Jackson v. Canyon County et al

Filing 48

MEMORANDUM DECISION ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that 1. Defendant Canyon Countys Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 37 ) is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part, as follows: a. Plaintiffs ADA claim is not dismissed. In this respect, Defendant s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. b. Plaintiffs wrongful termination in violation of public policy claim is dismissed. In this respect, Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 2. Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Docket No. 38 ) is DENIED. Signed by Judge Ronald E. Bush. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (cjs)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF IDAHO

KYLE JACKSON, an individual

Case No.: 1:13-cv-503-REB

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER RE:

vs.
CANYON COUNTY, a governmental entity, and
its governmental sub-unit, the CANYON COUNTY
SHERIFF’S OFFICE,
Defendant.

DEFENDANT CANYON COUNTY’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
(Docket No. 37)
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(Docket No. 38)

Now pending before the Court are (1) Defendant Canyon County’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Docket No. 37), and (2) Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Docket
No. 38). Having carefully considered the record, participated in oral argument, and otherwise
being fully advised, the Court enters the following Memorandum Decision and Order:
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Kyle Jackson (“Jackson”) is a former detention deputy with Defendant Canyon
County Sheriff’s Office. This case stems from Defendant’s firing of Jackson on September 4,
2012. In response to his discharge, Jackson brings this action, asserting two causes of action: (1)
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA), and (2) wrongful termination in
violation of public policy. Defendant now moves for summary judgment, arguing that (1)
Jackson’s ADA claim must be dismissed because he was not a qualified individual who could

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1

perform the essential functions of his position as a detention deputy, with or without reasonable
accommodation; and (2) Jackson’s wrongful termination claim must be dismissed because there
is no causal connection between his worker’s compensation claim and his termination (in
addition to the argument that Jackson could not perform the essential functions of his position as
detention deputy, with or without reasonable accommodation). Jackson naturally disagrees, and
moves for partial summary judgment himself, arguing that Defendant’s “100 percent healed
policy” violates the ADA as a matter of law.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate where a party can show that, as to any claim or
defense, “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). One of the principal purposes of summary
judgment “is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims . . . .” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-34 (1986). It is “not a disfavored procedural shortcut,” but is instead
the “principal tool[ ] by which factually insufficient claims or defenses [can] be isolated and
prevented from going to trial with the attendant unwarranted consumption of public and private
resources.” Id. at 327. “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the
parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). There must be a genuine dispute
as to any material fact – a fact “that may affect the outcome of the case.” Id. at 248.
The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and
the Court must not make credibility findings. Id. at 255. Direct testimony of the non-movant

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2

must be believed, however implausible. Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir.
1999). On the other hand, the Court is not required to adopt unreasonable inferences from
circumstantial evidence. See McLaughlin v. Liu, 849 F.2d 1205, 1208 (9th Cir. 1988).
When parties submit cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court must consider each
party’s evidence, regardless under which motion the evidence is issued. See Las Vegas Sands,
LLC v. Nehme, 632 F.3d 526, 532 (9th Cir. 2011). The Court must independently search the
record for factual disputes. See Fair Hous. Council of Riverside Cnty., Inc. v. Riverside Two,
249 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001). The filing of cross-motions for summary judgment – where
both parties essentially assert that there are no material factual disputes – does not vitiate the
Court’s responsibility to determine whether disputes as to material fact are present. See id.1
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine
dispute as to a material fact. See Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (en
banc). To carry this burden, the moving party need not introduce any affirmative evidence (such
as affidavits or deposition excerpts) but may simply point out the absence of evidence to support
the nonmoving party’s case. See Fairbank v. Wunderman Cato Johnson, 212 F.3d 528, 532 (9th
Cir. 2000). This then shifts the burden to the non-moving party to produce evidence sufficient to
support a jury verdict in his favor. See Devereaux, 263 F.3d at 1076. The non-moving party
must go beyond the pleadings and show “by her [ ] affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to
interrogatories, or admissions on file” that a genuine dispute of material fact exists. Celotex, 477
U.S. at 324.

1

While both parties here move for summary judgment, they each raise discrete issues.
Therefore, the at-issue motions do not represent typical dueling cross-motions for summary
judgment in the typical sense.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3

III. DISCUSSION
A.

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 37)
1.

Jackson’s ADA Claim

Title I of the ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating “against a qualified
individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Disability discrimination
claims typically proceed under the familiar McDonnell Douglas three-step, burden-shifting
framework – first, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie disability discrimination claim;
second, if the plaintiff does, the defendant must then articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its conduct; and, third, if the defendant does, the plaintiff must then demonstrate that
the articulated reason is pretext for discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973); see also Snead v. Metro Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1080, 1093
(9th Cir. 2001) (applying framework to ADA claims).
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment challenges the first element of the
McDonnell Douglas framework – that is, whether Jackson can establish a prima facie disability
discrimination claim. See generally Mem. in Supp. of MSJ, pp. 3-18 (Docket No. 37, Att. 2).
To establish a prima facie disability discrimination claim, Jackson must put forth evidence that
(1) he is “disabled”; (2) he is a “qualified individual”; and (3) he suffered an adverse
employment action “because of” his disability. See Hutton v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 273 F.3d
884, 891 (9th Cir. 2001). “At the summary judgment stage, the ‘requisite degree of proof
necessary to establish a prima facie case . . . is minimal and does not even need to rise to the

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4

level of a preponderance of the evidence.’” Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1112 (9th Cir.
2002) (quoting Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994)). Defendant’s Motion
for Summary Judgment takes aim at the second of these three elements, arguing that Jackson
cannot show that, at the time of his termination, he was qualified as a detention deputy.
The ADA defines a “qualified individual with a disability” as an “individual with a
disability who, ‘with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions
of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.’” Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 164 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)); see also 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(m). “To determine the essential functions of a position, a court may consider, but is not
limited to, evidence of the employer’s judgment of a position, written job descriptions prepared
before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, the work experience of past incumbents
of the job, and the work experience of current incumbents in similar jobs.” Basith v. Cook Cty.,
241 F.3d 919, 927 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)).2 Further, “[t]he function

2

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) provides:

(1) In general. The term essential functions means the fundamental job duties of the
employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires. The term
“essential functions” does not include the marginal functions of the position.
(2) A job function may be considered essential for any of several reasons, including
but not limited to the following:
(I) The function may be essential because the reason the position exists is to
perform that function;
(ii) The function may be essential because of the limited number of
employees available among whom the performance of that job function can
be distributed; and/or
(iii) The function may be highly specialized so that the incumbent in the
position is hired for his or her expertise or ability to perform the particular
function.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 5

may be essential because the reason the position exists is to perform that function.” 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(n)(2)(I). An employer has the burden to come forward with evidence of a job’s
essential functions, in part because “‘much of the information which determines those essential
functions lies uniquely with the employer.’” Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974,
991 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1113 (8th Cir.
1995)).
a.

The Essential Functions of a Detention Deputy

Defendants have put into evidence the essential functions of a detention deputy. For
example, the written job description (and confirmed by Jackson’s supervisors) outlines a
detention deputy’s essential functions, including:
•

“Sufficient personal mobility, flexibility, agility, reflexes, and physical
strength”;

(3) Evidence of whether a particular function is essential includes, but is not limited
to:
(I) The employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential;
(ii) Written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing
applicants for the job;
(iii) The amount of time spent on the job performing the function;
(iv) The consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the
function;
(v) The terms of a collective bargaining agreement;
(vi) The work experience of past incumbents in the job; and/or
(vii) the current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n).
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 6

•

“Stand[ing] and walk[ing] for long periods of time, lift[ing] up to 50 pounds,
respond[ing] physically to restrain inmates, and work[ing] in a detention
environment”;

•

Monitoring inmate activities to “ensure the safety and security of the
facility”;

•

Maintaining “facility security by patrolling the secure areas within and
around the detention center”;

•

Maintaining “facility security be seizing weapons, drugs, contraband, and
related items”;

•

Monitoring inmate behavior in a variety of activities and situations;

•

Transporting inmates;

•

“Deal[ing] verbally and/or physically with uncooperative, distraught, and
hostile inmates”;

•

“Recogniz[ing] and respond[ing] appropriately to unusual medical, physical,
or mental conditions of inmates”;

•

Performing cell searches and extractions;

•

Breaking up inmate fights; and

•

Properly use restraints and other mechanisms on violent or combative
subjects

Defs.’ SOF No. 2 (Docket No. 37, Att. 1); see also id. at No. 3 (Jackson agreeing pre-hiring that
he was “physically able to perform the duties and essential job functions,” which included
dealing with violence, breaking up fights/disturbances, conducting inmate body searches, and
transporting inmates alone). Defendants go on to point out the time necessary to perform these
alleged essential functions (carried out in three different work units: housing, booking, and
control) – noting that “the vast majority of the essential functions associated with the detention

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 7

deputy position are associated with the housing and booking units while only a small portion of
the essential functions are associated with the control unit.” See id. at Nos.4-5.3 In this setting,
Defendants finally note the risks associated with placing a detention deputy with a “substantial
history of knee instability and dislocations” in the more physically-demanding housing and
booking units (and, conversely, the burden on other staff if that detention deputy was restricted
only to the control unit). See id. at No. 26; see also Mem. in Supp. of MSJ, p. 7 (Docket No. 37,
Att. 2) (“In short, the detention center cannot be adequately and safely operated unless each
deputy can perform their duties in housing, booking, and control.”).
For his part, Jackson does not dispute the general duties of a detention deputy as
indicated in that position’s job description; instead, he questions whether such duties (or certain
of them) actually amount to a detention deputy’s essential functions, when keeping in mind the
work that he and other detention deputies historically performed. See Opp. to MSJ, pp. 5-6
(Docket No. 39) (“The time Jackson spent between the three different units, housing, booking,
and control, varied depending on the supervisor in charge that particular day. The
responsibilities differed by supervisor and was not a constant. Additionally, other deputies
performed varying levels of duties, such as not being able to walk stairs due to bad backs or
knees.”). Moreover, Jackson argues that, any burdens upon other staff in restricting a detention
deputy only to the control unit relate to whether a “reasonable accommodation” existed, not
whether work in other units amounted to an essential function. See id. at p. 6. In other words,
according to Jackson, either the duties identified by Defendants were not essential to being a

3

In this respect, Defendants note that, prior to August 7, 2009 (the date Jackson injured
his knee while an inmate was attempting suicide), Jackson spent at least 70% of his time
working in the housing and booking units, and approximately 30% of his time working in the
control unit. See Defs.’ SOF No. 4 (Docket No. 37, Att. 2).
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 8

detention deputy, or he had previously performed those essential functions with a reasonable
accommodation.
It is clear to the undersigned that a detention deputy must keep his or her finger on the
pulse of the detention center and, in doing so, is frequently placed in unpredictable, dangerous,
and physically-demanding circumstances which necessarily reflect the essential functions of the
detention deputy position. Still, delineating those essential functions as a matter of law for
purposes of this Memorandum Decision and Order is not required when – even if it is assumed
that a detention deputy’s essential functions are as Defendants describe – a question of fact exists
as to whether Jackson was able to perform them without or without a reasonable
accommodation.
b.

Jackson’s Ability to Perform the Essential Functions of a Detention
Deputy With or Without Reasonable Accommodation

The record establishes that, following his August 7, 2009 knee injury, Jackson
experienced difficulty performing certain aspects of his job as a detention deputy. And, it is
equally evident that, during this same time-frame, Defendants allowed Jackson to work more
sedentary, light-duty shifts in the control unit (as compared to the housing and booking units) as
Jackson attempted to recover from his injury. From this (and believing that Jackson’s condition
would never markedly improve after a re-injury and multiple unsuccessful medical procedures),
Defendants contend that “Jackson could not consistently perform the essential functions of his
position during the last three years of his employment.” Mem. in Supp. of MSJ, p. 9 (Docket
No. 37, Att. 2). Defendants’ position in this respect is understandable, to be sure; however, the
medical record is not so tidy as to justify as a matter of law their decision to terminate Jackson
under the ADA.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 9

Here, in an interesting (but still thorny) twist to things, Jackson filed a worker’s
compensation claim related to his August 7, 2009 injury. It was in this worker’s compensation
context that Jackson worked less at times and, when he did work, in light duty capacities. In that
worker’s compensation setting, Jackson’s doctors repeatedly confirmed that he was unable to
perform the essential functions of the detention deputy position. See Defs.’ SOF Nos. 6-10, 1418, 20-25, 28, 32-33 (Docket No. 37, Att. 1). This all changed in July 2012 when the State
Insurance Fund’s (“SIF”) orthopedist, Dr. Joseph Daines, conducted an independent medical
evaluation of Jackson’s right knee, and concluded in relevant part:
I feel that his objective examination dos not indicate severe instability in his
patellofemoral joint and I am not sure that medial reefing will benefit him. The
hallmark of treatment of patellofemoral joint problems is conservative and with
dedicated re-strengthening of especially the quad muscle but in reality, all muscles
that are involved in knee functioning. If he is left with residual symptoms that
preclude his return to certain forms of work, then he might have to be cautious in a
return to them. I am not sure that his job as a deputy sheriff in the jail would fall in
the category of work that he could not tolerate. I therefore believe that he can return
to full duty and this includes full duty as a detention deputy at the Canyon County
prison in Caldwell.
....
I do not feel that further surgery is indicated at this time. His clinical examination
is really negative for objective evidence of patellofemoral instability. His
apprehension test is completely negative. His patellofemoral joint seems to track in
the midline, his retinacular tissues are not overly tight or loose on either the medial
or lateral sides of his patellofemoral mechanism, and his knee was not reactive at the
time of my examination, with any evidence of chronic knee effusion, etc. I do not
feel he will benefit from medial reefing surgery to his right patellofemoral joint and
I am concerned that he has a tendency to form excessive scar after surgeries to his
right knee. I do feel that his best defense is a self-directed exercise program and
strengthening program and stretching program to the right knee, and I think if he
will do this religiously, he will probably improve his right knee functioning.
....
After he has completed a dedicated muscle re-strengthening program for his right
knee, I feel that he would be able to return to full duty work without restrictions.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 10

Ex. 1 to Jackson Dep., attached as Ex. A to Nelson Decl. (Docket No. 37, Att. 4) (emphasis
added).
Thus, as of August 2012 (the SIF received Dr. Daines’s report on August 15, 2012), the
medical record reveals, at the very least, a disagreement between medical providers/examiners
concerning Jackson’s abilities to perform the essential functions (whatever those might exactly
be (see supra)) of his job as a detention deputy.4
Whatever Jackson’s actual abilities were at that time is unknown;5 what is clear, though,
is that Dr. Daines’s report represents the finish line of Jackson’s worker’s compensation case.
See, e.g., Ex. C to Nelson Decl. (Docket No. 37, Att. 6) (8/15/12 record of phone call from SIF
to Lieutenant Daren Ward, informing latter that “IME physician’s opinion that [Jackson] can
return to full work activities”); see also Ex. I to Thomas Aff. (Docket No. 39, Att. 11) (8/16/12
letter from SIF to Jackson, informing latter that “Dr. Daines has . . . released you to return to
work without restrictions.”).6 In turn, because Defendants fired Jackson soon thereafter, it also
represents the beginning of what has now transformed into his ADA claim.
4

That there is no unequivocal release of Jackson back to full duties as a detention deputy
(even when coupled with Jackson’s medical history) is insufficient to compel a finding on
summary judgment that Jackson was incapable of performing the job’s essential functions when
he was terminated. To the contrary, Dr. Daines’ report, as equivocal as it may be, injects a
dispute of material fact on this lynchpin issue which, when construed in Jackson’s favor, auger
against summary judgment.
5

This becomes obvious when looking at the parties’ starkly contrasting arguments on
this point. Compare Mem. in Supp. of MSJ, p. 7 (Docket No. 37, Att. 2) (“Jackson was unable
to perform the essential functions of his position with or without reasonable accommodation.”),
with Opp. to MSJ, p. 8 (Docket No. 39) (“Contrary to Defendants’ claims, Jackson could
perform the essential job functions without accommodation.”).
6

It is true that Jackson disagreed with Dr. Daines and, even, was “not happy” with his
findings “at all.” See Ex. C to Nelson Decl. (Docket No. 37, Att. 6) (record of 8/20/12 telephone
call between SIF and Jackson). But this reaction is consistent with his rights under worker’s
compensation law and does not operate to overcome the import of Dr. Daines’s report when
considering whether to grant Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and dismiss Jackson’s
ADA claim.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 11

Notwithstanding the questions surrounding Jackson’s ability to perform the essential
functions of a detention deputy as of August 2012 (see supra), and assuming he could not, the
Court’s inquiry then asks whether a reasonable accommodation would have allowed Jackson to
perform those functions. To comply with the ADA, an employer must reasonably accommodate
the employee with a disability unless the employer can show that such an accommodation would
impose an undue hardship on the business. See Braunling v. Countrywide Home Loans Inc., 220
F.3d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir. 2000). “Employers must ‘engage in an interactive process with
employees in order to identify and implement appropriate reasonable accommodations.’”
Taysom v. Bannock Co., 2013 WL 3322296, *6 (D. Idaho 2013) (quoting Barnett v. U.S. Air,
Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1121 (9th Cir. 2000). “The obligation to engage in an interactive process in
inherent in the statutory obligation to offer a reasonable accommodation to an otherwise
qualified disabled employee.” Taysom, 2013 WL 3322296 at *6. “As explained in the EEOC’s
regulations, the interactive process ‘should identify the precise limitations resulting from the
disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations.’” Id.
(quoting Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1121) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). “Finding
the most appropriate accommodation is best achieved through an informal, flexible interactive
process involving both the employer and the employee with the disability.” Taysom, 2013 WL
3322296 at *6.
Engaging in the interactive process is mandatory. See Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1112. “[T]his
obligation is triggered either by the employee’s request for accommodation or by the employer’s
recognition of the need for accommodation.” Id. Employers must demonstrate that they acted in
good faith, and may do so by pointing to cooperative behavior that promotes the identification of
an appropriate accommodation. See id. at 1115. “If an employer fails to engage in the
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 12

interactive process in good faith, liability for the failure to provide reasonable accommodations
ensues when the employer bears responsibility for the breakdown.” Taysom, 2013 WL 3322296
at *7 (citing Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1115).
Here, Defendants’ arguments that they engaged in an interactive process to provide
Jackson with a reasonable accommodation largely focus on actions taking place while Jackson’s
worker’s compensation claim was open. See, e.g., Mem. in Supp. of MSJ, pp. 12-13 (Docket
No. 37, Att. 2); see also id. at pp. 13-18 (arguing that Defendants granted all of Jackson’s
reasonable accommodation requests during same time-frame). Even if true, and construing this
evidence in Jackson’s favor at this stage of the litigation, such actions were unrelated to an ADA
claim in that the record does not indisputably show that an interactive process followed the
issuance of Dr. Daines’s report, which, again, prompted the end to Jackson’s worker’s
compensation claim. Arguably, it was at that later point in time that an interactive process was
to take place under the ADA – one that, for example, would have presumably discussed the
exercise/strengthening/stretching programs that Dr. Daines recommended so that Jackson could
return to full duty as a detention deputy. See supra.
With all this in mind, issues of fact preclude the entry of summary judgment, dismissing
Jackson’s ADA claim. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is denied in this respect.
2.

Jackson’s Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy Claim

Generally, at-will employees may be terminated “at any time for any reason without
creating liability.” Edmonson v. Shearer Lumber Prods., 75 P.3d 733, 737 (Idaho 2003).
Nevertheless, if an employer fires an at-will employee for reasons that contravene public policy,
the employer may be liable. See Bollinger v. Fall River Rural Elec. Co-op, Inc., 272 P.3d 1263,
1271 (Idaho 2012). The Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that this public policy
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 13

exception must be narrowly construed; otherwise it could swallow the rule. See Venable v.
Internet Auto Rent & Sales, Inc., 329 P.3d 356, 361 (Idaho 2014). As Idaho courts explain,
“many activities and interests engaged in by employees benefit the community,” but “not all of
them are recognized as falling within the public policy exception.” McKay v. Ireland Bank, 59
P.3d 990, 994 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002); see also Crea v. FMC Corp., 16 P.3d 272, 275 (2000) (this
narrow exception exists in order to “balance the competing interests of society, the employer,
and the employee in light of modern business experience.”).
Terminating an at-will employee contravenes public policy only if the “employee is
terminated for engaging in some protected activity, which includes (1) refusing to commit an
unlawful act, (2) performing an important public obligation, or (3) exercising certain legal rights
or privileges. Id. Therefore, to bring a successful claim under the public policy exception, an
employee must (1) show that he was engaged in legally protected activity; and (2) that there is a
causal relationship between his engagement in the protected activity and his termination. See
Bollinger, 272 P.3d at 1271. Deciding if a public policy is sufficient to protect an at-will
employee from termination is a question of law. See Van v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., 212 P.3d 982,
991 (Idaho 2009).
Here, Jackson alleges that “Defendant[s] fired [him] from his employment because he
filed for worker’s compensation benefits” and that “Defendant[s] termination of [his]
employment and other adverse actions taken against [him] were the legal cause of [his]
damages.” Compl., ¶¶ 31 & 33 (Docket No. 1). Filing a worker’s compensation claim is a
protected activity for the purposes of bringing a wrongful termination claim. See Harris v.
Treasure Canyon Calcium Co., 132 F. Supp.3d 1228 (D. Idaho 2015) (identifying cases holding

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 14

that filing worker’s compensation claim represents protected activity). Even so, the causal
connection between Plaintiff filing a worker’s compensation claim and his termination is too
attenuated to support such a claim.
It can be argued that Jackson’s termination related generally to his worker’s
compensation claim – after all, he was fired after his worker’s compensation claim was closed
following Dr. Daines’s report suggesting that Plaintiff could return to full duty as a detention
deputy. See supra. However, it cannot be said that Jackson was fired because he (or someone
on his behalf) filed a worker’s compensation claim – exactly what Jackson alleges in his
Complaint. See supra. Three years transpired between these two events. Unfortunately for
Jackson, to establish a prima facie case of wrongful termination in violation of public policy, the
temporal proximity between an employer’s knowledge of protected activity and an adverse
employment action ‘must be very close.’” Harris, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 1242 (“Aside from the sixmonth gap between the filing of her worker’s compensation claim and her termination, Harris
has not put forth any additional, reliable evidence that the two were causally connected. And,
per established case law, a six-month gap by itself suggests no causality at all.”) (quoting Clark
Cnty. School Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273-74 (2001) (20-month gap between alleged
protected activity and adverse action suggested “by itself, no causality at all.”)) (citing Hughes v.
Derwinski, 967 F.2d 1168, 1174-75 (7th Cir. 1992) (four-month period insufficient)).
Because a rational trier of fact could not reasonably conclude that a causal connection
exists between the filing of Jackson’s worker’s compensation claim and his termination, his
wrongful termination in violation of public must be dismissed. Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment is granted in this respect.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 15

B.

Jackson’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Docket No. 38)
Jackson himself moves for summary judgment on his ADA claim, arguing that

Defendants maintained a “100 percent healed policy,” allowing them to fire Jackson for not
being able to fully perform his employment duties. See generally Mem. in Supp. of MSJ, pp. 6-7
(Docket No. 38, Att. 2).7 Jackson contends that such a policy represents a per se violation of the
ADA because it disregards the “qualified individual with a disability” analysis associated with a
disability discrimination claim – namely, whether an “individual with a disability who, ‘with or
without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment
position that such individual holds or desires.’” Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 1243,
1246 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)). In this respect, Defendants’ at-issue policy
reads in relevant part:
Effective June 27, 2010 members who are unable to perform their employment duties
because of injury will no longer be placed in a light duty position. Members will be
required to use their sick and vacation time benefit hours to provide them
opportunity to recover and return to full work status.
....
Before a member can return to work, they must provide their immediate supervisor
with a written release by an attending physician stating they can go back to full work
status.
Ex. D to Thomas Aff. (Docket No. 38, Att. 7) (emphasis added). According to Jackson,
Defendants impermissibly applied this policy as the basis for his firing. See Ex. E to Thomas

7

Jackson also argues, as a precursor to his “100 percent healed policy”-related
argument, that Defendants “mistakenly perceived Jackson as disabled and not able to work any
position, even though he was released to work.” Mem. in Supp. of MSJ, pp. 5-6 (Docket No. 38,
Att. 2). To the extent Jackson’s Motion for Summary Judgment is premised upon such an
argument in and of itself, it is denied, owing to the issues of fact created by the contrasting
medical opinions relating to his ability to perform the essential functions of a detention deputy.
See supra.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 16

Aff. (Docket No. 38, Att. 7) (8/24/12 Notice of Intent to Terminate, stating: “At this time, you
have been unable to provide a fitness-for-duty certification releasing you to perform the essential
functions of your position without restrictions.”).8
In response, Defendants argued that, unless Jackson can establish that, at the time of his
termination, he could perform the essential functions of a detention deputy with or without
reasonable accommodation (essentially that he was a “qualified individual” under the ADA),
there can be no violation of any alleged “100 percent healed policy. See Opp. to MSJ, pp. 17-18
(Docket No. 4) (citing McGregor v. Nat’l R.R. PassengerCorp., 187 F.3d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir.
1999); Hohider v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 574 F.3d 169, 195 (3rd Cir. 2009) (holding that “an
employer’s ‘100% healed’ policy, even if deemed per se discriminatory, cannot give rise to a
finding of liability and relief under the ADA without the statutorily required inquiry into whether
those affected by the policy are disabled and able to perform the essential functions of the jobs
they seek or desire with or without reasonable accommodation”)). And, as discussed elsewhere
in this Memorandum Decision and Order, genuine disputes of material fact on this point exist.
On this template, with inferences now construed in Defendants’ favor, Jackson cannot
show as a matter of law that he was a “qualified individual” under the ADA for the purposes of
then attacking Defendants’ alleged “100 percent healed policy.”

8

For the sake of completeness, it should be mentioned that Defendants’ policy goes on
to state that:
A member, who after using all leave benefits provided to them by Canyon County
and who is not released by an attending physician to return to their full duties, may
write a detailed letter to the sheriff asking for other employment opportunities with
the office. These letters will be considered on a case by case basis at the sole
discretion of the sheriff.
Ex. D to Thomas Aff. (Docket No. 38, Att. 7)
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Additionally, Defendants take issue with characterizing their policy as a “100 percent
healed policy” instead of what they contend it actually is, i.e., a policy that requires employees
to demonstrate that they can perform the essential function of their employment position. See
Opp. to MSJ, p. 19 (Docket No. 40). And, in this respect, Defendants argue that, following their
participation in an interactive process, they concluded that Jackson could not, in fact, perform
the essential functions of a detention deputy with or without accommodation and, as a
consequence, terminated him. See id.9 Again, questions of fact surround this issue as well,
another reason calling for denial of Jackson’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
Owing to the disputes of material fact that now orbit Jackson’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, it cannot be said as a matter of law that Defendants applied a “100 percent healed
policy” as justification for terminating Jackson in violation of the ADA. As a result, Jackson’s
Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
IV. ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
1.

Defendant Canyon County’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 37) is

GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part, as follows:
a.

Plaintiff’s ADA claim is not dismissed. In this respect, Defendant’s

Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

9

This argument also segues into Defendants’ parallel argument that they never applied a
“100 percent healed policy” to Jackson when considering that they historically allowed him to
work less and in different capacities as a result of his knee injury. See Opp. to MSJ, pp. 18-19
(Docket No. 40). These circumstances all tie back into whether Plaintiff is a “qualified
individual” under the ADA and/or Defendants’ participation in the interactive process – each of
which is infused with disputes of material fact. See supra.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 18

b.

Plaintiff’s wrongful termination in violation of public policy claim is

dismissed. In this respect, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
2.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Docket No. 38) is DENIED.
DATED: September 30, 2016

Honorable Ronald E. Bush
Chief U. S. Magistrate Judge

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