrine and allow Abbott’s claim
to proceed.
Dismissal of the injunctive and declaratory relief requests also is in harmony with
the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).Title 18 U.S.C. § 3626 limits the type of
prospective relief available in prison conditions lawsuits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Under that section, the term “prospective relief” is defined as “all relief other than
compensatory monetary damages.”18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(7). Particularly, 18 U.S.C. §
3626(a)(1)(A) limits such relief as follows:
Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions shall
extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right
of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve
any prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly
drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the
Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the
violation of the Federal right. The court shall give substantial weight to any
adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice
system caused by the relief.
In this instance, no prospective relief of the type requested by Abbott is necessary
to protect his constitutional rights. Accordingly, Abbot’s claims for injunctive and
declaratory relief are moot and subject to dismissal.
CONCLUSION
The Court will grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants as to Abbott’s
claim for monetary damages brought pursuant to Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 17
the Rehabilitation Act. In addition, the Court will dismiss Abbott’s claims for injunctive
and declaratory relief because they are moot, as Abbott is no longer incarcerated.
ORDER
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 26) is GRANTED.
September 30, 2015
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 18
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