Saetrum v. Ada County Sheriff's Office et al

Filing 245

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL - IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs Motion for New Trial (Docket No. 236 ) be, and the same hereby is, DENIED. Signed by Judge William B. Shubb. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (cjs)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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DISTRICT OF IDAHO

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----oo0oo----

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ADAM TODD SAETRUM,
Plaintiff,

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CIV. NO. 1:13-425 WBS
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION
FOR NEW TRIAL

v.
ADA COUNTY SHERIFF GARY
RANEY, in his individual
capacity, DEPUTY ADA COUNTY
SHERIFF JAKE VOGT, in his
individual capacity, DEPUTY
ADA COUNTY SHERIFF TYLER
STENGER, in his individual
capacity, ADA COUNTY
DETECTIVE KEVIN LOUWSMA, in
his individual capacity, and
DEPUTY ADA COUNTY SHERIFF
STEVE ROBINSON, in his
individual capacity,
Defendants.

----oo0oo----

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This excessive force case concerns plaintiff Adam Todd

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Saetrum’s claims against defendant Deputy Ada County Sheriff Jake

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Vogt based on defendant’s alleged striking of plaintiff with his

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patrol car during an arrest.

After a six-day trial, a jury found
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that defendant did not strike plaintiff with his patrol car, and

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the court entered judgment for defendant.1

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for a new trial.

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I.

Plaintiff now moves

(Docket No. 236.)

Legal Standard

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Pursuant to Rule 59, a “court may, on motion, grant a

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new trial . . . after a jury trial, for any reason for which a

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new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in

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federal court.”

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substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict, a trial court

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may grant a new trial if ‘the verdict is contrary to the clear

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weight of the evidence, or is based upon evidence which is false,

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or to prevent, in the sound discretion of the trial court, a

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miscarriage of justice.’”

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Desert Hot Springs, 251 F.3d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting

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United States v. 4.0 Acres of Land, 175 F.3d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir.

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1999)).

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A).

“[E]ven if

Silver Sage Partners, Ltd. v. City of

However, in ruling on a motion for new trial a court

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“must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does

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not affect the substantial rights of the parties.”

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P. 61.

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rights where it is clear that a purported error did not affect

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the outcome of trial.

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Lines, Inc., 525 F.2d 927, 929-30 (5th Cir. 1976).

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II.

Fed. R. Civ.

An error generally does not affect a party’s substantial

See, e.g., Conway v. Chem. Leaman Tank

Discussion

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Defendant complains of various rulings the court made

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Because the jury found that defendant did not strike
plaintiff with his patrol car, it did not address whether
defendant acted intentionally. (Docket No. 222.)
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at and before trial on the admissibility of evidence.

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the reasons the court made clear at the time of its rulings, the

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court is satisfied that those rulings were correct.

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court is equally satisfied that even if the case were to be re-

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tried with all of the excluded evidence allowed, it is highly

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unlikely that the outcome on retrial would be any different.

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those reasons, the motion will be denied.

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First, for

Second, the

For

After this court denied defendant’s motion for summary

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judgment, defendant took an interlocutory appeal to the Ninth

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Circuit, and in a memorandum disposition, the Court of Appeals

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affirmed in part and reversed in part, effectively splitting

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plaintiff’s cause of action into two parts, which they termed the

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“patrol car claim” and the “take-down claim.”

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673 F. App’x 688 (9th Cir. 2016).

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the denial of the motion for summary judgment on the patrol car

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claim, thus allowing the case to proceed to trial on the issue of

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whether defendant intentionally drove his patrol car into

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plaintiff.

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on the take-down claim on the grounds of qualified immunity.2

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Saetrum v. Vogt,

The Court of Appeals affirmed

But the court reversed the denial of summary judgment

The Ninth Circuit’s decision thus placed this court in

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the difficult position of assuring that the jury did not award

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damages for any injuries sustained as a result of the take-down.

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Plaintiff claimed, and defendant disputed, that he suffered a

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concussion.

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being struck by the patrol car, but always claimed it was a

Plaintiff never claimed that it was a result of

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The take-down claim refers to plaintiff’s allegation
that after defendant got out of his patrol car, he threw
plaintiff to the ground, causing various injuries.
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result of the take-down.

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that the only way to effectively implement the Ninth Circuit’s

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decision was to exclude evidence of the take-down and the alleged

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concussion altogether.

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that its ruling was correct and consistent with Rule 403 of the

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Federal Rules of Evidence.

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The court determined prior to trial

The court continues to believe strongly

If plaintiff had been permitted to talk about his

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alleged concussion and call other witnesses to express their

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opinions about it, defendant would have been permitted to present

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its evidence that plaintiff never manifested any signs or

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symptoms of a concussion.

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time and diverted attention from the real issues in the case.

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Worse, it would have made the jury wonder how plaintiff got the

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concussion, and thus opened the door to evidence of the take-

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down.

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That would have unnecessarily consumed

Most importantly, allowing evidence of the concussion

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would have made no difference in the verdict.

The jury

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specifically found that defendant did not strike plaintiff with

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his patrol car.

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whether plaintiff later sustained a concussion or not could have

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affected that finding.

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AstenJohnson, Inc., 740 F.3d 457, 466 (9th Cir. 2014) (erroneous

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admission or exclusion of evidence is reviewed for harmless error

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“by asking if . . . the evidence affected the outcome of trial”)

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(citations omitted); Richins v. Deere & Co., 231 F.R.D. 623, 626

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(D.N.M. 2004) (exclusion of evidence did not warrant new trial

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because movants had not shown that exclusion of the evidence was

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prejudicial or that admitting the evidence would have led to a

The court cannot conceive of how the question of

See, e.g., Estate of Barabin v.

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different result).
Plaintiff also complains that the court excluded

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evidence of an alleged abdominal injury.

He notes that he

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alleged an abdominal injury as a result of being struck by the

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patrol car in his Fourth Amended Complaint (see Docket No. 115 at

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¶¶ XXVI, LIV-LV, LXII), and that he never formally withdrew this

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allegation.

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injury in his Ninth Circuit briefs, and more importantly,

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plaintiff’s counsel expressly agreed with the Ninth Circuit panel

However, plaintiff did not discuss an abdominal

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at oral argument that if qualified immunity applied to

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plaintiff’s head injury, the only remaining issue would be his

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patrol car claim and the possible knee injury.

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Counsel did not simply misspeak at the Ninth Circuit.

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Plaintiff’s counsel represented to this court during multiple

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status conferences after the appeal that the only injury at issue

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was plaintiff’s knee injury, and plaintiff’s Supplemental

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Pretrial Statement Re: Damages (Docket No. 170) made no mention

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of an abdominal injury, referring only to his knee injury.

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on these representations, both the court and defendant prepared

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for a trial where no other injuries were at issue.

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these circumstances, plaintiff waived his claim of an abdominal

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injury as a result of being struck by defendant’s patrol car.

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Moreover, because the jury found no liability, any error in

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excluding evidence of injuries was harmless.

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Based

Under all

Plaintiff also complains that he was not allowed to

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cross examine Scott Haug, an expert witness called by defendant.

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That witness was withdrawn before he gave any relevant testimony,

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and plaintiff’s counsel waived cross examination.
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If plaintiff’s

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counsel had told the court he wanted to ask Haug any questions,

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the court might have allowed it.

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asked Haug could not have conceivably had any effect on the

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jury’s determination that defendant did not strike plaintiff with

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his car.

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However, anything he could have

Another trial ruling about which plaintiff complains in

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this Motion is the court’s admission of a recording of

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plaintiff’s conversation with a police officer during a prior

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drug transaction.

The court made clear its reasons for admitting

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the recording.

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“dropping off” drugs for his friend, the recording was properly

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admitted for impeachment because it contradicts plaintiff’s

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statement by showing that he was involved with another drug

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transaction.

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of plaintiff’s credibility as a witness, and the court did not

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err in admitting it.

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recording was harmless because it would not have affected the

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jury’s verdict given plaintiff’s lack of credibility and

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defendant’s highly credible testimony, as discussed above.

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Estate of Barabin, 740 F.3d at 466.

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Given plaintiff’s testimony that he was just

In other words, the recording was highly probative

Moreover, any error in admitting the

See

Finally, plaintiff complains that the court improperly

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instructed the jury that plaintiff had to establish that

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defendant acted intentionally in seizing the plaintiff.

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instruction, which followed the Ninth Circuit’s pattern

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instruction, was a correct statement of the law.

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why plaintiff’s attorney himself proposed the instruction before

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trial (see Docket No. 185 (Pl.’s Requested Instr. No. 25)), and

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then agreed during trial that it was a correct statement of the
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The

Perhaps that is

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law.

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A Fourth Amendment seizure only occurs when “there is a

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governmental termination of freedom of movement through means

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intentionally applied,” and not when, for example, a “pursuing

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police car sought to stop the suspect only by the show of

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authority represented by flashing lights and continuing pursuit,

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but accidentally stopped the suspect by crashing into him.”

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County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 844 (1998) (emphasis

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in original) (citation omitted).

See

Contrary to plaintiff’s

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contention, nothing in County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S.

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Ct. 1539 (2017), or any other case, for that matter, obviates the

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requirement that a plaintiff show that the defendant acted

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intentionally in a Section 1983 unreasonable seizure case.

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Additionally, of course, because the jury expressly found

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defendant did not strike plaintiff with his vehicle at all, any

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error in instructing whether it had to be intentional would be

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harmless.

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff’s Motion for New

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Trial (Docket No. 236) be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.

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Dated:

October 11, 2017

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