Hudson v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc.

Filing 31

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. It is therefore ordered that defendant's motion for summary judgment be, and the same hereby is, DENIED. Signed by Judge William B. Shubb. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (jp)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 DISTRICT OF IDAHO 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 JENNIFER HUDSON, Plaintiff, 13 14 15 16 CIV. NO. 1:13-366 WBS MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT v. HOME DEPOT, U.S.A., INC., a Delaware Corporation, d.b.a. THE HOME DEPOT, 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 Defendant. ----oo0oo---Plaintiff brought this action against her former employer, Home Depot, alleging Home Depot relied on her Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”)-qualifying absences as a negative factor in its decision to terminate her employment. Presently before the court is Home Depot’s motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. I. Factual and Procedural Background Home Depot hired plaintiff as a part-time cashier in 28 1 1 October 2001. 2 19:2) (Docket No. 25-1).) 3 special service desk position, in which she served customers 4 picking up special orders, called vendors for updates and price 5 points, offered credit and installations, directed customers to 6 the appropriate associate who could provide assistance, and 7 handled customer complaints. 8 9 (Williams Decl. Ex. L (“Hudson Dep.”) at 16:10-22, Plaintiff then moved into a full-time (Id. at 20:7-12.) At the time Home Depot first hired plaintiff, it utilized a point system for attendance issues, whereby associates 10 accrued points for absences or tardiness. 11 (Docket No. 21-29.) 12 absences or tardies exceeded a designated number, he or she would 13 be subject to discipline. 14 changed its policy, abandoning the point system in favor of a 15 more flexible system. 16 than three to five unexcused attendance or punctuality issues 17 within a twelve-month period despite having been warned about the 18 consequences of failing to improve, a manager was supposed to 19 conduct a “final counseling session.” 20 stated that “there is no policy governing the precise number of 21 days absent or late that will result in disciplinary action 22 because the discipline that is appropriate will vary according to 23 the circumstances.” 24 (Quanstrom Decl. ¶ 4 Under this new system, when an employee’s (Id.) In June 2010, Home Depot (Id. ¶ 5.) When an associate had greater (Id.) The written policy (Id.) Plaintiff’s mother began having severe health issues in 25 2004. (Hudson Decl. ¶ 4 (Docket No. 24).) 26 care to her mother, which caused her to be late to work and 27 occasionally absent. 28 to be late or absent, she called into work and spoke to the (Id.) Plaintiff provided Plaintiff states that when she had 2 1 manager on duty to inform him or her of the absence or tardiness 2 and explain that she was taking care of her ill mother.1 3 5.) 4 worry, that she should do what she needed to do to care for her 5 mother, and that the tardiness or absence would be excused. 6 (Id.) (Id. ¶ Each time, the manager on duty told her that she need not 7 Plaintiff’s absences and tardies persisted during the 8 period from 2003 to 2011.2 9 plaintiff to explain those attendance occurrences during her last According to a chart prepared by 10 year of employment, from the period of November 2010 to March 11 2011, plaintiff was absent once and tardy nine times where the 12 reason was caring for her mother. 13 (Docket No. 21-28).) 14 noted some tardies were for other reasons, including plaintiff’s 15 knee injuries, a welfare appointment, and a doctor’s visit. 16 (Id.) 17 (Henderson Decl. Ex. 25 During that same period, plaintiff also Plaintiff’s mother passed away. Thereafter, from 18 June 15, 2011, to July 22, 2011, plaintiff accrued seven more 19 tardies, two absences, and two early departures, both of which 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 In her deposition, plaintiff stated she never requested time off in advance due to a pre-planned or anticipated need to care for her mother. (Hudson Dep. 49:16-18.) Home Depot offers these comments in support of their assertion that plaintiff never requested FMLA leave; however, the deposition does not contradict plaintiff’s statement that she notified her employer that her unplanned late arrivals and absences were due to her mother’s illness. 2 Paperwork documenting written counseling indicates that from 2003 to 2009, Home Depot counseled plaintiff regarding her accrued points under the former point system for tardies, absences, and “mispunches.” (See Henderson Decl. Exs. 3-20.) 3 1 she states were excused due to the snow.3 2 2011, plaintiff received a “final counseling” for her tardies and 3 absences, where she was informed that additional attendance 4 violations could result in termination. 5 Five days later, on July 27, 2011, plaintiff was again absent 6 from work. 7 together with the district human resources manager Diana 8 Quanstrom, stated that they believed plaintiff should be 9 terminated because she was unwilling or unable to improve her (Id. ¶ 8.) (Id.) On July 22, (Quanstrom Decl. ¶ 7.) Two managers at plaintiff’s store, 10 attendance issues. 11 Depot Associate Advice and Counsel Group, which concurred in the 12 decision. 13 2011. 14 (Id.) (Id. ¶ 8.) They reached out to the Home Home Depot terminated plaintiff on August 6, Plaintiff brought a single claim against Home Depot, 15 alleging that Home Depot impermissibly used plaintiff’s FMLA- 16 protected leave as a negative factor in its decision to fire her. 17 (Compl. ¶ 24-26.) 18 arguing plaintiff’s termination did not violate the FMLA because 19 plaintiffs’ absences and tardies were not protected by the act 20 and, in any event, it did not rely on that leave as a negative 21 factor in its decision to terminate plaintiff. 22 II. Discussion Home Depot now moves for summary judgment, 23 A. Summary Judgment Standard 24 Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that 25 26 27 28 there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 3 The reasons plaintiff recorded for the tardies were car problems, three of which were marked as “Ok’d.” The two absences were recorded as “flu” and “headache.” (Henderson Decl. Ex. 28.) 4 1 movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 2 P. 56(a). 3 of the suit, and a genuine issue is one that could permit a 4 reasonable jury to enter a verdict in the non-moving party’s 5 favor. 6 (1986). 7 burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material 8 fact and can satisfy this burden by presenting evidence that 9 negates an essential element of the non-moving party’s case. Fed. R. Civ. A material fact is one that could affect the outcome Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial 10 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 11 Alternatively, the moving party can demonstrate that the non- 12 moving party cannot produce evidence to support an essential 13 element upon which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. 14 Id. 15 Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the 16 burden shifts to the non-moving party to “designate ‘specific 17 facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” 18 324 (quoting then-Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). 19 the non-moving party must “do more than simply show that there is 20 some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” 21 Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). 22 “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence . . . will be 23 insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could 24 reasonably find for the [non-moving party].” 25 at 252. Id. at To carry this burden, Matsushita Anderson, 477 U.S. 26 In deciding a summary judgment motion, the court must 27 view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving 28 party and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. 5 Id. at 1 255. 2 and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury 3 functions, not those of a judge . . . ruling on a motion for 4 summary judgment . . . .” “Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, Id. 5 B. Section 825.220(c) 6 The FMLA entitles “employees to take reasonable leave 7 for medical reasons, or the birth or adoption of a child, and for 8 the care of a child, spouse, or parent who has a serious health 9 condition.” 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b). The Act permits an employee to 10 take up to twelve weeks of leave during a twelve-month period. 11 Id. § 2612. 12 Section 825.220 of the federal regulations pursuant to 13 the FMLA provides that “employers cannot use the taking of FMLA 14 leave as a negative factor in employment actions, such as hiring, 15 promotions or disciplinary actions; nor can FMLA leave be counted 16 under no fault attendance policies.” 17 Diverging from other circuits, the Ninth Circuit has “explicitly 18 declined” to apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting 19 framework to § 825.220 claims.4 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 4 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c). Xiu Liu v. Amway Corp., 347 F.3d A plaintiff may prove a case of discrimination under federal anti-discrimination law by invoking the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under this framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case showing that 1) she belongs to a protected class of persons; 2) she satisfactorily performed her job; 3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and 4) her employer treated her differently than similarly situated employees not of the same protected class. Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). If the plaintiff successfully establishes her prima facie case, the “burden of production, but not persuasion, [] shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action.” Chuang v. 6 1 1125, 1136 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Bachelder v. Am. W. Airlines, 2 259 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2001)). 3 held that although § 825.220(c) “refers to ‘discrimination,’ [it] 4 actually pertains to the ‘interference with the exercise of 5 rights’ section of the [FMLA], § 2614(a)(1), not the anti- 6 retaliation or antidiscrimination sections, §§ 2615(a)(2) and 7 (b).” 8 burden-shifting framework from anti-discrimination law, “[in] 9 order to prevail on her claim . . . [the plaintiff] need only 259 F.3d at 1124. In Bachelder, the Ninth Circuit Consequently, rather than using the 10 prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her taking of FMLA- 11 protected leave constituted a negative factor in the decision to 12 terminate her.” 13 that (1) she took FMLA-protected leave and (2) such leave 14 constituted a negative factor in Home Depot’s decision to 15 terminate her employment. 16 WGC, 2014 WL 4699620, at *4 (D. Nev. Sept. 22, 2014); Jadwin v. 17 County of Kern, 610 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1159 (E.D. Cal. 2009) 18 (citing Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1122). Id. at 1125. Here, plaintiff must thus prove Bement v. Cox, Civ. No. 3:12-475 MMD 19 1. FMLA-Protected Leave 20 As a threshold matter, coverage by the FMLA is limited 21 to employers with over fifty employees, § 825.104, and employees 22 who have worked for the employer for at least twelve months and 23 24 25 26 27 28 Univ. of Cal. Davis, 225 F.3d 1115, 1123-24 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). Assuming the employer carries its burden, the plaintiff “must [then] show that the articulated reason[s][are] pretextual ‘either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.’” Chuang, 225 F.3d at 1124 (citing Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)). 7 1 1,250 hours, § 825.110. 2 and plaintiff met these requirements, nor do they dispute that 3 plaintiff’s mother’s condition was serious such that plaintiff’s 4 care would have qualified under the Act, see 29 U.S.C. § 2612 5 (covering leave for care of a parent with a “serious health 6 condition”). 7 provided sufficient notice for the attendance occurrences related 8 to her mother’s illness to come within the protection of the 9 FMLA. 10 Parties do not dispute that Home Depot Their disagreement is over whether plaintiff Section 825.302 of the Department of Labor regulations 11 covers notice requirements for “foreseeable” FMLA leave. See 29 12 C.F.R. § 825.302. 13 adoption, or knows of planned medical treatment for her or her 14 family member’s serious illness, she must provide either thirty 15 days notice, or if that is not possible, she must notify her 16 employer as soon as practicable. 17 cases . . . the determination of when an employee could 18 practicably provide notice must take into account the individual 19 facts and circumstances.” 20 foreseeable, the employee must provide “notice sufficient to make 21 the employer aware that the employee needs FMLA-qualifying leave, 22 and the anticipated timing and duration of leave.” 23 825.302(c). 24 a FMLA–qualifying reason, the employee need not expressly assert 25 rights under the FMLA or even mention the FMLA.” 26 employer previously provided FMLA leave for a particular 27 qualifying reason, then “the employee must specifically reference 28 the qualifying reason for leave or the need for FMLA leave.” Where the employee expects a birth or Id. § 825.302(a)-(b). Id. § 825.302(b). “In all Where leave is Id. § “When an employee seeks leave for the first time for 8 Id. Where the Id. 1 In all cases, “[i]t is the employer’s responsibility to determine 2 whether FMLA leave is appropriate, to inquire as to specific 3 facts to make that determination, and to inform the employee of 4 his or her entitlements.” Xin Liu, 347 F.3d at 1134. 5 According to plaintiff, at least ten of the attendance 6 occurrences cited in her termination letter were attributable to 7 caring for her mother.5 8 tardy or absent to care for her ill mother, she called the Home 9 Depot manager on duty to explain that her mother was the reason Plaintiff states that when she had to be 10 she could not be at work. 11 Quanstrom corroborates that plaintiff put Home Depot on notice 12 regarding attendance occurrences related to plaintiff’s care for 13 her mother: she says, “when we were discussing the matter and 14 determining what steps to take, we were aware that Ms. Hudson had 15 been caring for her mother, who had died three months earlier . . 16 . .”6 17 that none of plaintiff’s supervisors were aware that plaintiff’s 18 absences were related to caring for her mother. 19 is thus a disputed issue of material fact regarding whether 20 plaintiff’s supervisors were made aware that plaintiff’s 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 (Hudson Decl. ¶ 5.) HR manager Defendant nonetheless took the position at oral argument At best, there 5 The August 6, 2011 termination letter listed thirtyfour attendance occurrences that contributed to her dismissal. (Henderson Decl. Ex. 23 (Docket No. 21-26).) Plaintiff made a chart explaining those occurrences. (See Henderson Decl. Ex. 25 (Docket No. 21-26).) According to the chart, at least ten occurrences were attributable to caring for her mother. (Id.) 6 Quanstrom goes on to state that although Home Depot was aware of the reasons for plaintiff’s absences on those certain occasion relating to her mother, “[w]e did not consider any attendance issues related to the care of Ms. Hudson’s mother when we reached our decision to terminate her employment.” (Quanstrom Decl. ¶ 9.) 9 1 attendance occurrences were attributable to providing care for 2 her mother. 3 The issue then becomes whether plaintiff’s notice was 4 sufficient. The record is silent on the “individual facts and 5 circumstances” surrounding each attendance occurrence, making it 6 difficult for the court to determine whether plaintiff’s notice 7 was sufficient. 8 stated that none of the absences related to her mother’s care 9 were preplanned. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(b). (Hudson Dep. at 49:16-22). Plaintiff, however, This suggests that 10 the tardies or absences were not “foreseeable,” such that § 11 825.302 should even apply.7 12 foreseeable, there is at least a triable issue as to whether 13 plaintiff’s phone calls to the store constituted notice “as soon 14 as practicable.” 15 invoke the FMLA, see 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(c),8 the burden would 16 have then shifted to Home Depot to determine, on each occasion, If any tardies or absences were Because plaintiff was not required to expressly 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 Some courts have held that an employee must provide her employer notice even when the absence is unforeseeable. See Aubuchon v. Knauf Fiberglas, GMBH, 240 F. Supp. 2d 859, 865 (S.D. Ind. 2003) (“Where leave is not foreseeable, the employee must provide notice ‘as soon as practicable.’”) (citing Collins v. NTN-Bower Corp., 272 F.3d 1006, 1008 (7th Cir. 2001). Even under this rule, a factual inquiry must be conducted into the circumstances to determine when it would have been practicable to give notice. 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(b). 7 8 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff would have perhaps been required to expressly request “FMLA leave” if Home Depot had previously afforded her leave for the purpose of caring for her mother. See § 825.302 (c). However, nothing in the record suggests that Home Depot ever expressly granted plaintiff FMLA-qualified leave. Plaintiff was therefore not required to expressly invoke the FMLA when she informed her managers that she would be late or absent due to her mother’s illness. 10 1 whether plaintiff’s absences or tardies were qualifying. 2 Liu, 347 F.3d at 1134. 3 that at least ten of plaintiff’s tardies and absences in her last 4 year of employment qualify as FMLA-protected leave.9 5 See Xin A reasonable jury could thus conclude Id. “In the case of medical conditions, the employer may 6 find it necessary to inquire further to determine if the leave is 7 because of a serious health condition and may request medical 8 certification to support the need for such leave.” 9 825.302(c). 29 C.F.R. § Failure to respond “may result in denial of FMLA 10 protection if the employer is unable to determine whether the 11 leave is FMLA qualifying.” Id. 12 Quanstrom states that in 2004 or 2005, when she learned 13 plaintiff was caring for her ill mother, she asked her to provide 14 medical certification relating to her mother’s illness so that 15 any resulting absences would be covered by the FMLA. 16 Decl. ¶ 13.) 17 not want to take FMLA leave because she could not afford it. 18 (Id.) 19 took place. 20 dispute over whether plaintiff was ever asked to provide medical 21 certification. 22 Depot’s request for medical certification, potentially precluding 23 her from claiming leave related to her mother was FMLA-protected, 24 remains a genuine dispute of material fact. 27 28 She further states plaintiff responded that she did Plaintiff, however, denies that this conversation ever 25 26 (Quanstrom (Hudson Decl. ¶ 8.) There is accordingly a factual Whether plaintiff failed to respond to Home 2. Negative Factor 9 As previously discussed, defendant does not dispute that plaintiff’s mother’s condition was serious enough for plaintiff to qualify for leave under the FMLA. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612. 11 1 Under § 825.220(c), it is impermissible for an employer 2 to use FMLA-protected leave “as a negative factor at all” in its 3 decision to fire an employee. 4 Plaintiff “can prove this claim, as one might any ordinary 5 statutory claim, by using either direct or circumstantial 6 evidence, or both.” 7 Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1131. Id. at 1125. Quanstrom states that when she and store managers 8 conferred, they did not consider any attendance issues related to 9 the care of Ms. Hudson’s mother when they reached the decision to 10 terminate plaintiff’s employment. 11 documented phone calls between the Associate Store Manager and 12 the Associate Advice and Counsel Group regarding plaintiff, noted 13 the Associate Store Manager stated that “the associate was taking 14 care of her mother, who recently died. 15 addressed concerning her attendance issues.” 16 Ex. 22 (Docket No. 21-25).) 17 termination report states, “Schedule adherence is essential to 18 ensure that the appropriate levels of staffing are available to 19 meet our customer’s need. As of today [plaintiff] has had 20 thirty-four occurrences.” (Id. Ex. 23 (Docket No. 21-26).) 21 Several of the noted attendance occurrences in the termination 22 notice (September 1 and 25, October 24 and 26, December 17 and 23 23, 2010) were, according to plaintiff, related to caring for her 24 mother. 25 material fact such that a reasonable juror could conclude that 26 Home Depot relied on FMLA-protected attendance occurrences as a 27 “negative factor at all” in plaintiff’s termination. 28 (See id.; Ex. 25.) A July 27, 2011 report, which But those days are not (Henderson Decl. However, the August 6, 2011 There is thus a genuine dispute of Other circuits have held that an employer does not 12 1 violate § 825.220 when it would have fired an employee regardless 2 of the FMLA-protected leave. 3 Electric and Gas Company, the plaintiff’s ninety-two absences, 4 which exceeded the twelve weeks or eighty-four-day maximum the 5 FMLA protects, violated the “Last Chance Agreement” he had signed 6 with his employer. 7 plaintiff in that case conceded that any violation of the 8 Agreement would have automatically qualified him for termination. 9 Id. In Conoshenti v. Public Service 364 F.3d 135, 148 (3d Cir. 2004). The The court concluded that the record indicated that with the 10 FMLA-protected leave removed from the calculus, it would have 11 nevertheless made the same decision. 12 Medpointe Healthcare, the court affirmed summary judgment for 13 employer even though its termination letter identified FMLA- 14 protected leave as part of the reason for terminating the 15 employee, because the employer had “just cause” to terminate the 16 employee due to her other non-FMLA leave which violated its 17 absence policy. 18 Accordingly, Home Depot argues that the fourteen non-FMLA 19 attendance occurrences during plaintiff’s final year of 20 employment, “standing alone, were sufficient to terminate 21 [plaintiff’s] employment, as a matter of law.” 22 2.) 23 Id. Similarly, in Smith v. 338 Fed. Appx. 230, 234 (3d Cir. 2009). (Def.’s Mem. at In Bachelder, the Ninth Circuit clearly contemplated a 24 set of facts similar to Conoshenti and Smith and applied a more 25 lenient standard to a “negative factor” claim: 26 27 28 America West does not seriously contend that, even though it considered an impermissible reason in firing Bachelder, it would have fired her anyway for the 13 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 other two reasons alone. Even had it made such an argument, of course, the regulations clearly prohibit the use of FMLA-protected leave as a negative factor at all. Therefore no further inquiry on the question whether America West violated the statue in discharging Bachelder is necessary. Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1131 (emphasis added). In the Ninth Circuit, even if the FMLA-protected leave was not a but-for cause of the decision to terminate an employee, that does not necessarily preclude an employee from prevailing under § 825.220(c) where the leave was a factor “at all.” See also Xiu Liu, 347 F.3d at 1136 (holding that summary judgment was not appropriate where there was sufficient evidence that a supervisor’s evaluation, in which he took FMLA-protected leave into account in giving employee a low score, played a “central” factor in her termination).10 From the termination letter, which notes FMLA-protected leave as grounds for dismissal, the jury could reasonably conclude that Home Depot used the leave as a 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10 Home Depot cites two Ninth Circuit cases in support of its argument that plaintiff cannot prevail because her other nonFMLA-qualifying absences would have been sufficient grounds for termination. (See Def.’s Reply at 4 (Docket No. 27).) The first case, Buckman v. MCI World Com Inc., is inapposite. The court in Buckman did not discuss the causation requirements of the “negative factor” prong, because it determined plaintiff’s leave was not qualifying for lack of proper notice. See Buckman v. MCI World Com Inc., 374 Fed. Appx. 719, 720 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that leave was not FMLA-qualifying because plaintiff failed to provide notice in accordance with employer policy). The second case, Cooper v. T-Mobile USA, is distinguishable, because the court found there was insufficient evidence in the record suggesting that plaintiff had been terminated for any reason other than her long history of objective complaints and discipline. See 302 Fed. Appx. 581 (9th Cir. 2008). Here, plaintiff has provided sufficient direct evidence, the termination report, that Home Depot considered plaintiff’s FMLA leave as a negative factor. 14 1 negative factor, even if plaintiffs’ other attendance 2 occurrences would have, in theory, been sufficient for 3 plaintiff’s dismissal. 4 The key issues of material fact in this case--whether 5 plaintiff’s supervisors were aware that her absences and tardies 6 were due to caring for her mother, whether plaintiff was ever 7 asked to certify her mother’s condition, and whether defendant 8 relied on FMLA-protected attendance occurrences in its 9 termination decision--are all disputed and should be decided by 10 a jury. 11 grant summary judgment at this time. 12 Accordingly, it would be inappropriate for the court to IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT defendant’s motion for 13 summary judgment be, and the same hereby is, DENIED. 14 Dated: January 29, 2015 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 15

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