Norton et al v. Maximus Inc.

Filing 139

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF PARTIAL CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT. Signed by Judge William B. Shubb. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (st)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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YVETTE NORTON, JEANNETTE
RODRIGUEZ-GUZMAN, KELLY
BARKER, JOSEPH BELL, BRAD
EPPERLY, STEPHANIE JONES,
KATHERINE KELLEY KNOWLES,
NANCY RICHARDS, and MARK
ZUMWALT, Individually and On
Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated,

CIV. NO. 1:14-00030 WBS
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION
FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF PARTIAL
CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT

Plaintiffs,

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v.

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MAXIMUS INC.,

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Defendant.
----oo0oo----

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This class action under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938

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(“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219, involves claims by plaintiffs who

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work as Trainers and Supervisors for defendant Maximus Inc.

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Order is limited to the Trainer plaintiffs’ claims based on

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defendant’s misclassification of the Trainers as exempt

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1

This

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employees, failure to compensate the Trainers for overtime wages,

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and alleged retaliation against the Trainers when complaints were

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made about their exempt classification.

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court is the Trainer plaintiffs’ motion for final approval of the

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partial class action settlement.

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I. Factual and Procedural Background

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Presently before the

Defendant operates calls centers in Boise, Idaho and

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Brownsville, Texas to provide support for implementation of the

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Affordable Care Act.

The Trainers in both facilities worked

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overtime hours but were not compensated for that overtime when

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they were classified as exempt employees.

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this class action on January 24, 2014 and, shortly thereafter,

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defendant voluntarily reclassified the Trainers as non-exempt

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hourly employees.

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the same hourly pay and were compensated for their overtime.

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Plaintiffs initiated

Upon reclassification, all Trainers received

The court granted preliminary approval of plaintiffs’

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partial class action settlement on September 24, 2015.

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No. 127.)

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partial settlement pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

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23(e).

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(Docket No. 134.)

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II. Discussion

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(Docket

Plaintiffs now seek final approval of the class-wide

Defendant supports plaintiffs’ motion for final approval.

Rule 23(e) provides that “[t]he claims, issues, or

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defenses of a certified class may be settled . . . only with the

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court’s approval.”

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involves a two-step process in which the Court first determines

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whether a proposed class action settlement deserves preliminary

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approval and then, after notice is given to class members,

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e).

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“Approval under 23(e)

1

whether final approval is warranted.”

2

Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 221 F.R.D. 523, 525 (C.D. Cal. 2004)

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(citing Manual for Complex Litig., Third, § 30.41 (1995)).

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Nat’l Rural Telecomms.

The Ninth Circuit has declared a strong judicial policy

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favoring settlement of class actions.

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of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 1992).

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where, as here, “the parties reach a settlement agreement prior

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to class certification, courts must peruse the proposed

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compromise to ratify both the propriety of the certification and

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the fairness of the settlement.”

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Class Plaintiffs v. City
Nevertheless,

938, 952 (9th Cir. 2003).

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13

Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d

A. Class Certification
A class action will be certified only if it meets the

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four prerequisites identified in Rule 23(a) and additionally fits

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within one of the three subdivisions of Rule 23(b).

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Ontiveros v. Zamora, Civ. No. 2:08-567 WBS DAD, 2014 WL 3057506,

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at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 7, 2014); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)-(b).

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Although a district court has discretion in determining whether

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the moving party has satisfied each Rule 23 requirement, see

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Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 701 (1979); Montgomery v.

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Rumsfeld, 572 F.2d 250, 255 (9th Cir. 1978), the court must

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conduct a rigorous inquiry before certifying a class, see Gen.

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Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982); E. Tex.

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Motor Freight Sys. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403–05 (1977).

See

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1. Rule 23(a) Requirements

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Rule 23(a) restricts class actions to cases where:

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(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of
law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or
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1

defenses of the representative parties are typical of
the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.

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3
4

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).

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referred to as numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy

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of representation.
a.

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Numerosity

Under the first requirement, “[a] proposed class of at

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These requirements are more commonly

least forty members presumptively satisfies the numerosity

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requirement.”

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456 (C.D. Cal. 2012); see also, e.g., Collins v. Cargill Meat

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Solutions Corp., 274 F.R.D. 294, 300 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (Wanger,

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J.).

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thirty-three from the Boise call center and thirteen from the

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Brownsville call center.

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1).)

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Avilez v. Pinkerton Gov’t Servs., 286 F.R.D. 450,

The class in this case consists of forty-six trainers:

(See Pls.’ Mem. at 2 (Docket No. 133-

This satisfies the numerosity requirement.
b.

Commonality

Commonality requires that the class members’ claims

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“depend upon a common contention” that is “capable of classwide

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resolution--which means that determination of its truth or

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falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of

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each one of the claims in one stroke.”

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Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2550 (2011).

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and law need not be common to satisfy the rule,” and the

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“existence of shared legal issues with divergent factual

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predicates is sufficient, as is a common core of salient facts

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coupled with disparate legal remedies within the class.”

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v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998).

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Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
“[A]ll questions of fact

Hanlon

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The proposed class includes all former and current

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Trainers who were employed “at either Maximus’s Affordable Care

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Act call centers located in Boise, Idaho or Brownsville, Texas

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between May 20, 2013, and January 31, 2014” and who “‘opted in’

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to the above-named lawsuit by filing either a ‘Consent to Join’

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or a ‘Consent to Sue’ form during the course of this litigation.”

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(Pls.’ Notice of Proposed Partial Settlement (“Pls.’ Notice”) at

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2 (Docket No. 133).)

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core of salient facts and legal issues: defendant misclassified

The participating Trainers allege a common

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them as exempt, deprived them of their lawful overtime wages,

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prohibited them from keeping accurate time records of the hours

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they worked, and allegedly retaliated against them for

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complaining about the FLSA violations.

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the damages for each Trainer are not identical, they share common

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legal contentions and, as a result, the proposed class meets the

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commonality requirement.

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c.

(Pls.’ Mem. at 2.)

While

Typicality

Typicality requires that named plaintiffs have claims

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“reasonably coextensive with those of absent class members,” but

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their claims do not have to be “substantially identical.”

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Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020.

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other members have the same or similar injury, whether the action

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is based on conduct which is not unique to the named plaintiffs,

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and whether other class members have been injured by the same

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course of conduct.”

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508 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).

The test for typicality “is whether

Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497,

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While the Trainers worked at two separate facilities

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and worked different amounts of overtime, the Trainers had the
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same job responsibilities and suffered the same type of injury

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from defendant’s misclassification of them as exempt.

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the differences in the number of overtime hours claimed by the

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Trainers are taken into account by the settlement agreement.

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the settlement notice explains, “[e]ach Participating Trainer’s

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Gross Settlement Payment will differ based upon the amount of

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claimed overtime hours each Participating Trainer claimed during

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the course of this litigation, which each Participating Trainer

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submitted to his or her attorneys, as well as the annual salary

Moreover,

As

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that each Participating Trainer was offered by Maximus upon being

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hired as a Trainer.”

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receive 80.35% of their total claimed overtime hours multiplied

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by 1.5 times the hourly equivalent of their annual salary.

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(Pls.’ Mem. at 10.)

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typicality requirement.

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d.

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(Pls.’ Notice at 3.)

Each Trainer will

The proposed class therefore meets the

Adequacy of Representation

To resolve the question of adequacy, the court must

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make two inquiries: “(1) do the named plaintiffs and their

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counsel have any conflicts of interest with other class members

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and (2) will the named plaintiffs and their counsel prosecute the

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action vigorously on behalf of the class?”

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1020.

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factors, including “a sharing of interests between

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representatives and absentees.”

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F.2d 386, 390 (9th Cir. 1992).

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Hanlon, 150 F.3d at

These questions involve consideration of a number of

Brown v. Ticor Title Ins., 982

There do not appear to be any conflicts of interest.

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The named plaintiffs and their counsel’s interests are generally

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aligned with the class members’ interests.
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As discussed above,

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the class members suffered a similar injury as the named

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plaintiffs and the definition of the class is narrowly tailored.

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Furthermore, the named plaintiffs will not receive an incentive

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payment, which could create a potential conflict.

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named plaintiffs will recover the same 80.35% of their claimed

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overtime hours as all other class members.

Instead, the

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In addition, the named plaintiffs and their counsel

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have vigorously prosecuted the action on behalf of the class.

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“Although there are no fixed standards by which ‘vigor’ can be

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assayed, considerations include competency of counsel and, in the

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context of a settlement-only class, an assessment of the

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rationale for not pursuing further litigation.”

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at 1021.

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Hudson--both have considerable experience with employment related

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cases.

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discovery and 25 hours of mediation before deciding to settle.

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(Id. at 11, 6.)

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production and review of hundreds of thousands of documents, and

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a number of depositions.

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fully briefed a motion for summary judgment and defended against

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a cross-motion for summary judgment.

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to have carefully considered the risks of further litigation.

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(Id. at 5-9.)

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of conflicts of interest and the vigor of counsel’s

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representation satisfy Rule 23(a)’s adequacy assessment.

Hanlon, 150 F.3d

Plaintiffs’ counsel--Howard Belodoff and Jeremiah M.

(Pls.’ Mem. at 12.)

Plaintiffs’ counsel conducted full

This included written interrogatories,

(Id. at 11.)

Plaintiffs’ counsel also

Plaintiffs’ counsel seems

Accordingly, the court concludes that the absence

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2. Rule 23(b)

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An action that meets all the prerequisites of Rule

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23(a) may be certified as a class action only if it also
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satisfies the requirements of one of the three subdivisions of

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Rule 23(b).

Leyva v. Medline Indus. Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 512 (9th

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Cir. 2013).

Plaintiffs seek certification under Rule 23(b)(3),

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which provides that a class action may be maintained only if (1)

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“the court finds that questions of law or fact common to class

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members predominate over questions affecting only individual

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members” and (2) “that a class action is superior to other

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available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the

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controversy.”

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).

“Because Rule 23(a)(3) already considers commonality,

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the focus of the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry is on the

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balance between individual and common issues.”

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Gas & Elec. Co., 266 F.R.D. 468, 476 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (citing

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Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1022); see also Amchem Prods. Inc. v.

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Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997) (“The Rule 23(b)(3)

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predominance inquiry tests whether proposed classes are

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sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by

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representation.”).

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similar, if not identical.

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in overtime hours claimed by class members, there is no

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indication that those variations are “sufficiently substantive to

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predominate over the shared claims.”

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court finds that common questions of law and fact predominate

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over the class members’ claims.

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Murillo v. Pac.

The class members’ contentions appear to be
Again, although there are differences

See id.

Accordingly, the

In considering whether a class action is superior, the
court considers four non-exhaustive factors:
(A) the class members’ interests in
controlling the prosecution or defense
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individually
of separate

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actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation
concerning the controversy already begun by or against
class members; (C) the desirability or undesirability
of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the
particular forum; and (D) the likely difficulties in
managing a class action.

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).

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to certification, making factors (C) and (D) inapplicable.

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Murillo, 266 F.R.D. at 477 (citing Windsor, 521 U.S. at 620).

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Class members might have an interest in individually controlling

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prosecution given that recovery through settlement will amount to

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a recovery of 80.35% of their total claimed overtime hours and no

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additional damages for retaliation.

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pursued litigation individually there would be a possibility of

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recovering 100% of their claimed overtime hours and additional

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damages for retaliation.

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greater detail below, see supra Part II.B.2.a, there are

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significant risks associated with going to trial in this case and

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weaknesses in plaintiffs’ retaliation claim.

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members’ interest in pursuing individual suits is likely low.

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The court is unaware of any concurrent litigation already begun

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by class members regarding FLSA violations by defendant.

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stage, the class action device appears to be the superior method

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for adjudicating this controversy.

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The parties settled this action prior
See

In theory, if class members

However, as will be discussed in

As a result, class

At this

Accordingly, since the settlement class satisfied both

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Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3), the court will grant final

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certification of the settlement class.

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3. Rule 23(c)(2) Notice Requirements

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If the court certifies a class under Rule 23(b)(3), it

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“must direct to class members the best notice that is practicable

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under the circumstances, including individual notice to all

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members who can be identified through reasonable effort.”

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R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B).

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content of a proposed notice.

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651, 658 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,

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417 U.S. 156, 172–77 (1974)).

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“reasonably certain to inform the absent members of the plaintiff

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class,” actual notice is not required.

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Fed.

Rule 23(c)(2) governs both the form and
See Ravens v. Iftikar, 174 F.R.D.

Although that notice must be

Silber v. Mabon, 18 F.3d

1449, 1454 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).

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Plaintiffs mailed and emailed notice to all of the

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Trainers who had opted into the litigation on October 9, 2015.

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(Pls.’ Mem. at 3.)

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the lawsuit, the terms of the proposed settlement, and the time

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and place of the final fairness hearing.

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6-7.)

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with their annual salary, claimed overtime hours, and the

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percentage adjustment that was used to calculate their gross

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settlement.

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The notice included a specific description of

(Pls.’ Notice at 2-3,

In addition, each Trainer received a personalized chart

(Id.; Pls.’ Mem. at 3.)

The notice informed the Trainers of their right to

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object to the settlement agreement on or before November 4, 2015

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either by submitting a letter or “Attachment B.”

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with the proposed settlement agreement, the notice explained that

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they could “either (a) do nothing, or (b) state [their] approval

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in the comment section of ‘Attachment B.’”

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Lastly, it explained that as part of the agreement, class members

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would agree to dismiss their overtime payment, misclassification,

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and retaliation claims against defendant but not their claims for
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If they agreed

(Pls.’ Notice at 5.)

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liquidated damages, attorney’s fees, costs, or any FLSA claim

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they may have as a Supervisor in the case.

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(Id. at 4.)

The content of the notice was reasonably certain to

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inform the Trainers of the terms of the settlement agreement and

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was even individualized to reflect each Trainer’s claimed

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overtime hours and respective recovery.

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satisfied Rule 23(c)(2)(B).

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also Churchill Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec., 361 F.3d 566, 575

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(9th Cir. 2004) (“Notice is satisfactory if it ‘generally

The notice therefore

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B); see

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describes the terms of the settlement in sufficient detail to

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alert those with adverse viewpoints to investigate and to come

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forward and be heard.’” (citation omitted)).

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B. Rule 23(e): Fairness, Adequacy, and Reasonableness of
Proposed Settlement
Having determined class treatment to be warranted, the

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court must now determine whether the terms of the parties’

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settlement appear fair, adequate, and reasonable.

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Civ. P. 23(e)(2); Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026.

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requires the court to “balance a number of factors,” including:

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24
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See Fed. R.

This process

the strength of the plaintiff’s case; the risk,
expense, complexity, and likely duration of further
litigation; the risk of maintaining class action status
throughout the trial; the amount offered in settlement;
the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the
proceedings; the experience and views of counsel; the
presence of a governmental participant; and the
reaction of the class members to the proposed
settlement.
Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026.

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1. Strength of Plaintiffs’ Case

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An important consideration is the strength of

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plaintiffs’ case on the merits balanced against the amount
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offered in the settlement.

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in most cases where the court is not familiar with the issues at

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the time of settlement, the parties in this case had filed and

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fully briefed cross-motions for summary judgment and the court

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had begun analyzing those motions prior to settlement.

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the district court is not required to reach any ultimate

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conclusions on the merits of the dispute, “for it is the very

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uncertainty of outcome in litigation and avoidance of

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wastefulness and expensive litigation that induce consensual

DIRECTV, 221 F.R.D. at 526.

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settlements.”

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Unlike

Still,

City & Cty. of SF, 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 2004).

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Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of the

The settlement terms compare favorably to the

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uncertainties with respect to liability in this case.

Plaintiffs

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would face significant hurdles at trial in proving the total

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number of overtime hours owed.

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overtime hours, plaintiffs submitted declarations from several

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Trainers and contended this was representative testimony and a

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fair approximate of the overtime worked by the other employees.

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Defendant, however, presented evidence that the Trainer

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declarants did not work similar enough overtime hours to testify

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as representatives for the rest of the class.

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statistical computer software program, defendant’s expert witness

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contended that the 9,892.5 overtime hours claimed by the Boise

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Trainers should be reduced to 3,458 overtime hours and the 6,211

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overtime hours claimed by the Brownsville Trainers reduced to

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3,013.

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While plaintiffs contest the methodology and reliability of the

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expert’s opinion, (Pls. Mem. at 7), there is no question that

For example, to estimate their

Relying on a

(Id. at 7, 10; Def.’s Resp. at 3-4 (Docket No. 134).)

12

1
2

this would be a highly disputed issue at trial.
The settlement agreement focuses on the unpaid overtime

3

claim, but if plaintiffs had proceeded to trial they would also

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face significant difficulties in proving their retaliation claim.

5

The anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA renders it unlawful

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for an employer “to discharge or in any other manner discriminate

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against any employee because such employee has filed any

8

complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding

9

under or related to” the FLSA.

29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3).

“Under

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McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by

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showing [1] he engaged in an activity protected by the FLSA, [2]

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he suffered an adverse employment action subsequent to the

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protected activity, and [3] a causal connection between the

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protected activity and the employment action.”

15

Found. Hosps., No. 2:12–CV–1726 KJM EFB, 2014 WL 2506195, at *9

16

(E.D. Cal. June 3, 2014) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

17

Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).

18

protected activity under the FLSA, “an employee must actually

19

communicate a complaint to the employer.”

20

180 F.3d 997, 1007 (9th Cir. 1999).

Mayes v. Kaiser

In order to constitute a

Lambert v. Ackerley,

21

Defendant conceded that plaintiffs Barker and

22

Rodriguez-Guzman “raised concerns . . . about whether the Trainer

23

position had been correctly classified as exempt from overtime

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compensation under the FLSA,” (Lowry Decl. ¶ 6 (Docket No. 84-

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3)), and that this constituted protected activity under the FLSA,

26

(see Def.’s Reply to Motion for Summ. J. at 5 (Docket No. 92)).

27

Defendant argued in its summary judgment motions, however, that

28

none of the Trainers except Barker and Rodriguez-Guzman engaged
13

1

in protected activity and thus only those two individual

2

plaintiffs could satisfy this element of the Trainers’ FLSA

3

retaliation claim.

4

plaintiffs raised complaints on behalf of all the Trainers at the

5

Boise call center, where they worked, it would be very difficult

6

for them to prove that they also spoke on behalf of the Trainers

7

at the Brownsville call center.

8

plaintiffs could prove that the Brownsville Trainers participated

9

in protected conduct.

While it is plausible that the named

It is therefore unclear whether

Moreover, it would be challenging to prove

10

that plaintiffs suffered an adverse employment action subsequent

11

to complaining.

12

reduction in their annual compensation upon reclassification, the

13

record suggests the Trainers can actually earn a higher annual

14

income while working significantly less overtime now that they

15

are non-exempt hourly employees.

16

Despite their allegations that they suffered a

In comparing the strength of plaintiffs’ case with the

17

proposed settlement, the court finds that the proposed settlement

18

is a fair resolution of the issues in this case.

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20
21

2. Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of
Further Litigation
Further litigation could greatly delay resolution of

22

this case and increase expenses.

23

parties would likely have had to litigate class certification and

24

a jury trial.

25
26
27
28

Prior to any judgment, the

This weighs in favor of settlement of the action.

3. Risk of Maintaining Class Action Status Throughout
Trial
Plaintiffs state that if the case proceeded to trial,
there would be a risk that defendant would succeed in
14

1

decertifying the class because the Trainers were not similarly

2

situated due to the variance in the number of overtime hours

3

claimed by individual Trainers.

4

Accordingly, this factor also favors approval of the settlement.

(Pls.’ Mem. at 10.)

5

4. Amount Offered in Settlement

6

In assessing the amount offered in settlement, “[i]t is

7

the complete package taken as a whole, rather than the individual

8

component parts, that must be examined for overall fairness.”

9

Officers for Justice, 688 F.2d at 628.

“It is well-settled law

10

that a cash settlement amounting to only a fraction of the

11

potential recovery will not per se render the settlement

12

inadequate or unfair.”

13

Id.

The value of the settlement fund in this case is

14

$375,799.16.

15

80.35% of their total claimed overtime hours multiplied by their

16

hourly rate equivalent of the salary they were offered upon being

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hired by defendant.

18

will be $18.36 per hour in Boise and $16.83 in Brownsville.

19

(Pls.’ Notice at 3.)

20

been determined but will not deduct from the settlement amount.

21

(Id. at 3.)

22

amount they would recover at trial and is particularly fair and

23

reasonable in light of the risks and costs of further litigation

24

in this case.

25

plaintiffs given that defendant’s expert witness believed the

26

overtime hours should have been reduced to 35% of the claimed

27

hours in Boise and 48.5% of the claimed hours in Brownsville.

28

(Pls.’ Mem. at 10.)

(Id.)

Each Trainer will receive

The minimum hourly rate equivalent

The attorney’s fees and costs have not yet

Class members’ actual recovery is comparable to the

An 80% recovery is also a strong result for

5. Extent of Discovery and the State of Proceedings
15

1

A settlement that occurs in an advanced stage of the

2

proceeding indicates the parties carefully investigated the

3

claims before reaching a resolution.

4

No. 07-1895 WBS DAD, 2008 WL 4891201, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 12,

5

2008.)

6

that included written interrogatories, production of hundreds of

7

thousands of documents, and eight depositions.

8

11.)

9

supports its contentions regarding the number of overtime hours

Alberto v. GMRI, Inc., Civ.

The parties in this case completed extensive discovery

(Pls.’ Mem. at

In addition, defendant produced an expert report to

10

worked by plaintiffs.

(Id.)

The parties also engaged in twenty-

11

five hours of mediation before a third-party mediator who gave a

12

neutral evaluation of the strengths of both side’s arguments.

13

(Id.)

14

support of their cross-motions for summary judgment.

15

parties’ investigation of the claims through discovery,

16

mediation, and summary judgement motions and their consideration

17

of the views of a third-party mediator weigh in favor of

18

settlement.

Lastly, the parties exchanged extensive briefing in
(Id.)

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6. Experience and Views of Counsel

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The

Plaintiffs’ counsel have extensive experience

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litigating employment actions.

Mr. Belodoff has over thirty-

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seven years of litigation experience, which includes twelve class

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action cases and several employment related cases.

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at 13.)

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Section of the Idaho State Bar.

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five years of litigation experience in employment related cases.

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(Id.)

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proposed settlement is fair and adequate to the class members.

(Pls.’ Mem.

He is also the past chairperson of the Litigation
(Id.)

Mr. Hudson has more than

Based on their experience, plaintiffs’ counsel believe the

16

1

(Id.)

2

opinions regarding the settlement due to counsel’s experience and

3

familiarity with the litigation.

4

*10.

The court gives considerable weight to class counsel’s

Alberto, 2008 WL 4891201, at

This factor supports approval of the settlement agreement.

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7. Presence of Government Participant

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No governmental entity participated in this matter;

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this factor, therefore, is irrelevant to the court’s analysis.

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8. Reaction of the Class Members to the Proposed

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Settlement

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Notice of the settlement was sent to participating

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Trainers on October 9, 2015 and no objections were filed prior to

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the November 9, 2015 deadline.

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absence of a large number of objections to a proposed class

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action settlement raises a strong presumption that the terms of a

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proposed class settlement action are favorable to the class

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members.”

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weighs in favor of the court’s approval of the settlement.

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“It is established that the

DIRECTV, 221 F.R.D. at 529.

Accordingly, this factor

Having considered the foregoing factors, the court

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finds the partial settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable

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pursuant to Rule 23(e).

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III. Conclusion

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Based on the foregoing, the court grants final

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certification of the settlement class and approves the partial

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settlement set forth in the settlement agreement as fair,

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reasonable, and adequate.

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agreement is therefore approved.

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be binding upon all participating Trainers who opted into the

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litigation.

Consummation of the settlement

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The settlement agreement shall

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion for

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final approval of the class and class action settlement be, and

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the same hereby is, GRANTED.

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5

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT:
(1)

solely for the purpose of this settlement, and pursuant

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to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the court hereby

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certifies the following class: All Trainers employed by

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Maximus’s Affordable Care Act call centers in Boise,

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Idaho or Brownsville, Texas between May 20, 2013 and

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January 31, 2014 who opted into this lawsuit by filing

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either a “Consent to Join” or a “Consent to Sue” form

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during the course of this litigation.

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court finds that:

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(a)

Specifically, the

the settlement class members are so numerous that

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joinder of all settlement class members would be

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impracticable;

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(b)

there are questions of law and fact common to the

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settlement class which predominate over any

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individual questions;

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(c)

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claims of the named Trainer plaintiffs are typical
of the claims of the settlement class;

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(d)

the named Trainer plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ counsel

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have fairly and adequately represented and protected

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the interests of the settlement class; and

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(e)

a class action is superior to other available

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methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of

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the controversy.

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(2)

the court appoints the named Trainer plaintiffs,
18

1

Jeannette Rodriguez-Guzman, Kelly Barker, Joseph Bell,

2

Brad Epperly, Stephanie Jones, Katherine Kelley Knowles,

3

Nancy Richards, and Mark Zumwalt, as representatives of

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the class and finds that they meet the requirements of

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Rule 23;

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(3)

the court appoints Howard A. Belodoff, Belodoff Law

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Office, PLLC, 1004 West Fort Street, Boise, Idaho, 83702,

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and Jeremiah M. Hudson, Fisher Rainey Hudson, 950 W.

9

Bannock Street, Suite 630, Boise, Idaho 83702, as counsel

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to the settlement class and finds that counsel meets the

11

requirements of Rule 23;

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(4)

the settlement agreement’s plan for class notice is the

13

best notice practicable under the circumstances and

14

satisfies the requirements of due process and Rule 23.

15

The plan is approved and adopted.

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class complies with Rule 23(c)(2) and Rule 23(e) and is

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approved and adopted;

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(5)

The notice to the

having found that the parties and their counsel took

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appropriate efforts to locate and inform all putative

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class members of the settlement, and given that no class

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members have filed any objections to the settlement, the

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court finds and orders that no additional notice to the

23

class is necessary;

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(6)

as of the date of the entry of this Order, the Trainer

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plaintiffs and all class members hereby do and shall be

26

deemed to have fully, finally, and forever released,

27

settled, compromised, relinquished, and discharged

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defendant of and from their overtime pay,
19

1

misclassification, and retaliation claims.

2

do not release their claims for liquidated damages,

3

attorney’s fees, costs, or any claims they may have under

4

the FLSA as a participating Supervisor;

5

(7)

Class members

the Trainer plaintiffs and all class members’ claims for

6

failure to pay required overtime and keep accurate

7

records, misclassification as exempt, and retaliation are

8

dismissed with prejudice; however, without affecting the

9

finality of this Order, the court shall retain continuing

10

jurisdiction over the interpretation, implementation, and

11

enforcement of the settlement agreement with respect to

12

all parties to this action and their counsel of record;

13

and

14

(8)

All payments pursuant to the settlement shall be made to

15

each Trainer no later than ten court days after the date

16

of this Order.

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Dated:

November 19, 2015

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