Raymond v. Sloan et al

Filing 44

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS; MOTION TO AMEND; MOTION TO INTERVENE; MOTION TO STAY denying 28 Motion for Discovery Stay; granting in part 31 Motion for Leave to Amend; granting 41 Idaho State Police's Motion to Intervene; gra nting 27 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Plaintiffs claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Plaintiffs claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and her state-law claim for negligence are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff has twenty days from the date this Order is signed to file an amended Complaint, if she can do so consistent with this Order. Signed by Judge William B. Shubb. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (cjm)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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DISTRICT OF IDAHO

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----oo0oo----

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JACKIE RAYMOND, individually
as an heir, and as Personal
Representative of the Estate
of Barry Johnson,
Plaintiff,

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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION
TO DISMISS; MOTION TO AMEND;
MOTION TO INTERVENE; MOTION TO
STAY

v.
SCOTT SLOAN; PAYETTE COUNTY,
a political subdivision of
the State of Idaho; CHARLES
HUFF, Sheriff; and JOHN DOES
1-20,
Defendants,

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CIV. NO. 1:13-423 WBS

and the IDAHO STATE POLICE,
Intervenor.

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----oo0oo----

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Plaintiff Jackie Raymond brought this action against

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defendants Scott Sloan, Sheriff Charles Huff, and Payette County

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arising out of the death of her father in an automobile collision

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with Sloan.

Defendants now move to dismiss plaintiff’s Complaint
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pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure

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to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and to stay

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discovery pending the determination of their motion; plaintiff

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moves to amend her complaint; and the Idaho State Police (“ISP”)

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moves to intervene pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

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24(b).

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I.

Factual & Procedural History

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On October 18, 2011, Barry Johnson attempted to make a
left turn from Highway 30 into the driveway of his residence near

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New Plymouth, Idaho.

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so, Sloan, a deputy sheriff of Payette County, allegedly passed

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him in the left-hand lane at a speed of 115 miles per hour.

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¶ 13.)

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from the driver’s seat of his vehicle and died as a result of his

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injuries.

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(Compl. ¶ 12 (Docket No. 1).)

Their cars collided.

(Id. ¶ 16.)

As he did

(Id.

Johnson was ejected

(Id.)
Plaintiff is Johnson’s daughter and heir.

(Id. ¶ 4.)

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She asserts two basic theories of relief.

First, she brings a

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state-law claim for negligence against Sloan and Payette County,

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which she alleges is both vicariously liable for Sloan’s conduct

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and independently liable for its failure to train, supervise, and

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control its employees.

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alleges that defendants conspired with officers of the ISP to

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cover up Sloan’s misconduct and asserts that this conspiracy

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denied her of her constitutional right of access to the courts in

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violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.

(Id. ¶¶ 6, 15, 17-19.)

Second, she

(Id. ¶¶ 20-21.)

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Defendants now move to dismiss plaintiff’s Complaint

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for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,

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(Docket No. 27), and to stay discovery pending resolution of the
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motion to dismiss, (Docket No. 28); plaintiff seeks leave to

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amend her Complaint, (Docket No. 31); and ISP moves to intervene

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in the action for the purpose of opposing plaintiff’s motion to

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file an amended Complaint, (Docket No. 41).

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II.

Motion to Dismiss

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On a motion to dismiss, the court must accept the

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allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable

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inferences in favor of the plaintiff.

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U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Davis v.

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Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322

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(1972).

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plead “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

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plausible on its face.”

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544, 570 (2007).

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for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

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unlawfully,” and where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely

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consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the

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line between possibility and plausibility.”

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556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57).

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A.

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Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416

To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff needs to

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

This “plausibility standard,” however, “asks

Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

42 U.S.C. § 1985
Subsection 1985(3) prohibits two or more persons from

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conspiring to deprive any person or class of persons of the equal

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protection of the laws.

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under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must demonstrate a deprivation of a

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right motivated by ‘some racial, or otherwise class-based,

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invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’

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action.’”

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1056 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978

“To bring a cause of action successfully

RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045,

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F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992)); accord Griffin v. Breckenridge,

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403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).

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have designated the class in question a suspect or quasi-suspect

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classification requiring more exacting scrutiny or that Congress

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has indicated through legislation that the class required special

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protection.”

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1985) (citing DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 333

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(9th Cir. 1979)).

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This requires “either that the courts

Schultz v. Sundberg, 759 F.2d 714, 718 (9th Cir.

Here, plaintiff alleges only that defendants deprived

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her of her right of access to the courts in violation of the

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Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

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not alleged that she is a member of any protected class, let

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alone that defendants’ conduct was motivated by a membership in

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such a class.

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the court must grant defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s §

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1985 claim.

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B.

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(See Compl. ¶¶ 20-21.)

See RK Ventures, 307 F.3d at 1056.

She has

Accordingly,

42 U.S.C. § 1983
In relevant part, § 1983 provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
. . . , subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity or
other proper proceeding for redress . . . .

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42 U.S.C. § 1983.

While § 1983 is not itself a source of

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substantive rights, it provides a cause of action against any

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person who, under color of state law, deprives an individual of

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federal constitutional rights or limited federal statutory

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rights.

Id.; Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989).
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“The Supreme Court held long ago that the right of

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access to the courts is a fundamental right protected by the

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Constitution.”

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1998) (citing Chambers v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142,

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148 (1907)).

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in pre-filing actions which effectively cover[] up evidence and

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render[] any state court remedies ineffective.”

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Swekel v. City of River Rouge, 119 F.3d 1259, 1262 (6th Cir.

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1997)).

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Delew v. Wagner, 143 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir.

That right is “deni[ed] . . . where a party engages

Id. (citing

However, because the right of access to the courts is

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“ancillary to the underlying claim” that a plaintiff seeks to

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litigate, a plaintiff must allege that the defendants’ conduct

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actually prevented her from litigating that claim.

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v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002).

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guess that a state court remedy will be ineffective because of a

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defendant’s actions.”

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119 F.3d at 1264) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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she must show that she was “shut out of court” as a result of the

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defendants’ conduct.

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Christopher

A plaintiff “cannot merely

Delew, 143 F.3d at 1222 (quoting Swekel,
Rather,

Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415.

Even if plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient to

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establish that defendants had conspired to cover up Sloan’s

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misconduct, (see Compl. ¶ 20), she has not alleged that

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“defendants’ alleged cover-up caused h[er] to lose or

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inadequately settle h[er] prior meritorious action.”

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City of Los Angeles, 286 Fed. App’x 977, 978 (9th Cir. 2008).

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fact, aside from her bare allegation that defendants’ conduct

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“significantly impaired” her ability to seek legal redress for

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her injuries, (Compl. ¶ 21), plaintiff has not alleged any facts
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Ejigu v.
In

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establishing that she is currently unable to litigate her state-

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law negligence claim.

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At this stage in the litigation, it is premature to

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determine whether defendants’ alleged cover-up will result in the

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defeat of her negligence claim.

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fate of that claim, the court will instead dismiss plaintiff’s §

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1983 claim without prejudice.

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(holding that when a plaintiff alleges a cognizable but unripe

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access-to-courts claim, the proper course of action is to dismiss

Instead of speculating upon the

See Delew, 143 F.3d at 1223

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without prejudice).

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claim in state court prove unsuccessful, she is free to file a

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new access-to-courts claim in either state or federal court.1

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C.

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If plaintiff’s efforts to litigate that

Supplemental Jurisdiction
28 U.S.C. § 1367 authorizes federal courts to exercise

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supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims that are

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sufficiently related to those claims over which they have

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original jurisdiction.

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of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).

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decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . .

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if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which

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it has original jurisdiction.”

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); United Mine Workers
A district court “may

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see also

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Because an access-to-courts claim does not accrue until
the entry of judgment in the underlying claim, the statute of
limitations will not run on that claim until after plaintiff has
had the opportunity to pursue her negligence claim in Idaho state
court. See Morales v. City of Los Angeles, 214 F.3d 1151, 1154
(9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the plaintiffs’ access-to-courts
claim “accrued when the alleged police misconduct resulted in
judgments being entered against them”). The court’s dismissal of
this claim will therefore not prejudice plaintiff from bringing
an access-to-courts claim if and when it ripens.
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Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997)

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(“[A] federal district court with power to hear state law claims

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has discretion to keep, or decline to keep, them under the

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conditions set out in § 1367(c).”).

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Factors courts consider in deciding whether to dismiss

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supplemental state-law claims include judicial economy,

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convenience, fairness, and comity.

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Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 172-73 (1997).

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case in which federal law claims are eliminated before trial, the

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balance of factors . . . will point toward declining to exercise

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jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.”

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County of San Diego, 84 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 1996),

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overruled on other grounds by Acri, 114 F.3d at 1000.

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City of Chicago v. Int’l
“[I]n the usual

Reynolds v.

Because the court will dismiss plaintiff’s §§ 1983 and

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1985 claims, only her state-law negligence claim remains.

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Plaintiff does not identify any extraordinary or unusual

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circumstances suggesting that the court should retain

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jurisdiction over her state-law claim in the absence of any

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federal claim.

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essentially assert that she was deprived of her ability to seek

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relief available under state law, comity principles suggest that

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the state courts of Idaho should be allowed to hear her

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negligence claim in the first instance.

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1223.

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jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state-law negligence claim pursuant

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to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

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III. Motion to Intervene

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And because plaintiff’s federal-law claims

Cf. Delew, 143 F.3d at

The court therefore declines to exercise supplemental

Since ISP has moved to intervene for the limited
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purpose of joining in defendants’ motion to dismiss and opposing

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plaintiff’s motion to amend, the court must resolve that motion

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prior to determining whether amendment is proper.

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provides that, on a timely motion, the court may permit anyone to

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intervene who “has a claim or defense that shares with the main

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action a common question of law or fact.”

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24(b)(1)(B); see Perry v. Proposition 8 Official Proponents, 587

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F.3d 947, 955 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

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requires the court to consider whether intervention will unduly

Rule 24(b)

Fed. R. Civ. P.

Rule 24(b)

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delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties’

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rights.

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other factors in the exercise of its discretion, including ‘the

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nature and extent of the intervenors’ interest and ‘whether the

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intervenors’ interests are adequately represented by other

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parties.’”

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City Bd. of Educ., 552 F.3d 1326, 1329 (9th Cir. 1977)).

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3).

“The court may also consider

Perry, 587 F.3d at 955 (quoting Spangler v. Pasadena

Here, plaintiff alleges that defendants conspired with

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ISP and its officers to cover up and manipulate the investigation

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of Sloan’s wrongdoing; as a result, any defense that ISP might

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allege shares common questions of fact with those defendants

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assert and thereby satisfies Rule 24(b).

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ISP seeks to intervene for the limited purpose of supporting

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dismissal and opposing amendment, has already submitted briefs on

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these issues, and has already been heard at the hearing, there is

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little risk that its involvement in the case will further delay

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the proceedings or prejudice plaintiff.

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will grant ISP’s motion to intervene for the limited purpose of

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supporting dismissal and opposing amendment.
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Additionally, because

Accordingly, the court

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IV.

Motion to Amend
Plaintiff seeks leave to amend and has filed a proposed

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amended complaint (“PAC”).

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asserts five causes of action: (1) a state-law negligence claim;

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(2) a § 1985 claim; (3) a § 1983 claim alleging that defendants’

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cover-up denied plaintiff the right to access the courts; (4) a §

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1983 claim alleging that defendants’ conduct denied plaintiff

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substantive due process by terminating her relationship with her

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father; and (5) a § 1983 claim alleging that defendants denied

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plaintiff equal protection of the laws by interfering with the

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prosecution of Sloan.

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join ISP and four ISP officers as defendants.

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(Id.)

(Docket No. 31-1.)

That complaint

In addition, plaintiff seeks to
(Id.)

A motion to amend is generally subject to Rule 15(a),

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which provides that “[t]he court should freely give leave [to

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amend] when justice so requires.”

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“However, once a scheduling order has been entered pursuant to

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Rule 16(b), the more restrictive provisions of that subsection

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requiring a showing of ‘good cause’ for failing to amend prior to

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the deadline in that order apply.”

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Highway Dist., 233 F.R.D. 670, 672 (D. Idaho 2006) (Winmill, J.);

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accord Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609

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(9th Cir. 1992).

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which focuses on the bad faith of the party seeking an amendment

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and the prejudice to the opposing party, the ‘good cause’

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standard set forth in Rule 16 primarily focuses on the diligence

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of the party requesting the amendment.”

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Supp. 2d 1125, 1138 (D. Idaho. 2013) (Winmill, J.) (citing

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Johnson, 975 F.2d at 607).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).

Robinson v. Twin Falls

“Unlike Rule 15(a)’s liberal amendment policy,

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Sadid v. Vailas, 943 F.

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Here, plaintiff has not made the required showing of

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diligence.

On February 18, 2014, plaintiff filed a Notice of

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Tort Claim against ISP and four ISP officers alleging that those

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officers were involved in a conspiracy to cover up Sloan’s

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misconduct.

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notice, plaintiff indicated that she learned of the identity of

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those ISP officers on October 31, 2013.

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issued its scheduling order on February 28, 2014, indicating that

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the parties would have until April 14, 2014 to amend their

(See Hall Aff. Ex. C (Docket No. 39-1).)

The court then

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pleadings.

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to amend until July 1, 2014, nearly three months after that

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deadline had elapsed.

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evidently knew of the basis of any claims she might assert

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against ISP no later than February 18, 2014, her failure to do so

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before the deadline for amended pleadings shows that she was not

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diligent.

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forming the basis for the proposed amendment prior to the

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deadline for amending precludes a finding of due diligence.”)

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(Docket No. 20.)

(Id.)

In that

Yet plaintiff did not seek to leave

(Docket No. 31.)

Because plaintiff

See Robinson, 233 F.R.D. at 673 (“Knowing of the facts

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Plaintiff’s proposed amendments would also result in

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prejudice to ISP, which is an additional reason to deny leave to

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amend.

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required under Rule 16(b), it is an added consideration . . .

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.”); Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609 (noting that the “existence or

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degree of prejudice to the party opposing the modification might

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supply additional reasons to deny a motion” for leave to amend).

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In particular, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed ISP from this

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action on February 14, 2014; as a result, ISP has not conducted

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any discovery and has not anticipated having to defend this

See id. at 674 (“While a finding of prejudice is not

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action.

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to join ISP and its officers at this point, ISP would have

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approximately two months to produce an expert report and

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approximately five months to conduct discovery.

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20.)

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timetable at this point in the case would prejudice its defense

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of this case--particularly if the evidence has become stale or

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unavailable in the six months since plaintiff previously

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dismissed it from this action--and militates against granting

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(See Docket No. 18.)

If the court permitted plaintiff

(See Docket No.

Requiring ISP to complete discovery on an expedited

leave to amend.

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Although plaintiff’s counsel conceded at oral argument

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that plaintiff could not show good cause to modify the scheduling

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order under Rule 16, he nonetheless argued that plaintiff should

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be permitted to amend her complaint to cure those claims that she

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asserted in her initial complaint.2

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Circuit have repeatedly emphasized, it is generally appropriate

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to permit a plaintiff at least “one opportunity to amend, unless

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amendment would be futile.”

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670 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1135 (D. Idaho 2009) (Lodge, J.) (citing

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Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1108 (9th Cir.

As courts in the Ninth

In re Atlas Mining Co. Sec. Litig.,

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While Rule 16 does not expressly differentiate between
amendments to pleading upon a party’s motion and amendments to
pleading after dismissal, several courts have permitted limited
amendments to cure deficiencies in dismissed pleadings even when
these amendments otherwise would not have satisfied Rule 16’s
“good cause” requirement. See, e.g., Inge v. Rock Fin. Corp.,
281 F.3d 613, 626 (6th Cir. 2002); M.G. ex rel Goodwin v. County
of Contra Costa, Civ. No. 11-4853 WHA, 2013 WL 706801, at *2
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2013) (granting leave to amend complaint to
replace two Doe defendants with identified sheriff’s deputies,
even though the “[p]laintiff’s counsel admit[ted] that good cause
for the late amendment is absent”).
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2003)); see also Sonoma Cnty. Ass’n of Retired Emps. v. Sonoma

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County, 708 F.3d 1109, 1118 (9th Cir. 2013) (“As a general rule,

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dismissal without leave to amend is improper unless it is clear .

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. . that the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.”

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(citation, internal quotation marks, and alteration omitted)).

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However, this rule does not require the court to permit

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plaintiffs to assert new claims or join new parties.

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Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th

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Cir. 1990) (holding that denial of leave to include new claims

See, e.g.,

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was appropriate because the “new claims set forth in the amended

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complaint would have greatly altered the nature of the

12

litigation”); Stearns v. Select Comfort Retail Corp., 763 F.

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Supp. 2d 1128, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (granting leave to amend

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after dismissal but requiring plaintiffs to seek leave to add new

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claims).

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As plaintiff acknowledged at oral argument, her efforts

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to amend her § 1985 claim are futile: that statute requires a

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showing of some racial or other class-based animus, see RK

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Ventures, 307 F.3d at 1056, and plaintiff has not alleged--and

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appears unable to allege--that any cover-up was motivated by her

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membership in a protected class.

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oral argument that she had not alleged that any purported

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conspiracy was so motivated.

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claim with prejudice and without leave to amend.

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Plaintiff’s counsel conceded at

The court therefore dismisses this

Likewise, plaintiff’s efforts to amend her access-to-

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courts claim are futile.

While her proposed amended complaint

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adds considerable detail to her allegations of a cover-up, those

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new facts do not resolve the central flaw with her claim: she has
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not alleged that defendants’ actions have resulted in the defeat

2

of her state-law negligence claim and cannot do so until that

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claim reaches judgment.

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plaintiff leave to amend that claim would not cure this defect

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and is therefore futile.

6

Reno, 926 F. Supp. 1415, 1425 (S.D. Cal. 1995) (denying leave to

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amend claims challenging constitutionality of criminal statute

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when plaintiffs conceded that they were not currently facing

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prosecution under that statute).

10

See Delew, 143 F.3d at 1223.

Granting

See San Diego Cnty. Gun Rights Comm. v.

Plaintiff also seeks leave to assert a new equal

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protection claim in which she alleges that defendants denied her

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equal protection of the laws by interfering with Sloan’s

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prosecution.

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emphasized, a claim of this nature is unavailing because “a

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private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the

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prosecution or nonprosecution of another.”

17

D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973).

18

this claim appears nowhere in plaintiff’s initial Complaint, and

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the court need not permit her to assert it now.

20

F.2d at 1079.

21

(See PAC ¶ 25.)

But as the Supreme Court has

Linda R.S. v. Richard

And even if it were not futile,

See Rose, 893

Finally, plaintiff seeks leave to assert a substantive

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due process claim alleging that defendants’ misconduct terminated

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her relationship with her father and thereby denied her of a

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constitutionally protected liberty interest.

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Compl. ¶ 20.)

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allowed to amend her complaint to include this claim, in large

27

part because they disagree about whether plaintiff attempted to

28

assert a due process claim in her initial Complaint.

(See PAC ¶ 26;

The parties dispute whether plaintiff should be

13

Both sides

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agree that this dispute turns upon how the court construes

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paragraph 20 of the Complaint, which reads:

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10
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On information and belief, the defendants, and each of
them or some of them, during ISP’s investigation of
the misconduct of defendant Sloan as alleged above,
conspired and attempted to, and did, cover up such
misconduct and/or unduly influence the investigation,
evidence, and witnesses accordingly, in order to
shield defendants Sloan, Huff, and Payette County from
liability and responsibility for their aforesaid
misconduct, thereby depriving Plaintiffs of their
constitutional right to due process and access to the
courts, pursuant to official policies, practices, and
customs of ISP and the Payette County Sheriff’s
department, in violation of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution and 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.
(Compl. ¶ 20 (emphasis added).)

12

This paragraph is not a model of clarity, and it leaves

13

open the question of whether plaintiff’s allegations that she was

14

denied due process are a freestanding claim or merely part of her

15

access-to-courts claim.

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vigorously argued that plaintiff intended to assert a separate

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due process claim alleging that Sloan’s reckless or intentional

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conduct deprived plaintiff of a constitutionally protected

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interest.

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her father’s car while driving 115 miles an hour, the court

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cannot conclude that this claim would be futile.

22

County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845-55 (1998)

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(describing standards applicable to substantive due process

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claims).

25

At oral argument, plaintiff’s counsel

In light of her allegation that Sloan collided with

See generally

In short, while plaintiff has not shown good cause to

26

amend her complaint under Rule 16, the court may nonetheless

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permit plaintiff to cure deficiencies in her initial Complaint

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notwithstanding her lack of diligence.
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See Inge, 281 F.3d at

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626; M.G., 2013 WL 706801, at *2.

2

permit plaintiff to amend her complaint to re-assert one or both

3

of two claims: (1) a state-law negligence claim; and (2) a claim

4

that defendants’ conduct deprived her of substantive due process.

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The court will not permit plaintiff to plead any other claim or

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to join any additional defendant, including ISP or any of its

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officers.

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V.

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Accordingly, the court will

Motion to Stay
Defendants have moved to stay discovery pending the

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resolution of their motion to dismiss.

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have now been resolved by this Order.

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more motions in response to plaintiff’s amended complaint, but

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the court sees no value in staying discovery any further.

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district court “has broad discovery to stay discovery in a case

15

while a dispositive motion is pending.”

16

v. St. Louis Univ., 198 F.R.D. 670, 672 (S.D. Cal. 2001) (citing

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Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280 (9th

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Cir. 1977)).

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because they “may interfere with judicial efficiency and cause

20

unnecessary litigation in the future.”

21

Herakles, LLC, Civ. No. 2:07-393 MCE KJM, 2007 WL 2288299, at *2

22

(E.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2007).

23

discovery stay bears a “heavy burden” and must make a “strong

24

showing” in favor of a discovery stay.

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City of Los Angeles, 163 F.R.D. 598, 600 (C.D. Cal. 1995)

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(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

27
28

Their motions to dismiss
Admittedly there may be

A

Orchid Biosciences, Inc.

However, discovery stays are typically disfavored

Qwest Commc’ns Corp. v.

As a result, a party seeking a

Skellerup Indus. Ltd. v.

Defendants represent that “[t]his [m]otion is made to
save time and expense should the [c]ourt determine that there are
15

1

no viable allegations sufficient to create federal court

2

jurisdiction.”

3

pendency of a motion to dismiss alone is not enough to merit a

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discovery stay.

5

v. First Winthrop Corp., 133 F.R.D. 39, 40 (N.D. Cal. 1990).

6

do defendants explain how a discovery stay will save time and

7

expense; on the contrary, it appears that a discovery stay will

8

simply prolong these proceedings by forcing the parties to wait

9

until the resolution of an additional motion to dismiss to begin

(Docket No. 28.)

As a general rule, however, the

See, e.g., Skellerup, 163 F.R.D. at 600-01; Gray
Nor

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discovery.

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that a discovery stay is warranted, Skellerup, 163 F.3d at 600,

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and the court will deny its motion for a discovery stay.

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Defendants have therefore not made a “strong showing”

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion to

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dismiss be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED.

Plaintiff’s claim

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under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

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claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and her state-law claim for

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negligence are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Plaintiff’s

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

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(1) the Idaho State Police’s motion to intervene be,

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21

and the same hereby is, GRANTED;
(2) plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend be, and the

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same hereby is, is GRANTED IN PART on the terms set forth in this

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Order; and

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(3) defendants’ motion for a discovery stay be, and the
same hereby is, DENIED.
Plaintiff has twenty days from the date this Order is

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signed to file an amended Complaint, if she can do so consistent

28

with this Order.
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Dated:

August 25, 2014

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