Carr v. Carlyn et al
Filing
97
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER. Granting 93 MOTION to Voluntarily Dismiss Sgt. Mechtel filed by Jody Carr. Sgt. Mechtel dismissed. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (jp)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
JODY CARR,
Case No. 1:14-cv-00125-BLW
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER
v.
SGT. HIGGINS and SGT. MECHTEL,
Defendants.
INTRODUCTION
The Court has before it Plaintiff’s Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss Sgt. Mechtel
(Dkt. 93). For the reasons discussed below, the Motion to Dismiss will be granted.
BACKGROUND
On March 17, 2017 the Court granted Defendants’ Cross Motion for Summary
Judgement, dismissing Carr’s claims against Sergeant Mechtel (along with several
others) for failure to exhaust administrative remedies against those defendants. (Dkt. 85).
Carr subsequently appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. That court affirmed
the dismissal of the majority of Carr’s claims, but remanded the claims against Higgins
and Mechtel for consideration of whether Carr had properly exhausted his administrative
remedies. (Dkt. 92).
During the same timeframe, Carr was pursuing another lawsuit, Carr v. Higgins,
Case No. 1:13-cv-00380-REB (“Higgins”), in this District which generally involved the
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
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same factual background as this case. Carr attempted to amend his complaint in Higgins
to include the same First Amendment claim against Sergeant Mechtel as was already
asserted in this case. (Higgins, Dkt. 19). That request was denied in the same Order
summarily dismissing all of Carr’s existing claims in the Higgins case. (Higgins, Dkt.
78). Carr subsequently appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. That court
affirmed the summary dismissal of all but one defendant and provided leave for Carr to
amend his complaint relating to Sergeant Mechtel. (Higgins, Dkt. 92). Carr then filed an
Amended Complaint in Higgins to include the First Amendment claim against Sergeant
Mechtel. (Higgins, Dkt. 103). Carr now seeks to voluntarily dismiss Sergeant Mechtel
from the present case in order to pursue the same First Amendment claim against him in
the Higgins case. (Dkt. 93).
ANALYSIS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) “allows a plaintiff, pursuant to an order
of the court, and subject to any terms and conditions the court deems proper, to dismiss
an action without prejudice at any time.” Westlands Water Dist. v. United States, 100
F.3d 94, 96 (9th Cir. 1996). A district court should grant a motion for voluntary dismissal
under Rule 41(a)(2) unless a defendant can show that it will suffer some plain legal
prejudice as a result. Waller v. Fin. Corp. of Am., 828 F.2d 579, 583 (9th Cir.1987). Legal
prejudice is “prejudice to some legal interest, some legal claim, [or] some legal
argument.” Westlands Water Dist., 100 F.3d at 97.
A district court may consider whether the plaintiff is requesting a voluntary
dismissal only to avoid a near-certain adverse ruling or if the moving party has been
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dilatory in doing so. See Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 852 F.2d 424, 429 (9th Cir.1988);
Westlands Water Dist. v. United States, 100 F.3d 94, 97 (9th Cir. 1996). The Terrovona
court found that the district court’s refusal to use its discretion under F.R.C.P. 41(a)(2)
was reasonable because the magistrate judge had already issued his report and
recommendation when the plaintiff’s motion was filed. Terrovona, 852 F.2d at 429.
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has stated that the district court properly found legal
prejudice when the dismissal of a party would have rendered the remaining parties unable
to conduct sufficient discovery to untangle complex fraud claims and adequately defend
themselves against charges of fraud. See Hyde & Drath v. Baker, 24 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th
Cir. 1994), as amended (July 25, 1994).
Other courts have examined whether a dismissal without prejudice would result in
the loss of a federal forum, or the right to a jury trial, or subject a single plaintiff to
inconsistent rulings. See American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 931 F.2d at 1412; Manshack
v. Southwestern Elec. Power Co., 915 F.2d 172, 174 (5th Cir.1990); Templeton v.
Nedlloyd Lines, 901 F.2d 1273, 1276 (5th Cir.1990); BP W. Coast Prod. LLC v. SKR Inc.,
989 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1116 (W.D. Wash. 2013).
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit has explicitly stated that the expense incurred in
defending against a lawsuit does not amount to legal prejudice. Westlands Water Dist.,
100 F.3d at 97. Though not mandatory, the defendants’ interests can be protected by
conditioning the dismissal without prejudice upon the payment of appropriate costs and
attorney fees, but only those for work which cannot be used in future litigation of the
claims. Id. Prejudice also does not occur merely because the defendant may be
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
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inconvenienced by having to defend in another forum or where a plaintiff would gain a
tactical advantage by that dismissal. Smith v. Lenches, 263 F.3d 972, 976 (9th Cir. 2001).
Here, Defendants argue that they will suffer plain legal prejudice because the
matter has been extensively litigated in this action. Defendants also contend that Carr was
dilatory in filing his motion under F.R.C.P 41(a)(2) and that the rulings of the Appellate
Court in both actions would be complied with by keeping Mechtel a party in this case.
Although the present case has been ongoing since March 31, 2014, only three
Orders pertain to Mechtel. The first allowed Carr’s First Amendment claim to move
forward, the second summarily dismissed that claim, and the third reversed the summary
dismissal to further address whether administrative remedies were exhausted. Carr’s
Amended Complaint lodged in the Higgins case has confined the claim against Mechtel
to the same First Amendment claim as was asserted against him in the present case. Thus,
the procedural posture will remain the same in either action. Carr will be required to
satisfy the court that he has exhausted all administrative remedies against Mechtel before
proceeding further into the merits of his First Amendment claim. Whether Carr pursues
his claim against Mechtel in the present action or chooses to do so in Higgins, Mechtel’s
burden will not change, nor will he be prejudiced.
Carr may have been dilatory in requesting to dismiss Mechtel, but the Court does
not find any prejudice stemming from that delay. Defendants will be required to address
the same facts in either case. Similarly, although retaining Mechtel in the present action
would honor the Ninth Circuit’s rulings in both cases, so would allowing Carr’s
Amended Complaint to move forward in another proceeding in this forum.
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Additionally, dismissing Mechtel from the present action would not create the
potential for inconsistent rulings. Although the remanded claims against both Higgins and
Mechtel present themselves against the same general backdrop of alleged mistreatment
and conspiracy, the inquiries diverge factually regarding exhaustion of administrative
remedies against each. Thus, a ruling in once case would have no bearing upon the other.
Because Defendants have shown no legal prejudice which would result from
dismissing Mechtel from the present action, Carr’s motion will be granted.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED:
1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss (Dkt. 93) is GRANTED.
DATED: February 26, 2018
_________________________
B. Lynn Winmill
Chief U.S. District Court Judge
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
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