Turner v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER Petitioners Petitioner for Review (Dkt. 1 ) is DENIED, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED, and this action is DISMISSED in its entirety, with prejudice. Signed by Judge Ronald E. Bush. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (jp)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF IDAHO

ERIC L. TURNER
Case No. CV 1:14-CV-00016-REB
Petitioner,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER.

vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner of Social
Security,
Respondent.

Now pending before the Court is Petitioner Eric Turner’s Petition for Review (Dkt. 2),
filed on January 15, 2014, seeking review of the Social Security Administration’s final decision
to deny him disability benefits. This action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Having
carefully reviewed the record and otherwise being fully advised, the Court enters the following
Memorandum Decision and Order.
I. BACKGROUND AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
On June 7, 2011 Petitioner applied for Social Security Disability Insurance (“SSDI”)
benefits and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”), alleging a disability onset date of August
15, 2009. (AR 10). The claim was initially denied on October 4, 2011, and also denied upon
reconsideration on December 29, 2011 (Id.). The Petitioner thereafter requested a hearing before
an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), which was held on September 27, 2012. (Id.). ALJ John
Arkoosh presided over the hearing, at which the Petitioner was present and represented by his
attorney, Jessica Bublitz. A Medical Expert, Donna Veraldi, PhD, and a Vocational Expert, Kent

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1

Granant, both gave testimony at the hearing, as did Petitioner himself. (Id.)
On December 10, 2012, the ALJ issued a decision, denying Petitioner’s claims, finding
that Petitioner was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (AR 10-28). On
or about December 21, 2012, Petitioner requested review from the Appeals Council. (5-6.) The
Appeals Council then denied review on December 19, 2013, (AR 1-4), rendering the ALJ’s
decision the Commissioner’s final decision. Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of the
Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits. Petitioner contends the ALJ erred by failing to accord
proper weight to the opinion evidence in the file, and in particular, by disregarding the opinions
of Petitioner’s treating and examining medical providers in favor of those of a state agency
consultant. (Petitioner’s Brief at 1).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
To be upheld, the Commissioner’s decision must be supported by substantial evidence
and based on proper legal standards. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279
(9th Cir. 1996); Matney ex. rel. Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992);
Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1990). Findings as to any question of fact, if
supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In other words, if there
is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s factual decisions, they must be upheld, even when
there is conflicting evidence. Hall v. Sec'y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 602 F.2d 1372, 1374
(9th Cir. 1979).
“Substantial evidence” is defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971);
Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005); Flaten v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2

44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995). The standard requires more than a scintilla but less than a
preponderance of evidence, Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989); Sorenson
v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n. 10 (9th Cir.1975), and “does not mean a large or
considerable amount of evidence.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988).
With respect to questions of fact, the role of the Court is to review the record as a whole
to determine whether it contains evidence that would allow a reasonable mind to accept the
conclusions of the ALJ. See Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401; see also Matney, 981 F.2d at 1019.
The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility and resolving conflicts in medical testimony,
and for resolving ambiguities. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995); Allen v.
Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1989). The ALJ is also responsible for drawing inferences
logically flowing from the evidence, Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982).
Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation in a disability
proceeding, the reviewing court may not substitute its judgment or interpretation of the record
for that of the ALJ. Flaten, 44 F.3d at 1457; Key v. Heckler, 754 F.2d 1545, 1549 (9th Cir.
1985).
With respect to questions of law, the ALJ’s decision must be based on proper legal
standards and will be reversed for legal error. Matney, 981 F.2d at 1019. The ALJ’s
construction of the Social Security Act is entitled to deference if it has a reasonable basis in law.
See id. However, reviewing federal courts “will not rubber-stamp an administrative decision that
is inconsistent with the statutory mandate or that frustrates the congressional purpose underlying
the statute.” Smith v. Heckler, 820 F.2d 1093, 1094 (9th Cir. 1987).

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III. DISCUSSION
A.

Sequential Process
In evaluating the evidence presented at an administrative hearing, the ALJ must follow a

sequential process in determining whether a person is disabled in general (see 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520, 416.920) - or continues to be disabled (see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1594, 416.994) - within
the meaning of the Social Security Act.
The first step requires the ALJ to determine whether the claimant is engaged in
substantial gainful activity (“SGA”). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). SGA is
defined as work activity that is both substantial and gainful. “Substantial work activity” is work
activity that involves doing significant physical or mental activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1572(a),
416.972(a). “Gainful work activity” is work that is usually done for pay or profit, whether or not
a profit is realized. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1572(b), 416.972(b). If the claimant has engaged in SGA,
disability benefits are denied, regardless of how severe her physical/mental impairments are and
regardless of her age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If
the claimant is not engaged in SGA, the analysis proceeds to the second step. Here, the ALJ
found that the claimant had engaged in SGA for part of the period for which disability benefits
were sought, namely, from July 2012 through the date of the administrative hearing. However,
the ALJ also found that claimant had not engaged in SGA during the time frame running from
the date of the alleged disability onset until July of 2012. The remainder of the ALJ’s findings
addressed this period, as will the Court’s. (AR 12-13).
The second step requires the ALJ to determine whether the claimant has a medically
determinable impairment, or combination of impairments, that is severe and meets the duration

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4

requirement. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). An impairment or combination of
impairments is “severe” within the meaning of the Social Security Act if it significantly limits an
individual’s ability to perform basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). An
impairment or combination of impairments is “not severe” when medical and other evidence
establish only a slight abnormality or a combination of slight abnormalities that would have no
more than a minimal effect on an individual’s ability to work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521, 416.921.
If the claimant does not have a severe medically determinable impairment or combination of
impairments, disability benefits are denied. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). Here, the
ALJ found that Petitioner had the following severe impairments: gout, degenerative joint disease
of the left knee, schizo-affective disorder with psychosis, and a history of substance abuse that
had been in remission since August of 2010.1 (AR 13.).
The third step requires the ALJ to determine the medical severity of any impairments;
that is, whether the claimant’s impairments meet or equal a listed impairment under 20 C.F.R.
Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the
answer is yes, the claimant is considered disabled under the Social Security Act and benefits are
awarded. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If the claimant’s impairments neither meet nor
equal one of the listed impairments, the claimant’s case cannot be resolved at step three and the
evaluation proceeds to step four. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). Here, the ALJ
concluded that Petitioner’s physical limitations (gout and degenerative joint disease in the left

1

Schizoaffective disorder is “a condition in which a person experiences a combination of
schizophrenia symptoms–such as hallucinations or delusions–and mood disorder symptoms,
such as mania or depression.” See, http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/schizoaffective-disorder/basics/definition/con-20-029221.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 5

knee) were either not severe enough to affect his ability to ambulate effectively, or flared only
infrequently and were controlled with medication. (AR 13-14). The ALJ also found that
Petitioner’s mental impairment resulted in mild to moderate restrictions in the activities of daily
living, and moderate difficulties in social functioning, concentrating, and persistence. The ALJ
further concluded that Petitioner had not had any episodes of psychological decompensation
since he attained sobriety in August of 2010. Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Petitioner’s
mental impairment, whether considered singly or in combination with his physical limitations,
did not meet or equal a listed impairment. (AR 14-15). Only the ALJ’s conclusions regarding
Petitioner’s mental limitations are at issue in this appeal.
The fourth step of the evaluation process requires the ALJ to determine whether the
claimant’s residual functional capacity is sufficient for the claimant to perform past relevant
work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). An individual’s residual functional
capacity is her ability to do physical and mental work activities on a sustained basis despite
limitations from her impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945. Likewise, an individual’s
past relevant work is work performed within the last 15 years or 15 years prior to the date that
disability must be established; also, the work must have lasted long enough for the claimant to
learn to do the job and be engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(b),
404.1565, 416.960(b), 416.965. Here, the ALJ determined that physically, Petitioner retained the
ability to perform at least sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1576(a) and 416.967(a), with
some limitations on lifting. (AR 16). However, Petitioner’s schizo-affective disorder limited him
to “simple, routine, and repetitive tasks” that required only simple decision-making. (Id.). The
ALJ also concluded that any job should require no more than occasional interaction with the

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 6

public, only occasional supervision or “critical checking” of his work, and no more than
occasional changes in work routine. (Id.).
In the fifth and final step, if it has been established that a claimant can no longer perform
past relevant work because of his impairments, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show
that the claimant retains the ability to do alternate work and to demonstrate that such alternate
work exists in significant numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v),
416.920(a)(4)(v), 404.1520(f), 416.920(f); see also Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 681 (9th
Cir. 1993). If the claimant is able to do other work, she is not disabled; if the claimant is not able
to do other work and meets the duration requirement, she is disabled. The ALJ found, at step
five, that Petitioner is capable of making a successful adjustment to work that exists in
significant numbers in the national economy. (AR 19-20).
B.

Analysis
Before turning to the specific assignment of error raised by Petitioner, a few general

observations are in order. It is a truism in social security law that conditions that can be
controlled with medication or other treatment are not considered disabling for purposes of
determining eligibility for disability benefits. See, e.g. Warre v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec.
Admin, 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006). In this case, the ALJ’s conclusion that Petitioner
was not disabled was predicated on exactly this notion, (AR 17), and the Court’s own review of
the medical evidence also shows that Petitioner’s schizo-affective disorder, while clearly a
serious condition, is well-controlled with treatment. When Petitioner does not get treatment for
this condition, and in particular when he neglects to take the psycho-tropic medications that have
been consistently prescribed for many years, he suffers from significant symptoms of psychosis,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 7

to the point where, on occasion, he has demonstrated the potential to become a danger to himself
and others. (AR 572-594). If, however, Petitioner remains compliant with the regimen of
medication that has been prescribed to him over the past several years, his condition stabilizes,
and his mental outlook and ability to function in a workplace setting improve dramatically.
Consistent with the ALJ’s determinations, this Court’s review of the evidence
demonstrates that from the time of the onset of alleged disability in August of 2009 until about
November of 2010, Petitioner was not taking his prescribed medications consistently. (AR 550,
555-56, 578, 484). As a result, his schizoaffective disorder on several occasions became
significantly worse, as the medical records from two hospitalizations that occurred during the
2009-2010 time frame indicate. The first of these episodes was in October of 2009, when
Petitioner voluntarily checked himself into the hospital for approximately two days. (AR 550561). The second episode lasted from February 24 to March 2 of 2010 and was an involuntary
commitment that apparently resulted when Petitioner became combative with his landlord and
with police. (AR 572-594). The medical records indicate that at the time of the second
hospitalization, Petitioner was having suicidal and homicidal ideation, and that he had to be
sedated, placed under continuous observation, and placed in restraints. (AR 572-575). However,
several days after the medications were restarted, treatment records describe Petitioner as being
“pleasant and cooperative” and indicate that he was no longer producing significant delusional
thoughts. (AR 587). Though these episodes were undoubtedly traumatic for Petitioner, the ALJ
concluded that they were not of sufficient frequency or duration such that his schizoaffective
disorder would meet or equal a listed impairment. (AR 21). Petitioner does not challenge this
conclusion on appeal.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 8

In August of 2010, Petitioner was jailed for several months on charges related to grand
theft and possession of methamphetamine. Upon his release from incarceration in November of
2010, he was placed on probation, given a spot as a participant in a community Mental Health
Court, and came under the regular care of a psychiatrist, Dr. Katherine Roman. He also began
taking his medications consistently. After two or three months of treatment with Dr. Roman,
Petitioner’s condition had improved significantly. By the spring of 2012, it had improved to the
point where he was able to obtain and hold down, albeit with some difficulty, a part time job as a
cashier at a Maverick store–a job which actually required more in the way of public interaction
than the jobs that the VE identified as appropriate for him.2 During this time, Petitioner was also
living independently, managing to care for himself and to attend to his finances and the
necessities of daily living. He was also able to remain compliant with the terms of his probation,
which included participating in the requirements of Mental Health Court and abstaining from
drugs and alcohol – achievements for which Petitioner deserves significant credit. However, this
same evidence also supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Petitioner’s condition can be successfully
managed with medication, and is therefore not disabling.
With this background in mind, the Court now turns to the specific allegation of error that
Petitioner has ascribed to the ALJ’s decision. Petitioner’s sole argument on appeal is that the

2

Specifically, Petitioner testified that he sometimes got so stressed out from work that he
didn’t want to do anything but lie in bed. (AR 79). However, he also testified that the stress was
closely related to the aspects of his job that required public interaction, and that he felt capable
of performing other work that did not require so much public interaction, such as janitorial work.
(AR 76). The jobs the VE identified as being a proper fit for someone with Petitioner’s
capabilities and limitations–dowel inspector, touch-up inspector, and semi-conductor
bonder–were all sedentary positions that required only occasional interaction with the public.
(AR 100-101).
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ALJ erred by failing to accord proper weight to the opinions of his treating psychiatrist, Dr.
Katherine Roman, and those of an examining psychologist, Dr. Ryan Hulbert, to whom
Petitioner was referred for a mental status examination by the State of Idaho Disability
Determination Services.
1.

Dr. Roman

Petitioner relies heavily on a Mental Impairment Questionnaire that Dr. Roman
completed on February 6, 2012. In that questionnaire, Dr. Roman opined that Petitioner had “no
useful ability to function” at numerous work-related tasks, including remembering work-like
procedures, understanding, carrying out simple instructions, maintaining attendance and
punctuality, sustaining routines, getting along with co-workers, dealing with ordinary work
stress, and getting through an ordinary work day without experiencing psychologically
compromising symptoms. (AR 761). In handwritten notes explaining her assessment, Dr. Roman
wrote that, due to his schizo-affective disorder and bipolar disorder, “[Petitioner] has times that
he is unable to function, gets paranoid, hears voices, and can’t stand to be around people due to
paranoia.” (Id.). The Vocational Expert (“VE”) acknowledged at the hearing before the ALJ that
if Dr. Roman’s assessment of Petitioner’s limitations were accurate, it would rule out any
possibility of sustaining gainful employment. (AR 99-100).
In Social Security cases, courts reviewing an ALJ’s decision “employ a hierarchy of
deference to medical opinions depending on the nature of the services provided.” Ryan v.
Comm’r. of Soc. Sec. Admin, 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing standard in dissent); See
also, Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). This hierarchy distinguishes among three
types of physicians who may be involved with a social security claimant: those who treat the

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 10

claimant, those who examine the claimant but do not treat him, and those who neither examine
nor treat but simply review the medical evidence prepared by others and provide opinions as to
the presence or absence of functional limitations. Generally speaking, a treating physician's
opinion is entitled to more weight than an examining physician's opinion, and an examining
physician's opinion is entitled to more weight than a non-examining physician's opinion. Ryan,
528 F.3d at 1204. If a treating doctor’s opinion is not contradicted in the record by the opinion of
another doctor, an ALJ may reject it only for clear and convincing reasons that are supported by
substantial evidence in the record. Id. at 1198; Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. The ALJ must accord
“controlling weight” to a treating doctor’s opinion if medically approved, diagnostic techniques
support the opinion and the opinion is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the
record. Ligenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1038 n.10 (9th Cir. 2007). This standard of
deference to the opinions of treating doctors does not, however, require an ALJ to accept the
opinion of any doctor, including a treating doctor, that is “brief, conclusory, and inadequately
supported by clinical findings.” Chaudry v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 661 (9th Cir. 2012). An ALJ may
also properly reject opinions of treating physicians where they are wholly based on the
claimant’s self-reporting and not backed up by any objective medical findings. Turner v.
Comm’r. Soc. Sec., 613 F.3d 1217, 1222-24 (9th Cir. 2010); Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947,
957 (9th Cir. 2002).
Here, the ALJ’s conclusion that “in no way does the evidence portray an individual of the
critical impairment level set forth by Dr. Roman at Exhibit 18F,” is fully supported by the
evidence in the record. This is true whether one employs the “substantial evidence” test or the

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 11

“clear and convincing evidence” standard.3 While Dr. Roman’s opinions in the February 6, 2012
Mental Impairment Questionnaire are not directly contradicted by the opinions of another
provider, they are inconsistent, and strikingly so, with the rest of her treatment records. It is
difficult to reconcile the extremely pessimistic picture of Petitioner’s mental health that Dr.
Roman depicted in the February 6, 2012 Mental Impairment Questionnaire with the overall
much rosier picture of Petitioner’s mental functioning that she describes in the records of her
numerous visits with Petitioner during the eighteen- month period during which he was her
patient. In short, while the Mental Impairment Questionnaire may have accurately depicted
Petitioner’s mental health on that particular day, the ALJ did not err by refusing to take that day
as representative snapshot of Petitioner’s overall level of mental functioning.
Petitioner began seeing Dr. Roman just after he was released from the Canyon County jail
in November of 2010. During the first few weeks after his release from his jail, Petitioner’s
mental health status was very poor. During her first visit with Petitioner, which occurred on
November 8, 2010, Dr. Roman noted that he was depressed, anxious, and was displaying some
passive suicidal thoughts. During that visit, she also assigned him a Global Assessement
Functioning Score (“GAF Score”) of 45.4
3

As far as the Court can tell, the Ninth Circuit has never clarified whether district courts
reviewing an ALJ’s decision should use the “substantial evidence” standard or the “clear and
convincing evidence” standard where a provider’s opinions are inconsistent with her own
treatment records, as opposed to those of another doctor. While the Court is of the opinion that
“substantial evidence” is the appropriate test to employ in those circumstances, here, the
evidence easily satisfies either standard.
4

A GAF score represent’s a clinician's judgment as to a patient’s overall level of
psychological, social, and occupational functioning, without regard to any possible physical
impairments. See American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (“DSM–IV”), at 32 (4th ed.2000). A GAF score in the range of 41–50
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 12

Thereafter, Dr. Roman’s records indicate that Petitioner continued to struggle for most of
November, December, and January. During a clinic visit on November 22, 2010, Dr. Roman
noted that he had been off his psychiatric medications since being released from jail, and had only
recently started taking them again. (AR 674). On December 6, 2010, Petitioner apparently
indicated to Dr. Roman that he felt like beating fists against wall so that physical pain would take
away the mental pain. Dr. Roman assigned a GAF score of 46 on that day. (AR 672). On January
3, 2011 Dr. Roman indicated that Petitioner was still depressed, had been sleeping very little, and
was having auditory hallucinations and possibly some visual hallucinations as well. (AR 670).
Petitioner’s GAF scores for the months of November, December and January were all below 50.
(AR 670 to 674).
By February of 2011, however, Petitioner’s mental status began to improve considerably.
On February 14, 2011, he told Dr. Roman that he was doing much better. Dr. Roman indicated
that he displayed “no psychotic symptoms” and that his insight and judgment were good. She
described his schizo-affective disorder as being “currently stable” and his methamphetamine
dependence in “early full remission.” (AR 669). His GAF score for this day was approximately
55. (AR 669). On March 11, 2011, the picture had improved even more. Dr. Roman noted that
Petitioner had told her he was doing “very well.” Her notes also indicate, that “he [Petitioner] is
quite embarrassed when our staff tells the judge that he is doing incredibly well.” (AR 668). His
GAF score on this day was 56. (Id.). Dr. Roman’s records from the spring and summer of 2011
indicates serious symptoms or a serious impairment in social, occupational, or school
functioning indicative of an individual who would be unable to keep a job. Id. In contrast, a
GAF score in the range of 51–60 indicates only moderate symptoms or moderate difficulty in
social, occupational, and school functioning, indicative of someone who may have few friends
and some conflicts with peers or coworkers. DSM–IV, at 34.
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indicate that Petitioner continued to do well during this time period, with GAF scores in the low
to mid 50s. (AR 667, 769, 770). In August of 2011 Dr. Roman described him as “bright,
euthymic and mentally sharp.” (AR 770). In October of 2011 she again described him as stable.
(AR 768).
During late fall of 2011 and winter of 2012, Petitioner reported increased feelings of
depression and anxiety, as well as some passive suicidal thoughts and some hallucinations. (AR at
731, 765 - 768, & 797). Medical records indicate that this decrease in his mood during to this time
frame was a related to an incident that occurred in his mental health classes and anxiety over
completing the 9th Step of his AA treatment. (AR 731). On February 6, 2012, Petitioner reported
to Dr. Roman that he was not doing very well at all, was not sleeping well, that he didn’t want to
be around people and was hearing voices and getting paranoid. He reported that he would do well
for a while and then “plummet,” and that the plummets would last three or four weeks, which
made it difficult for him to hold down a job. (AR 797). It was on this day that Dr. Roman
completed the Mental Impairment Questionnaire describing a near total inability to function in a
workplace setting. (AR 758 to 763). Petitioner’s GAF score on February 6, 2012 was 45. (AR
758).
Less than a month later, however, Petitioner’s condition had improved significantly. On
his March 5, 2012, he reported to Dr. Roman that the Trazodone she had prescribed had helped
him sleep better and that his mood had improved as a consequence. (AR 796). In May and June of
2012 his GAF scores were back up to 55 and 58, respectively, and he had obtained the job as a
cashier at a Maverick store. (AR 793 to 795). By late July of 2012 he was describing himself as
“fairly stable,” and reported that “life was a lot better than it was two years ago.” (AR 796).

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During the time that he was seeing Dr. Roman, Petitioner was also successfully complying with
the terms of his probation and staying off of drugs and alcohol. (AR at 22). Though he did report
struggling sometimes with the aspects of his cashier job that required public interaction, he
nonetheless managed to hold this job down for at least several months, from June of 2012 until
the time of the hearing before the ALJ in September of 2012. (AR at 58-59).
Seen in this context, Dr. Roman’s Mental Health Impairment Questionnaire paints a
picture of total non-functionality that is quite out of step with the rest of her treatment records.
Though Petitioner’s condition did take a downward slide in the winter of 2012, this episode
resolved with treatment, to the point where several months later, he was able to find and maintain
employment, was reporting that he was in a generally positive frame of mind, and had GAF
scores above 50. In short, the record fully supports the ALJ’s decision not to take Dr. Roman’s
opinions in the Mental Health Impairment Questionnaire as a representative picture of
Petitioner’s overall capabilities.
B.

Dr. Hulbert.

Finally, the ALJ did not err in deciding to give little weight to the opinions of Dr. Hulbert,
the psychologist who examined Petitioner at the Request of Idaho State Disability Determination
Services. (AR 683-688). Dr. Hulbert saw Petitioner in September of 2011, at time when he had
been in treatment with Dr. Roman for approximately ten months. After examining Petitioner, Dr.
Hulbert remarked that his abilities in the areas of persistence and adaptability were “poor” and
“very poor” in the area of social interaction. Dr. Hulbert also concluded that Petitioner’s overall
prospect for full time employment was “poor to fair.” (AR 688). The ALJ elected to give limited
weight to these opinions because they were inconsistent with the evidence in the record, including

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 15

the evidence indicating that during this time frame, Petitioner was living independently,
socializing with friends, attending daily AA meetings, and complying with guidelines applicable
to his probation and mental health court goals. (AR 20). The opinions were also inconsistent with
Dr. Roman’s treatment records from the same time period, which described Petitioner as “bright
and euthymic” and his overall condition as “stable.” (AR 768 & 770). And, while the ALJ did not
note this particular discrepancy, Dr. Hulbert’s records also indicate that Petitioner’s GAF score in
the past year had not exceeded 50, a conclusion that is completely at odds with Dr. Roman’s
records.
For all the foregoing reasons, the ALJ’s conclusion that Petitioner’s schizo-affective
disorder was controllable with medication and therefore not disabling, is based on proper legal
standards and supported by substantial evidence. Overall, the evidence supports the ALJ’s
conclusion that when Petitioner takes his prescribed medications, his condition remains relatively
stable and is therefore not disabling. Accordingly, the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed.
IV. ORDER
Based on the foregoing, Petitioner’s Petitioner for Review (Dkt. 1) is DENIED, the
decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED, and this action is DISMISSED in its entirety, with
prejudice.

DATED: April 8, 2016

Honorable Ronald E. Bush
Chief U. S. Magistrate Judge

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 16