Saetrum v. Ada County Sheriff's Office et al

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: Motion for a More Definite Statement. The motion for a more definite statement (Docket No. 4 ) is DENIED. Signed by Judge William B. Shubb. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (jp)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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DISTRICT OF IDAHO

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----oo0oo----

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ADAM TODD SAETRUM,
Plaintiff,

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CIV. NO. 1:13-425 WBS
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION
FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT

v.
The ADA COUNTY SHERIFF’S
OFFICE; ADA COUNTY SHERIFF
GARY RANEY; DEPUTY JAKE VOGT,
Deputy Sheriff; and JOHN and
JANE DOES, deputies and
employees of the ADA COUNTY
SHERIFF’S OFFICE,
Defendants.

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----oo0oo----

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Plaintiff filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

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based on alleged excessive force and inadequate medical care

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during his arrest and detention on February 26, 2013.

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to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e), defendant Jake Vogt now

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moves for a more definite statement.

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that the Court require plaintiff to indicate whether plaintiff is

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suing him in his official or individual capacity.
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Pursuant

Specifically, he requests

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Rule 12(e) provides that “[a] party may move for a more

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definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading

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is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party

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cannot reasonably prepare a response.”

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“[M]otions for a more definite statement are disfavored, and

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ordinarily restricted to situations where a pleading suffers from

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unintelligibility rather than want of detail.”

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Cnty. Sheriff’s Officer, 921 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1013 (E.D. Cal.

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2013).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e).

Medrano v. Kern

A motion for a more definite statement should generally

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be denied “if the complaint is specific enough to notify

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defendant of the substance of the claim being asserted” or “if

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the detail sought by a motion for a more definite statement is

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obtainable through the discovery process.”

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Craigslist, Inc. v. Autoposterpro, Inc., Civ. No. 08-05069 SBA,

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2009 WL 890896, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2009).

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Id.; accord

Although unnecessary confusion frequently arises when a

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complaint fails to allege whether a defendant is sued in his

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individual capacity, official capacity, or both capacities,

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determining the appropriate capacity from the allegations in the

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complaint is neither impossible nor difficult.

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a plaintiff seeks damages from an official, the suit is generally

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against the official in his individual capacity; and if the

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plaintiff seeks an injunction, the suit is generally against the

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official in his official capacity.

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824, 828 (1990); Biggs v. Meadows, 66 F.3d 56, 61 (4th Cir.

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1995).

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have rejected the argument that a plaintiff is required to state

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the capacity in which a defendant is sued.

Simply stated, if

See Price v. Akaka, 928 F.2d

Because of this distinction, a majority of the circuits

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Biggs, 66 F.3d at 59.

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Instead, the majority approach “look[s] to the substance of the

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plaintiff’s claim, the relief sought, and the course of

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proceedings to determine the nature of a § 1983 suit when a

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plaintiff fails to allege capacity.”

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Second, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh circuits).

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Here, there is no doubt from the Complaint that the

Id. (citing cases from the

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only claims asserted against Vogt are for violations of

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plaintiff’s constitutional rights under § 1983, and plaintiff’s

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prayer for relief is also limited to seeking compensatory

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damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs.

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against Vogt are therefore clearly asserted against him in his

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individual capacity.1

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Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Vogt’s motion for a more

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definite statement (Docket No. 4) be, and the same hereby is,

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DENIED.

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Dated:

January 14, 2014

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In response to Vogt’s motion, plaintiff purports to
settle the issue by stating that Vogt was sued in his
“professional capacity” and pointing out that the Complaint
alleges Vogt was “acting under color of state law.” (Pl.’s Resp.
at 2 (Docket No. 6).) Plaintiff thus appears to “confuse[] the
capacity in which a defendant is sued with the capacity in which
the defendant was acting when the alleged deprivation of rights
occurred.” Price, 928 F.2d at 828. As the Ninth Circuit has
explained, “[t]he former need not coincide with the latter.
Clearly, under § 1983, a plaintiff may sue a state officer in his
individual capacity for alleged wrongs committed by the officer
in his official capacity.” Id. As noted above, it is the nature
of the relief sought, not the capacity in which the defendant was
acting, that dictates the capacity in which a defendant is sued
under § 1983.
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